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NO.  93-81434- 


MICROFILMED  1993 
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A  UTHOR: 


SMITH,  REGINALD 
BOSWORTH 


TITLE: 


CARTHAGE  AND  THE 
CARTHAGINIANS 

PLACE: 

NEW  YORK 

DATE: 

1913 


COLUMBIA  UNIVERSITY  LIBRARIES 
PRESERVATION  DEPARTMENT 


Master  Negative  # 
_J3^z  8143^^3 


BIBLIOGRAPHIC  MICROFORM  TARGET 


Original  Material  as  Filmed  -  Existing  Bibliographic  Record 


884.9 
SmSl 


Smith.  Reginald  Bosworth,  1839-1908. 
^tha^and  the  Carthaginians.    New  Tork, 

Longmans,  Green,  and  co.,  l^-I-f'  . 

xxvi,  400  p.     plates,  maps  (part  foW.J 


1.  Carthage  -  Hist. 


Restrictions  on  Use: 


NNC 


TECHNICAL  MICROFORM  DATA 

FILM     SIZE:___35__^:^^__  REDUCTION     RATIO:__       j/X 

IMAGE  PLACEMENT:    lA   /IIA    IB    UB  ~"  ^ 

DATE     FILMED:___^7iL£&_-3_ INITIALS J^_^£_ 

FILMED  BY:    RESEARCH  PUBLICATIONS.  INC  WOODBRIDGE.  CT 


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CARTHAGE 


AND 


THK  CARTHAGINIANS 


BY    THE  SAMK   AUTHOR. 


ROME     \ND    CARTHAGE: 

THE   PUNJO   WARS. 

(B.C.  264--B.C.  140.) 

IVITH  NINE  MAPS  AND  PLANS. 

Fcp.  8vo,  2s.  Qd. 

{Epochs  of  Ancient  Hiatonj.) 


LONGMANS,  G  R  K  K  xV,   AND  CO., 

LOXl«)\,  NEW   VOHK,  HO.MIUY  AND  CALCITTTA. 


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CARTHAGE 


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THE     CARTHAGINIANS 


BY 


R.    BOSWORTH    SMITH,    M.A 

luKMIULV     FELr.OW     OF     TRINITY     COI-LKGE,     OXFORD 

AUTHOR   OF   "MOHAMMED   AND    MOHAMMEDANISM" 

AND   "THE   LIFE   OF   LORD   LAWRENCE" 


NEiy   IMPRESSION 

LONGMANS,     GREEN,    AND    CO. 

39  PATERNOSTER  ROW,  LOXDOM 
NEW  YORK,  BOMBAY,  AND  CALCUITA 

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0UJU8  NOMEN  VIV^ 


BUIC  OPDSCULO  PKJSTKXI  DEBUERAT, 


QH)b  MATERNO  AMORE  INCErTO.M   FOVKUAT, 


MORTUJI  PBRAOTUM 


AMANTISSIMUS   DF.DICO. 


18916G 


PREFACE. 


TuE  pages  which  follow  are  an  attempt  within  mode- 
rate limits,  but  from  a  careful  study  of  all  the  materials 
which  have  come  down  to  us,  to  give  as  complete  a 
picture  as  possible  of  ancient  Carthage  and  of  her  two 
greatest  citizens — the  only  two  of  whom  we  have  any 
minute  or  personal  knowledge — Hamilcar  Barca  and 
Hannibal.  The  materials  themselves  are  extremely 
fragmentary.  The  medium  through  which  they  are 
presented  to  us  is  distorted,  and  I  am  only  too  conscious 
of  my  own  want  of  skill  in  handling  them ;  but,  what- 
ever the  deficiency  of  the  materials  and  whatever  my 
own  shortcomings,  I  cannot  help  feeling  that  I  have 
worked  to  ill  effect  if  I  have  failed  to  awaken  in  the 
minds  of  my  readers  something  of  that  enthusiasm  for 
«iie  subject,  and  that  keen  desire  to  pursue  it  further, 
which,  for  some  years  past,  has  made  the  labour  I  have 
imposed  upon  myself  a  labour  of  love. 

Whether  any  such  enthusiasm  or  desire  can  ever  be 
adequately  gratified  is  a  different  question,  and  one 
which  I  venture  to  think  does  not  necessarily  affect  its 
intrinsic  value.  In  history,  as  in  other  pursuits — more 
especially,  perhaps,  in  those  branches  of  history  in 
which  the  present  age  has  made  such  rapid  advances, 
the  study  of  long-buried  seats  of  empire,  of  extinct 
creeds,  and  of  vanished  civilisations — the  chase  is,  in  a 
certain  sense,  worth  more  than  the  game,  and  the  effort 


PREFACE. 


than  the  result.     If  by  such  studies— by  the  endeavour 
to  picture  to  ourselves  v^rbole  races  which  have  long 
since  disappeared,  and   altars  which   have  long  been 
overturned— the  imagination,  as  we  cannot  doubt,  is 
awakened  and  the   sympathies  enlarged;    if  we   are 
driven  to  take  a  wider  and  therefore  a  truer  view  of 
the  dealings  of  God  with   man;    to  recognise  more 
frankly  amidst  the  endless  diversities  of  the  human 
race  its  fundamental  and  substantial  unity  ;  to  press 
more  closely  home  to  ourselves  those  questions  which 
are  never  old  and  never  new— questions  always  to  be 
asked  and  never  adequately  to  be   answered— of  the 
Why  and  the  What,  the  Whence  and  the  Whither  of 
a  being  who  has   such   grovelling    desires   and   such 
noble  aspirations,  whose  capacities   are  so  boundless 
and  whose  performances  are  so  sorry,  who  is  so  great 
and  yet  so  little,  so  evanescent  and  yet  so  lasting— we 
may  well  rest  content  if  we  rise  from  the  attempt  with 
a  feeling  of  stimulus  rather  than  of  satiety,  of  unrest 
rather  than  reposa 

It  is  possible,  indeed,  that  more  extensive  excava- 
tions on  the  site  of  the  Byrsa  and  its  neighbourhood 
may,  hereafter,  prove  that  the  Romans  did  not  com- 
plete their  work  of  destruction  so  thoroughly  as  they 
imagined,  and  that  the  very  rapidity  with  which  they 
endeavoured  to  carry  out  old  Cato's  resolve— destroying 
everything  at  Carthage  which  they  could  see— was  the 
means  of  preserving  something  at  least  which  they  did 
not  see.     It  is  possible  that  the  further  discovery  of 
Phoenician  inscriptions  among  the  numerous  islands 
and  coasts  over  which  the  influence  of  that  ubiquitous 
people  once  extended  may  increase  our  knowledge  of 
the  Carthaginian  language,  and  may  give  us  a  longer 


PREFACE. 


list  of  Carthaginian  proper  names.  It  is  possible  that 
Marseilles  may  contain  other  tablets  like  that  famous 
one  discovered  in  1845,  when  a  house  was  being  pulled 
down — a  tablet  which  actually  fixes  the  tariff  of  prices 
to  be  paid  for  the  victims  offered  to  Baal — and  that 
the  recesses  of  the  Lebanon  may  still  conceal  another 
priceless  remnant  of  Phoenician  antiquity,  such  as  that 
statue  of  Baal  in  a  sitting  posture,  which  perished  only 
a  few  years  ago,  just  before  a  great  Phoenician  scholar 
arrived  in  the  country,  and,  by  a  cruel  fate  which  is 
not  without  precedent  in  such  matters,  heard  at  the 
same  moment  of  its  existence  and  destruction.  If  so, 
we  may  one  day  be  able  to  picture  to  ourselves  more 
vividly  that  worship  of  Baal  and  of  Ashtoreth  which  is 
as  interesting  to  the  student  of  Biblical  as  of  Cartha- 
ginian history.  It  is  possible,  once  more,  that  some  of 
the  lost  books,  or  fragments  of  the  lost  books,  of  the 
Greek  and  Roman  historians  who  treated  of  Carthage 
may  yet  be  discovered,  and  may  complete  the  picture, 
such  as  it  is,  which  the  Greek  colonists  in  Sicily,  or  the 
Romans  who  had  tested  for  themselves  the  indomitable 
patience  of  Hamilcar,  or  had  felt  the  weight  of  Hannibars 
arm,  were  able  to  form  of  their  redoubtable  antagonist. 
All  these  things  are  possible,  even  if  they  are  not 
very  probable.  But  we  cannot  venture  to  hope  that 
any  such  discoveries,  whatever  their  kind  or  number, 
will  ever  enable  us  to  know  Carthage,  as  we  know 
Athens  or  Rome,  from  its  own  citizens ;  or  will  do  more 
than  throw  a  few  scattered  lights  upon  that  imperial 
city  which — all  but  unknown  to  us  during  five  centuries 
of  her  growth  and  her  true  grandeur — blazes  forth  into 
the  light  of  day  only  in  that  century  which  witnessed 
her  heroic  struggles  and  her  fall. 


Xll 


PREFACE, 


The  historical  documents  which  might  have  thrown 
a  real  light  upon  Carthage  have  perished  irrevocably. 
Philinus,   the    Greek    of    Agrigentum,   who    wrote    a 
Carthaginian,   or  quasi-Carthaginian,   account   of  the 
First  Punic  War,  we  know  only  from  some  criticisms 
of  Polybius.      Sosilus  and  Silanus,  two  other  Greek 
historians  who,  if  only  they  had  been  worthy  of  their 
opportunities,  might   have  given  us  from   their  daily 
personal  observation  as  complete  an  account  of  Han- 
nibal's life  and  conversation  as  Boswell  has  given  us  of 
Dr.  Johnson,  have  left  behind  them  not  a  word ;  and 
the  contents  of  the  native  Carthaginian  Hbraries,  which 
the  Eomans,  Hke  rich  men  who  know  not  what  they 
give,  carelessly  handed  over  to  the  tender  mercies  of 
Numidian  chieftains,  and  which  Sallust,  a  century  after- 
wards, must  have  had  in  his  own  hands,  have  perished 
by  a  destruction  as  complete  as  that  which  overtook 
the  Alexandrian  hbrary  itself.     We  cannot  pretend  to 
contemplate  the  fate  of  these  Carthaginian  libraries  with 
the  philosophic  indifference  which  it  pleased  Gibbon  to 
affect  with  regard  to  that  of  Alexandria  ;  for  we  cannot 
suppose  that  the  destruction  of  the  Punic  literature 
was  in   any  way  a   benefit,  or  that   its  preservation 
would  have  been  anything  but  of  deep  interest  and 
value  to  posterity. 

A  few  words  of  explanation  as  to  the  general  treat- 
ment of  my  subject,  and  the  comparative  prominence 
which  I  have  allotted  to  its  different  parts,  may,  perhaps 
not  unfitly,  find  a  place  here. 

As  regards  the  method  of  inquiry,  I  have  in  all  cases 
gone  direct  to  the  fountain-head,  reading  carefully  every 
passage  which  has  come  down  to  us  from  the  ancients, 
comparing  conflicting  statements  with  each  other,  and 


PREFACE, 


XIII 


always  endeavouring  in  the  first  instance  to  form  an 
independent  judgment  upon  them.  On  points  which 
seemed  in  any  degree  doubtful  I  have  afterwards  con- 
sulted the  chief  modern  writers  on  the  subject,  such  as 
Gesenius,  Heeren,  Niebuhr,  Arnold,  Movers,  Kenrick, 
Lenormant,  Mommsen,  Beule  and  Ihne.  Where,  as  is 
often  the  case,  I  am  conscious  of  any  distinct  debt  to 
these  or  any  other  modern  writer,  I  have,  of  course, 
made  it  matter  of  special  acknowledgment  in  the 
notes ;  but,  as  a  general  rule,  the  references  I  have 
given  are  to  those  to  whom  I  really  owe  them — to  the 
ancient  authorities  themselves. 

I  have  avoided  all  prolonged  discussion  of  disputed 
points,  such,  for  instance,  as  the  route  of  Hannibal  over 
the  Alps,  the  battle-field  of  the  Trebia,  the  minutiae  of 
the  topography  of  ancient  Carthage,  or  the  exact  posi- 
tion of  its  Spanish  namesake.  On  such  subjects  I  have 
endeavoured  to  weigh  the  arguments  on  either  side,  and 
have  often,  as  in  the  case  of  the  passage  of  the  Alps, 
waded  through  what  is,  in  fact,  a  literature  in  itself — a 
very  sea  of  treatises  and  rejoinders,  of  observations  and 
counter-observations ;  but  have  been  compelled  to  con- 
tent myself  with  giving,  in  a  few  lines,  the  results 
themselves  rather  than  the  process  by  which  I  have 
arrived  at  them.  The  limits  of  the  book  make  any 
other  treatment  impossible  ;  and,  indeed,  it  seems  to 
me  that  the  minute  discussion  of  such  points  belongs 
to  a  continuous  history,  or  to  a  series  of  monographs, 
rather  than  to  a  book  which  is  not  intended  to  be 
exhaustive,  and  which  is  addressed  as  much  to  the 
general  reader  as  to  the  classical  scholar. 

As  regards  the  treatment  of  particular  parts  of  my 
subject,  in  the  two  opening  chapters  on  Carthage  I  have 


xhr 


PREFACE. 


attempted  to  give  a  general  sketch  of  the  Carthaginian 
influence  and  civilisation,  and  to  bring  together  into  as 
small  a  compass  as  is  consistent  with  any  degree  of 
accuracy  or  completeness,  all  the  hints  dropped  by  the 
writers  of  antiquity  which  seem  to  throw  any  clear 
light  on  the  city  in  the  days  of  its  birth,  its  growth, 
and  its  greatest  prosperity. 

In  the  third  chapter  it  has  been  my  object  to  set 
forth  the  main  differences  between  Carthage  and  her 
great  rival,  and  to  point  out  the  foundations  on  which 
the  achievements  and  greatness  of  Rome  principally 
rested.  It  is  the  more  necessary  to  do  this  pointedly 
at  the  outset  because,  since  Carthage  can  no  longer 
be  heard  in  her  own  defence,  the  historian  is  bound, 
throughout  his  treatment  of  the  Punic  Wars,  continually 
to  point  out  those  statements  which  he  considers  to  be 
coloured  by  the  bias  or  the  ignorance,  by  the  fears  or 
the  pride,  of  the  Roman  writers.  He  is  thus  driven 
sometimes  to  appear  as  the  advocate,  while  he  is,  in 
fact,  only  acting  or  wishing  to  act  the  part  of  the  judge. 
That  Rome  was  better  fitted  for  empire  than  Carthage, 
and  that  her  victory  is,  on  the  whole,  with  all  its  draw- 
backs, the  victory  of  progress  and  civiHsation,  is  a  fact 
to  which  all  history  seems  to  point ;  but  it  is  none  the 
less  the  duty  of  the  historian  to  dwell  upon  these  draw- 
backs, and  to  bring  into  full  relief  what  little  may  be 
said  on  the  other  side. 

The  history  of  the  First  Punic  War  I  have  treated  at 
considerable— perhaps  some  of  my  readers  may  think 
at  disproportionate— length.  I  have  more  than  one 
reason  for  doing  so.  To  begin  with,  the  First  Punic 
War  seems  to  me  to  throw  much  more  light  on  the 
energies  and  character  of  the  Carthaginians  as  a  whole 


PREFACE, 


n 


than  does  the  Second.  The  Second  Punic  War  brings 
Hannibal  before  us,  the  First  the  State  which  produced 
him.  The  First  Punic  War  shows  us  Carthage  as  still, 
in  some  sense,  the  mistress  of  the  seas  and  islands ;  in 
the  Second  she  hardly  dares  to  show  herself  on  the 
waters  which  were  so  lately  all  her  own.  We  have, 
moreover,  throughout  the  history  of  the  First  Punic 
War  the  guidance  of  Polybius,  who  had  before  him  in 
the  preparation  of  his  history  the  accounts  given  by  at 
least  two  writers  who  were  all  but  contemporaries  or 
eye-witnesses  of  the  events  which  they  described,  one 
of  them,  strange  to  say,  not  unfavourable  to  Carthage. 
Our  knowledge,  therefore,  of  the  First  Punic  War  is 
more  complete  than  that  of  any  portion  of  the  Second, 
unless  it  be  that  of  its  first  three  years. 

Again,  most  historians  seem  to  have  looked  upon  the 
First  Punic  War  as  a  dull  and  tedious  war,  and  have 
accordingly  been  content  to  give  it  a  very  cursory  notice. 
Dr.  Arnold,  for  example,  who  has  dedicated  a  whole 
volume  to  the  Second  Punic  War,  has  given  only  one 
chapter  to  the  First.  There  is  no  greater  mistake — 
unless  indeed  it  be  mine  in  hazarding  an  opposite 
opinion— than  to  suppose  that  the  First  Punic  War 
is  dull  and  tedious.  In  respect  of  its  battles  and  its 
sieges,  its  surprises  and  its  catastrophes,  the  Herculean 
exertions  made  by  both  States,  and  the  frightful  sacri- 
fices it  entailed  upon  them  both  ;  above  all,  in  the 
consummate  genius  of  one  at  least  of  the  generals  it 
produced,  it  seems  to  me  to  be  one  of  the  most  inter- 
esting wars  in  history.  If  I  have  failed  to  make  it  in 
some  measure  interesting  to  my  readers,  I  repeat  that, 
in  my  opinion,  it  is  the  fault  not  of  the  subject  but  of 
the  writer. 


KVi 


PREFACE. 


Once  more,  the  dazzling  genius   of   Hannibal,  and 
the    comparative    fulness— not    necessarily   the   trust- 
worthiness—of  our  authorities   for   his   history,  have 
hitherto  tended  to  throw  into  the  shade  the  man  who, 
if  he  was  inferior  to  Hannibal,  was  inferior  to  him 
alone,  the  heroic  Hamilcar  Barca.     In  point  of  fulness 
of  treatment  Hamilcar  has  fared  at  the  hands  of  his 
historians  much  as  has  the  war  in  which  he  bore  so 
large  a  part.     Dr.  Arnold,  whose  noble  history  was  cut 
short  by  his  untimely  death  when  he  had  only  reached 
the  turning-point  in  the   Hannibalian  war,  the   fatal 
battle  of  the  Metaurus,  has  given  four  hundred  pages 
to  that  much  of  Hannibal's  career  alone,  while  he  has 
given  barely  twenty  to  Hamilcar ;  and  Dr.  Mommsen 
himself,  though  he  is  in  no  way  sparing  of  his  admira- 
tion for  Hamilcar,  has,  in  point  of  fulness  of  treatment, 
dealt  with  the  father  and  the  son  in  a  manner  which, 
as  it  seems  to  me,  is  hardly  less  disproportionate  to 
their  comparative  merits  and  achievements.    It  seemed, 
therefore,  desirable  to  lay  rather  less  stress  on  what 
has  been  done  so  fully  and  so  exhaustively  before,  and 
to  give  more  time  and  space  to  what  has  hitherto,  per- 
haps, received  less  generous  treatment,  and  also  throws 
more  light  on  the  great  city  which  is  my  special  subject. 
The  chapters  relating  to  Hannibal  himself,  to  the 
Third  Punic  War,  and  to  the  destruction  of  Carthage, 
speak  for  themselves.     One  more  chapter  only  requires 
special  comment  here.     In  the  spring  of  1877,  after  I 
had  finished  the  first  draft  of  the  book,  and  was  far 
advanced  in  its  revision,  I  was  enabled  to  pay  a  visit 
to  the  site  of  Carthage  and  its  neighbourhood.     It  was 
a  short  visit,  but  was  full  of  deep  and  varied  interest. 
It  was  my  first  sight  of  an  Eastern  city,  and  it  brought 


PREFACE. 


XVll 


me,  for  the  first  time,  into  direct  personal  contact  with 
that  vast  religious  system  which  is  one  of  the  greatest 
facts  of  human  history,  and  which,  from  causes  deep  as 
human  nature  itself,  seems  destined,  whatever  the  up- 
shot of  the  present  Eastern  difficulties,  always  to  main- 
tain its  hold  on  the  Eastern  world.    I  was  able  several 
times  to  visit  the  site  of  the  Phoenician  city,  and  to 
study  as  far  as  my  limited  time  would  permit  me,  on 
the  spot,  those  questions  of  its  topography  and  history 
with  the  general  bearings  of  which  I  had  been  so  long 
familiar  in  books.      I  walked  round   the  harbours  of 
Carthage,  bathed  in  water  which  half  preserves   and 
half  conceals  its  ruins,  explored  the  Byrsa  and  the 
cisterns,   traced    for  many   miles    the  course  of   the 
aqueduct,  crossed  the  river  Bagradas,  and  examined, 
amongst  other  spots  renowned  in  ancient  story,  the 
site  of  the  still  more  ancient  city,  the  parent  city  of 
Utica.     In  the  concluding  chapter  of  this  volume  I 
have  endeavoured  to  gather  up  some  of  the  impressions 
which  I  derived  from  these  varied  sights  and  scenes ; 
and  I  hope  I  have  been  able  by  these  means,  as  well  as 
by  various  touches  which  I  have  inserted  subsequently 
in  other  portions  of  the  book,  to  communicate  to  my 
readers  what,  I  think,  I  gained  for  myself— a  more  vivid 
mental  picture  of  that  ancient  city  whose  chequered 
fortunes  I  have  endeavoured  to  relate. 

I  wish  to  return  my  hearty  thanks  to  the  Eev.  Sir  G. 
W.  Cox,  Bart.,  for  having  carefully  revised  my  book, 
both  in  manuscript  and  in  proof,  and  for  having  made 
several  valuable  suggestions. 


Thb  Knoll,  Harrow, 
26th  Nov.,  1877. 


ft 


CONTENTS. 


CHAPTEE  I. 


CAKTHAQE. 


Characteristics  of  Phoenicians— Their  defects— Size  of  their  territory— Their 
relations  to  Israelites— Early  commerce  in  Mediterranean— Pre-eminence 
of  Phoenicians— Origin  of  Carthage— Legend  of  Dido— Elements  of  truth 
contained  in  it— Its  treatment  by  Virgil — Position  and  population  of 
Carthage — Its  relation  to  Sicily — Our  knowledge  of  Carthage,  whence 
derived — Its  early  history — Rapid  growth  of  its  empire — Its  dealings 
with  the  native  Africans — with  the  Phoenician  cities  in  Africa — with 
Tyre — with  Sicilian  Greeks— Constitution  of  Carthage — The  SuflFetes — 
The  Senate— Anomalous  character  of  the  constitution — Its  deterioration 
— The  "  Hundred  Judges  " — Close  oligarchy— Greneral  contentment — 
Greek  and  Roman  views  of  Carthaginian  constitution — Causes  of  its 
stability — Social  life  of  Carthaginians — Their  luxury,  fine  arts,  architec- 
ture, wealth — Their  commercial  principles — Their  agriculture— Merits  of 
Mago's  work  on  agriculture — Carthaginian  religion — Worship  of  Baal- 
Moloch— Of  Tanith  or  Astarte— Deeply  rooted  character  of  this  worship — 
Inferior  divinities— Worship  of  Melcarth— Carthaginian  literature — The 
army— The  mercenaries  and  the  Numidian  cavalry— Condition  of  the 
masses — Colonisation — Periplus  of  Hanno — "Dumb  trade"  with  the 
Niger— Grold  dust — Periplus  of  Himilco — "Mago's"  harbour — Disaffec- 
tion of  subject  races — Was  Rome  or  Carthage  best  fitted  for  empire  t 


PAGE 


8 


CHAPTER  n. 

CARTHAGE   AND  SIOIIiY. 

(735-310  B.C.) 

Wars  between  Carthage  and  Sicilian  Greeks— First  appearance  of  Greeks  in 
Sicily— Their  gradual  spread— Battle  of  Himera— Second  Carthaginian 
Invasion  of  Sicily— Third  invasion  and  itfi  incidents— Exploits  of  Diony- 
sius — Siege  of  Motye— Fourth  invasion — Strange  vicissitudes  and  possible 


XX 


CONTENTS. 


PAOB 

importance  of  the  conflict — Ck>mparative  merits  of  Greek  and  Carthaginian 
mle  in  Sicily — Conflicting  stories  about  Hamilcar  at  Himera— River 
Halycus  fixed  as  boundary — Tiraoleon — Magnificent  Carthaginian  arma- 
ment—Battle of  Crimesus — Agathocles  invades  Africa  and  threatens 
Carthage - 48 

CHAPTER  III. 

CARTHAGE   AND   ROMS. 

(753-278   B.O.) 

Rome  and  Carthage  compared— Contrasted— Origin  and  growth  of  Rome- 
Constitutional  progress — Military  progress— Conquest  of  Etruscans— Of 
Gauls— Of  Latins— Of  Samnites— Roman  methods  in  war— Their  modera- 
tion— War  with  Pyrrhus — Its  character— Rome  brought  face  to  face  with 
Carthage  ---------••-•dO 

CHAPTER  IV. 

FIRST   PUNIC   WAB. 

(264-241  B.C.) 

MESS  AN  A  AND  AQBIQENTVM, 

(264-262  B.C.) 

Relations  of  Sicily  to  Carthage  and  Rome— Appeal  of  Mamertinea  for  aid 
— The  question  at  issue — Importance  of  the  decision — Romans  occupy 
Messana — They  attack  Syracuse — Results  of  first  campaign — Romans 
ally  themselves  with  Hiero — Carthaginians  unprepared  for  war — Agri- 
gentum — Its  siege — Its  fate --.-68 

CHAPTER  V. 

FIRST  ROMAN  FLEET.      BATTLES  OF  MTLJE  AND  BCNOMUB. 

(262-256  B.C.) 

Carthaginian  naval  supremacy— Roman  naval  affairs — Commercial  treaties 
with  Carthage — Difficulties  of  Romans — Want  of  ships  of  war — Want  of 
sailors — The  new  fleet — Its  first  ventures— Naval  science  and  tactics  of 
the  Ancients — The  Corvus — Battle  of  Mylse — Honours  paid  to  Duillius— 
Bgesta— The  Romans  attack  Sardinia  and  Corsica — Energy  of  Cai-tha- 
ginians — Romans  resolve  to  invade  Africa — Enormous  naval  armaments 
— Route  taken  by  the  Romans — Order  of  battle— Battle  of  Ecnomus       •    80 


CONTENTS. 


XXI 


CHAPTER  VI. 

INVASION   OF   AFRICA.      BEGULUS  AND   XANTHIPPUS. 

(256-250  B.C.) 


PAQB 


Invasion  of  Africa— Romans  overrun  Caithaginian  territory— Short-sighted- 
ness of  Carthaginians-Changes  necessary  in  Roman  military  system- 
Recall  of  Manlius-Victory  of  Regulus-Desperate  plight  of  Carthaginians 
-Terms  of  peace  rejected— Arrival  of  Xanthippus— He  is  given  the  com- 
mand-His  great  victory  near  Adis~Joy  of  Carthaginians-Thank- 
offerings  to  Moloch-Departure  of  Xanthippus-The  survivors  at  Clypea 
-Roman  fleet  destroyed  in  a  storm-Carthaginian  reinforcements  for 
Sicily-Romans  build  a  new  fleet— Take  Panormus-Second  Roman  fleet 
destroyed  in  a  storm-Carthaginians  threaten  Panormus-Romans  build 
a  third  fleet— Battle  of  Panormus— Part  played  by  elephants  in  First 
Punic  War-Story  of  embassy  and  death  of  Regulua-How  far  true  ?     -  100 

CHAPTER  VII. 

HAMILCAR  BARCA   AND   THE   SIEGE   OF   LILYBiEUM. 

(250-241  B.C.) 

Fortresses  remaining  to  Carthaginians  in  Sicily-Siege  of  Lilyb»um-Its 
origin  and  situation-Early  siege  operations-Carthaginians  run  the 
blockade-Hannibal  the  Rhodian- Carthaginian  sortie-Distress  of 
Romans-The  consul  Claudius-Battle  of  Drepanum-Claudian  family 
-Roman  reinforcements  for  siege  of  Lilyb«um  lost  at  sea-Romans  seize 
Eryx-HamilcarBarca-HeoccupiesMountErcte-Exhaustion  of  Romans 

-Culpable  conduct  of  Carthaginians-Genius  of  Hamilcar-His  plans- 
His  enterprises-He  transfers  his  camp  from  Ercte  to  Eryx-Romans 
build  one  more  fleet-Lutatius  Catulus-The  Carthaginian  plan-Battle 
of  ^gatian  Isles-Magnanimity  of  Hainilcar-Terms  of  peace-Roman 
gains  and  losses-Carthaginian  losses  and  prospects-Contest  only  deferred  121 

CHAPTER  Vm. 

HAMILCAR  BABOA  AND   THE   MERCENARY    WAR. 

(241-238  B.O.) 

Events  between  First  and  Second  Punic  War-Significance  of  Mercenary 
War— Weakness  of  Carthaginian  government— Symptoms  of  mutiny- 
Revolt  of  mercenaries  and  native  Africans-Hanno  and  Hamilcar  Barca 
—The  lYuceless  War— Its  atrocities  and  termination       •        -        •        -  144 


XXll 


CONTENTS. 


CHAPTER  IX. 


HAMILGAB  BABGA  IN  AFBICA   AND   8PAIM. 


(238-219  B.C.) 


PAGB 


Conduct  of  Romans  during  Mercenary  War — They  appropriate  Sardinia  and 
Corsica— Peace  and  war  parties  at  Carthage— Hamilear's  command— He 
takes  Hannibal  with  him — He  crossei>  to  Spain — Advantages  of  his  posi- 
tion there — His  administration  and  death— His  chai-acter — Administration 
of  Hasdrubal— New  Carthage  founded— Early  career  of  Hannibal— His 
vow  and  its  significance— Remissness  of  Romans— Rising  of  Gauls  in  Italy 
— Its  suppression— Hannibal  besides  Saguntum— War  declared  between 
Rome  and  Carthage 153 


CHAPTER   X. 

SECOND   PUNIC   WAR. 

(218-201   B.C.) 

PASSAGE  OF  THE  BHONE  AND  THE  ALPS,  RC.  218. 

Preparations  of  Hannibal — He  determines  to  go  by  land — Numbers  of  his 
army — His  march  through  Gaul — His  passage  of  the  Rhone — Vagueness 
of  ancient  ¥rriters  in  geographical  matters— Passage  over  Alps  selected  by 
Hannibal — Route  by  which  he  approached  it— The  first  ascent — Valley 
of  the  Is^— The  main  ascent — The  summit — Hannibal  addressas  his 
troops— The  descent — Interest  attaching  to  the  passage  of  the  Alpti— Its 
•jostandresults— The  "War  of  Hannibal" 172 


CHAPTER  XI. 

BATTLBB  OF  TBEBIA  AND  TBABIMENB. 

(218-217  B.C.) 

P.  Scipio  returns  from  Gaul  to  Italy— Sempronius  recalled  fh)m  Sicily— 
Battle  of  the  'Hcinus— Hannibal  crosses  the  Po — He  is  joined  by  the 
Gauls — Retreat  of  Scipio  to  the  Trebia — Hannibal  selects  his  ground  and 
time — Battle  of  the  Trebia — Results  of  the  victory — Hannibal  crosses  the 
Apennines— The  marshes  of  the  Arno— Position  of  the  Roman  armies — 
Flaminius  and  his  antecedents— Despondency  at  Rome— Resolution  of 
Flamiuius— He  follows  Hannibal  from  Arretium— Livy  and  Polybius 
compared— Position  chosen  by  Hannibal— Battle  of  the  Trasimeue  lake 
—Death  of  Flaminius 190 


CONTENTS. 


XXlll 


CHAPTER  XII. 

HANNIBAL  OVBEBUNS  CENTRAL   ITALY. 
(217-216  B.O.) 


PAGE 


News  of  the  Trasimene  defeat  reaches  Rome— Measures  of  the  Roman 
Senate— Hannibal  marches  into  Picenum— Sends  despatches  to  Carthage 
—He  arms  his  troops  in  the  Roman  fashion— Advance  of  the  Dictator 
Fabius— His  policy— Discontent  of  his  troops— Hannibal  ravages  Sam- 
nium  and  Campania— Beauty  and  wealth  of  Campania— Continued  in- 
action of  Fabius— He  tries  to  entrap  Hannibal  but  fails— Minucius  left 
in  command— Is  raised  to  equal  rank  with  Fabius— Is  saved  from  disaster 
by  him— Services  of  Fabius  to  Rome 211 

CHAPTER  Xni. 

BATTLE   OF   CANN«.      CHARACTER  OF   HANNIBAL. 

(216   B.C.) 

Energy  and  spirit  of  the  Romans— The  rival  armies  face  each  other  at  Caunse 
—Nature  of  the  ground — Th©  double  command  of  ^milius  PauUus  and 
Varro— Anxiety  at  Rome — Dii^>oositions  of  Hannibal  for  the  battle— Battle 
of  Cannae — Number  of  the  slain— Panic  at  Rome — Measures  of  the  Senate 
— Course  of  the  war— Was  Hannibal  right  or  wrong  in  not  advancing  on 
Rome  now  ?— Greatness  of  Hannibal  and  of  Rome— Character  and  genius 
of  Hannibal — His  ascending  series  of  successes— His  influence  over  men 
—Sources  of  our  knowledge  of  him— Charge  against  him— Roman  feeling 
towards  him— Change  in  character  of  war  after  Cannae— Polybius  and 
SilenuB     ---  

CHAPTER  XIV. 

REVOLT  OF  CAPUA.      SIEGE   OF  SYRACUSE. 
(216-212   B.O.) 

Capua  revolts— Its  previous  history  and  importance— Marcellus— Hannibal 
winters  at  Capua— Supposed  demoralisation  of  his  troops— Latin  colonies 
still  true  to  Rome— Great  exertions  of  Rome— Hannibal  negotiates  with 
Syracuse.  Sardinia  and  Macedon— His  position  at  Tifata— Revolt  of 
Bruttians— Conquest  of  Greek  cities— History  and  importance  of  Croton 
—Temple  of  Juno  Lacinia— Fabius  and  Marcellus  consuls — The  tide  turns 
against  Hannibal— He  gains  possession  of  Tarentura— Its  position  and 
importance— The  citadel  holds  out— The  war  in  Sicily— Importance  of 
Syracuse — Its  siege  and  capture — Its  fate 214 


223 


'! 


XXIV 


CONTENTS. 


CHAPTER  XV. 

BIEOE  OF  CAPUA  AND  HANNIBAL*  B  MARCH   ON  BOME. 


(212-208  B.C.) 


PAOB 


Importance  of  war  in  Spain — Successes  and  death  of  the  two  Scipios — Re- 
newed activity  of  Hannibal— Siege  of  Capua— Hannibal  attempts  to  relieve 
it— His  march  on  Rome— Fate  of  Capua— "  Ovation  "  of  Marcellus- The 
Numidian  cavalry  at  Salapia— Continued  superiority  of  Hannibal  in  the 
field— Death  of  Marcellus— Influence  of  family  traditions  at  Rome- 
Patriotism  of  Romans— Latin  colonies  show  symptoms  of  exhaustion      -  283 

CHAPTER  XVI. 

BATTLE   OF  THE   MBTAUBU8. 

(207  B.a) 

The  approach  of  Hasdrubal  from  Spain — His  messengers  fail  to  find  Hanni- 
bal— Importance  of  the  crisis — Brilliant  march  of  Nero— Retreat  of  Has- 
drubal—Description  of  the  Metaurus— Battle  of  the  Metaurus— Triumph 
and  brutality  of  Nero       ..---••---  280 

CHAPTER  XVII. 

p.   COBNELIUS   SCIPIO. 

(210-206  B.a) 

Scipio  in  Spain— His  early  history— His  character  and  influence— Made 
proconsul — Takes  New  Carthage — Carthaginians  finally  driven  out  of 
Spain 2JK) 

CHAPTER  XVIII. 

THE  WAR  IN  AFRICA.   BATTLE  OF  ZAMA. 

(206-202  B.C.) 

Scipio  returns  to  Rome  and  is  elected  Consul— Receives  leave  to  invade 
Africa— Goes  to  Sicily — His  doings  and  difficulties  there— Sails  for  Africa 
— Massinissa  and  Syphax — Roman  ignorance  of  Carthage — The  faU  of 
Carthage,  how  far  a  matter  of  regret— Siege  of  Utica— Scipio's  command 
prolonged — He  bums  the  Carthaginian  camps— Sophonisba — The  Car- 
thaginian peace  party — Sons  of  Hamilcar  recalled  to  Africa — Mago  obeys 


CONTENTS, 


XXV 


PAGE 

the  summons— Hannibal  obeys  it— The  Bruttlan  territory— The  "  Camp 
of  Hannibal  "—The  Lacinian  column— Joy  in  Italy— First  operations  of 
Hannibal  in  Africa- Battle  of  Zama— Dignity  of  Hannibal— Terms  of 
peace— Results  of  the  war — Alternative  policies  open  to  Rome        •        -  298 

CHAPTER  XIX. 

OABTHAGE   AT   THE   MERCY  OF  ROME. 
(201-150   B.O.) 

Deterioration  of  Roman  character— Condition  of  Italy— Condition  of  Rome 
—Condition  of  Roman  provinces— Story  of  Lucius  Flamininus— Story  of 
Sergius  Oalba— Rapid  conquest  of  the  East— State  of  Eastern  world- 
Summary  of  Roman  conquests  in  the  East— Reforms  introduced  by 
Hannibal  at  Carthage— Romans  demand  his  surrender— Self-abnegation 
of  Hannibal— Comparison  between  Hannibal  and  Napoleon— Hannibal's 
exile  and  wanderings— His  schemes,  his  sufferings  and  his  death— Roman 
fear  and  hatred  of  him— Credibility  of  the  anecdotes  about  him— Humour 
of  Hannibal— Anecdotes  of  him  while  at  court  of  Antiochus  and  during 
his  wandering  life— He  founds  Artaxata  and  Prusa— History  and  impor- 
tance of  Prusa- Hannibal's  personal  characteristics— Death  of  Scipio— 
Treatment  of  Carthage  by  Romans  and  Massinissa—"  Delenda  est  Car- 
thago"       823 

CHAPTER  XX. 


DESTRUCTION   OF   CARTHAGE. 

(149-U6   B.O.) 

Appian  and  his  history— Pol ybius— Characteristics  of  his  history— His  love 
of  truth — Topography  of  Carthage — Causes  of  its  obscurity— Changes 
made  by  nature— Changes  made  by  man— The  peninsula  and  the  isthmus 
— The  fortifications  and  triple  wall — The  Taenia— The  harbours — Resolve 
of  Rome  respecting  Carthage — Treachery  of  Romans — Scene  at  Utica — 
Scene  at  Carthage — The  Roman  attack  fails — Repeated  failures  and  losses 
— Soipio  ^milian— His  character  and  connections — He  takes  the  Megara 
—Siege  of  the  city  proper— Scipio's  mole  and  the  new  outlet— Contradic- 
tions in  Carthaginian  character— Scipio  attacks  the  harbour  quarter— He 
takes  Nepheris— The  final  assault— The  three  streets— The  Byrsa— Fate 
of  the  city  and  its  inhabitants — Curse  of  Scipio — Unique  character  of  the 
fall  of  Carthage— Its  consequences — Subsequent  cities  on  its  site — Final 
destruction  by  the  Arabs  ----------  348 


/ 

v 


S4 

4 


XXVI 


CONTENTS. 


CHAPTER   XXL 


OABTHAQB     AS     IT     IB. 


PAOB 


Interest  of  a  visit  to  Carthage— Nature  of  impressions  thence  derived— Its 
topography— First  view  disappointing— The  Goletta  and  the  Taenia— 
rjebel  Khawi  and  the  Necropolis — Vicissitudes  of  its  history — Its  treat- 
ment by  the  Romans — Sanctity  of  burying  place  among  Semitic  races — 
Ras  Sidi  bu  Said  and  its  sanctity — St.  Louis  a  Muslim  saint— Scene  of 
misadventure  of  Mancinus — His  picture  of  Carthage — Hill  of  St.  Louis 
the  ancient  Byrsa— Description  of  Byrsa— Gulf  of  Tunis  and  Peninsula 
of  the  Dakhla— Lake  of  Tunis  and  Plain  of  Carthage— The  aqueduct,  its 
character,  history  and  appearance — Utica— Obliteration  of  Punic  city — 
The  "  smaller  cisterns  "—Are  they  Punic  or  Roman  ?— The  larger  cisterns 
— D^ris  of  four  cities— Excavations  of  Dr.  Davis— Excavations  of  M. 
Benle — Remains  of  triple  wall  and  traces  of  final  conflagration- Catapult 
bolts — Remains  of  ancient  harbours— Buildings  beneath  the  sea— Oriental 
character  of  Tunis— Strange  mixture  of  races— Streets  of  Tunis— Sights 
of  Tunis— The  neighbourhood  of  Tunis— Patriarchal  life— Characteristics 
of  the  Arab — His  unchangeableness— Conclusion     •       •       •       •       .  375 


LIST  OF  ILLUSTRATIONS,   MAPS,  AND  PLANS. 


Rbmains  op  Ancient  Habbodrs  at  Carthaoe 


Ths  Smaller  Cisterns  at  Carthage 


PHdmciAN  Colonies  and  Carthaginlin  Emi'Irb  - 


-  Frontispiece 
•  to  face  p.  3 
17 


>f 


Sicily „ 

Battle  of  Ecnomus „ 

Italy „ 

Battle  of  Tribia     .........  „ 

Battle  of  Trasimsnb „ 

Battle  of  CannjB     .-...-..-  „ 


Carthage  and  its  NKioHBonRHooD - 
Plan  op  Harbouuj>  at  Cartuaqk    - 


ft 


96 
173 
196 
206 
289 
351 
354 


If 


( 


I 

ii 


I 


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5 

V 


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a 

H 

OS 


00 

PS 

H 

uo 


03 
00 

H 


CARTHAGE  AND  THE  CARTHAGINIANS. 


CHAPTER  I. 

CARTHAGE. 

Characteristics  of  Phcenicians— Their  defects— Size  of  their  territory— Their 
relations  to  Israelites— Early  commerce  in  Mediterranean— Pre-eminence 
of  Phoenicians— Origin  of  Carthage— Legend  of  Dido— Elements  of  truth 
contained  in  it— Its  treatment  by  Virgil— Position  and  population  of 
Carthage— Its  relation  to  Sicily— Our  knowledge  of  Carthage,  whence 
derived— Its  early  history— Rapid  growth  of  its  empire— Its  dealings  with 
the  native  Africans— with  the  Phoenician  cities  in  Africa— with  Tyre— with 
Sicilian  Greeks— Constitution  of  Carthage— The  Suffetes— The  Senate- 
Anomalous  character  of  the  Constitution— Its  deterioration— The  "Hundred 
Judges  "—Close  oligarchy—General  contentment— Greek  and  Roman  views 
of  Carthaginian  Constitution— Causes  of  its  stability— Social  life  of  Cartha- 
ginians—Their luxury,  fine  arts,  architecture,  wealth — Their  commercial 
principles— Their  agriculture— Merits  of  Mago's  work  on  agriculture— 
—Carthaginian  religion— Worship  of  Baal-Moloch— of  Tanith  or  Astarte 
—Deeply  roote<l  character  of  this  worship— Inferior  divinities— Worship  of 
Melcarth— Carthaginian  literature— The  army— The  mercenaries  and  the 
Numidian  cavalry— Condition  of  the  masses— Colonisation— Periplus  of 
Hanno— *•  Dumb  trade"  with  the  Niger— Gold  dust— Periplus  of  Himilco 
— "Mago's"  harbour— Disaffection  of  subject  races— Was  Rome  or  Carthage 
best  fitted  for  empire  ? 

It  was  well  for  the  development  and  civilisation  of  the 
ancient  world  that  the  Hebrew  fugitives  from  Egypt  were 
not  able  to  drive  at  once  from  the  whole  coast  of  Syria  its 
old  inhabitants;  for  the  accursed  race  of  the  Canaanites 
whom,  for  their  licentious  worship  and  cruel  rites,  they  were 
bidden  to  extirpate  from  Palestine  itself,  were  no  other  than 
those  enterprising  mariners  and  those  dauntless  colonists 
who,  sallying  from  their  narrow  roadsteads,  committed  their 


V 


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CARTHAGE  AND  THE  CARTHAGINIANS. 


CHAPTER  I. 

CARTHAGE. 

Characteristics  of  rhoeniciaiis— Their  defects— Size  of  their  territory— Their 
relations  to  Israelites— Early  commerce  in  Mediterrauean— Pre-eminence 
of  Phomicians— Origin  of  Carthage— Legend  of  Dido— Elements  of  truth 
contained  in  it— Its  treatment  by  Virgil— Position  and  population  of 
Carthage— Its  relation  to  Sicily— Our  knowledge  of  Carthage,  whence 
derived— Its  early  history— Rapid  growth  of  its  empire— Its  dealings  with 
the  native  Africans— with  the  Phoenician  cities  in  Africa— with  Tyre— with 
Sicilian  Greeks— Constitution  of  Carthage— The  Suffetes— Tlie  Senate- 
Anomalous  character  of  the  Constitution— Its  deterioration— The  "Hundred 
Judges  "—Close  oligarchy—General  contentment— Greek  and  Roman  views 
of  Carthaginian  Constitution— Causes  of  its  stability— Social  life  of  Cartha- 
ginians—Their luxury,  fine  arts,  architecture,  wealth— Their  commercial 
principles— Their  agriculture— Merits  of  Mago's  work  on  agriculture— 
—Carthaginian  religion— Worship  of  Baal-Moloch— of  Tanith  or  Astarte 
—Deeply  rooted  character  of  this  worship— Inferior  divinities— Worship  of 
Melcarth— Carthaginian  literature— The  army— The  mercenaries  and  the 
Numidian  cavalry— Condition  of  the  masses— Colonisation— Periplus  of 
Hanuo— *•  Dumb  trade"  with  the  Niger— Gold  dust— Periplus  of  Himilco 
—"Mago's"  harbour— Disaffection  of  subject  races— Was  Rome  or  Carthage 
Ihist  fitted  for  empire  ? 

It  was  well  for  the  development  and  civilisation  of  the 
ancient  world  that  the  Hebrew  fugitives  from  Egypt  were 
not  able  to  drive  at  once  from  the  whole  coast  of  Syria  its 
old  inhabitants;  for  the  accursed  race  of  the  Canaanites 
whom,  for  their  licentious  worship  and  cruel  rites,  they  were 
bidden  to  extirpate  from  Palestine  itself,  were  no  other  than 
those  enterprising  mariners  and  those  dauntless  colonists 
who,  sallying  from  their  narrow  roadsteads,  committed  their 


CARTHAGE  AND  THE  CARTHAGINIANS. 


1 1 


fragile  barques  to  the  mercy  of  unknown  seas,  and,  under 
their  Greek  name  of  Phoenicians,  explored  island  and 
promontory,  creek  and  bay,  from  the  coast  of  Malabar  even 
to  the  lagunes  of  the  Baltic.  From  Tyre  and  Sidon  issued 
those  busy  merchants  who  carried,  with  their  wares,  to 
distant  shores  the  rudiments  of  science  and  of  many  practical 
arts  which  they  had  obtained  from  the  far  East,  and  which, 
probably,  they  but  half  understood  themselves.  It  was  they 
who,  at  a  period  antecedent  to  all  contemporary  historical 
records,  introduced  written  characters,  the  foundation  of  all 
high  intellectual  development,  into  that  country  which  was 
destined  to  carry  intellectual  and  artistic  culture  to  the 
highest  point  which  humanity  has  yet  reached.  It  was  they 
who  learned  to  steer  their  ships  by  the  sure  help  of  the  Polar 
Star,i  while  the  Greeks  still  depended  on  the  Great  Bear; 
it  was  they  who  rounded  the  Cape  of  Storms,  and  earned  the 
best  right  to  call  it  the  Cape  of  Good  Hope,  two  thousand 
years  before  Vasco  de  Gama.'-^  Their  ships  returned  to  their 
native  shores  bringing  with  them  sandal  wood  from  Malabar, 
spices  from  Arabia,  fine  linen  from  Egypt,  ostrich  plumes 
from  the  Sahara,  ebony  and  ivory  from  the  Soudan.  Cyprus 
gave  them  its  copper,  Elba  its  iron,  the  coast  of  the  Black 
Sea  its  manufactured  steel.  Silver  they  brought  from  Spain, 
gold  from  the  Niger,  tin  from  the  Scilly  Isles,  and  amber 
from  the  Baltic.  Where  they  sailed,  there  they  planted 
factories  which  opened  a  caravan  trade  with  the  interior  of 
vast  continents  hitherto  regarded  as  inaccessible,  and  which 
became  inaccessible  for  centuries  again  when  the  Phoenicians 
disappeared  from  history.  They  were  as  famous  for  their 
artistic  skill  as  for  their  enterprise  and  energy.  In  the  Iliad 
and  the  Odyssey — the  best  picture,  next  after  the  Book  of 


lOvid.  F(M<t.  Hi.  107:— 

Esse  duas  Arctos,  quarum  Cynosura  petatur 
Sidoniis,  Helicen  Graia  carina  notet  ? 

Cf.  TrUtia,  iv.  3,  1. 
V  Herod,  iv.  42. 


CHARACTERISTICS  OF  PHCENICIANS.  5 

Genesis,  of  the  "  youth  of  the  world  "  which  has  come  down 
to  us — the  finest  embroideries,  the  most  costly  robes,  the 
most  exquisitely  chased  wine  bowls,  are  of  Sidonian  workman- 
ship. Indeed,  to  say  in  Homeric  times  that  a  thing  was  a 
work  of  fine  art  at  all  was  almost  equivalent  to  saying  that  it 
was  Phoenician.^  Did  the  greatest  of  the  Jewish  kings  desire 
to  adorn  the  Temple  which  he  had  erected  to  the  Most  High 
in  the  manner  least  unworthy  of  Him?  A  Phoenician  king 
must  supply  him  with  the  well-hewn  cedars  of  his  stately 
Lebanon,  and  the  cunning  hand  of  a  Phoenician  artisan  must 
shape  the  pillars  and  the  lavers,  the  oxen,  and  the  lions  of 
brass,  which  decorated  the  shrine.  "Thou  knowest  that 
there  is  not  among  us  any  that  hath  skill  to  hew  timber  like 
unto  the  Sidonians."  *^  Did  the  King  of  Persia  himself,  in  the 
intoxication  of  his  pride,  command  miracles  to  be  performed, 
boisterous  straits  to  be  bridged,  or  a  peninsula  to  become  an 
island?  It  was  Phoenician  architects  who  lashed  together 
the  boats  that  were  to  connect  Asia  with  Europe, ^  and  it  was 
Phoenician  workmen  who  knew  best  how  to  economise  their 
toil  in  digging  the  canal  that  was  to  transport  the  fleet  of 
Xerxes  through  dry  land,  and  save  it  from  the  winds  and 
waves  of  Mount  Athos.*  The  merchants  of  Tyre  were,  in 
truth,  the  princes,  and  her  traffickers  the  honourable  of 
the  earth.  Wherever  a  ship  could  penetrate,  a  factory  be 
planted,  a  trade  developed  or  created,  there  we  find  these 
ubiquitous,  these  irrepressible  Phoenicians. 

But  the  picture  is  not  all  bright.  The  Phoenician  civilisa- 
tion, brilliant  as  it  was,  was  narrow  and  self-seeking.  The 
spirit  of  commercial  enterprise  implies  many  individual  and 
many  social  virtues :  self-reliance  and  self-control,  patience 
and  inventiveness,  caution  and  daring,  the  spirit  of  discipline 
and  the  spirit  of  progress.     But  pushed  to  excess,  or  un- 

iCf.  Homer.  Odyssey,  iv.  613-619;  xv.  115-119;  Iliad,  vi.  289,  291;  xxiu. 

743,  Sifiofec  iroAvJai^oAot. 

2 1  Kings  V.  6 ;  cf.  Homer,  Od.  xv.  425,  2i3ii/os  «-o\vxaAxov. 
»Herod.  vii.  34.  Mbid.  23. 


CARTHAGE  AND  THE  CARTHAGINIANS. 


accompanied  by  more  elevated  impulses,  it  involves  evils 
which  ensure  premature  decline.  Even  in  modern  times 
where  development  is  necessarily  more  many-sided  than  in 
the  states  of  antiquity,  the  exclusively  commercial  spirit  has, 
after  a  brief  interval,  proved  to  be  inconsistent  with  the 
highest  national  virtues.  The  history  of  Portuguese  and  of 
Spanish,  of  Venetian  and  of  Dutch,  commercial  enterprise, 
whether  in  the  Old  or  New  World,  affords  lamentable  proof 
of  this.  The  impulse  of  discovery,  the  thirst  for  knowledge, 
the  spirit  of  adventure,  which  originally  accompanied  the 
commercial  spirit  and  lent  dignity  thereto,  are  in  time 
swallowed  up  by  it.  Wealth  is  pursued  for  its  own  sake 
only.  Life  is  maintained  at  the  cost  of  the  greater  part  of 
what  makes  Hfe  worth  having,  and  acts  of  cruelty  and  lust, 
of  treachery  and  ingratitude,  are  perpetrated  to  gratify  the 
ruling  passion.  And  so,  in  some  measure,  was  it  with  the 
Phoenicians.  They  were  never  cowards,  but  they  carried 
the  huckstering  spirit  into  all  their  dealings.  It  was  easier 
for  them  to  buy  with  their  gold  than  to  take  or  preserve  with 
their  swords;  and  as  early  even  as  the  time  of  Ezekiel  we 
find  them,  like  other  commercial  nations,  hiring  mercenaries 
from  Persia  and  from  ^Ethiopia  to  fight  their  battles  for 
them.^  It  was  not  from  high  moral  motives — for  such  were 
almost  unknown  to  the  nations  of  antiquity,  at  least  in  their 
dealings  with  each  other — but  from  a  shrewd  and  calculating 
policy,  that  the  Phoenicians,  alike  of  the  parent  country  and 
of  the  daughter  cities,  so  long  forbore  to  aim  at  foreign 
conquest  or  at  territorial  aggrandisement. 

We  know  well  what  the  tiny  territory  of  Palestine  has 
done  for  the  religion  of  the  world,  and  what  the  tiny  Greece 
has  done  for  its  intellect  and  its  art;  but  we  are  apt  to 
forget  that  what  the  Phoenicians  did  for  its  early  develop- 
ment  and   intercommunication   was   achieved    by  a   state 

1  Ezekiel  xxvii.  10 :  "  They  of  Persia  and  of  Lud  and  of  Phut  were  in  thine 
army ;  thy  men  of  war  ;  they  hanged  the  shield  and  lielmet  in  thee  ;  they  set 
forth  thy  comeliness  ". 


THEIR  DEFECTS, 


confined  within  much  narrower  boundaries  still.  In  the  days 
of  their  greatest  prosperity,  when  their  ships  were  to  be 
found  on  every  known  and  on  many  unknown  seas,  the 
Phoenicians  proper  of  the  Syrian  coast  remained  content 
with  a  narrow  strip  of  fertile  territory  squeezed  in  between 
the  mountains  and  the  sea,  of  the  length  of  some  thirty, 
and  of  the  average  breadth  of  only  a  single  mile !  And  if 
the  existence  of  a  few  settlements  beyond  these  limits,  as, 
for  instance,  Aradus  and  Tripolis  and  Berytus  to  the  north, 
and  Accho  and  Dora  to  the  south,  entitle  us  to  extend  the 
name  of  Phoenicia  to  some  hundred  and  twenty  miles  of 
coast,  with  a  plain  behind  it  which  sometimes  broadened 
out  into  a  sweep  of  a  dozen  miles,  was  it  not  sound  policy, 
even  in  a  community  so  enlarged,  to  keep  for  themselves 
the  gold  they  had  so  hardly  won,  rather  than  lavish  it  on 
foreign  mercenaries  in  the  hope  of  extending  their  sway 
inland,  or  in  the  vain  attempt  to  resist  by  force  of  arms 
the  mighty  monarchs  of  Egypt,  of  Assyria,  or  of  Babylon  ? 
Their  strength  was  to  sit  still,  to  acknowledge  the  titular 
supremacy  of  any  one  who  chose  to  claim  it,  and  then,  when 
the  time  came,  to  buy  the  intruder  off:  *'  Careless  they  dwelt, 
quiet  and  secure  after  the  manner  of  the  Zidonians,  and  had 
no  dealings  with  any  man  ".^ 

One  branch  of  business  there  was — and  a  lucrative  one  it 
must  have  been — which  did  tempt  the  Tyrian  merchants 
occasionally  to  overstep  their  natural  boundaries  even  by 
land.  They  were  slave  traders,  and  they  did  not  disdain, 
on  occasion,  to  trafi&c  in  the  persons  of  their  nearest  neigh- 
bours and  their  best  friends.  Palestine  was,  throughout  the 
period  of  the  later  Old  Testament  history,  the  granary  of 
Tyre,  supplying  it  with  com  and  oil;  and  mutual  conve- 
nience seems,  in  spite  of  the  cruelties  of  Jezebel  and  the 
bloody  offerings  to  Moloch,  to  have  long  maintained  a 
friendly  feeling  between   the  adjoining  peoples.      But   in 

t  Judges  xviii.  7. 


^ft 


8 


CARTHAGE  AND  THE  CARTHAGINIANS. 


the  time  of  the  Maccabees  there  is  evidence  to  show  that 
Tyrian  merchants  accompanied  the  armies  of  Syria  for  the 
purpose  of  purchasing  the  Jews  who  should  be  taken  captive 
in  the  war;  and  when  Jerusalem  fell  before  Antiochus  Epi- 
phanes,  the  number  of  those  sold  as  slaves,  doubtless  to  these 
same  Phoenician  slave  merchants,  equalled  that  of  the  slain. ^ 
To  practices  such  as  these — if,  indeed,  this  may  be  taken  as 
a  sample — which  must  have  been  as  revolting  to  the  patriot- 
ism as  their  impure  worship  was  to  the  religious  feelings  of 
the  Hebrew  prophets,  are  probably  due  the  unsparing  and 
unqualified  denunciations  of  Tyre  and  Sidon  which  we  find 
in  Joel  and  Amos,  in  Isaiah  and  in  Ezekiel.  The  religion 
of  the  Phoenicians  appears  to  have  been  originally  a  rude 
worship  of  the  powers  of  Nature ;  but  it  is  certain  that  their 
worship  of  Baal,  of  Astarte,  and  of  Adonis,  as  we  read  of 
it  in  the  Greek  and  Roman  no  less  than  in  the  Hebrew 
classics,  involved  abominations  of  which  human  sacrifice 
was  hardly  the  worst. 

The  land-locked  sea,  the  eastern  extremity  of  which  washes 
the  shores  of  Phoenicia  proper,  connecting  as  it  does  three 
continents,  and  abounding  in  deep  gulfs,  in  fine  harbours, 
and  in  fertile  islands,  seems  to  have  been  intended  by  Nature 
for  the  early  development  of  commerce  and  colonisation.  By 
robbing  the  ocean  of  half  its  mystery  and  of  more  than  half 
its  terrors,  it  allured  the  timid  mariner,  even  as  the  eagle 
does  her  young,  from  headland  on  to  headland,  or  from  islet 
to  islet,  till  it  became  the  highway  of  the  nations  of  the 
ancient  world;  and  the  products  of  each  of  the  countries 
whose  shores  it  laves  became  the  common  property  of  all. 
At  a  very  early  period  the  Etruscans,  for  instance — that 
mysterious  people  who  then  occupied  with  their  settlements 
Campania  and  Cisalpine  Gaul,  as  well  as  that  extensive  inter- 
mediate region  to  which  they  afterwards  gave  their  name — 
swept  all  the  Italian  seas  with  their  galleys,  half  piratical, 

^  1  Mace.  iii.  41 ;  2  Mace.  v.  14  ;  ef.  also  Joel  ill.  6  ;  Amos  i.  9. 


I' 


} 


PREEMINENCE  OF  PHCENICIAN  COMMERCE. 


and  half  commercial.  The  Greeks,  somewhat  later,  founded 
(B.C.  631)  Cyrene  and  (b.c.  560)  Barca  in  Africa,  (b.c.  564) 
Alalia  in  Corsica,  and  (b.c.  600)  MassiUa  in  Gaul,  and  lined 
the  southern  shores  of  Italy  and  the  western  shores  of  Asia 
Minor  with  that  fringe  of  colonies  which  were  so  soon  to 
echpse  in  prosperity  and  powiir  their  parent  cities.  Even 
Egypt,  with  her  immemorial  antiquity  and  her  exclusive 
civilisation,  deigned  to  open  (b.c.  550)  an  emporium  at 
Naucratis  for  the  ships  and  commerce  of  the  Greeks,  crea- 
tures of  yesterday  as  they  must  have  seemed  in  comparison 
with  her.i 

But  in  this  general  race  of  enterprise  and  commerce  among 
the  nations  which  bordered  on  the  Mediterranean,  it  is  to 
the  Phoenicians  that  unquestionably  belongs  the  foremost 
place.  In  the  dimmest  dawn  of  history,  many  centuries 
before  the  Greeks  had  set  foot  in  Asia  Minor  or  in  Italy, 
before  even  they  had  settled  down  in  secure  possession  of 
their  own  territories,  we  hear  of  Phoenician  settlements  in 
Asia  Minor  and  in  Greece  itself,  in  Africa,  in  Macedon,  and 
in  Spain.  There  is  hardly  an  island  in  the  Mediterranean 
which  has  not  preserved  some  traces  of  these  early  visitors : 
Cyprus,  Rhodes,  and  Crete  in  the  Levant;  Malta,  Sicily, 
and  the  Balearic  Isles  in  the  middle  passage;  Sardinia, 
Corsica,  and  Elba  in  the  Tyrrhenian  Sea;  the  Cyclades, 
as  Thucydides  tells  us,  in  the  mid-iEgean  ;  2  and  even  Samo- 
thrace  and  Thasos  at  its  northern  extremity,  where  Hero- 
dotus, to  use  his  own  forcible  expression,  himself  saw  a 
whole  mountain  ** turned  upside  down"  by  their  mining 
energy :  ^  all  have  either  yielded  Phoenician  coins  and  inscrip- 
tions, have  retained  Phoenician  proper  names  and  legends,  or 
possess  mines,  long,  perhaps,  disused,  but  which  were  worked 
as  none  but  Phoenicians  ever  worked  them.  And  among  the 
Phoenician  factories  which  dotted  the  whole  southern  shore 
of  the  Mediterranean,  from  the  east  end  of  the  greater  Syrtis 

I  Herod,  ii.  178.  sThucyd.  i.  8 ;  cf.  Herod,  iv.  147. 

*  Herod.   vL    47  :    opof  tieya  avearpafiiiivov  iv  rf  ^i}T^<rei. 


lO 


CARTHAGE  AND  THE  CARTHAGINIANS. 


even  to  the  Pillars  of  Hercules,  there  was  one  which,  from  a 
concurrence  of  circumstances,  was  destined  rapidly  to  out- 
strip all  the  others,  to  make  herself  their  acknowledged  head, 
to  become  the  Queen  of  the  Mediterranean,  and,  in  some 
sense,  of  the  Ocean  beyond,  and,  for  a  space  of  over  a 
hundred  years,  to  maintain  a  deadly  and  not  an  unequal 
contest  with  the  future  mistress  of  the  world.  The  history 
of  that  great  drama,  its  antecedents  and  its  consequences, 
forms  the  subject  of  this  volume. 

The  rising  African  factory  was  known  to  its  inhabitants 
by  the  name  of  Kirjath-Hadeschath,  or  New  Town,  to  dis- 
tinguish it  from  the  much  older  settlement  of  Utica,  of  which 
it  may  have  been,  to  some  extent,  an  offshoot.  The  Greeks, 
when  they  came  to  know  of  its  existence,  called  it  Earchedon, 
and  the  Romans  Carthago.  The  date  of  its  foundation  is  un- 
certain ;  but  the  current  tradition  refers  it  to  a  period  about 
a  hundred  years  before  the  founding  of  Rome.*  The  fortress 
that  was  to  protect  the  young  settlement  was  built  upon  a 
peninsula  projecting  eastwards  from  the  inner  coiiner  of  what 
is  now  called  the  Gulf  of  Tunis,  the  largest  and  most  beauti- 
ful roadstead  of  the  North  African  coast. 

The  topography  of  Carthage  will  be  described  in  detail  at 
a  later  period  of  this  history.  At  present  it  will  be  sufficient 
to  remark  that  the  city  proper,  at  the  time  at  which  it  is  best 
known  to  us,  the  period  of  the  Punic  wars,  consisted  of  the 
Byrsa,  or  Citadel  quarter  (a  Greek  word  corrupted  from  the 
Canaanitish  Bozra,  or  Bostra,  that  is,  a  fort),  and  of  the 
Cothon,  or  harbour  quarter,  so  important  in  the  history  of 
the  final  siege.  To  the  north  and  west  of  these,  and  occupy- 
ing all  the  vast  space  between  them  and  the  isthmus  behind, 
were  the  Megara  (Hebrew,  Magurim),  that  is,  the  suburbs 

1  Justin,  xviii  6,  9 :  "  Condita  est  urbs  hec  septuaginta  duobus  annis  ante- 
quam  Roma  ".  Appian  {Pun.  I)  places  its  foundation  fifty  years  before  the  fall 
of  Troy.  The  wide  discrepancy  may  be  perhaps  accounted  for  by  the  exist- 
ence of  an  earlier  Phoenician  settlement  on  or  about  tlie  same  spot,  said  to  havfl 
been  called  Cambe  or  Cacabe. 


CARTHAGE  AND  SICILY. 


XX 


and  gardens  of  Carthage,  which,  with  the  city  proper,  covered 
an  area  twenty-three  miles  in  circumference.*  Its  population 
must  have  been  fully  proportionate  to  its  size.  Just  before 
the  Third  Punic  War,  when  its  strength  had  been  drained  by 
the  two  long  wars  with  Rome  and  by  the  incessant  depreda- 
tions of  that  chartered  brigand  Massinissa,  it  contained  seven 
hundred  thousand  inhabitants,^  and  towards  the  close  of  the 
final  siege,  the  Byrsa  alone  was  able  to  give  shelter  to  a 
motley  multitude  of  fifty  thousand  men,  women,  and  chil- 
dren.* 

The  river  Bagradas  (Mejerda),  which  traverses  what  was 
then  the  most  fertile  portion  of  northern  Africa,  a  country 
smihng  with  corn  fields,  and  gardens,  olive  plantations,  and 
vineyards,  and  forming  the  home  domain  of  Carthage,  entered 
the  Gulf  of  Tunis  on  the  north  side  of  the  city ;  but  the  silt 
which  it  has  brought  down,  combined  with  the  sand  thrown 
up  in  that  part  of  the  gulf  by  wind  and  tide  together,  has,  in 
the  lapse  of  ages,  altered  its  course,  and  its  mouth  is  now  to 
be  found,  not  near  the  site  of  the  daughter,  but  some  miles 
to  the  northward,  near  the  parent  city  of  Utica. 

Facing  the  Hermaean  promontory  (Cape  Bon),  the  north- 
eastern horn  of  the  Gulf  of  Tunis,  at  a  distance  of  only  ninety 
miles,  was  the  island  of  Sicily,  which — as  a  glance  at  the 
map,  and  as  the  sunken  ridge  extending  from  one  to  the  other 
still  clearly  show — must  have  once  actually  united  Europe  to 
Africa.  This  fair  island  it  was  which,  crowded,  even  in  those 
early  days,  with  Phoenician  factories,*  seemed  to  beckon  the 
chief  of  Phoenician  cities  onwards  towards  an  easy  and  a 
natural  field  of  foreign  conquest.  This  it  was  which  proved 
to  be  the  apple  of  fierce  discord  for  centuries  between  Carthage 
and  the  Greek  colonies,  which  soon  disputed  its  possession 
with  her.  This,  in  an  ever  chequered  warfare,  and  at  the 
cost  of  torrents  of  the  blood  of  her  mercenaries,  and  of  untold 
treasures  of  her  citizens,  enriched  Carthage  with  the  most 

1  Polybius,  L  73-5 ;   Livy,  Epit.  41 ;   Strabo,  xvii.  3,  14. 

2  Ibid.  3-15.  »  Appian,  Pun.  130.  *Cf.  Thucyd.  vl  2. 


ta 


CARTHAGE  AND  THE  CARTHAGINIANS, 


EARLY  HISTORY  OF  CARTHAGE. 


13 


splendid  trophies— stolen  trophies  though  they  were— of 
Greek  art.  This,  finally,  was  the  chief  battle-field  of  the  con- 
tending forces  during  the  whole  of  the  First  Punic  War— in 
the  beginning,  that  is,  of  her  fierce  struggle  for  existence 
with  all  the  power  of  Rome. 

Such,  very  briefly,  was  the  city,  and  such  the  race  whose 
varied  fortunes,  so  far  as  our  fragmentary  materials  allow  us, 
we  are  about  to  trace.  What  were  the  causes  of  the  rapid 
rise  of  Carthage ;  what  was  the  extent  of  her  African  and  her 
foreign  dominions,  and  the  nature  of  her  hold  upon  them ; 
what  were  the  peculiar  excellences  and  defects  of  her  internal 
constitution,  and  what  the  principles  on  which  she  traded 
and  colonised,  conquered  and  ruled; — to  these  and  other 
questions  some  answer  must  be  given,  as  a  necessary  pre- 
liminary to  that  part  of  her  history,  which  alone  we  can  trace 
consecutively.  Some  answer  we  must  give,  but  how  are  we 
to  give  it  ?  No  native  poet,  whose  writings  have  come  down 
to  us,  has  sung  of  the  origin  of  Carthage,  or  of  her  romantic 
voyages.  No  native  orator  has  described,  in  glowing  periods 
which  we  can  still  read,  the  splendour  of  her  buildings  and 
the  opulence  of  her  merchant  princes.  No  native  annalist 
has  preserved  the  story  of  her  long  rivalry  with  Greeks  and 
Etruscans,  and  no  African  philosopher  has  moralised  upon 
the  stability  of  her  institutions  or  the  causes  of  her  fall.  All 
have  perished.  The  text  of  three  treaties  with  Rome,  made 
in  the  days  of  her  prosperity ;  the  log-book  of  an  adventurous 
Carthaginian  admiral,  dedicated  on  his  return  from  the 
Senegal  or  the  Niger  as  a  votive  otfering  in  the  temple  of 
Baal ;  some  fragments  of  the  practical  precepts  of  a  Cartha- 
ginian agriculturist,  translated  by  the  order  of  the  utilitarian 
Roman  Senate ;  a  speech  or  two  of  a  vagabond  Carthaginian 
in  the  Panulus  of  Plautus,  which  have  been  grievously 
mutilated  in  the  process  of  transcribing  them  into  Roman 
letters;  a  few  Punic  inscriptions  buried  twenty  feet  below 
the  surface  of  the  ground,  entombed  and  preserved  by 
successive  Roman,  and  Vandal,  and  Arab  devastations,  and 


now  at  length  revealed  and  deciphered  by  the  efforts  of 
French  and  English  archaeologists ;  the  massive  substructions 
of  ancient  temples ;  the  enormous  reservoirs  of  water ;  and 
the  majestic  procession  of  stately  aqueducts  which  no  bar- 
barism has  been  quite  able  to  destroy — these  are  the  only 
native  or  semi-native  sources  from  which  we  can  draw  the 
outlines  of  our  picture,  and  we  must  eke  out  our  narrative 
of  Carthage  in  the  days  of  her  prosperity,  as  best  we  may, 
from  a  few  chapters  of  reflexions  by  the  greatest  of  the  Greek 
philosophers,  from  the  late  Roman  annalists  who  saw  every- 
thing with  Roman  eyes,  and  from  a  few  but  precious  anti- 
quarian remarks  in  the  narrative  of  the  great  Greek  historian, 
Polybius,  who,  with  all  his  love  of  truth  and  love  of  justice, 
saw  Carthage  only  at  the  moment  of  her  fall,  and  was  the 
bosom  friend  of  her  destroyer. 

In  her  origin,  at  least,  Carthage  seems  to  have  been,  like 
other  Phoenician  settlements,  a  mere  commercial  factory. 
Her  inhabitants  cultivated  friendly  relations  with  the  natives, 
looked  upon  themselves  as  tenants  at  will  rather  than  as 
owners  of  the  soil,  and,  as  such,  cheerfully  paid  a  rent  to  the 
African  Berbers  for  the  ground  covered  by  their  dwellings.^ 
Thus  much,  if  thus  much  only,  of  truth  is  contained  in  the 
romantic  legend  of  Dido,  which  adorned,  as  it  has  been,  by 
the  genius  of  Virgil,  and  resting  in  part  on  early  local 
traditions,  must  always  remain  indissolubly  bound  up  with 
the  name  of  Carthage.  We  know  that  the  name  of  Dido 
comes  from  the  same  root  as  the  kindred  Hebrew  names 
of  "David"  and  "Jedidiah,"  and  means  "the  beloved," 
while  its  Virgilian  synonym  "Elissa"  is  nothing  but  the 
feminine  of  "  El,"  the  Hebrew  word  for  "  God  ".  We  know 
also  as  a  fact  that  as  long  as  Carthage  stood,  Dido  was 
worshipped  there  as  a  goddess.^  It  seems  probable,  there- 
fore, that  the  lovelorn  foundress  of  the  mighty  city  was 
originally  nothing  but  the  patron  goddess  of  the  whole  Phce- 


1  Justin,  zviii  5, 14. 


sibid.6,a 


m 


1 


14 


CARTHAGE  AND  THE  CARTHAGINIANS. 


nician  race ;  and  it  is  more  than  probable  that  the  story  of 
the  ox-hide,  cut  with  Phcenician  cunning  into  narrow  strips 
till  it  encircled  ground  enough  for  the  future  citadel,^  is 
nothing  but  a  Greek  legend  based  on  the  superficial  resem- 
blance of  the  Phcenician  word  "  Bozra,"  a  fortress,  to  the 
Greek  "  Byrsa,"  an  ox-hide.  It  is  a  story  which  has  done 
duty  in  many  other  parts  of  the  world  since  then,  and  is 
probably  neither  more  nor  less  true  when  related  of  the 
settlement  of  the  Assassins  in  Persia,  of  the  Saxons  in 
England,  and  of  the  English  themselves  in  Pennsylvania, 
than  of  the  Phoenician  settlers  in  Africa. 

Yet  there  are  many  points  in  the  legend— such,  for  instance, 
as  the  sending  of  the  colony  direct  from  Tyre,  the  civil 
dissensions  which  were  its  immediate  occasion,  the  earlier 
date  of  Utica,  the  peaceful  settlement  at  first,  and  the 
friendly  relations  so  long  maintained  with  the  native  African 
races— which  all  point  to  historical  facts  and  give  something 
more  than  a  merely  poetic  interest  to  the  whole.  It  can 
hardly,  therefore,  be  out  of  place  to  indicate  here— much  as 
Venus  did  to  her  shipwrecked  son  when  he  first  came  in 
sight  of  the  city— at  least  its  general  outline.^ 

Elissa,  sister  to  Pygmalion,  king  of  Tyre,  had  married  her 
uncle  Acerbas  or  Sychaeus,  high  priest  of  Melcarth,  a  post 
second  in  dignity  to  that  of  royalty  alone,  and  perhaps 
surpassing  it  in  its  wealth.  Coveting  his  riches,  Pygmalion, 
with  an  act  of  violence  not  unknown  to  his  family— since  he 
reckoned  Eth-baal  and  Jezebel  among  his  immediate  an- 
cestors—slew SychaBus  at  the  altar,  and  managed  to  hide 
his  guilt  from  his  widow.  Deceived  by  his  specious  promises, 
the  faithful  Elissa,  Penelope-like,  long  continued  hoping 
against  hope  for  her  lord's  return  ;  but  in  the  dead  of  night 
his  ghost  appeared  to  her,  revealing  the  hideous  deed  and 
bidding  her  fly  the  country  with  the  wealth  which  had 
prompted  the  crime,  and  had  hitherto  escaped  the   grasp 

1  Virg.  J^n.  i.  367-368 ;  Justin,  xviii.  5,  9. 

»  Virg.  ^En.  i.  346 :  "  Sumraa  sequar  fastigia  renim". 


STORY  OF  DIDO. 


15 


of  the  criminal.  She  obeyed,  and,  flying  with  a  band  of 
faithful  followers,  carried  off  with  her,  not  only  the  wealth 
of  her  husband,  but  that  of  his  murderer  as  welL  She 
touched  at  Cyprus,  which  was  already  covered  with  Phoenician 
settlements.  There  she  obtained  wives  for  her  followers, 
and  induced  the  priest  of  Baal  himself  to  leave  his  temple, 
and  to  accompany  her  on  her  voyage.  Like  the  wandering 
Levite  in  the  Book  of  Judges,  he  stipulated  that  the  office 
of  the  priesthood  should  belong  to  him  and  his  for  ever  in 
the  kingdom  that  was  to  be,  and— like  the  adventurous 
Micah,  in  the  same  story,  who  felt  confident  "that  the 
Lord  would  do  him  good,  seeing  that  he  had  a  Levite  to  his 
priest" — the  princess  started  with  fresh  confidence  in  her 
destiny,  since  she  carried  with  her  the  priest  of  her  fathers' 
god.  Once  more  the  exiles  set  sail  for  Libya,  and,  purchasing 
from  the  friendly  natives  a  small  plot  of  land,  became  the 
founders  of  the  imperial  city.^ 

The  subsequent  incidents  of  the  story  as  we  find  them  in 
the  ^neid:  the  landing  of  the  shipwrecked  ^neas;  his 
first  sight  of  the  queen,  beautiful  as  Diana  among  her 
nymphs,  superintending  the  building  of  her  city,  and  giving 
laws  to  her  infant  kingdom  ;  the  hospitality  freely  offered 
and  received;  the  "tale  of  Troy  divine,"  told  by  the  chief 
actor  in  it ;  the  queen's  admiration  for  the  hero  deepening 
gradually  into  an  o'ermastering  love  for  the  man ;  the  wild 
conflict  of  feelings  within  her  breast ;  fidelity  to  the  memory 
of  her  murdered  husband,  and  passion  artfully  fanned  or 
concealed  by  the  suggestion  made  to  her  queenly  ambition 
that  Trojan  and  Tyrian  might,  by  her  marriage,  be  united 
beneath  one  sceptre ;  the  inevitable  victory  of  passion ;  the 
subsequent  awakening  of  -^neas  to  the  true  destiny  reserved 
for  him,  the  founding,  not  of  a  Trojan  or  of  a  Tyrian,  but  of 
an  Italian  empire;  the  desertion,  the  desolation,  the  suicide 
of  the  queen ;  above  all,  the  magnificent  curse  and  prophecy 
in  Q»e  which  breaks  from  her  dying  lips : — 

>  Virgil,  Ain.  l  338,  363;  Justin,  xviil  4,  5;  Appian,  run. 


i6 


CARTHAGE  AND  THE  CARTHAGINIANS. 


'•  Rise  from  my  ashes,  scourge  of  crime, 
Born  to  pursue  the  Dardau  horde 
To-day,  to-morrow,  through  all  time. 
Oft  as  our  hands  can  wield  the  swortl ; 
Figlit  shore  with  shore,  fight  sea  with  sea, 
Figlit  all  that  are  or  e'er  shall  be  !  "  ^ 

All  these  incidents,  incomparable  as  they  are  in  their  beauty 
and  in  their  tragic  power,  form  no  part  of  the  original  legend, 
and  are  mentioned  here  chiefly  as  showing  how  truly  the 
great  Koman  poet  appreciated  the  one  worthy  rival  of  his 
country,  the  rival  whom  she  had  blotted  out  of  existence,  and 
how  anxious  he  was,  as  far  as  might  be,  to  undo  the  deed. 

But  we  must  now  return  to  the  course  of  the  history.  It 
was  the  instinct  of  self-preservation  alone  which,  in  the 
course  of  the  sixth  century,  dictated  a  change  of  policy  at 
Carthage,  and  transformed  her  peace-loving  mercantile  com- 
munity into  the  warlike  and  conquering  state,  of  which 
the  whole  of  the  western  Mediterranean  was  so  soon  to 
feel  the  power.  A  people  far  less  keen- sighted  than  the 
Phoenicians  must  have  discerned  that  it  was  their  very 
existence  which  was  at  stake ;  at  all  events,  that  unless  they 
were  willing  to  be  dislodged  from  Africa,  and  Sicily,  and 
Spain,  as  they  had  already  been  dislodged  from  Italy  and 
Greece,  and  the  islands  of  the  Levant,  by  the  flood  of 
Hellenic  colonisation,  they  must  alter  their  policy.  Accord- 
ingly they  joined  hands  (in  B.C.  537)  with  their  inveterate 
enemies,  the  Etruscans,  to  prevent  a  threatened  settlement 
of  some  exiled  Phocaeans  on  the  important  island  of  Cor- 
8ica.2  In  Africa  they  took  up  arms  to  make  the  inhabitants 
of  Cyrene  feel  that  it  was  towards  Egypt  or  the  interior, 
not  towards  Carthage,  that  they  must  look  for  an  extension 
of   their  boundaries  ;8  and  in  Sicily,  by  withdrawing  half 

1  Exoriare  aliquis  nostris  ex  ossibus  ultor 
Qui  face  Dardanios,  ferroque,  sequare  colonos. 
Nunc,  olim,  quocunque  dabunt  se  tempore  viroa, 
Litora  litoribus  contraria,  fluctibus  undas 
Imprecor,  arma  armis ;  pugnent  ipsique  nepotes(l^^ 

—.*-'«.  iv.  U25-629. 
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voluntarily  from  the  eastern  side  of  the  island  in  which  the 
Greeks   had   settled,  they   tightened   their   grip   upon   that 
western  portion  which,  as  being  nearer  to  Carthage,  was  more 
important  to  them,  and  where  the  original  Phoenician  settle- 
ments of  Panormus,  Motye,  and  Soloeis  had  been  planted. 
The  result  of  this  change  of  policy  was  that  the  western 
half  of  the  Mediterranean  became,  with  one  exception  ^ — 
what  the  whole  of  it  had  once  bidden  fair  to  be — a  Phoe- 
nician lake,  in  which  no  foreign  merchantmen  dared  to  show 
themselves.     It  was  a  vast  preserve,  to  be  caught  trespass- 
ing upon   which,  so  Strabo  tells  us,   on  the  authority  of 
Eratosthenes,  ensured  the  punishment  of  instant  death  by 
drowning.'-^     No  promontory  was  so  barren,  no  islet  so  in- 
Bignificant,^  as  to  escape  the  jealous  and  ever-watchful  eye  of 
the  Carthaginians.     In  Corsica,  if  they  could  not  get  any 
firm  or  extensive  foothold  themselves,  they  at  least  prevented 
any  other  state  from  doing  the  like.*     Into  their  hands  fell, 
in  spite  of  the  ambitious  dreams  of  Persian  kings  and  the 
aspirations  of  patriot  Greeks,  that  "  greatest  of  all  islands," 
the  island  of  Sardinia;^  theirs  were  the  iEgatian  and  the 
Liparaean,  the  Balearic  and  the  Pityusian  Isles;  theirs  the 
tiny  Elba,  with  its  inexhaustible  supply  of  metals;^  theirs, 
too,   Malta  still  remained,  an  outpost  pushed  far  into  the 
domain  of  their  advancing  enemies,  a  memorial  of  what  once 
had  been,  and,  perhaps,  to  the  sanguine  Carthaginian  tem- 
perament, an   earnest  of  what  might   be  again  hereafter.^ 
Above  all,  the  Phoenician  settlements  in  Spain,  at  the  inner- 


'  Massilia,  a  Phocsean  colony  like  Alalia,  but  more  fortunate,  appears  always 
to  have  held  her  own  in  her  own  sea,  and  planted  several  colonies,  such  as 
Emporiae,  along  the  coast,  which  helped  to  maintain  her  ascendancy. 

«  Strabo,  xvil  1, 19.  SThucyd.  vl  2  ;  Polyb.  i.  10,  5. 

♦Herod,  i.  166;  cf.  Servius  on  Virg.  jEn.  iv.  628,  "  litora  litoribus  con- 
traria,"  where  he  quotes  the  stipulation  on  the  neutrality  of  C!orsica,  as  between 
the  Carthaginians  and  Romans. 

»  Herod,  i.  170.  and  v.  106  ;  Polyb.  iii.  22  and  25. 

*  Virg.  ^n.  X.  174  :  "  Insula  inexhaustis  Chalybum  generosa  metallis". 

^  Cf.  Uvy,  xxl  61 :  Diod.  v.  12 ;  Cicero.  Verres,  ii.  72 ;  iv.  46. 


th 


CARTHAGE  AND  THE  CARTHAGINIANS, 


DEALINGS  WITH  PHCENICIAN  CITIES. 


Z9 


lit 


most  corner  of  the  great  preserve,  with  the  adjacent  silver 
mines  which  gave  to  these  settlements  their  peculiar  value, 
were  now  trebly  safe  from  all  intruders. 

Elated,  as  it  would  seem,  by  their  naval  successes,  which 
were  hardly  of  their  own  seeking,  the  Carthaginians  thought 
that  they  might  now  at  last  become  the  owners  of  the  small 
strip  of  African  territory  which  they  had  hitherto  seemed  to 
occupy  on  sufferance  only,  and  they  refused  the  ground-rent 
which,  up  till  now,  they  had  paid  to  the  adjoining  tribes.^  Step 
by  step  they  enlarged  their  territories  at  the  expense  of  the 
natives,  till  the  whole  of  the  rich  territory  watered  by  the 
Bagradas  became  theirs.  The  Nomadic  tribes  were  beaten 
back  beyond  the  river  Triton  into  the  country  named,  from 
the  roving  habits  of  its  inhabitants,  Numidia,  or  into  the 
desert  of  Tripolis,2  and  were  henceforward  kept  in  check  by 
the  primitive  defence  of  a  hne  of  ditch  and  rampart,^  just 
as,  in  earher  times,  the  rich  plains  of  Babylonia  had  been 
protected  by  the  "wall  of  Semiramis  "  from  the  incursions  of 
the  less  civilised  Medes.  The  agricultural  tribes  were  forced 
to  pay  tribute  to  the  conquerors  for  the  right  of  cultivating 
their  own  soil,  or  to  shed  their  blood  on  the  field  of  battle  in 
the  prosecution  of  further  conquests  from  the  tribes  beyond. 

Nor  did  the  kindred  Phoenician  settlements  in  the  ad- 
joining parts  of  Africa  escape  unscathed.  Utica  alone,  owing 
probably  to  her  antiquity  and  to  the  semi-parental  relation 
in  which  she  stood  to  Carthage,  was  allowed  to  retain  her 
walls  and  full  equality  of  rights  with  the  rising  power ;  *  but 
Hippo  Zarytus,  and  Adrumetum,  the  greater  and  the  lesser 

1  Justin,  xix.  1,  3.  and  ii  4;  Appian,  Pun.  2. 

»Cf.  Herod,  iv.  191.  » Appian,  Pun.  32  and  64. 

*  It  is  remarkable  that  while  Utica  is  not  mentioned  in  the  first  treaty  between 
Rome  and  Carthage,  concluded,  according  to  Poly  bins  (iii.  22),  in  509  rc,  she 
appears  in  the  second  treaty  (Polyb.  iii.  24)  348  B.C.  on  terms  of  exact  equality 
with  Carthage,  and  even  in  that  made  by  Hannibal,  when  in  Italy,  with 
Philip  of  Macedon  (Polyb.  vii.  9)  215  B.C..  she  receives  the  honour  of  a 
special  and  independent  mention.  Probably  the  subjection  to  Carthage  of  the 
other  Phoenician  cities  in  Africa  had  taken  place  in  the  interval,  and  had  left 
Utica  in  this  position  of  solitary  pre-eminence. 


Leptis,  were  compelled  to  pull  down  their  walls  and  acknow- 
ledge the  supremacy  of  the  Carthaginian  city.  All  along 
the  northern  coast  of  Africa  the  original  Phoenician  settlers, 
and,  probably,  to  some  extent,  the  Carthaginians  them- 
selves, had  intermarried  with  the  natives.  The  product  of 
these  marriages  was  that  numerous  class  of  Libyphoenicians 
which  proved  to  be  so  important  in  the  history  of  Cartha- 
ginian colonisation  and  conquest  ;^  a  class  which,  equidistant 
from  the  Berbers  on  the  one  hand,  and  from  the  Cartha- 
ginians proper  on  the  other,  and  composed  of  those  who  were 
neither  wholly  citizens  nor  yet  wholly  aliens,  experienced  the 
lot  of  most  half  castes,  and  were  alternately  trusted  and  feared, 
pampered  and  oppressed,  loved  and  hated,  by  the  ruling  state. 
It  would  follow,  from  what  has  been  already  said  of  the 
retreat  of  the  Phoenicians  from  the  Eastern  Mediterranean, 
and  the  occupation  of  this  portion  of  the  sea  by  the  Greeks, 
that  as  Carthage  rose  so  would  Tyre  naturally  decline ;  but 
it  was  in  the  days  of  that  decline  that  Tyre,  like  other 
Phoenician  cities,  gathering  fresh  strength  from  her  weak- 
ness, and  fresh  courage  from  her  despair,  displayed  those 
powers  of  dogged  resistance  to  the  inevitable  which  would 
seem  to  be  the  peculiar  dower  of  her  own  and  of  kindred 
nations.  Three  tremendous  sieges,  directed,  the  one  by  the 
greatest  of  the  Assyrian,  the  second  by  the  greatest  of  the 
Babylonian,  and  the  third  by  the  greatest  of  the  Macedonian 
monarchs,  did  Tyre  undergo  even  in  the  days  of  her  "  decline 
and  fall "  ;  and  the  terrible  vengeance  of  Alexander,  when  the 
bitter  end  had  come  upon  the  city  which  he  could  break  but 
could  not  bend,  is  the  best  evidence  of  the  more  than  human 
endurance  which,  when  they  were  driven  to  stand  at  bay, 
the  inhabitants  of  the  great  merchant  city  could  put  forth. 
Tyre  herself  fell  (b.o.  332),  but  the  great  Tyrian  city  in  the 
Bay  of  Tunis  still  remained ;  and  to  Carthage  did  the  few 
Tyrians — young  children  or  old  men — who   alone  escaped. 

iHanno's  Periplus,  see  below,  pp.  40-44;  Polyb.  iii.  33,  16;  Livy,  xxi.  22; 
XXV.  40 ;  Died.  xx.  55. 


20 


CARTHAGE  AND  THE  CARTHAGINIANS, 


CONSTITUTION  OF  CARTHAGE, 


21 


> 


transfer  their  fortunes  and  their  hopes. i  In  the  annals  of 
Phoenician  colonisation— and  it  should  be  remembered,  for 
it  sheds  a  kindly  ray  of  human  feeling  over  a  history  which 
as  seen  in  our  imperfect  records  of  it,  with  what  we  know 
as  well  as  what  we  do  not  know,  is  not  too  human— the 
closest  ties  of  intimacy  were  generally  maintained  between 
the  mother  and  the  daughter  cities.2  There  was  no  mean 
jealousy,  as  so  often  happened  among  the  Greeks,  on  the 
part  of  the  mother  towards  the  daughter;  there  was  no 
precocious  self-assertion  or  unseemly  arrogance  on  the  part 
of  the  rising  daughter  towards  her  declining  mother.  The 
Persian  king  might  command  the  services  of  the  Phoenician 
navy  to  help  him  to  crush  a  Greek  or  an  Egyptian  rival ; 
but  the  most  ferocious  of  them  all,  Cambyses  himself,  found 
that  he  might  as  weU  have  issued  his  orders  to  the  winds 
or  the  waves  as  have  bidden  the  Tyrians  to  take  up  sacri- 
legious arms  against  their  Carthaginian  children.^ 

One  enterprise,  indeed,  the  Carthaginians  did  undertake  in 
obedience  to  the  fiat  of  the  great  king,  which,  to  the  lasting 
good  of  humanity,  failed  of  its  object.  Xerxes  (b.c.  480) 
advancing  with  his  millions  of  barbarians  upon  Athens  from 
the  east,  bade,  so  it  is  said,  Hamilcar  advance  with  his 
three  hundred  thousand  mercenaries  upon  Syracuse  from  the 
west.4  The  torch  of  Greek  learning  and  civilisation  was  to 
be  extinguished  at  the  most  opposite  ends  of  the  Greek  world 
at  one  and  the  same  moment ;  but,  happily  for  mankind 
at  large,  both  attempts  were  foiled.  The  efiforts  of  Xerxes 
ended  in  the  destruction  of  the  Persian  fleet  at  Salamis,  and 
the  disgraceful  flight  of  the  king  to  Asia;  the  efforts  of 
HamQcar  ended  in  his  defeat  and  death  at  Himera,  and  in 
the  destruction  of  a  hundred  and  fifty  thousand  of  his  army ; 
and  by  a  dramatic  propriety  which  is  not  common  in  history' 
whatever  it  may  be  in  fiction,  this  double  victory  of  Greek 

iDiodorus  Siculus,  xvii.  40,  46 ;  Q.  Curtius.  iv.  2.       ' 
«Diod.  XX.  14;  cf.  Justin,  xviii.  7.  7.  »  Herod,  iii.  19 

*Diod.  xi.  21-24 ;  Justiu,  xix.  1,  12. 


civilisation  is  said  to  have  taken  place  in  the  same  year  and 
on  the  very  same  day.^ 

Let  us  now  turn  to  the  political  organisation  of  the  city 
which  achieved  so  rapid  and  marvellous  a  development,  and 
inquire  how  far  it  was  the  effect,  and  how  far  the  cause,  of 
her  prosperity.  The  constitution  of  Carthage  was  not  the 
work  of  a  single  legislator,  as  that  of  Sparta  is  said  to  have 
been,  nor  of  a  series  of  legislators,  like  that  of  Athens ;  it 
was  rather,  like  that  of  England,  the  growth  of  circumstances 
and  of  centuries.  It  obtained  the  praise  of  Aristotle  for 
its  judicious  admixture  of  the  monarchical,  the  oligarchical, 
and  the  democratical  elements.^  The  oligarchical  element, 
he  admits,  tended  from  very  early  times  to  a  predominance ;  ^ 
but  that  it  must  have  been  moderate  and  beneficial  in  the 
use  of  its  power  is  shown,  he  remarks,  by  the  fact  that  its 
rule  was  never  seriously  threatened  either  by  a  despot  from 
above  or  by  the  masses  from  below.*  It  must  be  remem- 
bered— for  much  of  the  confusion  that  exists  with  regard  to 
the  Carthaginian  constitution  is  owing  to  its  being  forgotten 
— that  Aristotle's  remarks  as  to  the  mixed  character  of  the 
Carthaginian  government,  however  true  they  may  be  of  the 
Carthage  of  the  earlier  times,  are  only  true  in  a  limited 
sense  of  the  Carthage  we  know  best — the  Carthage  of  the 
Punic  wars. 

The  original  monarchical  constitution — doubtless  inherited 
from  Tyre — was  represented  (practically  in  Aristotle's  time, 
and  theoretically  to  the  latest  period)  by  two  supreme 
magistrates  called  by  the  Eomans  Suffetes.  Their  name  is 
the  same  as  the  Hebrew  Shofetim,   mistranslated  in  our 

1  Herod,  vii.  166.    See  below,  p.  49. 

2  Aristotle,  Politics,  ii.  11 ;  cf.  also  Polyb.  vi  61,  2.  See  Heeren's  chapter 
on  the  Constitution  of  Carthage  ("Reflexions  on  Trade"),  vol.  L  cap.  3,  to 
which,  in  common  with  all  other  modern  writers  on  Carthage,  I  am  much 
indebted.  He  has  collected  nearly  all  the  information  relating  to  the  obscure 
subject  of  the  constitution  of  Carthage  to  be  found  in  the  ancients ;  obscure, 
however,  it  still  unfortunately  remains. 

»Ari8t.  Pol.  it  11,  8-a  *Arist.  loc.  cU.  2. 


V 


22 


CARTHAGE  AND  THE  CARTHAGINIANS. 


CHANGES  IN  CONSTITUTION, 


33 


Bible,  Judges.  The  Hamilcars  and  Hannos  of  Carthage 
were,  Hke  their  prototypes,  the  Gideons  and  the  Samsons 
of  the  Book  of  Judges,  not  so  much  the  judges,  as  the 
protectors  and  the  rulers  of  their  respective  states.  They 
are  compared  by  Greek  writers  to  the  two  kings  of  Sparta, 
and  by  the  Romans  to  their  own  consuls.^  That  they  were, 
in  the  earliest  times,  appointed  for  life,  and  not,  as  is  commonly 
supposed,  elected  annually,  is  clear  from  a  variety  of  indica- 
tions; and,  Hke  the  "king  of  the  sacrifices"  at  Rome,  and 
the  "king  archon"  at  Athens,  they  seem  when  the  kingly 
ofl&ce  itself  was  abohshed,  to  have  retained  those  priestly 
functions  which,  according  to  ancient  conceptions,  were  in- 
dissolubly  united  with  royalty.^ 

Beneath  these  kings  came,  in  the  older  constitution,  a 
council,  called  by  the  Greeks  the  Gerusia,^  or  Council  of 
Ancients,  consisting  of  twenty-eight  members,  over  which 
the  Sufifetes  presided.  This  council  declared  war,  ordered 
levies  of  troops,  appointed  generals,  sent  out  colonies.*  If 
the  council  and  Suffetes  agreed,  their  decision  was  final; 
if  they  disagreed,  the  matter  was  referred  to  the  people  at 
large.^  In  this  and  in  other  ways  each  element  of  the 
body  politic  had  its  share  in  the  administration  of  the 
state. 

Not  the  least  remarkable  feature  of  the  Carthaginian  con- 
stitution, as  just  described,  is  its  general  resemblance  to 
those  forms  of  government  with  which  we  are  familiar  in 
Greece,  in  Rome,  and  in  the  countries  of  modern  Europe, 
and   which  we  are  apt  to  consider  the  peculiar  property 

J  Aristotle,  locca.  Z;  Polyb.  vi  61,  2;  Livy,  xxx.  7.     "Senatum  itaque 
Suffetes  (quod  velut  consulare  imperium  apud  eos  erat)  vocaverunt."    There 
were  two  Suffetes  also  at  Gades,  and  perhaps  in  all  the  PhcEnician  colonies. 
Livy,  xrviii.  37.     "Suffetes  eorum,  qui  summus  Pcenis  est  magistratus  . 
cruci  adfigi  jussit." 

«Cf.  Herod,  viii.  167,  etc 

»Cf.  Livy,  xxx.  16.  "  Oratores  ad  pacem  petendam  mittunt  trigirta 
seniorum  principes.  Id  erat  sanctius  apud  illos  consilium,  maximaque  ad 
ipsum  senatum  regendum  vis." 

*Cf.  Polyb.  I  31,  8  ;  iii.  33,  2-3 ;  vl  61,  2.  *  Arist  Pa.  il  11.  6. 


of  the  Indo-Germanic  races.  Oriental  in  its  origin,  the  Car- 
thaginian constitution  has  nothing  about  it  which  savours 
of  the  East.  The  general  division  of  authority  between 
king,  senate,  and  assembly,  which  we  find  at  Carthage,  is 
something  for  which  we  look  in  vain  in  any  of  those  eastern 
countries,  Egypt,  Assyria,  Babylonia,  Persia,  Palestine,  with 
which  the  Phoenicians,  before  they  became  naturalised  on 
the  shores  of  the  Western  Mediterranean,  must  have  had 
most  to  do.  In  particular,  the  government  of  Tyre,  the 
mother  city  of  Carthage,  bears  no  resemblance  at  all  to  that 
of  her  daughter.  How  are  we  to  account  for  this  anomaly  ? 
Did  the  Carthaginians,  who  in  general  made  so  little  impres- 
sion on  the  peoples  amongst  whom  they  settled,  and  who 
themselves  gathered  so  little  from  them,  pick  up  from 
the  Greek  towns  with  which,  as  they  travelled  westward, 
they  were  brought  into  contact,  institutions  which  we  usually 
assume  to  be  necessarily  of  home  growth;  or  did  those 
institutions  gradually  grow  up,  after  the  Carthaginians  had 
already  settled  in  the  far  west,  as  the  natural  result  of 
their  environment?  This  we  do  not  know,  and  we  must 
be  content  to  draw  pointed  attention  to  the  fact  alone. 

But,  whatever  account  is  to  be  given  of  its  origin,  the 
Carthaginian  constitution  described  and  praised  by  Aristotle 
is  not  the  same  as  that  of  the  Punic  wars.  In  the  interval 
which  separates  the  two  epochs,  short  as  it  is,  a  great  change, 
which  must  have  been  long  preparing,  had  been  completed. 
The  Sufifetes  had  gradually  become  little  more  than  an  hono- 
rary magistracy.  The  Senate  over  which  they  presided  had 
allowed  the  main  part  of  their  power  to  slip  out  of  their  hands 
into  those  of  another  body,  which,  if  it  seemed  to  be  more 
liberal  in  point  of  numbers  and  in  conformation,  was  much 
more  exclusive  in  policy  and  spirit.  The  appeal  to  the  people 
was  only  now  resorted  to  in  times  of  public  excitement,  when 
the  rulers,  by  appearing  to  share  power,  tried  to  lessen  envy, 
and  allowed  the  citizens  to  go  through  the  form  of  registering 
what,  practically,  they  had  already  decreed.     The  details  of 


24 


CARTHAGE  AND  THE  CARTHAGINIANS. 


CLOSE  OLIGARCHY. 


as 


the  change  are  obscure ;    but  there  are  some  points  which 
are   undisputed   and   are  suflficient   to   indicate   its   general 
character.      The  new  body  consisted  of  104  members,  and 
was  commonly  known  by  the  name  of  "  The  Hundred ". 
Its  members  were  selected  indeed  from  a  larger  body,  who 
were  themselves,  in  some  sense,  the  choice  of  the  people. 
But  the  choice  of  the  people  in  Carthage  fell  only  on  the 
wealthy;   and  these,  when  once  they  had  been  so  chosen, 
were  responsible  to  no  one  for  the  exercise  of  their  pa- 
tronage,!  and  filled  up  the  vacancies  in  the  Hundred  from 
among  themselves,  like  the  members  of  a  close  college.    The 
result  was  an  oHgarchy,  hke  that  of  Venice,  clear-sighted 
and  consistent,  moderate,  nay,  often  wise  in  its  policy,  but 
narrow  in  its  views,  and  often  suspicious  alike  of  its  oppo- 
nents and  of  its  friends. 

By  the  old  constitution  the  Senate  had  the  right  to  control 
the  magistrates ;  but  this  new  body  of  judges  controUed  the 
Senate,  and  therefore,  in  reality,  the  magistrates  also.      Nor 
was  it  content  to  control  the  Senate;   it  practically  super- 
seded it.     Its  members  did  not,  as  a  rule,  appropriate  the 
offices  of  State  to  themselves ;  but  they  could  summon  their 
holders  before  them,  and  so  draw  their  teeth.     No  Shofete, 
no  senator,  no  general,  was  exempt  from  their  irresponsible 
despotism.2    The  Shofetes  presided,  the  senators  dehberated, 
the  generals  fought,  as  it  were,  with  a  halter  round  their 
necks.      The  sentences  passed  by  the  Hundred,  if  they  were 
often  deserved,  were  often  also,  hke  those  of  the  dreaded 
"  Ten  "  at  Venice,  to  whom  they  bore  a  striking  resemblance 
arbitrary  and  cruel.     The  unsuccessful  general,  ahke,  whether 

lArist  PoZ.  il  1,7. 

a  Justin,  xix  2,  6.  "Centum  ex  numero  senatorium  judices  deliguntur 
qui,  reversis  a  bello  ducibus,  rationem  rerum  gestarum  exigerent,  ut  hc^  metu 
ita  m  bello  imperia  cogitarent.  ut  domi  judicia  legesque  respicerenf '  Liw 
if^""^"*  .f  •  ^]  f^*^^«  *^**  »*  tte  end  of  the  Second  Punic  War  the  office  of 
judge  had  become  an  office  for  life;  there  was  therefore  no  check  at  all 
upon  the  abuse  of  its  powers :  "  Res  fama.  vitaque  omnium  in  illorum  potestate 
erat ;  qui  unum  ejus  ordinis,  idem  omnes  adversos  habebat " 


his  ill-success  was  the  result  of  uncontrollable  circumstances 
or  of  culpable  neglect,  might  be  condemned  to  crucifixion ;  ^ 
indeed,  he  often  wisely  anticipated  his  sentence  by  committing 
suicide. 

Within  the  ranks  of  this  close  oligarchy  first-rate  ability 
would  seem  to  have  been  at  a  discount.  Indeed  the  exact 
equality  of  all  within  the  privileged  ranks  is  as  much  a 
principle  of  oligarchy  as  is  the  equal  suppression  of  all  that 
is  outside  of  it.  Language  bears  testimony  to  this  in  the 
name  given  aUke  to  the  Homoioi  of  Sparta  and  the  "  Peers  " 
of  England.  It  was  jealousy,  for  instance,  of  the  superior 
abilities  of  the  family  of  Mago,  and  their  prolonged  pre- 
eminence in  the  Carthaginian  State,  which  had  in  the  fifth 
century  B.C.  cemented  the  alliance  between  other  and  less 
able  families  of  the  aristocracy,  and  so,  according  to  the 
express  testimony  of  Justin ,2  had  first  given  rise  to  this 
very  institution  of  the  Hundred  Judges  ;  and  it  was  the 
same  mean  jealousy  of  all  that  is  above  itself,  which,  after- 
wards, in  the  time  of  the  Punic  wars,  united  as  one  man  a 
large  part  of  the  ruling  ohgarchs  in  the  vain  efifort  to  control 
and  to  thwart,  and  to  annoy  with  a  thousand  petty  annoy- 
ances, the  one  family  of  consummate  ability  which  Carthage 
then  possessed,  that  noble-minded  Barcinegens,  that  "  lion's 
brood,"  ^  who  were  brought  to  the  front  in  those  troublous 
times  by  the  sheer  force  of  their  genius,  and  who,  for  three 
generations — in  the  persons  of  Hamilcar  Barca,  his  son-in- 
law,  Hasdrubal,  and  his  three  sons,  Hannibal,  Hasdrubal, 
and  Mago — ruled  by  the  best  of  all  rights — the  right  Divine 
— that  of  unswerving  devotion  to  their  country,  of  the  ability 
to  rule,  and  the  will  to  use  that  abihty  well. 

But  if  we  assert,  as  we  have  impUed,  that  it  was  the 
want  of  power  rather  than  of  will  on  the  part  of  the  ruhng 
ohgarchy,  which  ever  left  to  the  general-in-chief  that  ab- 

1  Ct  Polybius,  L  11,  6 ;  Diod.  xx.  10 ;  VaL  Max.  il  7,  1  ext. ;  Zouaras, 
viii.  11  and  17. 

2  Justin,  xix.  2,  5-6.  =»Val.  Max.  ix.  3.  2  ext. 


26 


CARTHAGE  AND  THE  CARTHAGINIANS. 


MERITS  OF  THE  CONSTITUTION, 


a? 


solute  command  and  that  unlimited  term  of  office,  which, 
to  our  minds,  is  essential  to  the  prosecution  of  a  great  and 
distant  war,  we  must  take  care  that  we  are  just.      Our  ideas 
of  the  Carthaginian  constitution  are  derived,  such  as  thoy 
are,  always  from  foreign,  and  almost  always  from  unfriendly 
sources.     Moreover,  the  information  given  us  on  such  a  sub- 
ject is — all  questions  of  bias  or  prejudice  apart — necessarily 
even  more  fragmentary,  and  derived  from  far  more  imperfect 
data,  than  is  our  knowledge  of  the  material  resources,  or 
the  external  relations  of  Carthage.     The  student  of  Cartha- 
ginian history  stands,  therefore,  in  the  position  of  the  judge 
who,  when  there  is  no  counsel  to  be  found  for  the  accused,  is 
himself,  in  some  measure,  bound  to  undertake  that  office. 
If  the  scales  of  justice  are  to  be  held  even,  he  must  look 
upon  himself  as  so  far  holding  a  brief  for  the  defence,  as 
to  be  bound  to  suggest  everything  that  may  fairly  be  urged 
in  suspense  of  an  adverse  judgment.      And  that  the  judg- 
ments of  the  Hundred  were  not  always  so  arbitrary,  and  the 
policy  of  the  aristocracy  not  always  so  ungenerous,  as  is 
often  supposed,  is  clear  from  two  indisputable  facts:    first, 
that  the  best  and  ablest  citizens  were  never  backward  to 
place  their  services,  in  time  of  war,  at  the  disposal  of  the 
government ;  and,  secondly,  that  no  general  of  mark,  how- 
ever popular  he  might   be   with  his   soldiers,  or  however 
much  fortune  might  have  frowned  upon  his  enterprises,  ever 
attempted  to  use  his  power  for  the  overthrow  of  the  consti- 
tution.     Such  was  not  the  experience  of  either  Greece  or 
Kome;    and  we  cannot,  therefore,  help  feeling,  in  spite  of 
what  the  Greek  and  Roman  writers  say,  that  there  must 
have  been  at  Carthage  a  general  feeling  of  satisfaction  with 
the  government,  and  an  expectation  of  substantial  justice 
at  their  hands. 

Nor,  again,  is  the  verdict  of  the  Greek  and  Roman  writers 
by  any  means  so  unanimous  or  so  unfavourable  as  is  often 
supposed.  One  of  them,  and  he  the  greatest  political  philo- 
sopher of  antiquity,  says  emphatically,  as  has  been  already 


hinted,  "  the  Carthaginians  seem  to  me  to  be  a  well-governed 
people  " ;  while,  in  another  place,  he  classes  Carthage  with 
Crete  and  Lacedaemon,  each  of  which  "  deserved  to  stand  in 
high  repute  ".1  And  this,  the  dehberate  judgment  of  Aris- 
totle, is  in  itself  sufl&cient  to  make  us  receive  with  much  sus- 
picion the  statements  of  the  Romans  who  hated  the  Cartha- 
ginians as  their  rivals,  and  of  the  Greeks  who  despised  them 
as  barbarians.2  Had  Aristotle's  treatise  on  governments, 
which  contained  a  special  account  of  Carthage,  been  pre- 
served to  us,  a  flood  of  light  would  probably  have  been 
thrown  on  this  most  obscure  subject,  and  it  is  more  than 
probable  that  the  unfavourable  view  which  we  are  led,  from 
the  materials  now  before  us,  to  form  of  the  Carthaginian 
constitution,  would  have  been  considerably  modified. 

It  appears  from  the  chapters  in  the  Politics,  to  which 
reference  has  been  already  made,  that  what  most  attracted 
the  admiration  of  the  Greek  philosopher  in  the  Carthaginian 
constitution  was  its  stability,  and  its  immunity  from  violent 
revolution.  In  Crete  and  in  Sparta  this  great  object  of 
government  was  obtained  under  conditions  which  did  not 
exist  at  Carthage.  There  was  nothing  at  Carthage  analogous 
to  the  complete  isolation  of  Crete,  or  to  that  iron  system  of 
Spartan  education  which  turned  men  into  machines,  and 
subordinated  all  other  considerations  to  that  of  the  military 
greatness  of  the  state.  If  we  know  little  of  the  circumstances 
which  at  Carthage  produced  so  desirable  a  result,  the  result 
itself  is  certain.  Much,  perhaps,  turned  on  the  nature  of  the 
Carthaginian  aristocracy.  The  patriciate  at  Carthage,  unlike 
that  of  early  Rome,  was  not,  in  the  strict  sense  of  the  word, 
hereditary.  It  depended  as  much  upon  wealth  as  upon 
birth, 2  and  where  wealth  could  be  had  almost  for  the  asking, 

1  Arist  Pol.  U.XII  and  16. 

2  Cf.   Plutarch,   Timoleon,  xvii. :  ttip  waAau  ktyoiitvnv  iKfiappApwaiv,  and  xx. 

TOV«   KOKiaTOVi   Koi   fffOViKtardrovi   Kapxn^oviovt    iyyvrtpta    icaroiKi^oi'rec   ijfutv.       Cf. 

the  proverbial  4>oii'tKwv  <n>i^«ai  for  sharp  dealing. 

•*  Arist.    Pol.    iU    Xi.    8 :    ov  ^dfoi'  ipurrlvSriv   oAAa  koX   nXovrivStiv  otovrat  Self 
•ipeia^ai  TOV«  apxovTas.      Cf.  10,  «»'ijTas  tlvm  rot  fityiara^  tuv  apxutv. 


a8 


CARTHAGE  AND  THE  CARTHAGINIANS. 


SOCIAL  LIFE. 


^ 


I-  ^* 


as  was  the  case  at  Carthage,  by  the  exercise  of  a  little 
commercial  energy,  and  where  discontent  among  the  masses 
could  always  be  quieted  by  the  ready  expedient  of  drafting 
them  off  to  the  virgin  soil  which  was  always  open  to  them 
along  the  coasts  of  the  Mediterranean  and  the  Atlantic,  there 
would  be  no  need  for  the  frequent  secessions  and  the  long 
constitutional  struggles  which  alone  were  able  to  raise  the 
plebeians  at  Rome  to  equality  with  their  masters. 

Nor,  again,  if  the  government  of  Carthage  knew,  as 
certainly  they  did,  how  to  make  full  use  of  their  advantages, 
would  there  be  any  room  for  these  internecine  feuds  between 
city  and  city,  and  between  different  factions  of  the  same  city, 
which  make  up  so  large  a  part  of  the  history  of  Greece,  or  of 
the  republics  of  mediaeval  Italy.  Well  might  the  Greek  cities 
which,  of  Sicily,  as  Thucydides  tells  us,  *'  swarmed  with  a 
heterogeneous  population,  and  were  always  liable  to  partial 
or  complete  changes  of  government "  i— envy  the  stability  of 
their  great  neighbour  across  the  Mediterranean,  who,  what- 
ever her  faults,  and  whatever  the  misery  of  her  subject  races, 
yet  seems  to  have  held  a  homogeneous  people  within  her 
walls,  and  to  have  retained  from  age  to  age  the  same  form  of 
government.  Well,  too,  might  the  Romans  themselves, 
when  once  they  had  been  freed  by  the  lapse  of  a  century 
from  the  terror  with  which  they  had  so  long  regarded 
Carthage,  afford,  in  the  midst  of  their  own  civil  wars  and 
their  proscription  lists,  to  be  at  least  so  far  generous  to  her 
memory  as  to  endorse  the  words  of  Cicero,  in  his  treatise  on 
Governments:  "Neither  could  Carthage  have  maintained 
her  pre-eminent  position  for  six  hundred  years  had  she  not 
been  governed  with  wisdom  and  with  statesmanship  ".» 

If  we  try,  as  we  cannot  help  trying,  to  picture  to  ourselves 

1  Thucyd.  Vi.  17  :  ©xAois  ri  yap  fw/*fii«Toiv  iroAvai'«pow<rti'  at  »oAeis,  koX  ptfSCat 
txovai  ri>v  noXiTtihtv  ra^  fiera/3oAaf  icai  cirijoxa?. 

2 Cicero  de  Repiiblica,  ii.  48  :  "Nee  tantum  Carthago  habuisset  opum  sex- 
centos  fere  annos  sine  consiliia  et  disciplina  ".  "  Disciplina  "  in  the  mouth  of  a 
Roman  means  much  more  than  either  statesmanship  or  discipline,  and  is  one  of 
the  highest  terms  of  praise  he  could  give. 


the  daily  life  and  personal  characteristics  of  the  people  whose 
political  organisation  has  been  just  described,  and  to  ask,  not 
what  the  Carthaginians  did— for  that  we  know — but  what 
they  were,  we  are  confronted  by  the  provoking  blank  in  the 
national  history  which  has  been  already  noticed.     Such  few 
indications  as  we  have  are  in  thorough  keeping  with  the 
view  we  have  taken  of  the  poHtical  exclusiveness  of  the  ruling 
clique.     There  were  public  baths ;  but  since  no  member  of 
the  Senate  would  bathe  where  the  people  bathed,  a  special 
class  of  baths  were  set  apart  for  their  use.^     There  were 
public  messes,  as  they  were  called ;  but  these  were  not,  as 
Aristotle  supposed,  analogous  to  the  Spartan  Syssitia,^  an 
institution  intended  to  foster  manliness  and  simplicity  of  hfe. 
The   black  broth  of  the  heroes  of  Sparta  would  not  have 
suited  the  Carthaginian  nobles,  who,  clad  in  their  famous 
cloth  dyed  twice  over  with  the  purple  dye  of  their  African, 
their  Spanish,  or  their  Tyrian  fisheries,^  and  decorated  with 
the  finely-cut  glass  beads,  the  invention  of  their  Phcenician 
forefathers,*  fared  sumptuously  on  their  abounding  flocks  and 
herds,  or  on  such  dehcious  fruits — figs  and  oranges,  lemons 
and  pomegranates^ — as  those  with  which  Cato  moved  the 
astonishment  and  the  envy  of  the  senators  of  Rome.     The 
Carthaginian  Syssitia  were  incentives  to  luxury,  not  checks 
upon  it ;  they  were  clubs  formed  originally  for  social  gather- 
ings, and  afterwards  applied  to  the  purposes  of  political  gossip 
or  corruption.     Wine  of  all  varieties  there  must  have  been 
in  abundance  in  a  city  which  commanded  the  trade  of  the 
Mediterranean,  and  which  thought  it  desirable,  during  one 

1  Valerius  Maximus,  ix.  5,  4  ext. 

2Arist.  Pol.  il  11.  3;  cf.  Livy,  xxxiv.  61:  **In  circulis  convivisque  cele- 
brata  sermonibus  res  est ;  deinde  in  senatu  quidam,"  etc. 

»Hor.  Epode,  xu.  21:  '•Muricibus  Tyriis  iterata  vellera  lanae,"  aud  Ode, 
ii.  16,  35,  "te  bis  Afro  murice  tinctae"  ;  these  garments  were  called  5ipa<tta. 

*  Pliny,  Hist.  Nat.  xxxvi.  65 ;  Tac  Hist.  v.  7. 

8 Pomegranates  were  called  "  Punica  mala".    Plin.  Hist.  Nat.  xiii.  19  ;  c£ 

Ovid,  Fasti,  iv.  607. 

Rapta  tribus  dixit,  solvit  jejunia  grania. 
Punica  qua  leuto  cortice  poma  teguut 


30 


CARTHAGE  AND  THE  CARTHAGINIANS, 


SPLENDOUR  OF  THE  CITY, 


31 


^H 


IM 


portion  of  her  history  at  least,  to  prohibit  such  of  her  own 
citizens  from  its  use  as  were  employed  in  her  active  service.* 
Dining-tables  of  the  costly  citron  wood — a  single  specimen 
of  which,  Pliny  tells  us,  in  the  time  of  the  Boman  Empire 
cost  as  much  as  a  broad  estate — must  have  been  common 
amongst  those  who  monopolised  the  commerce  of  the  countries 
where  alone  the  citron  tree  grows. ^  Gold  and  silver  plate 
cannot  have  been  rare  amongst  those  who  controlled  the 
rich  mines  of  Spain,  and  to  whom  their  ambassadors  reported, 
with  a  touch  of  scorn,  upon  their  return  from  Rome,  that 
they  had  been  hospitably  entertained  by  senator  after 
senator,  but  that  one  service  of  plate  had  done  duty  for  all. 
Objects  of  fine  art — statues,  and  paintings,  and  embroideries 
— there  were  in  abundance  at  Carthage,  but  they  were  the 
work  of  Greek,  not  of  Phoenician  artists,  and  their  abundance 
indicated  not  so  much  the  genius,  critical  or  creative,  of  the 
Carthaginian  community,  as  the  number  of  Greek  towns — 
Selinus  and  Himera,  Gela  and  Agrigentum — sacked  in  the 
Sicilian  wars.  The  first  commercial  state  of  antiquity  of 
course  possessed  a  gold  and  silver  coinage  of  its  own ;  but 
of  the  coins  which  have  come  down  to  us  it  is  very  doubtful 
whether  many  belong  to  the  Phoenician  city,  and  it  is  certain 
that  those  which  are  in  any  way  remarkable  for  the  beauty 
of  their  design  or  execution — as,  for  instance,  the  famous  coin 
representing  the  horse's  head,  which  is  said  to  have  been  dug 
up  when  the  foundations  of  the  city  were  laid,  and  was 
supposed  to  typify  at  once  its  military  greatness  and  its 
fertiUty^ — were  struck  in  Sicilian  mints  and  designed  by 

1  Arist  (Econ.  i.  5. 

3  "  Latifundii  taxatione  si  quis  pnedia  tanto  mercari  velit."    See  Pliny,  Hist. 
Nat.  ziil  28-30 ;  and  cf.  Martial,  xiv.  89. 

Accipe  felices,  Atlantica  munera  sylvas : 
Aurea  qui  dederit  dona,  minora  dabit. 
Cf.  also  the  phrase  "  Mauri  orbes  ". 
•Virgil,  ^n.  i.  443. 

Effodere  loco  signum,  quod  regia  Juno 
Monstrarat,  caput  acris  equi ;  sic  nam  fore  bello 
Egregiam  et  faqjiem  victu  per  ssecula  gentem. 


Greek  artists.  In  the  issue,  however,  of  a  leathern  money 
of  a  representative  value,  which  would  circulate  throughout 
her  dependencies,  Carthage  seems,  alone  of  the  commercial 
states  of  antiquity,  to  have  anticipated  the  convenient  inven- 
tion by  modern  economists  of  a  paper  money.* 

Of  the  architecture  of  the  city  we  have  no  adequate  account ; 
but  the  gilded  temple  and  statue  of  Apollo  in  the  Forum ; 
the  Numidian  marble,  on  the  possession  of  which  even  the 
Romans  prided  themselves,'^  and  which  still  strews  the 
surface  of  the  ground  with  innumerable  fragments;  the 
mosaic  pavements  found  far  below  the  surface  of  the  ground, 
too  far  below  it  to  belong  to  any  but  the  Phoenician  city; 
the  ivory  and  amber  and  ebony  which  we  know  were  common 
articles  of  Carthaginian  commerce,  enable  us,  without  drawing 
unduly  either  on  the  poetic  descriptions  of  Virgil,  or  on  the 
pictures  of  Turner,  to  realise  something  of  its  general  splendour 
and  magnificence.  At  all  events,  they  enable  us  better  to 
point  the  contrast  between  the  luxury  of  the  city,  and  the 
squalid  huts  made  of  branches  of  trees  daubed  with  clay,^ 
which  had  once  covered  the  ground  where  Carthage  now 
stood,  and  in  which  the  inhabitants  of  the  country  districts 
dragged  on  a  precarious  existence,  hiding  their  grain,  like 
their  descendants  the  Kabyles  of  the  present  day,  or  like 
the  Israelites  in  the  time  of  Gideon,  in  holes  in  the  ground, 
if  haply  they  might  save  it  from  a  worse  than  Midianite 
oppression. 

According  to  another  legend  (Justin,  xviii.  5,  15-16),  the  head  of  an  ox  was 
first  dug  up,  which  indicated  only  the  fertility  of  the  soil.  Afterwards  came 
the  far  better  omen  of  military  greatness,  the  head  of  a  war  liorse.  "  Cacabe," 
the  old  name  of  Carthage,  is  said  to  have  meant  "a  horse's  head".  Hence 
probably  the  origin  of  the  legend. 

^iEsch.  Dial.  Socrat.  p.  78,  ed.  Fischer:  Aristid.  Orat.  Platon.  iL  p.  146 
(quoted  by  Heeren). 

*  Horace,  Ode,  ii.  18,  4 :  "  columnas  ultima  recisas  Africa  ".  Juvenal,  Sat. 
212 :  '  •  longis  Numidarum  fulta  columnis  ". 

'Called  "  mapalia"  or  "  magalia  ".  Virg.  Oeorgic.  iii.  340 :  "  raris  habitata 
mapalia  tectis".  And  uEn.  i.  421:  "Miratur  molem  iEneas,  magaiia  quon- 
dam". Sallust  (Jiigurtha,  xviii.)  describes  them  as  being  oblong,  with  sides 
curved  like  the  keel  of  a  ship. 


1 1 


3t 


CARTHAGE  AND  THE  CARTHAGINIANS. 


CARTHAGINIAN  RELIGION, 


33 


ill 


Carthage  was,  beyond  doubt,  the  richest  city  of  antiquity. 
Her  ships  were  to  be  found  on  all  known  seas,  and  there  was 
probably  no  important  product,  animal,  vegetable,  or  mineral, 
of  the  ancient  world,  which  did  not  find  its  way  into  her 
harbours  and  pass  through  the  hands  of  her  citizens.  But 
her  commercial  policy  was  not  more  far-sighted  or  more 
liberal  than  has  been  that  of  other  commercial  states,  even 
till  very  modern  times.  Free  trade  was  unknown  to  her ;  it 
would  have  seemed  indeed  like  a  contradiction  in  terms. 
If  she  admitted  foreign  merchantmen  by  treaty  to  her  own 
harbour,  she  took  care  by  the  same  document  jealously  to 
exclude  them  from  the  more  important  harbours  of  her  de- 
pendencies. She  allowed  her  colonies  to  trade  only  so  far  as 
suited  her  own  immediate  interests,  and  the  precautions  she 
took  made  it  impossible  for  any  one  of  them  ever  to  become 
a  great  centre  of  commerce,  still  less  to  dream  of  taking  her 

place. 

It  is  remarkable,  again,  that  while  in  no  city  in  the  ancient 
world  did  commerce  rank  so  high,  the  noblest  citizens  even 
of  Carthage  seem  to  have  left  commercial  enterprise  to 
those  who  came  next  below  them  in  the  social  scale.  They 
preferred  to  live  on  their  estates  as  agriculturists  or  country 
gentlemen,  and  derive  their  princely  revenues  from  their  farms 
or  their  mines,  which  were  worked  by  prodigious  gangs  of 
slaves.  The  cultivation  of  the  soil  was,  probably,  nowhere 
in  the  ancient  world  carried  on  with  such  rich  results  as  in 
the  smiling  country  which  surrounded  Carthage.  When 
Agathocles,  tyrant  of  Syracuse,  boldly  ventured  to  transfer 
to  Africa  the  war  he  was  waging  with  doubtful  success  in 
Sicily,  he  led  his  army,  we  are  told,  through  a  country 
crowded  with  gardens  and  plantations,  everywhere  intersected 
with  canals,  by  which  they  were  plentifully  watered.  Landed 
estates  succeeded  to  each  other  in  continuous  succession,  each 
adorned  with  splendid  mansions,  which  revealed  the  wealth 
of  the  owners.  Prolonged  peace  had  stored  their  abodes  with 
everything  which  nature  or  art  could  supply;  the  country 


was  fertile  with  every  species  of  fruit  tree ;  flocks  and  herds 
and  brood-mares  abounded  in  their  pastures.  Here  dwelt  tie 
richest  of  the  Carthaginians,  and  vied  with  each  other  in 
pomp  and  luxury.^ 

But  the  most  important  factor  in  the  history  of  a  people — 
especially  if  it  be  a  Semitic  people — is  its  religion.  The  religion 
of  the  Carthaginians  was  what  their  race,  their  language,  and 
their  history  would  lead  us  to  expect.  It  was,  with  slight 
modifications,  the  religion  of  the  Canaanites,  the  religion,  that 
is,  which,  in  spite  of  the  purer  Monotheism  of  the  Hebrew « 
and  the  higher  teaching  of  their  prophets,  so  long  exercise^l 
a  fatal  fascination  over  the  great  bulk  of  the  Hebrew  raco. 
The  Phoenician  religion  has  been  defined  to  be  "  a  deification 
of  the  powers  of  Nature,  which  naturally  developed  into  a  i 
adoration  of  the  objects  in  which  those  powers  seemed  most 
active  ".2  Of  this  adoration  the  Sun  and  Moon  were  the 
primary  objects.  The  Sun  can  either  create  or  destroy,  he 
can  give  life  or  take  it  away.  The  Moon  is  his  consort ;  she 
can  neither  create  nor  destroy,  but  she  can  receive  and  develop, 
and,  as  the  queen  of  night,  she  presides  alike  over  its  stillness 
and  its  orgies.  Each  of  these  ruling  deities,  Baal-Moloch  or 
the  Sun-god,  and  the  horned  Astarte  or  the  crescent  Moon — 
worshipped  at  Carthage,  it  would  seem,  under  the  name  of 
Tanith — would  thus  have  an  ennobling  as  well  as  a  degrading, 
a  more  cheerful  as  well  as  a  more  gloomy,  aspect.  Un- 
fortunately, it  was  the  gloomy  and  debasing  side  of  their 
worship  which  tended  to  predominate  alike  in  Phoenicia 
proper  and  in  the  greatest  of  the  Phoenician  colonies. 

Baal-Moloch  was  a  malignant  deity ;  he  was  the  fire  god, 
rejoicing  *'  in  human  sacrifices  and  in  parents'  tears  ".  His 
worshippers  gashed  and  mutilated  themselves  in  their  reli- 
gious frenzy.  Like  Kronos  or  Saturn — to  whom  the  Greeks 
and  Komans  aptly  enough  compare  him — he  was  the  de- 
vourer  of  his  own  children.    In  times  of  unbroken  security 


1  Diodorus  Siculus.  xz.  8. 


*  Movers, 


m 


34 


CARTHAGE  AND  THE  CARTHAGINIANS. 


CHARACTER  OF  THE  WORSHIP. 


II 


35 


the  Carthaginians  neglected  or  forgot  him ;  but  when  they 
were  elated  by  an  unlooked-for  victory,  or  depressed  by  a 
sudden  reverse,  that  fanaticism  which  is  often  dormant  but 
never  altogether  absent  from  the  Semitic  breast,  burst  forth 
into  a  devouring  flame,  which  gratified  to  the  full  his  thirst 
for  human  blood. ^ 

Tanith  or  Astarte,  in  the  nobler  aspects  which  she  some- 
times presented,  as  the  goddess  of  wedded  love  or  war,  of 
the  chase,  or  of  peaceful  husbandry,  was  identified  by  the 
Romans,  now  with  Juno,  now  with  Diana,  and  now  again 
with  Ceres ;  but,  unfortunately,  it  was  when  they  identified 
her  w4th  their  Venus  Ccelestis  that  they  came  nearest  to  the 
truth.  Her  worship,  like  that  of  the  Babylonian  Mylitta, 
required  immorality,  nay,  it  consecrated  it.  The  *'  abomina- 
tion of  the  Sidonians"  was  also  the  abomination  of  the 
Carthaginians.2 

To  one  or  other  of  these  two  deities  almost  all  the  votive 
tablets  disinterred  at  Carthage,  whether  they  belong  to  the 
Phoenician  or  the  Eoman  city,  are  dedicated. ^  How  deeply 
the  practices  that  their  worship  sanctioned  must  have  been 
rooted  in  the  hearts  of  the  Phoenician  people  is  clear  from  the 
fact  that  long  after  Carthage  and  the  Carthaginians  had  been 
swept  away;  when  a  new  Eoman  city  had  taken  its  place, 
subject  to  Eoman  laws,  and  administered  by  Eoman  magis- 
trates, but  ^peopled,  in  great  part,  by  such  waifs  and  strays  of 
the  Phoenician  population  as  could  be  got  together  from  the 
adjoining  districts  of  Africa,  with  the  rising  temples  came 
back  also  their  chartered  libertinism  and  their  human  sacri- 
fices. A  Eoman  proconsul,  named  Tiberius,  endeavoured  to 
check  the  practice  of  human  sacrifice  by  hanging  the  priests 
on  the  trees  of  their  own  sacred  groves.     But  this  violent 

1  Diod.  Sic.  XX.  14  and  65  ;  Silius  Italicus.  iv.  765-773.  See  below,  pp.  109- 
111. 

2  See  Herod,  i.  199,  for  worship  of  Mylitta  at  Babylon  ;  for  that  of  Venus 
at  Sicca,  see  Val.  Max.  u.  6,  15  ext. ;  and  of.  Justin,  xviii.  5,  4. 

3  See  Davis,  Carthage  and  her  Remains,  p.  256  sq.  and  plates ;  cf.  also 
Beul^.  FouilUs  a  Carthage,  plate  3. 


attempt  to  suppress  the  deep  religious  instincts  of  a  people 
who  even  then  called  themselves  Canaan ites  was  not  more 
successful  than  had  been  the  peaceful  effort  said  to  have  been 
made  with  the  same  object  by  Darius  nearly  five  centuries 
before  Christ.^  And  for  several  centuries  after  Christ  wo 
find  that  Christian  bishops,  such  as  Cyprian,  or  Christian 
Fathers,  such  as  TertuUian  and  Augustine,  are  loud  in  their 
denunciations  of  the  immoralities  belonging  to  a  worship 
which  had  been  so  long  forbidden  and  so  long  retained. 

Other  gods  of  whom  we  read,  such  as  Esmun  or  ^scu- 
lapius,  to  whom  the  temple  on  the  Byrsa,  the  finest  in  the 
whole  city,2  ^^g  dedicated;  Apollo,  whose  temple,  adorned 
with  plates  of  gold,  excited  the  cupidity  of  the  Eoman  soldiers 
even  amidst  the  horrors  of  the  final  assault,  and  whose 
colossal  statue  was  afterwards  carried  off  to  Eome ;  ^  Demeter 
and  Persephone,  whose  worship  was  imported  from  Sicily 
after  a  pestilence  which  had  broken  out  in  the  Carthaginian 
army  as  a  punishment  for  the  desecration  of  their  temples  ;  * 
— all  these  gods  were  doubtless  originally  looked  upon  only 
as  manifestations  of  the  two  superior  deities,  but  in  time  they 
assumed  a  separate  existence  of  their  own. 

But  there  was  one  of  these  inferior  gods  who  stood  in  such 
a  peculiar  relation  to  Carthage,  and  whose  worship  seems  to 
have  been  so  much  more  genial  and  so  much  more  spiritual 
than  the  rest,  that  we  are  fain  to  dwell  upon  it  as  a  foil  to 
what  has  preceded.  This  god  was  Melcarth,  that  is,  Melech- 
Kirjath,  or  the  king  of  the  city ;  he  is  called  by  the  Greeks 
"  the  Phoenician  Hercules,"  and  his  name  itself  has  passed, 
with  a  slight  alteration,  into  Greek  mythology  as  Melicertes. 
The  city  of  which  he  was  pre-eminently  the  god  was  Tyre. 
There  he  had  a  magnificent  temple,  which  was  visited  for 

1  Justin,  xix.  1, 10-13.     "  Interrogati,"  says  Augustine,  "rvstici  nostri  quid 
sint,  Punic^  respondent,  Chananl" 
'Appian,  Pun.  vi.  130. 

'Plutarch,  FlamininuSf  L  ;  Appian,  Pun.  127. 
*Diod.  Sic  xiv.  77. 


36 


CARTHAGE  AND  THE  CARTHAGINIANS. 


antiquarian  purposes  by  Herodotus.  ^  It  contained  two 
splendid  pillars — one  of  pure  gold ;  the  other,  as  Herodotus 
believed,  of  emerald,  which  shone  brilliantly  at  night — but 
there  was  no  image  of  the  god  to  be  seen.  The  same  was 
the  case  in  his  famous  temple  at  Thasos,  and  the  still  more 
famous  one  at  Gades,  which  contained  an  oracle,  a  hierarchy 
of  priests,  and  a  mysterious  spring  which  rose  and  fell  in- 
versely with  the  tide,  but  still  no  image.'^  At  Carthage 
Melcarth  had  not  even  a  temple.  The  whole  city  was  his 
temple,  and  he  refused  to  be  locahsed  in  any  particular  part 
of  it.  He  received,  there  is  reason  to  believe,  no  sacrifices 
of  blood;  and  it  was  his  comparatively  pure  and  spiritual 
worship  which,  as  we  see  repeatedly  in  Carthaginian  history, 
formed  a  chief  link  in  the  chain  that  bound  the  parent  to  the 
various  daughter-cities  scattered  over  the  coasts  and  islands 
of  the  Mediterranean. 

The  Carthaginian  proper  names  which  have  come  down  to 
us  form  one  among  many  proofs  of  the  depth  of  their  religious 
feeUngs  ;  for  they  are  all,  or  nearly  all,  compounded  with  the 
name  of  one  or  other  of  their  chief  gods.  Hamilcar  is  he 
whom  Melcarth  protects ;  Hasdrubal  is  he  whose  help  is  in 
Baal ;  Hannibal,  the  Hanniel  of  the  Bible,  is  the  grace  of 
Baal ;  and  so  on  with  Bomilcar,  Himilco,  Ethbaal,  Maherbal, 
Adherbal,  and  Mastanabal. 

A  considerable  native  literature  there  must  have  been  at 
Carthage,  for  Mago,  a  Carthaginian  Shofete,  did  not  disdain 
to  write  a  treatise  of  tw^enty- eight  books  upon  the  agricultural 
pursuits  which  formed  the  mainstay  of  his  order ;  and  when 
the  Roman  Senate,  in  their  fatuous  disregard  for  intellect, 
gave  over  with  careless  profusion  to  their  friends,  the  Berber 

1  Herod,  ii.  44.  Another  name  of  the  god  was  Baal-Tzur,  i.e.  the  god  of 
Tyre. 

2Sil.  Ital.  iii.  30:~ 

Sed  nulla  effigies,  simulacrave  nota  deorum. 
MaJ  estate  locum  et  sacro  implevere  timore. 


CARTHAGINtAN  LITERATURE. 


31 


chiefs,^  the  contents  of  all  the  libraries  they  had  found  in 
Carthage,  they  reserved  for  this  work  the  especial  honour  of 
an  authorised  translation  into  Latin,  and  of  a  formal  recom- 
mendation of  its  practical  maxims  to  the  thrifty  husbandmen 
of  Rome.- 

That  many  smaller  works  upon  the  same  subject  must 
have  existed  at  Carthage  before  a  work  of  such  magnitude 
could  have   been  produced  by  a  man  who  was  an  active 
general  as  well  as  an  agriculturist  is  evident  enough.     That 
the  intrinsic  merits  of  Mago's  treatise  were  not  inferior  to  its 
bulk  is  also  clear  from  the  influence  which  the  authorised 
translation  at  once  asserted  and  long  maintained  at  Rome. 
What  Aristotle  was  to  the  mediaeval  philosophers  and  theo- 
logians, that  Mago  seems  to  have  been,  in  his  measure,  to 
the  Italian  agriculturists.     Varro,  the  most  learned  of  the 
Romans,  and  the  author,  among  489  other  publications,  of 
the  most  valuable  treatise  on  ancient  agriculture  which  we 
possess,  quotes  Mago  as  the  highest  authority  on  the  sub- 
ject,3  and  other  Roman  writers  have  handed  down  to  us,  with 
no  less  respect,  various  maxims  on  the  breeding  and  manage- 
ment of  cattle,  the  care  of  poultry  and  of  bees,  the  planting 
of  forest  trees,  and  the  treatment  of  the  vine  and  the  olive, 
the  almond  and  the  pomegranate,  all  drawn  from  the  same 
fountain  head.      *'  We  honour,"   says   Columella,    "  above 
all  other  writers,   Mago   the    Carthaginian,   the    father  of 
husbandry."*    Nor  can  a  work  which  stood  the  test  of  a 
translation  into  Greek,  as  well  as  into  Latin,  have  been  alto- 
gether destitute  of  literary  merit.    Be  that  as  it  may,  what  we 
know  of  this  one  specimen  of  Carthaginian  literature  does  not 
dispose  us  to  view  with  more  indulgence  the  criminal  care- 
lessness of  the  Romans.     If  they  destroyed  the  city  and  its 


1  Pliny,  Bist.  Nat.  xviii.  5:  "regulis  Africe". 

2  The  chief  translator  was  one  D.  Silanus ;  a  good  Punic  scholar.  It  was 
also  translated  into  Greek  by  Cassius  Dionysius  of  Utica.  Varro,  i.  1,  10 
(quoted  by  Heeren).    See  his  appendix  on  Mago's  work. 

•Varro,  i.  1,  10.  *  Columella,  I  1,  13. 


3^ 


dAkfHAGE  AND  THk  CARTHAGWtANS. 


CARTHAGINIAN  MERCENAktM, 


3d 


inhabitants,  they  might  have  taken  steps  to  preserve  its 
literature;  at  all  events  they  need  not  have  handed  it  over 
to  its  most  illiterate  and  inveterate  enemies.  But  having 
done  a  deed  of  which  some  of  the  better  spirits  even  amongst 
themselves  were  ashamed,  they  determined,  as  it  would  seem, 
to  leave  nothing  which  could  unnecessarily  remind  them  of 
it.  A  century  later,  Sallust  saw  some  of  these  very  Cartha- 
ginian books,  the  property,  as  he  was  told,  of  King  Hiempsal.^ 
What  little  of  their  contents  on  other  subjects  he  was  able  to 
gather  from  his  interpreters  he  embodied  in  his  history  of 
the  Jugurthine  War ;  but  when  he  reaches  the  point  where 
he  would  naturally  have  launched  out  on  Carthage,  it  is  with 
a  touch  of  sadness,  not  unmixed,  as  we  would  fain  hope, 
with  shame,  that  he  passes  on  with  the  remark,  **  I  say 
nothing  about  Carthage,  for  I  think  it  is  better  to  say  nothing 
about  her,  than  to  say  too  little  ".2 

Those  members  of  the  Carthaginian  aristocracy  who  did 
not  find  a  sufficient  field  for  their  ability  in  agriculture  or  in 
politics,  in  Hterature  or  jn  commerce,  took  refuge  in  the  pro- 
fession of  arms,  and  formed  always  the  chief  ornament  and 
often  the  chief  strength  of  the  Punic  armies.  At  one  period, 
at  least,  of  the  history  of  the  State  they  formed  a  so-called 
"Sacred  band "3  consisting  of  2500  citizens,  who,  clad  in 
resplendent  armour,  fought  around  the  person  of  their 
general-in-chief ,  and  feasting  from  dishes  of  the  costliest  gold 
and  silver  plate,  commemorated  in  then:  pride  the  number  of 
their  campaigns  by  the  number  of  the  rings  on  their  fingers.* 

It  was,  however,  the  one  fatal  weakness  of  the  Carthaginian 
State  for  military  purposes  that  the  bulk  of  their  vast  armies 
consisted  not  of  their  own  citizens,  nor  even  of  attached  and 
obedient  subjects,  but  of  foreign  mercenaries.  There  were 
few  countries  and  few  tribes  in  the  western  world  which 
were  not  represented  in  a  Carthaginian  army.     Money  or 

1  Sallust,  Jug.  i.  17.  n\A±  Jug.  L  19. 

»Diod.  Sic.  xvi.  80 ;  xx.  10-12;  cf.  also  Plutarch,  TimoUan,  27. 
.*Arist  PoL  iv.  2,  10. 


li 


superior  force  brought  to  Carthage  samples  of  every  nation 
which  her  fleets  could  reach.  ^  Native  Libyans  and  Liby- 
phoenicians,  Gauls  and  Spaniards,  slingers  from  the  far- 
famed  Balearic  Isles,  Greeks  and  Ligurians,  Volscians  and 
Campanians,  were  all  to  be  found  within  its  ranks.  But  it 
was  the  squadrons  of  light-horsemen  drawn  from  all  the 
nomad  tribes  which  lay  between  the  Altars  of  Phileni  on 
the  east  and  the  Pillars  of  Hercules  on  the  west,  which 
formed  its  heart.  Mounted  on  their  famous  barbs,  with  a 
shield  of  elephant's  hide  on  their  arm  and  a  lion's  skin 
thrown  over  their  shoulders,  the  only  raiment  they  ever  wore 
by  day  and  the  only  couch  they  ever  cared  to  sleep  on  at 
night;  without  a  saddle  and  without  a  bridle,^  or  with  a 
bridle  only  of  twisted  reeds  which  they  rarely  needed  to 
touch ;  equally  remarkable  for  their  fearlessness,  their  agility, 
and  their  cunning  ;  equally  formidable,  whether  they  charged 
or  made  believe  to  fly ;  they  were,  at  once,  the  strength  and 
the  weakness,  the  delight  and  the  despair  of  the  Carthaginian 
State.  Under  the  mighty  military  genius  of  Hannibal — with 
the  ardour  which  he  breathed  into  the  feeblest  and  the 
discipline  which  he  enforced  on  the  most  undisciplined  of 
his  army — they  faced  without  shrinking  the  terrors  of  the 
Alps  and  the  malaria  of  the  marshes,  and  they  proved  in- 
vincible against  all  the  power  of  Rome,  at  the  Ticinus  and 
the  Trebia,  at  Trasimene  and  at  CannsB ;  but,  as  more  often 
happened,  led  by  an  incompetent  general,  treated  by  him 
as  not  even  Napol^(>i  treated  his  troops,  like  so  many  beasts 
for  the  slaughter,  and  sometimes  even  basely  deserted— 
exposed  on  a  barren  rock  to  perish,  or  betrayed  into  the 
enemies'  hands  ^ — they  naturally  proved  a  two-edged  weapon 
piercing  the  hand  that  leaned  upon   it,  faithless  and  re- 

'Cf.   Plutarch,    Timoleon^  20:    trrfiarhv  i.y«i(iavra%  av6  onjAwi' "HpeucAetW  K«i 
Ti}?  'ArXai'Tiiti)?  riKnv  BaXarTfi^. 

2  Virg.  jEn.  iv.  41 :  "  Et  Numidae  infreni  cingunt  et  inhospita  Syrtis  "  ;  cf. 
Silius  Italicus.  i.  215:  "  Hie  passim  exultant  Nomades.  gens  inscia  freni", 
»  Dio<l.  V,  11 ;  xiv.  75  ;  Zouaras,  viii.  10  and  13. 


4A 


CAkTtiAGn  AND  THE  CARTttAGtNtANS. 


vengeful,  learning  nothing  and  forgetting  nothing,  finding 
once  and  again  in  the  direst  extremity  of  Carthage  their  own 
deadliest  opportunity. 

But  if  the  life  of  the  great  capitalists  of  Carthage  was  as 
brilliant  as  we  have  described  it,  how  did  it  fare  with  the 
poorer  citizens,  with  those  whom  we  call  the  masses,  till  we 
sometimes  forget  that  they  are  made  up  of  individual  units  ? 
If  we  know  little  of  the  rich,  how  much  less  do  we  know  of 
the  poor  of  Carthage  and  her  dependencies  I  The  city 
population,  with  the  exception — a  large  exception  doubtless 
— of  those  engaged  in  commerce,  well-contented  as  it  would 
seem,  like  the  Eomans  under  the  Empire,  if  nothing  deprived 
them  of  their  bread  and  of  their  amusement,  went  on  eating 
and  marrying  and  multiplying  until  their  numbers  became 
excessive,  and  then  they  were  shipped  off  by  the  prudence 
of  their  rulers  to  found  colonies  in  other  parts  of  Africa  or  in 
Spain.i  Their  natural  leaders,  or,  as  probably  more  often 
happened,  the  bankrupt  members  of  the  aristocracy,  would 
take  the  command  of  the  colony,  and  obtain  free  leave,  in 
return  for  their  services,  to  enrich  themselves  by  the  plunder 
of  the  adjoining  tribes. 

To  so  vast  an  extent  did  Carthage  carry  out  the  modem 
principle  of  reheving  herself  of  a  superfluous  population,  and 
at  the  same  time  of  extending  her  empire,  by  colonisation, 
that,  on  one  occasion,  the  admiral  Hanno,  whose  "  Periplus  " 
still  remains,  was  despatched  with  sixty  ships  of  war  of  fifty 
oars  each,  and  with  a  total  of  not  less  tl^n  thirty  thousand 
half-caste  emigrants  on  board,  for  the  purpose  of  founding 
colonies  on  the  shores  of  the  ocean  beyond  the  Pillars  of 
Hercules. 

But  the  document  recording  this  voyage  is  of  an  interest 
so  unique,  being  the  one  rehc  of  Carthaginian  literature 
which  has  come  down  to  us  entire,  that  we  must  dwell  for 
a  moment  on  its  contents.     It  was  posted  up  by  the  admiral 

»  Arist.  Pol.  ii.  11,  16,  and  vi.  6,  9l 


THE  PERtPLUS  OF  HANNO, 


himself,  as  a  thank-offering,  in  the  temple  of  Baal,  on  his 
return  from  his  adventurous  voyage,  the  first  attempt,  and 
possibly  the  successful  attempt,  made  by  the  Phoenicians  to 
reach  the  equator  from  the  north-west  of  Africa.  It  is  pre- 
served to  us  in  a  Greek  translation  only,^  the  work  probably 
of  some  inquisitive  Greek  traveller,  some  nameless  Herodotus 
who  went  wandering  over  the  world,  like  his  matchless  fellow- 
countryman,  his  note-book  always  in  his  hand,  and  always 
jotting  down  everything  which  was  of  interest  to  himself, 
or  might  be  of  importance  to  posterity.  Hanno  passed,  so 
he  himself  tells  us,  the  Pillars  of  Hercules  and  deposited 
his  living  freight  at  various  points  along  the  coast  of  Morocco 
and  the  great  desert  beyond  it ;  at  last  he  reached  an  island 
to  which  he  gave  the  name  of  Cerne,  and  which  we  may 
perhaps  identify  with  Arguin,  10^  north  of  the  equator, ^ 
since  his  crew  calculated  that  it  lay  as  far  beyond  the  Pil- 
lars of  Hercules  as  the  Pillars  of  Hercules  themselves  were 
from  Carthage.  Here  he  landed  the  remainder  of  his  Liby^ 
Phoenicians,  and  from  this  point  he  began  his  great  voyage 
of  discovery.  He  had  already  taken  interpreters  on  board, 
and  he  now  struck  out  once  more  towards  the  south.  He 
passed  the  mouth  of  the  Senegal  River,  a  river  abounding, 
then  as  now,  with  crocodiles  and  river-horses.  Near  its 
l)anks  dwelt  a  race  of  savages,  no  longer  the  brown  men  of 
the  Barbary  States,  or  of  the  Sahara,  with  whom  he  must 
have  been  familiar  enough,  but  the  ebony  Negroes  of  the 
Soudan.  They  were  clothed  in  skins  of  wild  beasts,  and 
spoke  a  language  unintelligible  even  to  the  interpreters. 
"They  drove  us  away,"  says  Hanno  pathetically,  "  by  throw- 
ing stones  at  us."  But  on  went  the  explorers.  They  passed 
forests  of  odoriferous  trees,  they  saw  the  natives  burning 
down,  as  they  do  at  the  present  day,  the  withered  grass  on 
the  hill-sides,  and  they  heard  by  night  the  sound  of  pipes 

iJt  will  be  found  printed  in  Hudson's  Geographi  Minorca.    See  Heeren's 
Appendix. 

^  See  Lenonnant,  Manud  dPhisioire  ancienne,  p.  201. 


4« 


CARTHAGE  AND  TUB  CARTHAGINIANS, 


and  cymbals,  drums  and  confused  shouts,  the  favourite 
amusements,  then  as  ever,  of  the  Negro  race.  On  they 
went,  till  they  reached  what  was,  very  possibly,  the  Cama- 
roons  Mountain  itself,  only  5°  above  the  equator.  ^  At  all 
events,  there  is  no  other  volcano  on  the  west  African  coast, 
and  none  therefore  answering  to  the  description  given  by 
Hanno.  The  voyagers  arrived  by  night.  The  country  around 
seemed  full  of  fire,  and  in  the  middle  of  it  were  flames  far 
higher  than  the  rest  which  seemed  to  touch  the  stars.  When 
day  came  they  found  it  was  a  large  mountain,  which  they 
well  named  the  "Chariot  of  the  Gods".  Passing  once 
more  onwards  still,  they  reached  a  gulf  called  the  Southern 
Horn,  which  contained  an  island  with  a  lagoon.  It  was 
inhabited  by  savage  people,  the  greater  part  of  them  women, 
covered  with  hair.  "Though  we  pursued  the  men,"  says 
the  log-book,  "  we  could  not  catch  any  of  them ;  they  all  fled 
from  us,  leaping  over  the  precipices  and  defending  themselves 
with  stones.  We  caught  three  of  the  women,  but  they 
attacked  us  with  tooth  and  nail,  and  could  not  be  persuaded 
to  return  with  us;  accordingly  we  killed  and  flayed  them 
and  took  their  skins  with  us  to  Carthage."  These  strange 
creatures  were  called  by  the  interpreters  "  Gorillas  "  ;  a  name 
not  destined  to  be  heard  again  till  its  strange  revival  two 
thousand  years  later,  when  the  mysterious  half-human  ape 
of  equatorial  Africa,  then  discovered  or  rediscovered,  took 
its  name,  not  unnaturally,  from  its  equally  mysterious  proto- 
type in  the  Periplus  of  Hanno.  From  this  point,  "  Hanno's 
farthest,"  as  it  might  well  be  called  by  subsequent  explorers, 
the  admiral  returned ;  for,  as  the  record  ends  with  eloquent 
brevity,  "  here  our  provisions  failed  us  ". 
What  was  the  general  nature  of  the  Carthaginian  trade  in 


1  The  numeroas  commeDtaries  on  the  Periplus  of  Hanno  differ,  as  was  to  be 
expected,  very  widely  as  to  the  farthest  point  reached  by  him.  They  range 
between  28°  and  6°  N.  latitude ;  but  the  known  length  of  other  Carthaginian 
voyages,  and  the  "  hairy  men  and  women  "  and  "  the  burning  mountain  "  taken 
together,  perhaps  entitle  us  to  prefer  the  more  southern  limit 


bVMB  TRADE. 


4S 


the  distant  regions  thus  thrown  open  to  them  we  happen  to 
know  from  another  ancient  writer  whose  authority  is  beyond 
dispute.  There  was  in  Libya — so  the  Carthaginians  told 
Herodotus — beyond  the  Pillars  of  Hercules,  an  inhabited 
ref^ion  where  they  used  to  unload  their  cargoes,  and  leave 
them  on  the  beach.  After  they  had  returned  to  their  ships 
and  kindled  a  fire  there,  the  natives,  seeing  the  rising  column 
of  smoke,  ventured  down  to  the  beach,  and  depositing  by  the 
merchandise  what  they  considered  to  be  its  equivalent  in 
gold,  withdrew  in  their  turn  to  their  homes.  Once  more  the 
Carthaginians  disembarked,  and  if  they  were  satisfied  with 
the  gold  they  found,  they  carried  it  ofl^  with  them,  and  the 
dumb  bargain  was  complete.  If  not,  they  returned  a  second 
time  to  their  ships  to  give  the  natives  the  chance  of  offering 
more.  The  law  of  honour  was  strictly  observed  by  both 
parties ;  for  neither  would  the  Carthaginians  touch  the  gold 
till  it  amounted,  in  their  opinion,  to  the  full  value  of  the 
merchandise ;  nor  would  the  natives  touch  the  merchandise 
till  the  Carthaginians  had  cUnched  the  transaction  by  carrymg 
off  the  gold.i 

This  strange  story,  long  looked  upon  as  fabulous,  has,  like 
many  other  strange  stories  in  Herodotus,  been  proved  by  the 
concurrent  testimony  of  modern  travellers  to  be  an  accurate 
account  of  the  dumb  trade  which  still  exists  in  many  parts  of 
Africa,  and  which,  traversing  even  the  Great  Desert,  brings 
the  Marroquin  into  close  commercial  relations  with  the 
Negro,  and  supplies  the  great  Mohammedan  kingdoms  of  the 
Soudan  with  the  products  of  the  Mediterranean.  It  proves 
also  that  the  gold-fields  of  the  Niger,  so  imperfectly  known  to 
us  even  now,  were  well  known  to  the  Carthaginians,  and 
that  the  gold-dust  with  which  the  natives  of  Ashanti  lately 
purchased  the  retreat  of  the  European  invader  was  the  re- 
cognised medium  of  exchange  in  the  days  of  the  father  of 

history. 

Nor  was  Hanno,  the  hero  of  the  Periplus,  an  exceptional 

1  Herod.  vL  196. 


44 


CARTftAGM  AND  TtiE  CARTHAGINIANS. 


specimen  of  Carthaginian  daring.    If  only  we  knew  Carthage 
as  we  know  Athens  or  Borne,  from  the  Carthaginians  them- 
selves, we  should  probably  have  abundant  proof  that  Hanno 
was  only  one  example  of  a  numerous  class  of  bold  explorers 
whose  services  the  great  colonising  and  commercial  republic 
was  always  able  to  command.      At  aU  events,  we  hear  from 
i-lmy  of  another  expedition  which  was  sent  in  this  same  fifth 
century,  under  the  command  of  another  admiral,  Himilco 
to  explore  the  western  coasts  of  Europe.     A  fra<'mentary 
account  of  this  voyage  also  has  come  down  to  us  in  the 
shape  of  a  metrical  Latin  paraphrase  of  the  document  which 
originally  recorded  it,'  and  Englishmen  and  Irishmen,  at  all 
events,  will  be  interested  to  hear  what  we  are  told  of  its 
destmation       In  a  four  months'  voyage,  keeping  to  his  left 
the  great  shoreless  ocean  on  which  no  ship  had  ever  ven- 
tured, where  the  breeze  blows  not,  but  eternal  fogs  rest  upon 
Its  hfeless  waters,^  Himilco  reached  the  ^strymnides  (ScUly 
Isles)     "  E,ch  are  they  in  metals,  tin,  and  lead ;  spirited  and 
industrious  are  the  race  which  inhabit  them;   fond,  too,  are 
they  of  trade,  and  they  traverse  the  boisterous  sea,  not  on 
barques  of  pine  or  oak,  but  on  coracles  made  of  skins  sewn 
together.     At  the  distance  of  two  days'  saU  from  these  is  the 
Holy  Island,  with  its  abundant  emerald  pastures,  inhabited  by 
the  Hibermans ;  hard  by  lies  also  the  wide  Isle  of  Albion  " 
One  other  Unk  connecting  indirectly  Great  Britain  with 

*r'T  ,  nf.  *^^  ""^y'  ^^^''^'  ^  Pointed  out  here.  The 
island  of  Mmorca  was  early  colonised  by  the  PhcBnicians,  and 
afterwards  passed  into  the  hands  of  the  Carthaginians.  It 
contains  the  finest  harbour  in  the  Mediterranean  Within  it 
a  large  fleet  of  line-of-battle  ships  can  lie  in  seven  fathoms  of 
water  safe  from  every  wind  that  blows.      This  harbour  was 

"  The  o™  Maritima  of  Festus  Avienus.    It  is  to  be  found  in  the  Poeta>  Latini 
ittnores     See  Heeren's  Appendix  and  Comments.  '"' 

Afri^     ZfJ"r:t  fV  t7  ^'^'^  '^^^  ""  '^""'  of  *''«  ^^  *o  the  west  of 


PORT  MAHON. 


45 


called  **  Portus  Magonis,"  either  after  some  early  Carthaginian 
explorer  of  that  name,  or,  as  seems  more  probable,  after  the 
younger  brother  of  Hannibal  himself,  who,  when  he  was 
ejected  from  Spain  by  the  Komans,  passed  over  to  Minorca 
and  spent  the  winter  there.^  The  name  has  now  been 
softened  into  Port  Mahon.  The  Spaniards  have  a  saying 
about  it  that  "  the  ports  of  the  Mediterranean  are  June,  July, 
August,  and  Port  Mahon  ".  The  possession  of  the  harbour 
made  the  island  of  Minorca  a  bone  of  contention  among  all 
the  maritime  powers  of  Europe  throughout  the  last  century. 
In  1708  it  was  attacked  by  General  Stanhope,  who,  it  is  said, 
by  shooting  arrows  into  it,  to  which  were  attached  papers 
threatening  the  garrison  with  labour  in  the  mines  unless  they 
instantly  surrendered,  induced  them  to  capitulate  just  before 
a  relieving  Spanish  force  arrived.  To  commemorate  this 
event,  General  Stanhope,  when  he  was  afterwards  raised  to 
the  peerage,  received  the  title  of  Lord  Mahon ;  and  thus,  in 
the  strange  vicissitudes  of  human  fortune,  an  English  noble- 
man bears  the  name  of  the  brother  of  Hannibal,  and  also  of 
the  reputed  founder  of  the  Carthaginian  empire  itself.  ^ 

To  defray  the  expenses  of  this  vast  system  of  exploration 
and  colonisation,  as  well  as  of  their  enormous  armies,  the 
most  ruinous  tribute  was  imposed  and  exacted  with  unspar- 
ing rigour  from  the  subject  native  states,  and  no  slight  one 
either  from  the  cognate  Phoenician  cities.  The  taxes  paid  by 
the  natives  sometimes  amounted  to  a  half  of  their  whole 
produce,^  and  among  the  Phoenician  dependent  cities  them- 
selves we  know  that  the  lesser  Leptis  alone  paid  into  the 
Carthaginian  treasury  the  sum  of  a  talent  daily.*  The  tribute 
levied  on  the  conquered  Africans  was  paid  in  kind,  as  is  the 
case  with  the  rayahs  of  Turkey  to  the  present  day,  and  its 
apportionment  and  collection  were  doubtless  liable  to  the 


1  Livy,  xxviiL  37  and  46. 
'See  Justin,  xviii.  7:  "  Mago 
imperium  Poenonira  condidisset " 
8  Polybius,  i.  72,  2. 


.  cum  primus  onmiiim  ordinata  disciplina 
*  livy,  zxziv.  62. 


46 


CARTHAGE  AND  THE  CARTHAGINIANS. 


DISAFFECTION  OF  SUBJECT  RACES, 


47 


fl 


same  abuses  and  gave  rise  to  the  same  enormities  as  those  of 

which  Europe  has  lately  heard  so  much.      Hence  arose  that 

universal  disaffection,  or  rather  that  deadly  hatred,  on  the 

part  of  her  foreign  subjects,  and  even   of  the  Phoenician 

dependencies,  towards  Carthage,  on  which  every  invader  of 

Africa  could  safely  count  as  his  surest  support.      Hence  the 

ease  with  which  Agathocles,  with  his  small  army  of  fifteen 

thousand   men,  could  overrun  the  open  country,  and  the 

monotonous  uniformity  with  which  he  entered,  one  after 

another,  two   hundred  towns,  which  Carthaginian  jealousy 

had  deprived  of  their  walls,  hardly  needing  to  strike  a  blow.^ 

Hence,  too,  the  horrors  of  the  revolt  of  the  outraged  Libyan 

mercenaries,  supported  as  it  was  by  the  free-will  contributions 

of  their  golden  ornaments  by  the  Libyan  women,2  who  hated 

their  oppressors  as  perhaps  women  only  can,  and  which  is 

known  in  history  by  the  name  of  the  *'  War  without  Truce," 

or  the  "  Inexpiable  War  ". 

It  must,  however,  be  borne  in  mind  that  the  inherent 
differences  of  manners,  language,  and  race  between  the 
native  of  Africa  and  the  Phoenician  incomer  were  so  great ; 
the  African  was  so  unimpressible,  and  the  Phoenician  was  so 
little  disposed  to  understand,  or  to  assimilate  himself  to  his 
surroundings,  that,  even  if  the  Carthaginian  government  had 
been  conducted  with  an  equity,  and  the  taxes  levied  with  a 
moderation  which  we  know  was  far  from  being  the  case,  a 
gulf  profound  and  impassable  must  probably  have  always 
separated  the  two  peoples.  This  was  the  fundamental,  the 
ineradicable  weakness  of  the  Carthaginian  Empire,  and  in  the 
long  run  outbalanced  all  the  advantages  obtained  for  her  by 
her  navies,  her  ports,  and  her  well-stocked  treasury ;  by  the 
energies  and  the  valour  of  her  citizens ;  and  by  the  consum- 
mate genius  of  three,  at  least,  of  her  generals.  It  is  this, 
and  this  alone,  which  in  some  measure  reconciles  us  to  the 
melancholy,  nay,  the  hateful  termination  of  the  struggle,  on 
the  history  of  which  we  are  about  to  enter  : — 

iDiod.  Sic.  XX.  17  ad  Jin.  •Polyb.  i.  72,  4* 


Meu  are  we,  and  must  grieve  when  e'en  the  name 
Of  that  which  once  was  great  has  passed  away. 

But  if  under  the  conditions  of  ancient  society,  and  the 
savagery  of  the  warfare  which  it  tolerated,  there  was  an 
unavoidable  necessity  for  either  Kome  or  Carthage  to  perish 
utterly,  we  must  admit,  in  spite  of  the  sympathy  which  the 
brilliancy  of  the  Carthaginian  civilisation,  the  heroism  of 
Hamilcar  and  Hannibal,  and  the  tragic  catastrophe  itself  call 
forth,  that  it  was  well  for  the  human  race  that  the  blow  fell 
on  Carthage  rather  than  on  Rome.  A  universal  Carthaginian 
empire  could  have  done  for  the  world,  as  far  as  we  can  see, 
nothing  comparable  to  that  which  the  Roman  universal 
empire  did  for  it.  It  would  not  have  melted  down  national 
antipathies,  it  would  not  have  given  a  common  literature  or 
language,  it  would  not  have  prepared  the  way  for  a  higher 
civilisation  and  an  infinitely  purer  religion.  Still  less  would 
it  have  built  up  that  majestic  fabric  of  law  which  forms  the 
basis  of  the  legislation  of  all  the  states  of  Modern  Europe  and 
America. 


\t\ 


48 


CARTHAGE  AND  THE  CARTHAGINIANS, 


PHCENICIANS  AND  GREEKS  IN  SICILY. 


49 


CHAPTER  IL 

CARTHAGE  AND   SICILY. 
(735-310  B.O.) 

Wars  between  Carthage  and  Sicilian  Greeks— First  appearance  of  Greeks  in 
Sicily— Their  gradual  spread— Battle  of  Himera— Second  Cartli.iginian 
invasion  of  Sicily— Third  invasion  and  its  incidents— Exploits  of  Dioiiysiiis 
—Siege  of  Motye— Fourth  invasion— Strange  vicissitudes  and  possible  im- 
portance  of  the  conflict— Comparative  merits  of  Greek  and  Carthaginian 
rule  in  Sicily— Conflicting  stories  about  Hamilcar  at  Himera— River  Ualy- 
CU8  fixed  as  boundary— Timoleon— Magnificent  Carthaginian  armament 
—Battle  of  Crimesus— Agathocles  invades  Africa  and  threatens  Carthage. 

Before  we  enter  on  the  history  of  the  long  struggle  between 
the  Romans  and  Carthaginians  for  the  possession  of  Sicily, 
it  is  necessary  to  give  some  account  of  the  less  known  and 
much  longer  series  of  wars  which  had  been  waged  for  the 
same  object  between  the  Carthaginians  and  the  Greeks.    Our 
knowledge  of  these  wars  comes  to  us,  as  was  to  be  expected, 
exclusively  from  Greek  sources ;  and  the  same  caution  with 
which   we  receive  from  the  Roman  writers  indiscriminate 
charges  of  cruelty  and  of  bad  faith  against  their  formidable 
antagonists  in  the  Punic  wars,  is  necessary,  perhaps  even 
more  necessary,  here.     If  we  cannot  often  prove  that  the 
charges  brought  are  groundless,  we  can,  at  least,  always 
remember  that  they  are  one-sided.     The  light  thrown  by  the 
Sicilian  wars  on  the  inner  life  of  the  Carthaginians  is  scanty 
enough,  but  where  our  materials  are  so  meagre  we  must 
make  the  best  of  even  that  little ;  and  some  facts,  at  least, 
come  out  which  are  alike  interesting  and  suggestive. 
From  very  early  times,  as  we  have  seen,  the  Phoenicians 


had  occupied  every  coign  of  vantage  on  the  coast  of  Sicily 
and  its  adjacent  islands,  and  had  from  thence  carried  on 
their  peaceful  warfare  with  the  natives  of  the  interior.^     But 
about  the  eighth  century  a  still  more  adventurous  and  gifted 
people  appeared  upon   the   scene.     The    Phoenicians,   true 
to  their  general  policy,  to  attempt  to  hold  nothing  by  war 
which  they  could  not  hold  without  it,  and  to  trade  with  those 
countries  only  where  trade  was  its  own  passport  and  its  own 
security,  retired  gradually  before  the  incomers,  and  would, 
very  possibly,  have  disappeared  altogether  from  the  island, 
had  not  Carthage,  endowed  as  she  was  with  all  the  colonising 
and  commercial  aptitudes  of  Tyre,  as  well  as  with  a  capa- 
city for  empire  which  Tyre  never  had,  stepped  into  the  place 
which  the  mother-city   declined  to  fill,  and   entered  upon 
that  vigorous  and  aggressive  policy  which  was  one  day  to 
make  the  Western  Mediterranean  a  Carthaginian  lake. 

But  the  spread  of  the  Greek  colonies  in  Sicily  was  not 
rapid.  Naxos  and  Syracuse,  Catana  and  Leontini  had  been 
founded,  about  b.o.  735,  on  its  eastern  coast,  for,  perhaps, 
half  a  century  before  we  hear  of  the  Greeks  advancing  even 
as  far  west  as  Gela ;  nor  was  it  till  another  half  century  or 
thereabouts  had  passed  away,  that  we  find  them  at  Himera, 
and  SeHnus  threatening,  or  seeming  to  threaten,  the  Cartha- 
ginians in  the  western  corner  of  the  island  to  which  they  had 
retreated.2  But  Carthage  was  still  peacefully  inclined.  She 
loved  a  quiet  life,  and  it  was  not  till  after  Mago,  about  530 
B.C.,  had  extended  her  home  domain  in  Africa,  and  till 
Mago's  son  Hasdrubal  had  annexed  Sardinia,  that  any 
serious  attempt  was  made  by  her  to  recover  the  ground 
which  had  been  lost.s 

At  the  head  of  a  vast  and  motley  army,  drawn  from  all  the 
countries  to  which  the  Carthaginian  fleets  had  access, 
Hamilcar,  the  second  son  of  Mago,  landed  in  Sicily  in  the 
year  480.     The  great  battle  of  Himera  lasted  from  morning 


Tliucyd.  ▼.  2, 


«Ibid.  vi.  3-4. 
4 


t  Justin,  xix.  1, 1-i. 


50 


CARTMAGB  AND  THE  CARTHAGINIANS. 


to  evening,  and  it  ended,  as  we  have  already  seen,  in  the 
complete  rout  of  the  Carthaginians.  Hamilcar,  who  through- 
out the  battle  had,  in  his  twofold  capacity  of  Shofete  and 
commander-in-chief,  been  sacrificing  to  the  gods  of  Carthage, 
when  he  found  that  his  efforts  were  of  no  avail  disappeared, 
and  was  seen  no  more.^  The  Carthaginians,  with  charac- 
teristic prudence,  fell  back  once  again  on  the  three  original 
Phoenician  fortresses  of  Motye,  Parnormus,  and  Soloeis,  and 
from  their  retirement  they  looked  on  complacently  for  the 
next  seventy  years  at  the  incessant  revolutions  and  counter- 
revolutions which  were  as  the  breath  of  life  to  their  ever 
restless  yet  ever  prosperous  Greek  neigh bours.^ 

At  last,  in  b.c.  410,  the  half-native  and,  as  it  was  believed, 
half-Trojan  city  of  Egesta,  which,  by  its  appeal  to  Athens  for 
aid  against  Selinus,  had  brought  on  Sicily  and  Greece  aUko 
the  calamities  of  the  Syracusan  expedition,  made  a  similar 
appeal  to  Carthage,  and  so  kindled  the  flames  of  that  new 
war,  or  rather  series  of  wars,  which,  with  fitful  intermissions, 
devastated  the  island  for  a  century  and  a  half.  The  Cartha- 
ginians hesitated  long,  we  are  told,  before  renewing  the  venture 
which,  seventy  years  before,  had  ended  so  disastrously.^  But 
at  last  the  die  was  cast.  It  was  an  evil  day  for  the  Greek 
cities  of  Sicily.  Hannibal,  grandson  of  the  Hamilcar  who 
had  fallen  at  Himera,  and  therefore,  as  Diodorus  remarks,^  a 
born  enemy  of  the  Greeks,  took  the  command.  Sehnus  fell 
almost  at  the  first  attack :  its  inhabitants  were  slaughtered, 
and  its  splendid  walls  and  temples  levelled  with  the  ground. 
The  majestic  columns  which  it  was  long  thought  that  nothing 
but  an  earthquake  could  have  overthrown,  still  show,  it  is 
said,  marks  of  the  Carthaginian  crowbars  which  were  used 
to  overturn  them.  Himera  shared  the  fate  of  Selinus.*  To 
a  message  from  the  Syracusans  begging  that  he  would 
admit  his  prisoners  to  ransom  and  spare  at  least  the  temples 
of  the  gods,  Hannibal  replied  roughly  that  those  who  could 

1  Herod,  va  165-167.  ^Thucya.  vi.  17.  sDiod.  x'm.  4a 

*lbid.  I.  c  :  ^^ati  M"reAAi,K.  ^  Ibid.  xiii.  66-58. 


tMUASlONS  6P  SICIlV. 


51 


not  preserve  their  freedom  must  try  their  hands  at  slavery. 
And  even  as  the  Jews,  when  Jerusalem  was  about  to  fall  before 
Titus,  heard,  or  fancied  that  they  heard,  voices  which  were 
not  of  earth,  saying,  "  Let  us  go  hence  " ;  ^  so,  with  terrible 
realism,  did  the  Carthaginian  general  now  tell  the  affrighted 
Greeks  that  the  gods  themselves  had  left  their  shrines,  and 
so  had  abandoned  their  cities  to  destruction.  Then,  in  an 
outburst  of  fanaticism,  half  family  and  half  national,  he 
slaughtered  three  thousand  prisoners  in  cold  blood  on  the 
spot  on  which  his  grandfather  had  fallen.^ 

Sated  with  plunder  and  bloodshed,  Hannibal  sailed  back 
to  Africa,  but  only  to  return  three  years  later  to  complete  his 
work  of  devastation.  The  splendid  city  of  Agrigentum,  with 
its  vast  population,  its  prodigious  temples,  and  its  innumer- 
able works  of  art,  fell  after  a  siege  of  seven  months.  The 
towns  of  Gela  and  Camarina  came  next,  and  from  the  whole 
southern  coast  of  Sicily  Greek  culture  and  civilisation  seemed 
to  be  blotted  out.  We  turn  away  with  disgust  from  the 
details  of  so  savage  and  barbarous  a  warfare ;  but  we  must 
note,  as  we  pass,  one  or  two  of  its  more  characteristic  and 
suggestive  incidents.  Such  are:  the  mutiny  of  Campanian 
mercenaries,  quelled  by  the  present  of  the  rich  gold  and  silver 
drinking-cups  which  the  body-guard  of  the  Carthaginian 
general  had  brought  with  them ;  the  wanton  destruction  of 
the  Agrigentine  sepulchres  by  the  besieging  army;  the  re- 
ligious terrors  which  followed — the  heaven-sent  pestilence, 
the  spectres  of  the  outraged  dead  haunting  the  sentries 
at  their  posts,  and  the  solemn  sacrifice  of  a  child  to  Baal 
by  the  general  in  command,  the  glorious  works  of  art — 
the  statue  of  Artemis  at  Egesta,^  of  the  poet  Stesichorus  at 
Himera,*  of  Apollo  at  Gela,*  of  the  bull  of  Phalaris  at 


^  lurafiaivwiJitr  iyTrv9fy.  So  too  at  the  siege  of  Veil  (Livy,  v.  21)  it  was 
believed,  "deos  votis  ex  urbe  sua  evocatos  hostium  templa  novasque  sedes 
spectare  *', 

^Diod.  xiiL  59,  ad  iniL  3  Cicero,  Vares,  iv.  33. 

*lbid.  ii.  35.  ^Diod.  xiiL  108. 


52 


Carthage  and  the  Carthaginians. 


Agrigentum^ — carried  off  to  Carthage  or  to  Tyre.  In  vain 
(B.C.  405)  did  the  Syracusans  try  to  stave  off  the  storm  by 
sending  troops  half-way  to  meet  it ;  in  vain  did  they  depose 
their  incapable  generals  and  bow  their  necks  beneath  the 
yoke  of  the  one  man  who  in  point  of  courage  and  ability 
seemed  to  be  marked  out  as  the  saviour  of  their  state,  the 
tyrant  Dionysius.  Syracuse  itself,  the  acknowledged  head 
of  the  Greek  cities  of  Sicily,  seemed  about  to  fall ;  but  the 
ravages  of  the  pestilence,  which  carried  off  half  the  Cartha- 
ginian army,  compelled  Hannibal  to  leave  his  task  unfinished, 
and  he  returned  to  Africa  carrying  with  him  the  pestilential 
taint  which  was  to  spread  havoc  in  Carthage  and  its  neigh- 
bourhood. 

It  was  now  the  turn  of  Dionysius  to  justify  his  assumption 
of  arbitrary  power  by  the  use  he  made  of  it,  and  after  a  few 
years  of  strenuous  preparation  he  set  forth  on  his  mission  of 
"liberation".  Every  species  of  cruelty  which  had  been 
visited  by  the  barbarous  mercenaries  of  Carthage  on  the  un- 
happy Greeks  was  now  atoned  for  by  the  equally  unhappy 
Carthaginians  who  had  settled  in  the  southern  parts  of  Sicily. 
Onward  the  tide  of  invasion  flowed,  swollen,  as  it  advanced, 
by  the  Greeks  who  were  now  able  to  return  to  their  devas- 
tated homes,  till  at  length  it  reached  the  westernmost  comer 
of  the  island,  and  found  itself  checked,  for  the  moment,  by  the 
narrow  arm  of  sea  which  separates  the  island  fortress  of  Motye 
from  the  mainland. 

The  small  garrison  of  Motye  defended  itself  with  all  the 
resolution  of  the  Phoenician  race,  and  the  incidents  of  the 
siege  which  followed — the  mole  thrown  out  by  Dionysius  to 
connect  it  with  the  mainland,  the  battering  of  its  walls  by 
new  and  unheard-of  military  engines,  such  as  the  catapult, 
just  then  invented,  the  huge  moving  towers,  the  diversions 
effected  by  the  fleets,  the  final  assault,  the  desperate  house-to- 
house  fighting  in  the  narrow  streets,  the  flight  for  refuge  to 


iDiod.  ziil  9a 


DIONYSIUS  AND  HIMILCO. 


53 


the  temples  of  the  gods,  the  promiscuous  pillage  and  massacre, 

all  these  incidents  are  characteristic  of  the  Phoenicians 

when  driven  to  stand  at  bay,  and  remind  us,  in  some  measure, 
now  of  the  heroic  resistance  made,  in  the  following  century, 
by  the  parent  of  Phoenician  cities  to  Alexander  the  Great, 
and  now,  again,  of  that  still  more  terrible  resistance  of  despair 
to  which  this  history  leads  us  up,  and  in  which  it  finds  its 
most  tragic  conclusion. 

The  '*  liberator"  had  all  but  done  his  work ;  but  these  were 
not  the  days  when  we  know  Carthage  best — the  days  of  her 
vacillation  and  of  half-hearted  counsels — they  were  the  days 
of  her  strength  and  of  her  pride.  In  spite  of  the  havoc 
wrought  by  the  plague  in  Carthage  and  the  surrounding 
country,  another  huge  host  of  one  hundred  thousand  men 
started  (b.c.  397)  under  Himilco  for  Sicily.  They  recovered 
Eryx  and  Motye  almost  at  a  blow,  and  within  the  course  of 
a  single  year  took  Messana  at  the  other  end  of  Sicily,  and 
rolled  back  the  tide  of  invasion  on  Syracuse  itself.  Seldom 
has  the  fortune  of  war  veered  round  so  rapidly  and  so  com- 
pletely. But  the  marshes  of  the  Anapus  were  once  more 
the  best  and  the  last  ally  of  Syracuse.  A  new  pestilence  of 
unexampled  fury  broke  out.  Part  of  the  Carthaginian  navy 
was  destroyed  by  fire,  and  Himilco  purchased,  we  are  told, 
the  safety  of  the  remaining  Carthaginians  in  his  army  by  the 
betrayal  of  all  his  mercenaries.  It  was  an  act  of  baseness  of 
which  Dionysius  himself  and  even  Hiero  after  him,  were  also 
guilty,  and  it  is  not  without  parallel  in  the  history  of  the 
Punic  wars ;  ^  but  it  enables  us,  in  some  measure,  to  explain, 
what  is  otherwise  so  difi&cult  to  account  for,  the  sudden 
collapse  of  the  energies  of  Carthage  when,  once  and  again, 
she  seemed  to  be  in  the  full  career  of  success. 

It  is  useless  to  speculate,  but  it  is  hardly  possible  to  resist 
the  temptation  to  do  so,  as  to  what  might  have  been  the  con- 
sequence to  Carthage,  to  Sicily  itself,  to  Kome,  and  to  the 


^Zonaras,  viil  IQ, 


54 


CARTHAGE  AND  THE  CARTHAGINIANS. 


world  at  large,  had  either  party  succeeded  altogether  in  the 
attempt  in  which  each  had  all  but  succeeded,  within  the  term 
of  these  last  three  years :  had  Carthage,  for  instance,  been 
able  to  push  forward  her  victorious  career  into  Italy  at  the 
very  time  when  the  Gaul  was  at  the  gates  of  Kome,  or  had 
Syracuse  been  able  to  accomplish  with  ease  in  a  single  year 
what  could  hardly  be  accomplished  a  century  and  a  half  later 
in  a  twenty-three  years'  war  by  all  the  power  of  Rome.  It 
is  impossible  to  say  what  might  have  been  the  result  in  such 
a  case ;  but  it  is  possible  to  point  out  much,  at  least,  which 
could  hardly  have  happened,  and  to  realise  to  ourselves  how 
entirely  different  the  conditions  would  have  been  under  which 
the  struggle  for  universal  empire,  whoever  might  have  been 
the  combatants,  must  have  been  carried  on. 

The  horrors  perpetrated  by  the  Carthaginians  and  the 
ferocity  and  treachery  of  some  of  their  generals  are  brought 
out  in  full  relief  by  Diodorus  and  by  the  earlier  Sicilian 
historians,  Phihstus  and  Timaeus,  who  form  his  chief  autho- 
rities.    It  is  all  the  more  important  therefore  to  notice  that 
Diodorus  himself  inadvertently  drops  hints  which  show  that 
if  the  merits  of  Greek  and  Carthaginian  rule  in  Sicily  must 
needs  be  compared,  the  advantage  was  not  always,  in  the 
judgment  of  the  Sicilians  themselves,  on  the  side  of  the 
Greeks.     Many  of  the  Sicilian  Greeks,  he  tells  us,  migrated 
of  their  own  free  will,  carrying  their  property  with  them, 
from  the  Greek  to  the  Carthaginian  portion  of  Sicily,  for  they 
found,  or  fancied,  at  least,  that  they  would  find,  the  rule  of 
Carthage  to   be  less    oppressive    than  that  of   the   tyrant 
Dionysius.i     On  the  other  hand,  many  Sicanians  and  Sicilians 
uhoni  Dionysius  offered  to  transfer  to  Syracuse  from  the 
neighbourhood  of  the  Carthaginians,  dechned  his  offer  with 
thanks,  preferring  the  Carthaginian  rule  to  his ;  while  those 
tribes  or  towns  which  he  had  compelled  to  join  him  went 
back  again  with  alacrity  to  Carthage  as  soon  as  she  reappeared 
on  the  scene.'-^    In  like  manner  when,  at  a  moment's  notice, 
1  Diod.  xiv.  41,  Jibid.  xiv.  56,  68. 


GREEK  AND  CARTHAGINIAN  RULE. 


55 


Dionysius  plundered  the  property  of  all  the  Carthaginians 
resident  in  Syracuse,  it  is  clear  that  the  Carthaginians,  in  spite 
of  the  provocation  they  had  received,  did  not  make  reprisal? 
on  the  Greeks  resident  in  Carthage.^  These  indications  may 
tend  to  strengthen  the  misgivings  which  are  naturaUy  sug- 
gested  to  us  when  we  recollect  the  medium  through  which 
alone  our  information   as  to   Carthaginian   misgovernment 

comes. 

There  is  another  curcumstance  which  is  still  more  sugges- 
tive.    Of  what  followed  the  fatal  battle  of  Himera  we  have 
two  versions ;   one  of  them  by  a  lucky  chance,  which  is  al- 
most without  a  parallel  in  the  history  of  these  wars,  comes 
from  the  Carthaginians  themselves.     It  has  been  preserved 
by  Herodotus,  and  tells  us  that  Hamilcar,  when  he  found 
that  the  battle  of  Himera  had  gone  against  him,  flung  him- 
self headlong,  as  a  whole  burnt  offering,  into  the  fire  which 
he  had  kindled,  and  that  almost  divine  honours  were  paid  to 
his  memory  by  a  grateful  country,  alike  in  Sicily  and  in  the 
capital.2    The  other  version  is  that  given  us  by  the  Greeks : 
that  the  Carthaginians,  unable  to  vent  their  anger,  even  on 
the  lifeless  corpse  of  the  unfortunate  Hamilcar  by  nailing 
it,  as  they  sometimes  did  in  similar  cases,  to  a  cross,  vented 
it' on  his  innocent  son,  Gisco,  whom  they  banished  for  life  to 
the  Greek  town  of  Selinus.s      Either  of  these  stories,  or 
neither  of  them,  or  both  of  them,  inconsistent  as  they  seem 
with  each  other,  may,  among  a  people  so  volatile  as  the 
Carthaginians,  perhaps  be  true.     But  the  discrepancy  is  at 
least  suggestive,  and  it  does  not  make  us  less  sorry  that 
in  other  cases  where  we  hear  of  anything  to  the  discredit 
of  Carthage,  we  are  unable  to  balance  the  Greek  by  the 
Carthaginian  version  of  the  story. 

Other  desultory  attempts  were  made  by  the  tyrant  Diony- 
sius in  his  long  reign  of  thirty-eight  years  to  drive  the  Car- 
thaginians from  Sicily,  but  without  success ;  and  the  fitful 


>  DicKL  xiv.  76,  77. 


2  Herod,  vii.  167. 


3  Diod.  xiii.  43, 


56 


P 


CARTHAGE  AND  THE  CARTHAGINIANS. 


TIMOLEON. 


57 


struggle  ended  (b.o.  383)  in  a  treaty  which  assigned  to 
Carthage  aU  the  territory  which  lay  to  the  west  of  the  river 
Halycus.  This  river  practically  remained  tlie  boundary  be- 
tween  the  contending  parties  for  the  next  hundred  years  •  but 
on  two  occasions  during  that  period  the  Carthaginians  ap. 
peared  m  arms  before  the  walls  of  Syracuse.  The  first  was 
m  the  time  of  the  best,  the  other  of  the  worst,  of  all  its  rulers 
Akeady  the  Carthaginians  had  gained  possession  of  the 
whole  of  the  town  of  Syracuse  except  its  island  citadel  of 

?W  fvT*  u  7!f  *^'/''*  ^'"^^  ^°  ^^^'  *^^"«^°d  conflicts 
that  they  had  attamed  so  nearly  to  the  summit  of  their  am- 
bition;  and  every  one  believed,  to  quote  the  words  of  a 
patriotic  Greek,  that  the  long-talked-of  and  long-expected 
flood  of  barbansm  had  come  at  last,  and  had  overwhelmed 
Sicily.i  But  just  when  the  horizon  was  at  its  darkest,  light 
appeared      The  younger  Dionysius,  a  man  as  weak  as  he 

s^kiTf  r  hi  T^*^'  '^*y  ^'  ^^^  misgoverned  without 

strikmg  a  blow  m  its  defence,  and  flying  to  Greece  ma^A 

way  for  the  Corinthian  Timoleon.     EqUy  remrki"^^^^ 
his  courage  and  his  gentleness,  for  his  abihty  to  command 

aS  tY'f "'''  *'  f'3^  '^^  *^^  "^^^^'^^'^  -^  ^s  affections 

lit  J)    .    -T'"'  ""1  ^''  ''°'"  ^^  ^^*y'  ^^^^^  all  for  his 
absolute  disinterestedness,  Timoleon  is  the  highest  ideal  of 

one  side,  and  that  perhaps  the  noblest  side,  of  the  Greek 

character.    He  had  saved  his  brother's  hfe  in  battle  at  the 

nsk  of  his  own   and  yet  when  that  brother  plotted  against 

the  lives  and  hberties  of  his  fellow  citizens  he  gave  him  oTer 

served^     Such  was  the  man  who,  summoned  to  an  arduous 
post  which  he  would  never  have  sought  but  dared  not  decline 

ebT  iTlt"'  '""'"'  "'^" '''  ^^^^^'^^^  --  ^*  ^*«  lowest 
The  Carthaginians  vanished  for  a  time,  but  reappeared 


» Plutarch.    Timoleon.    xvil :    i„.  ^^,,,,  ,j,^„    .  , 

a  Ibid.  IV.  and  v. 


V  «a« 


a  few  years  afterwards  at  the  head  of  one  of  the  most 
splendid  armaments  that  they  had  ever  put  into  the  field. 
It  consisted  of  seventy  thousand  infantry,  of  ten  thousand 
cavalry,  of  a  large  number  of  war  chariots  drawn  by  four 
horses  each,  of  one  hundred  ships  of  war,  and  one  thousand 
transports  laden  with  supplies  and  ammunition  of  every  kind.^ 
But  the  armament  was  not  less  remarkable  for  its  com- 
position than  its  size.  The  merchant  princes  of  Carthage, 
so  often  content  to  look  at  war  as  a  gigantic  mercantile 
speculation,  cared  not,  as  a  rule,  to  risk  their  own  lives 
when  there  were  plenty  of  barbarians  who  for  a  small  sum 
of  money  were  willing  to  throw  away  theirs  instead.  It 
was  doubtless  pleasanter  for  those  who  enjoyed  life,  as  did 
the  wealthy  Carthaginians,  when  there  was  any  risk  to  be 
run,  to  do  so,  as  the  Greek  proverb  expresses  it,  "in  the 
person  of  a  Carian  ".  But  when  real  danger  threatened  the 
State,  it  is  a  mere  calumny  to  assert  that  they  were  not 
ready  to  do  battle  in  their  own  persons  and  to  fight,  as 
their  mercenaries  hardly  ever  fought,  in  defence  of  their 
hearths  and  homes.  In  this  pre-eminently  patriotic  arma- 
ment there  were,  we  are  told,  no  less  than  ten  thousand 
native  Carthaginians,  all  clad  in  splendid  panoplies,  and 
all  carrying  white  shields,  conspicuous  from  afar,  as  if  to 
mark  them  out  as  targets  for  the  enemy.  Amongst  them 
was  the  famous  "  Sacred  Band "  of  2500  chosen  nobles 
in  all  the  bravery  of  their  gold  rings,  their  costly  raiment, 
and  their  drinking  vessels  of  solid  gold  and  silver. 

The  battle  which  ensued,  the  Battle  of  the  Crimesus,  is 
described  with  graphic  detail  by  Diodorus^  and  Plutarch,^ 
who  evidently  had  the  testimony  of  eye-witnesses  before 
them.  We  seem,  as  we  read,  to  be  moving  in  an  atmosphere 
of  poetry  and  of  portent,  of  miracle  and  of  religious  enthu- 
siasm. It  is  the  Battle  of  Megiddo  and  the  brook  Kishon 
that  we  fancy  that  we  see;    it  is  the  song  of  triumph  of 

1  Plutarch,  Timoleon.  xxv.  ;  Diod.  xvi.  77. 
8DioU.  xvi.  80,  ^piut.  Tim.  27,  28, 


1 1        I 


58 


CARTHAGE  AND  THE  CARTHAGINIANS. 


AGATHOCLES. 


59 


Deborah  and  of  Barak  that  we  fancy  that  we  hear.  The 
parallel  is  close  indeed  throughout.^  A  tempest  of  rain  and 
hail,  accompanied  by  hghtning  and  thunder,  broke  with  ex- 
traordinary violence  at  the  critical  moment  right  in  the  faces 
of  the  advancing  Carthaginians.  The  stars  in  their  courses 
fought  against  Carthage,  and  the  brook  Crimesus,  swollen  in 
a  few  minutes  to  an  angry  torrent,  swept  away  in  its  waters 
the  war-chariots,  and  the  plunging  horses,  and  the  heavy- 
armed  foot  soldiers  of  the  Carthaginians.  Then,  as  at  Megiddo, 
**  strength  was  broken  down  " ;  the  Carthaginian  citizens  in 
their  heavy  panopHes,  slipped  in  the  mud  and  fell  to  rise  no 
more.  The  Sacred  Band  stood  their  ground,  by  the  confes- 
sion of  the  Greeks  themselves,  in  a  manner  worthy  of  their 
privileges  and  responsibihties,  and  died,  fighting  bravely,  to 
a  man.  The  camp  and  costly  baggage  fell  into  the  hands  of 
the  victors,  and  Timoleon,  laden  with  booty  and  with  honour, 
returned  to  Syracuse  to  hve  there  as  a  simple  citizen,  and 
after  securing  to  his  adopted  country  a  period  of  twenty-two 
years  of  prosperity  and  liberty  and  peace,  such  as  it  had  hardly 
enjoyed  before,  and  certainly  has  not  attained  to  since,  to  be 
regretted  in  his  death  as  the  **  common  father  and  benefactor  " 
of  all  the  Sicilians.2 

Timoleon  passed  away,  and  Syracuse  once  more  fell  (b.c. 
310)  under  the  yoke  of  a  tyrant  as  able  and  unscrupulous 
as  the  elder  Dionysius.  Bursting  through  the  Carthagin- 
ian squadron,  which  was  blockading  him  in  his  capital, 
with  a  heroism  which  is  almost  unparalleled  in  warfare,' 
Agathocles  made  his  way  at  the  head  of  a  few  ships  to 
Africa,  and  with  a  Carthaginian  fleet  following  close  behind 
him  and  a  Carthagmian  army  ready  to  receive  him  on  his 
landing,  he  made  Carthage  herself  tremble  for  her  safety. 
Once  again  the  city  poured  forth,  in  its  own  defence,  its 
hophtes  and  its  horsemen,  its  war-chariots,  and  its  Sacred 

Ut  has  been  eloquently  drawn  out  by  Dean  Stanley.  Jacish  Church  voL  L 
chap.  14.  ' 

2 Plutarch,  Timoleon,  xxxix.,  i^wtp  waj^p  wivov. 


Band.  But  it  was  not  till  after  Agathocles  had  been  for 
three  years  over-running  the  open  country,  till  he  had  oc- 
cupied an  almost  fabulous  number  of  Carthaginian  towns, 
and  had  kindled  into  a  mighty  blaze  the  flame  of  discontent 
which  was  always  smouldering  among  the  African  subjects 
of  the  imperial  city,  that  he  returned  to  Sicily  to  carry  fire 
and  sword  into  other  regions  from  which  their  Greek  blood 
might  have  been  expected  to  protect  them.i  The  havoc 
which  Agathocles  had  wrought  in  Africa  might  be  repaired, 
and  was  soon  repaired  by  the  wealth  and  energy  of  the 
Carthaginians;  but  there  was  something  which  no  efiforts 
of  theirs  could  now  undo.  By  his  invasion  of  Africa  Agatho- 
cles had  shown  the  way  in  which  Carthage  could  be  best 
assailed.  He  had  probed  the  weakness  of  the  Carthaginian 
empire  to  the  very  bottom,  and  mightier  men  than  he,  and  a 
mightier  people  than  the  Greeks  of  Sicily,  were,  all  too  soon, 
to  follow  in  his  footsteps. 

iDiod.  XX.  3,56,  6iseq. 


6o 


CARTHAGE  AND  THE  CARTHAGINIANS, 


ORIGIN  AND  GROWTH  OF  ROME, 


6i 


li 


CHAPTER  III. 

CAKTHAGB  AND  ROMB. 
(753-278  B.C.) 

Rome  and  Carthage  compared -Contrasted-Origin  and  growth  of  Rome- 
ConsUtutional  progress-Military  progress-Conquest  of  Etruscans-Of 
0aul8-0f  Latms-Of  Samnites-Roman  methods  in  war-Their  modera- 
C^rth'ajr  Py^h«s-Its  character-Rome  brought  face  to  face  with 

It  is  now  time  to  take  a  glance  at  the  origin  and  rise  of  the 
younger  city  on  the  banks  of  the  Tiber,   whose  progress 
towards  the  dominion  of  the  worid  Carthage,  and  Carthage 
alone  of  the  states  of  antiquity,  was  able  seriously  to  delay 
The  history  of  Rome  is  like,  and  yet  unhke,  that  of  Carthage 
It  IS  like  It,  for  we  see  in  each  the  growth  of  a  civic  com- 
mumty  which,  from  very  small  beginnings,  under  an  aristo- 
cratic  form  of  government,  and  with  slight  literary  or  artistic 
tastes,  acquired  first,  by  the  force  of  circumstances,  the  leader- 
ship of  the  adjoining  cities,  which  were  akin  to  her  in  blood 
and  subsequently,  by  a  far-sighted  policy,  or  by  a  strong  arm' 
became  mistress,  not  only  of  them,  but,  by  their  aid,  of  all 
the  tnbes  whom  Nature  had  not  cut  ofif  from  them  by  the 
sea,  the  mountains,  or  the  desert. 

But  Roman  history  is  intrinsically  unlike  the  Carthaginian 
for  the  greatness  of  Rome  rested  not,  as  did  the  greatness  of 
Carthage,  on  her  wealth,  or  her  commerce,  or  her  colonies 
or  her  narrow  oligarchy,  but  on  the  constitutional  progress 
which,  after  a  long  struggle,  obliterated  the  mischievous  privi- 
leges of  an  aristocracy  of  birth,  and  raised  the  commonalty 
to  a  complete  social  and  political  equality  with  their  former 


lords.  It  rested  on  the  grand  moral  qualities  which  formed 
the  groundwork  of  the  Roman  character  in  its  best  times, 
earnestness  and  simpHcity  of  life,  reverence  for  the  sanctities 
of  the  family  relations,  reverence  for  the  law,  reverence  for 
the  gods.  It  rested  on  the  extraordinary  concentration  of 
all  these  qualities,  together  with  the  soundest  practical  ability 
which  the  State  contained,  in  the  Senate,  perhaps,  when 
taken  at  its  best,  the  noblest  deliberative  assembly  which 
the  world  has  ever  seen.  And  when  the  two  orders  in  the 
State  had  become  united,  and  Rome  was  fairly  launched  in 
a  career  as  a  conquering  power,  her  greatness  rested — how 
unlike  to  Carthage ! — on  the  real  community  of  interest  and 
of  blood  which  united  her  to  the  greater  number  of  the 
Italian  tribes  that  she  absorbed ;  on  the  self-sacrifice  which 
bade  her  then,  and  for  a  long  time  to  come,  tax,  not  her  sub- 
jects but  herself ;  on  the  wise  precautions  which  she  took  to 
secure  their  permanent  allegiance,  partly  by  isolating  them 
from  one  another,  partly  by  leaving  them  in  some  sense  to 
govern  themselves,  or  by  admitting  them  to  a  share,  actual 
or  prospective,  in  the  Roman  citizenship. 

The  district  originally  occupied  by  the  Latin  race  which 
achieved  such  grand  results  was  a  small  tract  of  land,  not 
larger  than  an  English  county,  which  lay  between  the  Tiber 
and  the  Anio  on  the  north,  and  the  Alban  Hills  on  the  south, 
and  the  future  capital  of  the  world  was  originally  only  one  of 
thirty  small  settlements,  of  which  she  was  the  first  neither  in 
antiquity,  nor  in  strength,  nor  in  natural  advantages.  Alba 
and  Lanuvium  were  older,  Tusculum  was  stronger,  Tibur 
and  Prseneste  were  more  fruitful  and  more  salubrious  than 
Rome.  What  circumstances  enabled  Rome,  built  as  she  was 
on  one  of  the  least  healthy  and  least  fertile  spots  occupied  by 
the  Latin  league,  so  soon  to  obtain  a  pre-eminent  position 
among  them,  we  need  not  here  inquire.  The  Roma  Quadrata 
on  the  Palatine  Hill  soon  grew  into  Rome  of  the  Seven  Hills. 
She  encouraged  migration  to  herself  from  the  adjoining  cities 
of  the  league  ;  the  manumission  of  slaves,  and  the  growth  of 


fe 


I 


CARTHAGE  AND  THE  CARTHAGINtANS. 


ITS  CONSTITUTIONAL  PROGRESS. 


63 


commerce  and  agnculture,  soon  gave  her  a  dependent  popula- 
tion, which  formed  the  origin  of  the  Plebeians;  and!  when 
the  venerable  Alba  feU  before  the  arms  of  Kome,  Kome 
naturally  succeeded  by  the  right  of  the  worthiest,  as  weU  as 
by  the  right  of  the  strongest,  to  aU  her  privileges  and  dignities 
as  president  of  the  Latin  league.  "  aignities 

It  belongs  not  to  our  purpose  here  to  trace  the  vicissitudes 
of  the  long  and  eventful  struggle  between  the  privileged 
Patrimns  and  the  unenfranchised  Plebs ;  to  show  in  deLl 

trl  i'l  'T  ^'T'^'  °f  '»»« lo^-e^-  orders-their  exclusion 
from  aU  share  in  the  public  land  for  which  they  had  shed 
heu:  blood,  the  caste  jealousy  which  forbade  a  Jatrician  o 
intermarry  with  one  of  a  less  sacred  race-the  atrocious  law 
of  debtor  and  creditor,  gave  way,  one  after  the  other,  in  spite 
of  the  ^med  opposition  and  the  prejudices  and  the  subter- 
fuges of  those  Patricians  who,  as  they  alone  profited   by 

reform.    Nor  need  we  relate  at  length  how  these  same 
Plebeians,  by  the  heroism  of  their  natural  leaders,  or  their 
secessions  to  the  Sacred   Mount,  first  obtained  inviolable 
magistrates  of  their  own,  the  Tribunes  of  the  Plebs    with 
powers  so  extraordinary  that  if  the  Roman  people  h^d  not 
been  the  most  law-abiding  people  in  the  world  all  pubUc 
busmess  must  have  come  to  a  standstill ;  how  the  right  of 
appeal  from  the  arbitrary  sentences  of  the  magistrate  to  the 
people  assembled  in  their  Comitia,  was  again  and  again  con! 
flrmed-even  as  Magna  Charta  was  again  and  again  con- 
firmed  by  English  kings-each  fresh  ratification  SeZl 
no  doubt,  the  sanction  more  impressive,  and  using  the  word 
n^n   '"^  """"^  comprehensive  and  a  truer  sense;  how 

^d  Mi  ^  t°t  '"^  "^f  "y  "'*"'  "^'S^^'y-  *he  Qu*st;rship 
and  Mditary  Tribunate,  the  Consulship  and  the  Senate  itself 

were  thrown  open  to  the  Plebeians,  first  in  theory  and  after- 
wards m  fact;  how  the  Licinian  Eogations,  after  nine  years 
of  party  warfare,  ceased  to  be  Eogations  and  became  llws; 
and  how.  finally,  CamiUus.  the  chief  of  the  old  aristocracy 


crowned  the  political  edifice  by  what,  perhaps,  rightly  con- 
sidered, is  the  greatest  event  in  the  internal  history  of  Rome, 
the  dedication  of  the  famous  Temple  of  Concord  ^  (b.c.  367). 
It  is  incumbent  on  the  student  of  the  history  of  Carthage  not 
so  much  to  analyse  the  process  as  to  note  the  result  of  this 
long  constitutional  conflict ;  and  that  grand  result  was  that 
the  two  orders  became  indissolubly  united,  socially  and 
politically,  into  one  nation,  and  were  thus  prepared,  whether 
for  good  or  for  evil,  to  assert  their  natural  supremacy  over 
the  rest  of  Italy,  and  then  to  conquer  the  world. 

Nor,  again,  does  it  fall  within  the  scope  of  this  work  to 
follow  with  any  degree  of  minuteness  the  early  progress  of 
the  Eoman  arms.  It  must  sufi&ce  to  trace  only  so  much  of 
its  outline  as  may  enable  us  to  judge  of  the  true  position  of 
the  conquering  city,  when  a  wider  field  opened  before  her 
and  she  had  to  face,  no  longer  the  petty  warfare  of  bordering 
townships,  nor  even  the  collective  strength  of  Samnite  and 
Etruscan  confederations,  but  Carthage,  Macedon,  and  the 
East. 

The  expulsion  of  the  kings  (b.c.  509)  left  Rome  still  a  prey 
to  internal  discord,  a  circumstance  of  which  her  nearest 
neighbours,  the  Etruscans,  wholly  aUen  as  they  were  to  her 
in  race,  were  not  slow  io  avail  themselves.  The  Etruscan 
nation,  with  its  gloomy  and  mysterious  religion,  the  solemn 
trifling  in  its  augural  science,  and  the  cruelty  of  its  gladia- 
torial games,  was  just  then  at  the  height  of  its  power  by 
land  and  sea.  Now  was  its  opportunity ;  and  the  fond  but 
soul-stirring  romances  of  the  ballad-singers  and  annalists  of 
early  Rome  have  not  been  able  wholly  to  disguise  the  fact 
that  the  city  itself  fell  before  the  arms  of  Porsena.^  But  the 
triumph  of  Etruria  was  not  long  lived.  A  protracted  war- 
fare of  150  years  succeeded,  in  which  the  star  of  Rome  came 
gradually  into  the  ascendant,  and  the  fall  of  Veii  after  a  ten 
years'  siege,  and,  still  more  perhaps,  the  hurricane  of  Northern 

1  Plutarch,  Camillus,  42,  4-7  ;  cf.  Livy.  vi.  42. 
«Tac.  JJist.  iii.  72  :  "  dedita  urbe". 


i!    1 


«4 


CARTHAGE  AND  THE  CARTHAGtNlANS. 


ITS  MILITARY  PROG  REUS. 


65 


barbarians  which  just  then  burst  over  the  fairest  plains  of 
Sria  ^°'  ^''*'  ^  ^"""  "^""^^^  "^  *^  "'•*«  "^ 

Qoi^w  c°?*.  "'"^  dehvered  from  the  Etruscans  only  (b.c 
390)  to  find  that  the  Gaul  was  thundering  at  her  gates  The 
city  was  burned  to  the  ground,  her  temples  desecrated,  her 
historical  records  destroyed,  her  inhabitants  dispersed  or 
slain ;  but  no  such  ephemeral  calamity  could  shatter  the 
Editions  or  shake  the  resolution  of  the  Roman  people. 
Rome  rose,  hke  the  phoenix,  from  her  ashes,  and  s  Jted 
^esh  on  her  career  of  conquest  Her  ancient  enemies,  the 
^qmans  and  Volscians,  who,  according  to  the  patriotic  nar- 

TZ  t      II'  K  "^  ^°'  '°  "^^^y  y^"^  ^  '^'  ^^^y  history 
of  the  Repubhc  been  annually  exterminated  and  had  annually 

CI  Jv."  ^^'«™r '^^  »g»i°.  had  long  since  died  their 
last  death  as  mdependent  nations.  The  Etruscans  were  now 
powerless;  the  last  desperate  effort  of  the  Latins  to  restore 
when  ,t  was  too  late  (b.c.  340-338),  the  equality  of  their 
ancient  leape.  was  crushed  in  two  campaigns,  and  Rome 
now  found  herself  face  to  face  with  the  wortWest  antagonists 
she  had  yet  met,  the  brave  and  hardy  Sabellian  race,  which 

Campania  and  which  clung  with  desperate  tenacity  and  with 
manners  that  never  changed  to  the  rugged  mountains  and 
the  inaccessible  defiles  of  the  Central  and  Southern  Apennines. 
The  struggle  is  memorable  for  the  deeds  of  heroism  which 
m«k  Its  course  on  either  side ;  for  the  stubborn  resistance 
and  chivabous  bravery  of  the  weaker,  and,  on  more  than  one 
occasion,  for  the  perfidy  and  the  meanness  of  the  stronger 
combatant^  But  it  is  yet  more  remarkable,  in  the  eye  of  hfn^ 
who  would  read  the  story  of  the  Punic  wars  arighi.  for  th^ 
^ght  It  throws  upon  the  true  secret  of  the  Roman  strength  in 

292'  ^"l^.^t  Vn"  ™  ^°'~'""  °»"""  P™P«  •'«'<•""■'  «»t ".      This  wa»  in 
^ce^exljei^j^.'^rir  ""  "*'  ""'•  *"  ""  ^''-  "^«"«'»  't^- 


Never  did  the  iron  resolution  and  devotion  of  her  citizens, 
never  did  the  unbending  consistency  of  purpose  and  the 
marvellous  self-restraint  of  the  Senate,  display  itself  more 
brilliantly.      Without   haste,    but    without   a  pause,   never 
elated  by  victory,  never  depressed  by  defeat,  not  caring  to 
overrun  wrhat  they  could  not  hold  by  force  of  arms,  or  to 
obtain  by  treaty  what  they  could  not  take  without  it,  willing 
to  employ  years  instead  of  months,  and  to  conquer  by  inches 
where  they  might  have  conquered  by  leagues,  the  Koman 
Senate,  slow  but  sure,  held  on  the  even  tenor  of  their  course, 
determined  only  that  where  the  Koman  eagles  had  once  set 
down  their  talons,  there  they  should  remain,  till  the  time 
came  to  plunge  them  more  deeply  into  the  vitals  of  the  foe. 
Did  Samnium  at  the  close  of  the  great  twenty-two  years' 
struggle  lie,  to  all  appearance,  prostrate  at  the  feet  of  Kome, 
the  last  of  her  fortresses,  Bovianum,  in  the  grasp  of  the 
conqueror?     That  conqueror  concluded  an  equitable  peace, 
on  terms  of  all  but  equal  alliance,^  not  because  she  liked  to 
spare  the  conquered — that  maxim  is  to  be  found  only  in  the 
patriotic  imagination  of  the  author  of  "iEneid"— but  simply 
because  she  did  not  choose  to  be  brought  face  to  face  with 
Southern  Italy  before  she  had  made  quite  sure  of  Central. 
To  build  a  new  fortress,  to  found  a  new  military  colony,  to 
complete  a  stage  or  two  more  of  a  great  military  road— if 
only  it  could  better  secure  what  lay   behind,   and   give   a 
vantage  ground   for  future   operations   whenever   the  time 
should  come— this  was  the  strictly  practical  object  of  Kome 
when  she  took  up  arms  ;  this  she  kept  in  view  when  smarting 
under  a  defeat ;  and,  what  is  more  remarkable,  with  this  she 
rested  content  even  when  flushed  with  victory.     In  this  way, 
always  aiming  only  at  what  was  feasible,  making  sure  of 
every  inch  of  her  way,  drawing  her  iron  network  of  colonies 
and  military  roads  over  every  district  which  she  professed  to 
claim,  Kome  found  herself  at  length  (b.c.  293)  with  not  a 

*Livy,  ix.  45:  "  l^'cedus  antiquum  Samnitibus  redditum". 


t! 


66 


CARTHACfE  AND  THE  CARTHAGINIANS. 


ROME  FACE  TO  FACE  WITH  CARTHAGE. 


67 


'I 


Single  danger  behind  her.  and  with  nothing  in  front  save 
some  luxurious  Greek  cities,  and  some  insignificant  tribes  of 
Italian  aborigines,  to  separate  her  from  that  which  was  at 
once  the  object  of  her  highest  hopes  and  of  her  most  practical 
and  stern  resolves,  the  union  of  the  whole  of  Italy  beneath 
her  sway. 

We  have  said  that  there  was  but  one  obstacle  to  the  reali- 
sation  of  the  aim  of  Kome;   but  one  other  there  shortly 
appeared,  which,  as  it  had  been  beyond  the  visible,  so  was  it 
necessarily  beyond  the  mental  horizon  of  so  matter-of-fact  a 
body  as  the  Roman  Senate.    The  adventurous  King  of  Epu-us 
whose  erratic  course  it  would  have  required  a  genius  like  his 
own  to  have  anticipated,  shot  down  like  a  meteor  on  the 
scene  (b.c.  280).     Fired  with  the  ambition  of  emulating  his 
great  relative  Alexander,  and  of  founding  a  vast  Greek  empire 
in  the  west  on  the  ruins  of  Italy  and  Carthage,  as  Alexander 
had  founded  his  on  the  ruins  of  Persia  and  of  E<^ypt    he 
eagerly  seized  the  opportunity  afforded  him  by  the  appeal  of 
the  frivolous  Tarentines,  and  offered  to  lead  the  Greek  cities 
of  Italy  in  their  opposition  to  Rome. 

The  struggle  is  rich,  above  most  of  those  in  which  Rome 
engaged,  in  the  play  of  individual  character  and  in  the  traits 
of  knightly  chivaby  and  generosity,  which  lend  to  it  a  charm 
which  IS  altogether  its  own.     Even  his  sober-minded  and 
severely  practical  enemies  could  scarcely  come  into  contact 
with  so  high-bred  and  chivalrous  a  foe  as  Pyrrhus  without 
catching  some  sparks  of  his  courtesy  and  his  enthusiasm  • 
but  the  struggle  is  also  memorable  as  the  first  occasion  in 
which  Greece  and  Rome  met  in  the  shock  of  battle     Here 
for  the  first  time  might  be  seen  the  Roman  legion  meeting 
the  phalanx  of  Macedon ;  a  national  militia  arrayed  against 
highly  trained  and  veteran  mercenaries ;  individual  militarv 
genius  against  collective  mediocrity.     For  a  moment  fortune 
seemed  to  waver,  or  even  to  incline  in  favour  of  the  ad 
venturer;  but  she  could  not  waver  long.     The  victories  of 
Heraclea  and  Asculum  must  have  made  the  name  of  Pyrrhus 


a  name  to  be  spoken  with  bated  breath  even  in  the  Roman 
Senate ;  and  the  lightning  rapidity  with  which  he  swept 
Sicily  from  end  to  end,  cooping  the  Mamertines  in  Messana 
on  the  extreme  east,  and  the  Phoenicians  in  Lilybieum  in  the 
extreme  west,  must  have  made  his  name  a  name  of  terror 
even  among  the  burghers  of  Carthage.  But  the  proud 
answer  returned  by  the  Roman  Senate  to  the  embassy  of 
Pyrrhus  after  his  first  victory,  that  Rome  never  negotiated  so 
long  as  an  enemy  was  on  Italian  soil.^  must  have  at  once 
opened  the  eyes  of  the  Epirot  king  to  the  hopeless  nature  of 
the  enterprise  he  had  undertaken,  and  marked  triumphantly 
the  goal  to  which  centuries  of  tempered  aspiration  and  of  im- 
petuous resolve  had  raised  the  Latin  city.  To  the  Roman 
mind  an  ideal  which  could  not  be  realised  was  no  ideal  at  all. 
and  the  Romans  had  now  realised  their  highest  ideal  to  an 
extent  which  entitled  them  to  take  a  wholly  new  point  of 
departure  (b.c.  278). 

Pyrrhus  disappeared  from  the  western  world  almost  as 
rapidly  as  he  had  descended  on  it,  crying  with  his  last  breath, 
half  in  pity,  half  in  envy,  *'  How  fair  a  battle-field  are  we 
leaving  to  the  Romans  and  Carthaginians  !  "  -  He  spoke  too 
truly.  The  arena  was  already  cleared  of  its  lesser  combat- 
ants, and  for  some  few  years  there  was.  as  it  were,  the  hush 
of  expectation,  the  audible  silence  of  suspense,  while  mightier 
combatants  were  arming  for  the  fray,  and  the  great  duel  was 
preparing  of  which  a  hundred  years  would  hardly  see  the 
termination. 


'  Plutarcli,  Pyrrhm,  xix.  5  ;  Appian,  Sam.,  Frag.  10,  2,  3. 
-  Plntardi,    Pyrrhus,    xxiii.    7;   oloi'  airoAeiTo/xei/,  w  <^iAot,  KapxjjSon'ois  Ka\ 
'Pwfxaioif  TraXaiarpai'. 


6S 


CARTHAGE  AND  IHU  CARTHAGINIANS. 


CIIAPTKR  IV. 


FIRST   PUNIC   WAR. 

(264-241  B.C.) 

MKSSAXA  A XI,  AGIUOKXTUU. 

(2G4-262  B.C.) 

-Ihc  qu«.t,oi,  at  muc-Iniportance  of  the  .lecision-Romans  occiipv 
M.s^-,na-Thoy  .attack  S,rac»3e-Ro»ult»  of  fct  campaigi-KoirX 

"^^^^^'fa"::™-'^"''"^'"""^  '"'''-'^-^ '-  --A^i«c,r,;: 

It  is  not  the  least  striking  testimony  to  the  sense  of  relief 
with  which  the  nations  of  the  West  must  have  seen  Pyrrhus 
return  to  his  own  country,   that  the  Eomans  and  Cartha- 
ginians, in  the  face  of  so  redoubtable  a  foe,  had  agi-eed  to 
forget  their  mutual  jealousies  till  such  time  as  he  should 
transfer  himself  and  his  ambitious  schemes  to  another  quarter 
of  the  globe     The  second  victory  of  Pyrrhus  over  the  Romans 
had  been  foUowed  by  the  appearance  of  a  Carthaginian  fleet 
off  the  mouth  of  the  Tiber,  offering  to  the  Roman  Senate  their 
aid  against  him.'     The  offer  was  at  first  declined,  but  shortly 
afterwards  a  close  alliance  was  concluded,  and  the  Cartha- 
ginian fleet,  which  had  in  vain  attempted  to  intercept  Pyrrhus 
on  his  crossing  into  Sicily,  inflicted  a  heavy  loss  upon  him 
as  he  hastily  retreated  from  it.^'    But  hardly  had  Pyrrhus 
urned  his  back  for  the  last  time  on  Italy,  when  the  first 

'Justin,  xviii.  2,  1-3. 

n'oljbius,  iu.  25;  Plutarch,  Pyrrhm.  xxiv.  1  ;  Appian,  Sam.  12,  Frag.  oZ 


SICILY  AND  ROME, 


69 


note  of  war  between  the  nations  so  recently  allied  was 
sounded.  It  came,  as  was  to  be  expected,  from  that  fair 
island  which,  by  its  position,  seemed  to  belong  half  to 
Europe,  half  to  Africa,  and  from  that  point  in  it  which  lay 
actually  within  sight  of  Khegium,  the  town  which  was,  as 
yet,  the  farthest  outpost  of  the  Eoman  alliance.  For  more 
than  a  century  past  Greeks  and  Carthaginians  had  been 
contending,  with  varying  success,  for  the  possession  of  the 
island.  Few  towns  of  any  importance  within  its  limits  had 
escaped  destruction,  fewer  still  had  escaped  a  siege,  and 
many  had  been  taken  and  retaken  almost  as  many  times  as 
there  had  been  campaigns.  On  the  whole,  in  spite  of  the 
efforts  of  able  leaders  like  Dionysius  the  Tyrant,  Timoleon, 
and  Agathocles,  fortune  had  favoured  the  Carthaginians ;  and 
the  power  of  Syracuse,  the  head  of  the  Greek  states,  was 
now  confined  to  the  south-eastern  corner  of  the  island. 

But  there  was  one  town  in  the  island,  and  that  an  all- 
important  one  from  its  geographical  position,  which  had  by 
a  strange  destiny  ceased  to  be  Greek  without  becoming  Car- 
thaginian, and  after  outraging  Greek  and  Carthaginian  alike, 
and  arousing  their  active  hostility,  had  now,  to  make  matters 
better,  appealed  for  aid  to  a  third  power  which  was  destined 
to  prove  mightier  than  either. 

When  Agathocles,  tyrant  of  Syracuse,  died  (b.c.  289),  his 
mercenary  troops  were  disbanded,  and  a  body  of  them,  on 
their  way  back  to  Campania,  their  native  country,  treacher- 
ously seized  Messana,  which  had  entertained  them  hospitably. 
They  expelled  or  slew  the  male  inhabitants,  divided  their 
wives  and  children,  and  calling  themselves  the  children  of 
Mamers,  or  Mars,  proceeded  to  justify  their  name  by  plun- 
dering or  harrying  all  the  surrounding  country. ^ 

Such  outi-ages  could  not  be  overlooked  by  the  Cartha- 
ginians. Still  less  could  they  pass  unnoticed  by  the  young 
king  Hiero,  who  had  lately  obtained  the  vacant  throne  of 


*Pol>li.  I  7;  l>kMl.  xxi.  Frag.  13;  I'liitarch,  Pt/rihus,  xxiii. 


SICIfA'  AM)  ROME. 


69 


note  of  war  between  the  nations  so  recently  allied  was 
sounded.  It  came,  as  was  to  be  expected,  from  that  fair 
island  which,  by  its  position,  seemed  to  belong  half  to 
Europe,  half  to  Africa,  and  from  that  point  in  it  which  lay 
actually  within  sight  of  Rhegium,  the  town  which  was,  as 
yet,  the  farthest  outpost  of  the  Roman  alliance.  For  more 
than  a  century  past  Greeks  and  Carthaginians  had  been 
contending,  with  varying  success,  for  the  possession  of  the 
island.  Few  towns  of  any  importance  within  its  limits  had 
escaped  destruction,  fewer  still  had  escaped  a  siege,  and 
many  had  been  taken  and  retaken  almost  as  many  times  as 
there  had  been  campaigns.  On  the  whole,  in  spite  of  the 
efforts  of  able  leaders  like  Dionysius  the  Tyrant,  Timoleon, 
and  Agathocles,  fortune  had  favoured  the  Carthaginians ;  and 
the  power  of  Syracuse,  the  head  of  the  Greek  states,  was 
now  confined  to  the  south-eastern  corner  of  the  island. 

But  there  was  one  town  in  the  island,  and  that  an  all- 
important  one  from  its  geographical  position,  which  had  by 
a  strange  destiny  ceased  to  be  Greek  without  becoming  Car- 
thaginian, and  after  outraging  Greek  and  Carthaginian  alike, 
and  arousing  their  active  hostility,  had  now,  to  make  matters 
better,  appealed  for  aid  to  a  third  power  which  was  destined 
to  prove  mightier  than  either. 

When  Agathocles,  tyrant  of  Syracuse,  died  (n.c.  289),  his 
mercenary  troops  were  disbanded,  and  a  body  of  them,  on 
their  way  back  to  Campania,  their  native  country,  treacher- 
ously seized  Messana,  which  had  entertained  them  hospitably. 
They  expelled  or  slew  the  male  inhabitants,  divided  their 
wives  and  children,  and  calling  themselves  the  children  of 
Mamers,  or  Mars,  proceeded  to  justify  their  name  by  plun- 
dering or  harrying  all  the  surrounding  country. ^ 

Such  outrages  could  not  be  overlooked  by  the  Cartha- 
ginians. Still  less  could  they  pass  unnoticed  by  the  young 
king  ITiero,   who  had  lately  ol)tained  the  vaca!it  throne  of 


M'ul\lt,  i.  7;   hiotl.  \\i,  Fi;ii.^  l.'i;  riiiL:uch,  Pf/n/iits,  .\.\iii. 


1 1 


70 


CARTHAGE  AND  THE  CARTHAGINIANS. 


APPEAL  OF  MAMERTINES. 


71 


Syracuse  by  the  best  of  titles,  the  free  choice  alike  of  his 
comrades  in  arms  and  of  his  fellow-citizens;  and  he  pro- 
ceeded to  lay  siege  to  the  town.  The  Mamertine  councils 
were  divided.  It  was  clear  that  without  allies  they  would 
not  long  hold  out  against  the  powerful  foes  whose  deadly 
hostility  they  had  provoked.  One  party  among  them  was 
for  surrendering  the  place  to  the  Carthaginians  to  keep  out 
the  Syracusans ;  the  other  was  for  invoking  the  Komans  to 
keep  out  both  alike.  1 

Never  was  a  question  fraught  with  more  important  issues, 
moral  and  political,  brought  before  the  Roman  Senate ;  and 
never  did  they  shirk  their  responsibility  more  shamefully. 
It  is  not  perhaps  so  easy  to  see  what  was  the  right  thing  to 
do  as  it  is  to  see  that  what  the  Roman  Senate  did  was  the 
very  worst  thing  that  they  could  do.  Were  they,  on  the  one 
hand,  to  refuse  to  protect  Itahans  who  appealed  to  them 
avowedly  as  the  head  of  the  Italian  Confederation  for  aid 
against  the  Greeks  and  Carthaginians,  and  to  look  calmly  on 
while  the  city  of  Messana  fell  into  the  hands  of  the  Cartha- 
ginians, to  be  used  by  them  as  a  standing  menace  to  their 
power  and  a  vantage  ground  in  the  great  conflict  which 
could  not  now  be  far  distant  ?  Or  were  they,  on  the  other 
hand,  to  lull  their  consciences  to  sleep,  to  turn  round  upon 
Hiero,  their  ally,  who  had  recently  lent  them  his  aid  in 
getting  rid  of  the  lawless  banditti  who  had  seized  Rhegium 
as  the  Mamertines  had  seized  Messana,  and  to  take  under 
their  special  protection  a  band  of  cut-throats  on  one  side 
of  the  straits,  while  they  had  just  scourged  and  beheaded 
every  member  of  a  similar,  and  perhaps  a  less  guilty  band 
on  the  other?  It  was  a  question  beset  with  difficulties. 
National  honour  and  common  gratitude  pointed  clearly  in 
one  direction :  ambition  and  immediate  interest  pointed  as 
clearly  in  another,  and  the  Roman  Senate  took  the  most 
Ignoble  course  of  all  open  to  it,  that  of  shifting  the  immediate 

»  Pol)  1).  i.  8-10. 


responsibility  from  their  own  shoulders  to  that  of  the  people 
assembled  in  their  Comitia.     Not  that  they  broke  the  letter 
of  the  constitution  in  so  doing.     In  a  government  which 
rested,  as  did  that  of  Rome,  on  a  popular  basis,  the  ultimate 
decision  on  a  question  of  peace  or  war  would  necessarily 
remain  with  the  people  at  large.     But,  usually,  a  question 
of  the  kind  was  referred  to  the  Comitia  only  in  the  light 
of  a  previous  resolution  of  the  Senate.     Nor  would  it  often 
happen  that  a  people  who,   in  the  matter  of  an  ordinary 
election,  showed  such  a  profound  respect  for  the  chance  vote 
of  their  own  first  century,  that  they  hardly  ever  failed  to 
follow  its  lead  and  to  elect  the  candidate  it  had  named,  would, 
in  the  far  graver  matter  of  peace  or  war,  set  at  nought  the 
majestic  "  prerogative  "  of  the  Senate.     If  ever  there  was  an 
occasion  in  Roman  history  when,  in  view  of  the  complicated 
moral  questions,  and  the  far-reaching  consequences  involved, 
It  was  desirable  that  the  irresponsible  and  ill-educated  masses 
should  have  the  help  of  such  guidance  as  the  most  highly 
trained  intellects,   and   the   most  responsible   body  in   the 
State  could  give  them,  that  occasion  was  the  present.     The 
consuls,  Appius  Claudius  Caudex  and  M.  Fulvius  Flaccus, 
were  ambitious  men,  eager  for  war  at  any  price.     It  was 
easy  for  them  to  raise  a  patriotic  cry  of  Italians  against 
foreigners,  and  to  hold  out  visions  of  assignations  of  public 
land  amongst  the  rich  fields  of  Sicily  to  the  multitude  whose 
appetite  for  such  booty  had  been  recently  whetted  by  the 
large  distributions   of  land   in   Italy.     The  decision  of  the 
people  under  such  circumstances  was  not  doubtful ;  and  the 
most  momentous  resolution  ever  arrived  at  by  the  Romans 
was  taken  without  either  the  definite  sanction  or  the  explicit 
disapproval  of  the  Senate  (b.c  264).i     It  was  possible  for  the 
Senate,  perhaps,  by  such  paltry  conduct,  to  deprive  them- 
selves of  some  of  the  credit  which  might  ultimately  be  won 
by  the  war.     It  was  not  possible  to  relieve  themselves  of  the 
shame  of  its  commencement. 

iPolyb.  i.  10,  11  ;  I.ivy,  Kpit.  xvi.  ;  Zouanis.  viii.  8. 


i 


ii  H I 


!1 


72  CARTHAGE  AND  THE  CARTHAGINIANS. 

Nor  was  the  step  now  taken  less  serious  from  a  political 
than  from  a  moral  point  of  view,  for,  in  tnith,  upon  the 
passmg  of  the  narrow  arm  of  sea  which  rages  between 
Italy  and  Sicily  hinged  the  future  destinies  of  both  countries  • 
and  not  of  these  alone,  but  of  the  ancient  civilised  world! 
Hitherto  the  pohcy  of  the  Koman  Senate  had  been  definite 
and  stnctly  practical,  and  had  not  carried  them  beyond  the 

uT  i  ^i'^u^  P'^P^'-     ^^  *^^y  ^^^  ^^°^d  si^ips  of  war  at 
all,  they  had  been  of  a  small  size  and  built  upon  an  antique 

model     Now,  for  the  first  time,  they  were  about  to  set  foot 
beyond  the  seas,  to  embark  upon  a  poHcy  the  course  of  which 
It  would  no  longer  rest  with  them  to  determine;  to  claim 
without  ships  of  their  own,  from  the  greatest  of  naval  powers' 
a  portion  of  the  island  which  had  for  centuries  been  looked 
upon  as  her  peculiar  appanage.     Some  clear-sighted  men 
there  must  have  been  among  the  Eoman  senators  who  recoiled 
from  the  results  of  what  they  had  done,  or  rather  from  the 
results  of  what  they  had  refrained,  through  moral  coward- 
ice, from  doing;  but  their  voices  were  not  heard,  and  active 
operations  began.     War,  indeed,  against  Carthage  was  not 
formally  declared,  for  the  diplomatists  of  either  nation  had 
yet  to  go  through  the  solemn  farce  which  usually  precedes 
such  a  declaration  by  raking  up   forgotten   grievances  or 
inventing  new  ones  to  justify  the  resolution  which  had  been 

MeTslna^i^       *  *""*  '''^^''^   '^^'^   ^'^^"^  *"*  ''"''^   *°  ^^^'^^^ 

The  command  was  committed  to  Appius  Claudius  (b.o 
,264),  more  easy  work  being  found  for  his  colleague,  Flac 
cus,  nearer  home.  The  want  of  ships  of  war,  and  even  of 
transports-for,  by  a  strange  short-sightedness,  the  Romans 
had  allowed  such  ships  as  they  had  to  fall  into  decay  at 
the  very  time  when  they  most  needed  them  -was  met,  as 
Polybius  tells  us,  by  borrowing  them  from  the  Greek  cities 
of  Italy,  Tarentum,  Locri,  Velia,  and  Neapolis.2    It  would 


IMPORTANCE  OF  DECISION  TAKEN. 


73 


>Polyb.  i.  11.3;  Floras,  ii.  2,  1-5. 


^Vo\yh.  i.  20,  13.  14. 


rather  seem,  however,  from  the  admitted  fact  that  commis- 
sioners of  the  fleet  had  for  some  time  past  been  regularly 
stationed  at  various  points  along  the  coasts  of  Italy,  that 
these  ships  were  in  no  sense  the  voluntary  offerings  of 
the  communities  which  supplied  them,  but  were  rather  the 
regular  contingents  which  the  Greek  cities  were  bound  to 
furnish  to  the  Roman  confederacy,  when  it  called  upon  them 
to  do  so.  Anyhow  a  more  serious  difficulty  occurred,  w^hen 
Claudius,  the  legate  of  the  consuls  and  forerunner  of  the 
Roman  army,  appeared  at  Rhegium.  Things  had  taken  an 
unexpected  turn  at  Messana.  The  party  favourable  to 
Carthage  had  got  the  upper  hand,  and  the  Carthaginian  fleet 
was  riding  at  anchor  in  the  harbour,  while  a  Carthaginian 
garrison  was  in  possession  of  the  citadel.  Here  was  an 
awkward  predicament  for  the  Romans !  but  C.  Claudius  was, 
like  most  of  his  family,  a  man  of  energy  and  audacity.  He 
crossed  the  straits  at  the  peril  of  his  life,  invited  Hanno,  the 
Carthaginian  admiral,  to  a  conference,  and  then,  in  defiance 
of  the  law  of  nations  and  of  honour,  took  him  prisoner,  and 
allowed  him  to  purchase  his  liberty  and  life  only  by  the 
surrender  of  the  citadel.  Hanno's  life  was  not  worth  the 
price  he  paid  for  it;  for  the  Carthaginians,  enraged  at  his 
cowardice  and  incapacity,  condemned  him  to  be  crucified — a 
punishment  which  was  not  very  exceptional  in  their  adminis- 
tration of  justice  and  was  certainly  not  always  so  well 
deserved.^  The  Mamertines,  who  were  equally  ready  to 
follow  any  one  who  seemed  able  to  promise  them  the  lives 
which  by  their  crimes  they  had  so  justly  forfeited,  were 
now  besieged  in  Messana  from  the  north  side  of  the  city  by 
a  second  Hanno  whom  the  Carthaginians  had  sent  out  to 
replace  the  first,  while  Hiero  attacked  it  from  the  south. 

Such  was  the  condition  of  afifairs  when  Appius  Claudius 
himself  appeared  with  his  army  upon  the  scene.  How  he 
managed  to  cross  the  straits  with  20,000  men  in  the  face  of 

>  I'olyb.  i,  11,  4,  r» ;  Zoiiuras,  viii.  9 


74 


CARTHAGE  AND  THE  CARTHAGINIANS. 


an  enemy  whose  proud  boast  it  was  that  without  their  leave 
no  Eoman  could  even  bathe  his  hands  in  the  sea,  w^e  do 
not  knowJ  But  cross  them  he  did,  and  by  a  double  victory 
on  two  successive  days,  first  over  Hiero,  and  then  over  the 
Carthaginians,  he  succeeded  in  raising  the  siege,  and,  after 
ravaging  the  country  in  every  direction,  pitched  his  camp 
under  the  walls  of  Syracuse  and  prepared  to  besiege  Hiero 
in  his  own  capital.  But  two  hundred  years  of  internecine 
warfare  with  the  Carthaginians  had  not  predisposed  the 
Syracusans  to  take  any  very  strong  measures  in  defence  of 
their  temporary  alliance  with  them.  Appius  sufifered,  as  had 
so  often  been  the  case  in  previous  sieges  of  Syracuse,  far 
more  from  the  malaria  of  the  marshes  of  the  Anapus  than 
from  any  active  hostility  of  Hiero;  and  when  the  Eomans 
thought  fit  to  retreat  towards  Messana  from  so  unhealthy  a 
region,  and  were  followed  closely  by  the  Syracusans,  Hiero 
found  that  the  troops  of  the  rival  armies  were  more  disposed 
to  meet  in  friendly  gatherings  at  the  outposts  than  in  hostile 
array  in  the  battle-field.^ 

So  ended  the  first  campaign.  With  one  small  army  the 
Romans  had  already  attained  the  ostensible  objects  of  the 
war.  The  Mamertines  had  been  reheved,  the  protectorate  of 
Rome  over  them  asserted,  much  booty  had  been  gained,  the 
Carthaginians  had  been  driven  back  towards  the  north-west 
and  the  Syracusans  towards  the  south-east  of  the  island. 
Why  did  not  Rome  stop  here  ?  Why  was  she  not  content 
to  rest  upon  her  laurels  and  to  retain  in  her  own  hands,  or 
in  those  of  the  Mamertines  who  were  now  devoted  in  her 
interests,  the  intermediate  state  of  Messana,  which  from  its 
position  would  henceforward  have  to  bear  the  brunt  of  any 
attack  on  the  part  of  the  Carthaginians  ?  Could  the  Romans 
have  foreseen  the  heavy  reverses  and  the  "Cadmean  victo- 
ries "  of  the  twenty- three  years'  war  which  was  to  drag  out 
its  tedious  length  after  so  brilliant  a  beginning,  they  might 

1  Polyb.  i.  11,  9;  Zonaras,  viii.  I». 
^ViAyh.  I  12;  Dioil.  Sic.  Frag,  xxiii.  9. 


THE  SECOND  CAMPAIGN. 


75 


well  have  hesitated  to  purchase  at  so  heavy  a  price  an  island 
which,  by  the  time  it  came  into  their  hands,  would  be  hardly, 
in  itself,  worth  possessing.  But  once  more  the  horizon  of 
the  Senate  had  expanded  with  their  achievements ;  and,  no 
longer  content  with  securing  the  corner  of  Sicily  nearest  to 
themselves,  they  had  conceived  the  design  of  stripping  Car- 
thage and  Syracuse  ahke  of  so  much  of  their  Sicihan  posses- 
sions as  would  render  them  for  ever  innocuous  neighbours. 
Where  one  small  army  had  achieved  so  much  in  the  face 
of  every  obstacle,  physical  and  moral,  what  might  not  two 
consular  armies  accomplish,  especially  when  supported  by 
powerful  allies  in  the  island  itself,  whose  fidelity  was  secured 
by  the  strongest  of  securities  ? 

The  second  campaign  was  not  less  successful  than  the  first. 
There  was  now  no  rumour  of  disturbance  in  the  neighbour- 
hood of  Rome ;  and  the  two  consuls,  M'.  OctaciUus  and  M'. 
Valerius,  were  able  to  cross  together  into  Sicily  with  their 
united  armies  amounting  to  35,000  men.  They  met  with  no 
serious  resistance,  fifty,  or,  as  others  said,^  sixty-seven,  towns 
belonging  to  Hiero  or  the  Carthaginians  submitted  to  them ; 
and  Hiero  himself,  consulting,  partly,  no  doubt,  the  wishes 
of  his  subjects,  partly  his  own  feelings  of  hatred  towards  the 
hereditary  oppressors  of  his  country,  turned  from  the  setting 
to  the  rising  sun  and  made  overtures  of  peace  to  Rome. 
The  Romans  were  keenly  alive  to  the  advantages  which  an 
aUiance  with  Syracuse  would  bring  them  while  they  were 
waging  war  in  the  interior  of  the  island.  Their  supplies— 
theV>iii<i  in  ^^^^^  *^^y  ^^'®^®  ^^^^  deficient— would  be  secured 
by  the  immediate  neighbourhood  of  so  opulent  a  friend.  But 
the  Senate  thought  fit  to  assume  the  air  of  those  who  were 
conferring  a  favour,  and  managed  to  drive  a  hard  bargain 
with  the  Syracusan  king.  Perhaps  a  power  which  was  in  the 
full  tide  of  success  could  hardly  have  been  expected  to  act 
otherwise.     Hiero   was  compelled   to  pay  a  war  contribu- 


1  Kutiopius,  ii.  19. 


76 


CARTHAGE  AND  THE  CARTHAGINIANS. 


tion  of  200  talents  and  to  surrender  several  of  his  towns  ;  and 
he  became,  henceforward,  to  the  end  of  his  long  life  and 
reign,  to  all  appearance,  the  grateful,  and  certainly  the  faithful 
and  the  trusted  ally  of  Rome.  Under  his  wise  and  beneficent 
rule,  Syracuse,  though  war  was  surging  round  her  by  land 
and  sea,  enjoyed  a  degree  of  prosperity  and  of  internal  quiet 
to  which,  with  the  one  exception  of  the  time  of  Timoleon,  it 
may  perhaps  be  said,  she  had  been  a  stranger  for  two  cen- 
turies before,  and  which  she  has  never  enjoyed  since. ^ 

But  where  were  the  Carthaginians  all  this  time?  Two 
campaigns  had  been  fought  and  won,  and  they  had  nowhere 
yet  shown  themselves  in  force.  They  had  allowed  them- 
selves, with  hardly  a  struggle,  to  be  swept  from  the  larger 
half  of  the  island.  Would  they  allow  themselves  to  be  swept 
without  resistance  from  the  remainder?  The  truth  is  that 
they  were  neither  inactive  nor  cowardly.  They  were  simply, 
owing  to  the  defects  of  their  military  system,  unprepared ; 
and  they  wore  all  this  time  straining  every  nerve  to  raise 
a  force  in  Africa,  in  Liguria,  in  Spain,  and  in  Gaul,  which  they 
hoped  might  eventually  be  able  to  strike  a  vigorous  blow 
and  to  retrieve  their  fortunes.^ 

About  half  way  between  the  promontories  of  Lilybseum  and 
Pachynus,  and  drawn  back  a  mile  or  so  from  the  southern 
coast,  was  the  important  city  of  Agrigentum.  It  had  once 
boasted  a  population  of  two  hundred  thousand  souls  ^— a  fact 
to  which  the  size  and  extent  of  its  majestic  ruins  still  bear 
witness— and  though  its  ruthless  destruction  by  the  Cartha- 
ginians (B.C.  405),  which  has  already  been  described,*  and 
the  misgovernment  of  domestic  tyrants  had  shorn  it  of  much 
of  its  grandeur  and  prosperity,  it  had  been  refounded  by 
Timoleon,^  and  was  still  at  the  time  of  the  First  Punic  War 
the  second  Greek  city  in  Sicily,  and  was  able  to  give  shelter 
to  a  garrison  of  fifty  thousand  men.     Here  Hannibal,  son  of 

1  Polyb.  i.  15-lG  ;  Di<Hl.  xxiii.  Fra},'.  5  ami  9  ;  Klorus.  ii.  2.  6  ;  Zonaras.  viii.  9. 

sPolyb.  i.  17.  4  r» ;  Zonanis,  viii.  10.  sDitxl.  Sic.  xiii.  90. 

■*  ^'♦^  I*-  ''^-  *  Plutorcli .  Timoleon,  C»r». 


A 


SIEGE  OF  AGRIGENTUM. 


77 


Gisco,  concentrated  the  forces  which  had  been  gathered  from 
such  distant  countries  ;  here  he  determined  to  make  a  stand 
in  the  field,  and  behind  its  bulwarks,  after  collecting  vast 
stores  of  provisions  and  of  materials  for  war,  he  was  prepared, 
if  need  be,  to  stand  a  siege.  Hither  also  came  all  the  forces 
which  the  Roman  Senate  thought  necessary  to  deal  with  the 
foe  who  during  two  campaigns  had  seemed  anxious  only  to 
keep  himself  out  of  sight — a  small  army,  so  it  is  said,  of  two 
legions  only !  ^  That  this  army,  however,  was  on  second 
thoughts  judged  to  be  too  small  and  was  doubled  in  size  is 
clear  from  the  fact  that  both  consuls  are  mentioned  as  having 
taken  part  in  the  siege,  and  doubtless  the  Mamertines  and 
Syracusans  made  the  total  much  larger  still.^ 

The  consuls  of  the  year  were  L.  Postumius  and  Q.  Mamilius 
(B.C.  262);  they  pitched  their  camp  eight  stadia  from  the 
town  and  imprudently  sent  out  their  troops  in  large  numbers 
to  forage  in  the  surrounding  country.  Hannibal  seized  the 
opportunity,  and  only  the  heroism  of  some  Roman  pickets 
who,  to  allow  time  for  the  foragers  to  get  back  into  the  camp, 
died  to  a  man,  fighting  bravely  at  their  posts,  saved  the 
Romans  from  disaster.^  It  is  not  the  only  occasion  in  this 
war  which  proves  that  the  far-famed  sentry  of  Pompeii,  who 
preferred,  with  visor  down,  to  be  overwhelmed  by  the  lava 
torrent  at  his  post  rather  than  leave  it  with  the  flying  citizens, 
was  no  isolated  or  exceptional  example  of  Roman  heroism. 
He  only  acted  as  every  Roman  was  brought  up  to  act,  as 
a  matter  of  course,  and  as  few  ever  failed  to  act,  when  the 
emergency  arrived.  Both  sides  now  displayed  greater  caution. 
The  Carthaginians  contented  themselves  with  harassing  the 
Romans  with  missiles  from  a  distance,  while  the  Romans 
broke  up  their  army  into  two  separate  camps,  connected  by 
a  double  line  of  entrenchments — the  one  to  protect  them 
against  the  sallies  of  the  besieged,  the  other  to  guard  against 
possible  dangers  from  the  rear.     The  town  of  Erbessus,  a  few 

iPolyb.  i.  17.  1.  -' Ibid.  L  17,  6. 

Mbid.  I  17,  9-13. 


78 


CARTHAGE  AND  THE  CARTHAGINIANS. 


FALL  OF  AGRIGENTUM. 


79 


■ 


I* 


miles  to  the  north,  supplied  them  with  abundant  provisions, 
and  seemed  to  remove  famine,  at  all  events,  from  the  list 
of  contingencies  to  which  they  might  be  exposed.     In  this 
state  of  things  five  months  passed  away,  and  to  all  appear- 
ance the  siege  was  no  nearer  a  successful  termination  than 
at  the  beginning;    but  provisions  had  begun  to  fail  in  the 
closely-packed  quarters  of  the  defenders,  and  in  deference  to 
the  urgent  solicitations  of  Hannibal,  Hanno  was  sent  to  Sicily 
with  a  new  army,  and  with  orders,  if  possible,  to  compel  the 
Eomans  to  raise  the  siege.     Making  Heraclea  his  head-quar- 
ters, Hanno  managed  to  surprise  Erbessus,  and  so  cut  off  the 
supplies  of  the  enemy.     The  Eomans  now  found  themselves 
in  the  position  of  besieged  rather  than  besiegers.     Pestilence 
as  well  as  famine  was  at  work  in  their  lines,  and  it  was  the 
extraordinary  energy  of  Hiero  in  supplying  them  with  pro- 
visions  when  Erbessus  fell  which  alone  prevented  them  from 
giving  up  the  enterprise  in  despair.  ^ 

Decisive  operations  could  not  now  be  long  delayed.      In  a 
preliminary  engagement  the  Roman  horse  experienced,  for 
the  first  time,  the  superiority  of  the  famous  Numidian  light 
cavalry ;   but  in  the  battle  which  ensued  the  motley  Cartha- 
ginian infantry  found  that  they  were,  as  yet,  no  match  for 
the  soldiers  of  the  legion.      Fifty  elephants— wild   beasts 
Polybius,  with  an  air  of  horror,  still  calls  them— fought  on 
the  side  of  the  Carthaginians,  a  number  many  times  as  great 
as  that  which  a  few  years  before,  in  the  time  of  Pyrrhus,  had 
carried  dismay  and  confusion  into  the  Roman  ranks ;  but  on 
this  occasion,  as  often  afterwards,  elephants  were  found  to 
be  a  two-edged  weapon,  which  might  be  fatal  to  the  hand 
that  wielded  it.      Thirty  of  the  fifty  were  killed,  and  eleven 
remained  alive  in  the  hands  of  the  Romans,  as  vast  moving 
trophies  of  the  victory  that  had  been  won.    Hanno  saved  a  rem- 
nant  of  his  army  by  his  hasty  flight  to  Heraclea,  and  Hannibal, 
whom  the  Romans  looked  upon  as  already  within  their  grasp, 


sheltered  by  the  darkness  of  a  winter's  night,  and  helped  by  the 
energy  of  despair,  made  a  last  effort  to  break  through  the  lines 
of  his  victorious  foe.  The  Romans,  overcome  with  fatigue, 
or  giving  the  reins  to  their  joy,  had  relaxed  their  vigilance. 
With  bags  stufifed  with  straw  Hannibal  filled  up  the  deep 
trenches,  scaled  the  ramparts,  and  managed  with  the  effective 
part  of  his  army  to  pass  through  the  Roman  lines  unobserved. 
In  the  morning  the  enemy,  discovering  what  had  happened, 
went  through  the  form  of  pursuing  the  retreating  Hannibal ; 
but  they  were  more  eager  to  fall  on  the  unhappy  town  which 
he  had  abandoned  to  their  mercy.  The  inhabitants  surren- 
dered at  discretion,  but  they  had  to  undergo  all  the  horrors 
of  a  place  taken  by  storm.  The  town  was  given  up  to  plun- 
der, and  25,000  freemen  were  sold  into  slavery.  Nothing 
throughout  the  whole  of  Sicily  now  remained  in  the  hands 
of  the  Carthaginians  save  a  few  fortresses  on  its  western 
coasts;  and  this  was  at  the  precise  moment  at  which,  ac- 
cording to  the  explicit  statement  of  Polybius,^  it  first  dawned 
upon  the  Romans  that  they  had  embarked  upon  a  war  the 
true  and  only  object  of  which  must  be  to  eject  the  Cartha- 
ginians altogether  from  the  island. 

ii^ol^b.  i.  19,  20,  1-2;  Zouaras,  viu.  10. 


iPolyb.  i.  18. 


I 


80 


CARTHAGE  AND  THE  CAHTIIAGIiMANii. 


CHAPTER  V. 


FIRST  ROMAN   FLEET.       BATTLES   OF   MYL^   AND   ECNOMUS. 

(262-256  B.C.) 

Cartliaginian  naval  supremacy— Roman  naval  affairs— Commercial  treaties 
with  Carthage— Difficulties  of  Romans— Want  of  ships  of  war— Want 
of  sailors— The  new  fleet-Its  first  ventures— Naval  science  and  tactics 
of  the  Ancients-The  Corvus-Battle  of  Mylje— Honours  paid  to  Duillius 
— Egesta^The  Romans  attack  Sardinia  and  Corsica— Energy  of  Cartha- 
ginians—Romans resolve  to  invade  Africa— Enormous  naval  "armaments- 
Route  tiken  by  the  Romans— Order  of  battle— Battle  of  Ecnomus. 

If  the  resolution  now  come  to  by  Rome  was  to  be  carried  out, 
it  was  clear  that  a  complete  change  in  the  conduct  of  the  war 
would  be  necessary.  The  Carthaginians  had  at  length  begun 
to  put  forth  their  real  strength,  and  to  assert  the  supremacy 
over  the  seas  which  had,  in  fact,  never  ceased  to  belong 
to  them.  With  a  fleet  of  sixty  ships  they  coasted  round 
Sicily,  and  by  sheer  terror,  without  striking  a  blow,  brought 
back  to  their  allegiance  many  towns  which  had  gone  over 
to  Rome.  The  Romans  might  retain  their  grip  on  the  in- 
terior of  the  island,  but  the  coasts,  it  was  clear,  would  belong 
to  Carthage  so  long  as  she  remained  mistress  of  the  seas. 
Nor  was  this  all.  By  making  frequent  descents  at  distant 
points  on  the  Italian  coast,  the  Carthaginian  fleet  kept  the 
inhabitants  of  the  sea- board  in  a  state  of  constant  alarm, 
which  it  was  quite  beyond  the  power  of  any  land  forces 
raised  by  the  Italians  themselves  to  allay ;  for  by  the  nature 
of  the  case  the  Carthaginians,  choosing,  like  the  Northmen 
centuries  afterwards,  their  own  place  and  time,  were  able 
to  destroy  a  town,  or  to  harry  a  district,  before  alarm  could 


ROMAN  NAVAL  AFFAIRS, 


81 


be  given  to  the  nearest  military  station.^  It  was  apparent 
that  the  war  might  go  on  for  ever,  each  of  the  combatants 
being  able  to  annoy  and  injure,  but  not  to  paralyse  or  destroy, 
the  other,  unless  something  should  occur  to  change  the  con- 
ditions under  which  it  was  being  carried  on.  The  Cartha- 
ginians wanted  only,  what  they  had  not  yet  succeeded  in 
finding,  a  first-rate  general,  to  enable  them  to  make  a  descent 
in  force  in  Italy,  and  so  make  Rome  tremble  for  her  own 
safety.  The  Romans  wanted  only  an  efficient  fleet  to  enable 
them  to  meet  Carthage  on  her  own  element,  and  then  to 
transfer  the  contest  to  Africa.  The  all-important  question 
was  which  would  be  found  first.  A  life  and  death  struggle 
generally  finds  out,  and  brings  to  the  front,  in  spite  of  all 
artificial  obstacles,  a  true  military  genius,  even  amongst  a 
people  whose  collective  genius  is  not  military ;  but  it  has 
very  rarely  been  known  to  change  the  whole  character  of  a 
people  at  once,  to  transform  land-lubbers  into  seamen,  and, 
what  is  more  extraordinary  still,  to  enable  them  to  cope  on 
equal  terms  with  the  greatest  naval  power  of  the  time.  The 
chances  therefore  were,  so  far,  not  in  favour  of  Rome. 

But  we  must  beware  of  indulging  in  the  exaggerations  in 
which  it  was  natural  enough  for  Polybius  and  other  historians 
of  the  time  to  indulge,  in  their  admiration  of  the  energy  of 
Rome.  What  the  Romans  did  was  wonderful  enough  with- 
out the  addition  of  a  single  fictitious  detail  to  make  it  more 
so.  It  may  possibly  be  true,  as  Polybius  says,  that  at  the 
outbreak  of  the  war  Rome  had  no  decked  ships,  no  ships  of 
war,  no,  not  even  a  lembus — a  small  ship's  boat  with  a  sharp 
prow — which  she  could  call  her  own.2  But  that  the  Romans 
were  not  so  wholly  ignorant  of  naval  affairs  as  the  ludicrous 
picture  of  a  hundred  batches  of  would-be  sailors,  training 
themselves  to  row  on  the  sand,  from  scaffolds,  would  at  first 
suggest,  is  clear  from  the  fact  that  Rome  had  in  the  early 
days  of  the  Republic  fitted  out  ships  with  three  banks  of  oars 


Poly  b.  120,6-7. 


^Ibid.  i.  20.  13. 


8a 


CARTHAGE  AND  THE  CARTHAGINIANS. 


TREATIES  BETWEEN  ROME  AND  CARTHAGE.         83 


II 
If 


il 


I 

I ; 

H 


to  keep  in  order  piratical  neighbours  like  the  Antiates  or  the 
Etruscans ;  ^  that  there  were  magistrates,  called  Duumviri 
navales,  who,  from  time  to  time,  were  appointed  for  the 
express  purpose  of  repairing  the  fleet ;  and  that  the  Cartha- 
ginians themselves  had  thought  it  worth  their  while  repeatedly 
to  form  a  commercial  treaty  with  the  Romans,  restricting 
carefully  their  mutual  rights  and  duties. 

**  The  Romans  and  their  allies  shall  not  sail  beyond  the 
south  of   the   Fair   Promontory— that   is,    the   well-known 
Hermaean  promontory  to  the  north-east  of  Carthage— unless 
compelled  by  stress  of  weather  or  an  enemy ;  and  if  so  com- 
pelled, they  shall  not  take  or  purchase  anything,  except  what 
is  barely  necessary  for  refitting  their  vessels,  or  for  sacrifice, 
and  in  any  case  they  shall  depart  within  five  days.     Roman 
merchants  who  come  for  purposes  of  trade  only  shall  pay  no 
customs  except  the  usual  fees  to  the  herald  and  the  notary ; 
and  if  they  sell  their  goods  in  the  presence  of  these  func- 
tionaries in  any  part  of  Libya  or  Sardinia,  the  state  itself  will 
be  security  for  the  payment.     If  any  Roman  land  in  that  part 
of  Sicily  which  is  subject  to  the  Carthaginians,  he  shall  have 
no  wrong  done  to  him.     The  Carthaginians,  on  their  part, 
shall  not  injure  the  inhabitants  of  Ardea,  Antium,  Laurentum, 
Circeii,  Tarracina,  nor  any  other  Latin  community  subject  to 
Rome ;  neither  shall  they  meddle  at  all  with  any  Latin  com- 
munity not  so  subject.     If  they  do,  they  shall  surrender  it 
unharmed  to  the  Romans.     They  shall  build  no  fort  in  any 
part  of  Latium,  and  if  they  land  there  while  engaged  in  any 
military  enterprise,  they  shall  not  pass  the  night  on  shore." 
So  runs— if  Polybius  was   able  to  translate  correctly  the 
antique  phraseology   in    which  it  was  written  2_the  first 
commercial  treaty  between  Rome  and  Carthage,  concluded, 
as  it  would  seem  from  internal  evidence  no  less  than  from  the 
explicit  statement  of  Polybius,  in  the  consulship  of  Brutus  and 
Horatius,  only  a  year  after  the  expulsion  of  the  kings,  and 


»Cf.  Livy,  viii.  14;  ix.  38. 


"Polyb.  0122,3. 


while  as  yet  Rome  was  hardly  the  undisputed  head  of  the 
Latin  league  (b.c.  509).^  A  second  treaty,  concluded,  accord- 
ing to  the  same  authority,  one  hundred  and  thirty-one  years 
later  (b.c.  378),  shortly  after  the  passing  of  the  Licinian 
Rogations,  contains  similar  but  still  more  jealous  stipulations. 
In  it  the  Roman  vessels  are  precluded — and  the  mere  fact  of 
the  prohibition  is  a  proof  of  the  possible  extent  of  Roman 
maritime  enterprise — not  only  from  the  rich  emporia  on  the 
Lower  Syrtis,  but  from  the  navigation  of  the  Atlantic,  and 
from  all  commercial  dealings  with  the  subjects  of  Carthage 
in  Africa  and  Sardinia.-  These  two  treaties — though  their 
very  existence  seems  to  have  been  forgotten  in  later  times, 
and  though  they  were  unknown  even  to  the  better  educated 
Romans  contemporary  with  Polybius — were  engraved  on 
brazen  tablets,  and,  together  with  a  third  treaty  made  in  view 
of  the  invasion  of  Pyrrhus,  were  preserved  in  the  Capitol, 
and  were  seen  there  and  examined  ^  by  the  historian  himself. 
Still  the  Romans,  though  they  had  made  commercial  treaties 
with  the  great  maritime  and  commercial  state,  had  never  been 
a  really  maritime  or  commercial  people  themselves  ;  they  did 
not  love  the  sea,  much  less  had  they  been  a  naval  power; 
and  how  were  they  to  become  so  all  at  once? 

The  question  was  beset  with  difficulties.  Triremes  no 
doubt  they  might  demand  from  the  Greek  cities  of  the  Italian 
Confederation,  as  they  had  done  once  before;  but  these 
would  no  more  face  the  bulky  monsters  called  quinqueremes, 
which  now  formed  the  Carthaginian  ships  of  the  line,  than 
an  English  revenue  cutter  could  board  a  frigate.  The  Romans 
must  have  felt  all  the  needs,  upon  a  vaster  scale,  which 
dawned  upon  a  people  as  land-loving  and  as  exclusive  as 
themselves,  when  the  conquest  of  Ezion  Geber  opened  to  the 
untravelled  Israelites  the  navigation  of  the  Red  Sea,  and  the 
unknown  possibilities  of  the  East  beyond  it.     But  to  the 

*  Polyb.  iii.  22.    Mommsen,  for  reasons  which  he  gives  at  length,  refers  the 
treaty  to  a  much  later  date,  to  348  B.C.     {Roni.  I/id.  i.  p.  426  and  442-414. > 
"I'olyb.  iii.  24.  »Ibid.  iii.  25,  26,  1-2. 


m 


84 


CARTHAGE  AND  THE  CARTHAGINIANS. 


THE  NEW  FLEET, 


85 


U. 


Hebrew  subjects  of  King  Solomon  a  way  out  of  the  ditliculty 
was  open  which  was  not  available  to  the  Romans  now. 
The  gold  of  Solomon  was  able  to  procure  Phoenician  ship- 
wrights who  could  construct,  and  Phoenician  mariners  who 
could  navigate  and  steer,  his  vessels  among  the  dangerous 
waters  of  the  Red  Sea  and  the  Indian  Ocean.  The  descend- 
ants of  these  self-same  Phoenicians,  the  heirs  of  their  tradi- 
tions and  of  a  double  portion  of  their  maritime  genius,  were 
the  deadly  enemies  of  Rome,  and  the  Roman  landsmen  must 
face  the  dangers  of  the  sea,  not  with  their  aid,  but  against 
their  most  strenuous  opposition. 

Again,  the  quinquereme  was  not  merely  twice  as  large  as  a 
trireme,  but  was  of  a  different  build  and  construction.  It  was 
necessary,  therefore,  to  obtain  either  shipwrights  or  a  model 
from  some  nation  to  which  such  moving  castles  had  been 
long  familiar.  There  were  ships  of  the  line  enough,  no  doubt, 
in  the  fleet  of  the  Macedonians — their  original  inventors — 
or  in  that  of  the  Egyptians;  but  to  procure  shipwrights 
or  a  model  of  a  quinquereme  from  them  would  be  difficult 
in  time  of  war,  and  would  involve  a  serious  and  perhaps 
a  dangerous  delay.  Here  chance  was  on  the  side  of  the 
Romans.  A  Carthaginian  quinquereme  had  run  ashore  on 
the  coast  of  Bruttium  two  or  three  years  before,  and  had  fallen 
into  the  hands  of  the  Romans.^  This  served  as  the  wished- 
for  model ;  and  it  is  asserted  by  more  than  one  writer  that 
within  sixty  days  a  growing  wood  was  felled  and  transformed 
into  a  fleet  of  a  hundred  ships  of  the  line  and  twenty 
triremes.'- 

The  next  difficulty  was  to  find  men  for  the  fleet,  and  when 
they  had  found  them  to  train  them  for  their  duties.  How 
the  large  number  of  thirty  thousand  rowers  necessary  to 
propel  the  ships,  and  of  twelve  thousand  marines  necessary  to 
fight  on  board  of  them,  were  raised,  in  so  short  a  time,  from 
a  people  that  was  not  a  seafaring  people,  we  have  no  precise 

1  Polyb.  i.  20,  15. 

2 Pliny,  Ili^t.  Nat.  x\\.  192;  Florus,  U.  2-7. 


information ;  but  as  soon  as  they  had  been  got  together,  and 
while  the  building  of  the  ships  was  still  in  progress,  they 
went,  if  we  may  believe  the  well-known  story,  through  a 
course  of  training  for  the  most  important  of  their  functions, 
that  of  rowing  in  time  at  the  voice  of  the  Kcleustes,  by  taking 
their  seats  on  tiers  of  stages,  and  by  making  believe  to  go 
through  the  various  evolutions  which  would  be  expected  of 

them.^ 

Probably  never  did  a  fleet  set  sail  under  greater  difficulties 
of  every  kind  than  did  this.  The  starting  timbers  of  the 
unseasoned  w^ood  of  which  the  ships  were  built,  and  the 
distressing  maladies  which  would  assuredly  befall  a  herd 
of  landsmen  who  had  gone  through  only  the  mechanical  pre- 
paration for  the  sea  which  has  just  been  described,  might 
well  have  made  men  doubt  whether  either  ships  or  crews 
would  ever  live  to  experience  the  shock  of  the  Carthaginian 
battle.  But  we  hear  nothing  of  this.  Perhaps,  after  all,  the 
ships  were  manned  in  part  not  by  Romans,  but  by  Greek 
and  Etruscan  mariners ;  and  we  know  only  that  hardly  were 
the  ships  launched  when  they  fearlessly  set  sail  (b.c.  261). 

M.  Cornelius  Scipio  went  forward  with  the  vanguard  of 
seventeen  vessels,  leaving  the  other  consul,  M.  Duillius,  be- 
hind to  superintend  the  equipment  of  the  main  body  of  the 
fleet,  and  afterwards  to  take  command  of  the  army.  He 
reached  Messana  in  safety ;  but  a  message  from  Lipara,  the 
largest  of  the  group  of  islands  of  that  name  to  the  N.E. 
of  Sicily,  which  belonged  to  Carthage,  induced  him  to  cross 
over  to  receive,  as  he  thought,  its  submission.  He  had  no 
sooner  entered  the  harbour  than  he  found  his  retreat  cut 
off  by  twenty  Carthaginian  vessels  which  had  been  sent  for 
that  purpose  by  Hannibal,  the  admiral  at  Panormus.  The 
crews  were  seized  with  a  sudden  panic,  and  with  true  lands- 
men's instincts  made  for  the  friendly  shore  which  was  close 
at  hand.     Cornelius,  who  earned  for  himself  the  name  of 

1  Polyb.  i.  21,  1,2. 


% 


86 


CARTHAGE  AND  THE  CARTHAGINIANS, 


NAVAL    TACTICS  OF  THE  ANCIENTS. 


87 


t  i 


I 


Asina  by  the  ease  with  which  he  had  fallen  into  the  trap 
which  had  been  laid  for  him,  stuck  gallantly  to  his  post,  and 
was  taken  prisoner,  together  with  the  empty  vessels  of  his 
fleet.  This  was  not  a  promising  beginning  for  the  Romans  ; 
but  imprudence  and  incapacity  were  not  confined  to  them. 
The  Carthaginian  admiral,  elated  by  his  success,  determined 
to  intercept  the  whole  Italian  fleet  as  it  sailed  down  the  coast 
towards  Messana.  He  fell  unexpectedly  into  their  midst  when 
his  ships  were  in  disorder,  and  he  himself  escaped  with  dif- 
ficulty, leaving  the  greater  number  of  his  vessels  in  the  hands 
of  the  enemy. 1 

The  Carthaginians  had  been  disposed  at  first  to  laugh  at 
the  idea  of  the  Romans  venturing  to  face  them  in  their  own 
element ;  and  though  the  laugh  had  now,  for  the  moment  at 
all  events,  been  turned  against  themselves,  the  Romans  were 
much  too  clear-sighted  not  to  see  that  it  was  chance  and  the 
imprudence  of  the  enemy  which  had  been  their  best  ally  in 
this  first  engagement,  and  that  the  Carthaginians,  having 
been  caught  napping  once,  would  be  sure  to  be  more  widd 
awake  in  future.     Dr.  Arnold  remarks  that  the  naval  service 
of  the  ancients  generally  was,  out  of  all  proportion,  inferior 
to  their  land  service.     The  seamen  were  of  a  lower  class; 
the  ships  were  propelled  in  battle  by  oars  alone ;  engines  for 
the  discharge  of  missiles  were  unknown  or  unused ;  and  the 
charge  with  the  beak  was  the  only  recognised  method  of 
attack.2    The  remark  is  a  just  one,  and    it   applies,  in  its 
measure,  to  the  nations  which  were  foremost  as  well  as  to  those 
which  were  more  backward  in  naval  aff'airs.     But  the  skill  in 
naval  warfare  which  the  Carthaginians  had  acquired  in  cen- 
turies could  not  be  learnt  by  Rome  in  a  day.     There  are  many 
points  connected  with  the  equipment  and  management  of  an 
ancient  trireme  which  have  not  been  cleared  up ;  but  it  is 
certain  from  the  nature  of  the  case  itself,  as  well  as  from 
the  detailed  account  of  the  engagements  in  the  Corinthian 


1  Polyl).  i.  21 ;  Florus,  ii.  2. 


2  Arnold's  Ilnm.  Hist.  ii.  ^Z-'J  574. 


Gulf  contained  in  the  second  book  of  Thucydides,  that 
even  for  the  simple  manoeuvres  practised  by  the  ancients, 
the  cmbolc,  or  charge  on  the  side,  and  the  prosbole,  or  charge 
beak  to  beak,  the  'pcriphiSy  and  the  diecpkcs,  there  was  an 
incalculable  difiference  between  trained  and  untrained  rowers. 
"  No  Peloponnesian  fleet,"  Phormion  told  his  men,  and  told 
them  truly,  "  whatever  its  numbers,  could  possibly  contend 
against  them  with  success;  "^  and  his  repeated  victories 
showed  that  neither  numbers,  nor  personal  valour,  nor  dis- 
cipline could  be  of  any  avail  against  the  superior  skill  in 
mancBUvring  which  the  Athenians  had  attained  during  the 
fifty  years  which  had  passed  since  the  fight  at  Salamis. 

It  must  also  be  borne  in  mind  that  the  ancient  rowers  had 
often  to  contend  in  battle  against  wind  and  tide  as  well  as 
against  the  foe — for  the  sails  and  masts  were  always  cleared 
away  as  a  preparation  for  action — and  if  the  sea  was  running 
high,  the  utmost  nicety  in  steering  and  the  most  perfect  time 
and  skill  in  rowing  would  be  essential  to  the  success  of  even 
the  simplest  manoeuvre.  There  was  nothing  but  the  voice 
of  the  Kcleustes  to  keep  the  three  tiers  of  rowers,  ranged  one 
above  the  other,  wnth  their  oars  of  different  w^eights  and 
different  lengths,  in  time,  and  that  voice  would  necessarily  be 
drowned  by  the  least  excitement  or  confusion  amongst  the 
crews.  If  such  careful  training  was  found  to  be  essential  for 
the  management  of  the  trireme,  what  must  it  not  have  been 
for  the  quinquereme,  a  ship  nearly  twice  the  size,  with  five 
banks  of  oars  instead  of  three  ? 

The  immediate  problem,  therefore,  for  the  Romans  to  solve 
was  not  how  best  to  train  their  crews  to  charge  with  the  beak 
■ — for  no  training  would  have  fitted  them  for  that  before  the 
engagement  which  was  imminent — but  how  best  to  parry  that 
charge,  and  then  to  convert  the  naval  into  a  land  battle, 
leaving  as  little  opportunity  as  possible  for  subsequent 
manoBUvring,   and   as   much   as   possible   for   hand-to-hand 

»Thucyd.  ii.  89-92. 


! 


88 


CARTHAGE  AXD  THE  CARTHAGINIANS. 


UATTLE  OF  MYLM, 


89 


ii 


\i 


conflict.     The  device  which  the  Romans  adopted  to  secure 
these  ends  was  clumsy  but  it  was  effectual.     On  the  fore  part 
of  each  vessel  was  erected  an  additional  mast,  and  lashed  to 
It  by  a  powerful  hinge  at  a  height  of  twelve  feet  above  the 
deck,  was  a  species  of  drawbridge,  rising,  when  it  stood  erect, 
twenty-four  feet  above  it.     At  the  top  of  the  mast  was  a 
pulley,  through  which  ran  a  rope  connecting  it  with  the 
higher  end  of  the  drawbridge.     On  the  end  of  this  last  and 
standing  out  from  it  at  right  angles  was  a  sharp  spike  of  the 
strongest  iron,  which  from  its  resemblance,  when  in  this 
position,  to  the  bill  of  the  raven,  gave  the  name  of  Corvus  to 
the  whole  construction.     When  an  enemy's  vessel  was  seen 
approaching  for  the  purpose  either  of  charging  directly  beak 
to  beak,  or  of  striking  obliquely  the  tiers  of  oars,  and  so  of 
mcapacitating  them  for  further  use,  the  drawbridge  by  an 
ingenious   contrivance    could    be    swung    round    the    mast 
towards   the  point  where  the  danger  threatened;  and  the 
moment  the  enemy  came  within  reach,  it  could  be  let  fall  from 
Its  commanding  height  and  with  its  heavy  weight  upon  the 
deck  of  the  attacking  ship.     The  iron  beak  would  pierce 
through  the  planking  of  the  deck  and  hold  it  fast  in  a  death 
grapple.     The  drawbridge  was  four  feet  broad,  and  was  fur- 
nished with  parapets  reaching  as  high  as  the  knee.     The 
Roman  marines  could  therefore  descend  along  it  two  abreast 
m  continuous  columns,  the  foremost  pair  defending  themselves 
completely  by  holding  in  front  their  oblong  shields,  while 
those  who  followed  were  protected  in  flank  partly  by  the 
parapets  and  partly  by  their  small  round  shields.  ^     In  this  way 
in  a  very  few  moments  from  that  at  which  the  Corvus  fell,  the 
whole  body  of  the  Roman  marines  would  find  themselves  on 
board  the  enemy's  deck.     The  sea  fight  would  be  practically 
over,  and  the  land  fight  would  begin,  and  the  issue  of  this 
conflict  between  the  "  mere  rabble  of  an  African  crew  "  and 
picked  Roman  legionaries,  could  not  be  for  a  moment  doubted. 

>  Polyl).  i.  22. 


I. 


Much  ingenuity  has  been  expended  on  the  question  of  the 
purpose  that  could  be  served  by  fixing  the  lower  end  of  the 
drawbridge  so  high  up  the  mast,  and  therefore  so  inconveni- 
ently high  above  the  deck.  But  the  explanation  seems  to  lie 
in  the  fact,  which,  perhaps,  has  escaped  notice  simply  because 
it  was  so  obvious,  that  the  ships  of  both  Romans  and  Cartha- 
ginians had  bulwarks,  and  to  enable  the  Corvus  not  merely  to 
catch  them  as  by  a  hook,  but  to  penetrate  the  deck  itself  with 
its  spike,  it  was  necessary  that  the  base  of  the  drawbridge 
should  be  at  a  greater  height  than  the  bulwarks  over  which  it 
would  have  to  fall.  A  light  ladder  fixed  on  the  side  of  the 
mast  opposite  to  the  Corvus,  and  doubtless  revolving  with  it, 
would  give  easy  access  to  the  boarding  bridge  at  the  moment 
when  it  was  required. 

C.  Duillius,  hearing  of  the  calamity  that  had  befallen  his 
patrician  colleague  at  Lipara,  left  the  control  of  the  army — a 
matter,  as  it  seemed  now,  of  less  moment — to  inferior  ofl&cers, 
and  assumed  the  far  more  critical  post  of  admiral  of  the  fleet. 
Finding  that  the  enemy  were  engaged  in  ravaging  Mylae, 
a  peninsula  and  town  on  the  north-east  of  the  island,  not 
far  from  Messana,  he  sailed  fearlessly  towards  them.  The 
Carthaginians,  when  with  one  hundred  and  thirty  well-built 
and  well-manned  ships  they  saw  the  hundred  ungainly 
Roman  hulks,  the  timbers  of  which  ought  still  to  have  been 
seasoning  in  the  timber  yard,  and  their  landsmen  sailors, 
drawn  from  they  knew  not  where,  must  have  felt  some- 
thing of  the  thrill  of  long-deferred  delight  which  forced 
from  Napoleon  the  exclamation,  "At  last  I  have  them,  those 
English,  in  my  grasp,"  as,  assuredly,  they  must  have  felt 
something  of  the  keenness  of  his  disappointment  at  the  still 
more  unlooked-for  result.  Not  caring  in  their  confidence 
and  joy  even  to  form  in  line  of  battle,  they  bore  down  at 
once  upon  the  Romans  as  on  an  easy  prey.  When  they 
drew  near,  they  were  for  the  moment  taken  aback  by 
the  strange  appearance  of  vessels  coming  into  battle  with 
their  masts  left  standing — masts,  too,  with   such  uncouth 


i 


go 


CARTHAGE  AND  THE  CARTHAGINIANS, 


SARDINIA  ATTACKED. 


9« 


and  extraordinary  appendages  attached  to  them.  But  their 
hesitation  was  only  for  a  moment.  Evidently  these  raw  ene- 
mies of  theirs  did  not  even  know  how  to  clear  their  decks 
for  action.  With  redoubled  confidence  thirty  of  the  Car- 
thaginian vessels  charged  beak  to  beak  on  as  many  of  the 
Eoman  vessels,  and  each  immediately  found  itself  a  prisoner, 
held  fast  by  the  grappling  iron  which  had  so  excited  their 
surprise  and  their  contempt.  Others  of  the  Carthaginian 
ships,  thinking  to  escape  the  fall  of  the  drawbridge  which  had 
caught  their  comrades,  charged  sideways  against  other  parts 
of  the  Roman  ships;  but  round  swung  the  fatal  Raven, 
as  though  it  was  a  thing  of  hfe,  and  descended  upon  them, 
pinning  the  vessels  tight  alongside  of  each  other,  and  en- 
abling the  Roman  legionaries  to  dispense  with  the  bridge 
and  to  leap  at  once  from  every  part  of  their  vessel  into  that 
of  the  enemy.  After  fifty  of  their  ships  of  war  had  been 
locked  in  this  deadly  embrace,  the  remainder,  declining  to 
fight  at  all  with  foes  who  were  ill-bred  enough  to  fight  and 
conquer  against  all  the  rules  of  naval  warfare,  took  to  flight. 
The  admiral's  ship,  a  monster  heptireme,  said  formerly  to 
have  belonged  to  Pyrrhus  of  Epirus,  was  amongst  those 
taken  by  the  Romans,  and  the  admiral  Hannibal  himself 
escaped  in  a  little  skiff  by  almost  as  narrow  an  escape  as  that 
by  which,  when  general  of  the  army,  he  had  sHpped  through 
the  Roman  lines  at  the  end  of  the  siege  of  Agrigentum.^ 

The  Romans  were  overjoyed,  as  well  they  might  be,  at 
their  success.  It  was  their  first  naval  battle,  and  their  first 
great  naval  victory  over  the  greatest  naval  power  which  the 
world  had  seen.  Its  importance  was  not  to  be  measured 
by  its  immediate  results,  but  rather  by  the  omen  it  gave 
for  the  future.  Honours  till  then  unexampled  were  freely 
bestowed  upon  the  Plebeian  Duillius.  When  he  went  out  to 
supper  it  was  to  the  sound  of  music ;  when  he  returned  home 
it  was  with  an  escort  of  torch -bearers.     A  pillar  was  erected 

» Polyb.  i.  23  ;  Floriis,  ii.  2,  8,  9. 


to  his  honour  in  the  Forum,  called  the  Columna  Rostrata,  for 
it  was  adorned  with  the  brazen  beaks  of  the  vessels  which  his 
wise  ignorance  and  his  clumsy  skill   had  enabled  him   to 

capture.^ 

The  great  battle  of  Mylae  was  fought  in  the  year  b.c.  260, 
and  the  Roman  army  improved  the  victory  of  their  fleet  by  at 
once  marching  to  Egesta,  a  town  which  claimed  relationship 
to  Rome  by  reason  of  their  supposed  common  descent  from 
Troy,  and  which  was  situated  in  a  part  of  Sicily  considerably 
beyond  any  in  which  we  have  as  yet  seen  the  Romans.  Egesta 
was  always  ready  to  ally  itself  with  a  foreigner.  As  we  have 
already  seen,  it  had  called  in  the  aid,  first  of  the  Athenians 
and  afterwards  of  the  Carthaginians,  against  its  neighbour 
and  rival  Selinus,  and  now,  in  the  second  year  of  the  war,  it 
had  attached  itself  to  Rome  ;  but  the  Carthaginians,  eager  to 
punish  its  defection,  had  straightway  blockaded  the  place, 
and  were  on  the  point  of  capturing  it  when  the  Romans 
arrived  and  forced  them  to  raise  the  siege.^ 

The  Roman  fleet,  too,  now  no  longer  confined  its  aims  to 
the  narrow  SiciUan  waters,  but  striking  boldly  across  the  open 
sea,  threatened  the  empire  of  Carthage  in  the  rich  island  of 
Sardinia  also.  In  the  savage  mountains  of  the  interior  the 
natives  still  managed  to  maintain  something  of  their  inde- 
pendence and  of  their  barbarism  ;  but  the  coasts  had  been 
for  centuries  in  the  possession  of  the  Carthaginians.  Thither 
the  unfortunate  Hannibal,  son  of  Cisco,  had  withdrawn 
shortly  after  his  defeat  at  Mylae,  thinking  doubtless  that 
there,  at  least,  he  would  be  safe  from  Roman  molestation ; 
but  even  there  the  Romans,  in  the  exultation  of  their  first 
victory,  pursued  him.  Penned  within  the  harbour  in  which 
he  had  taken  refuge,  he  lost  several  of  his  ships  in  an  engage- 
ment, and  on  his  escape  to  land  was  apprehended  by  his  own 

»  Polyb.  i.  24,  1 ;  Livy,  Epit.  xvii. ;  Cicero,  de  Senedute,  xiii.  44 ;  Pliny, 
//.  iV.  xxxiv.  5.  Cf.  Virg.  (Jeoiy.  iii.  29 ;  and  Silius  Italicus,  Pun.  vi.  663- 
C6.S;  Tac.  Ann.  ii.  49. 

-  Polyb.  i.  24,  2 ;  Diod.  xxiii.  Frag.  7. 


93 


CARTHAGE  AND  THE  CARTHAGINIANS. 


men  and  crucified.     They  took  the  law  into  their  own  hands ; 
but,  doubtless,  they  only  anticipated  the  sentence  which  would 
have  been  passed  by  the  inexorable  Hundred  on  an  unlucky 
admiral  who  should  have  returned  to  Carthage  after  surviv- 
ing so  many  and  such  unprecedented  reverses. i    The  Komans 
followed  up  their  success  by  an  attack  on  Olibia,  the  capital 
of  the  island.     The  expedition  failed.     But  an  attempt  upon 
Aleria,  formerly  a  Phocaean  colony,  and  now  the  capital  of 
Corsica,  was  more  successful.     Corsica  had,  probably,  never 
belonged  outright  to  Carthage;  but  it  had,   at  least,   ac- 
knowledged  her  maritime  supremacy,  and  the  second  treaty 
between  Eome  and  Carthage  seems  to  have  recognised  it  as 
a  kind  of  neutral  territory  between  the  two.-'    The  epitaph  of 
L.  Cornelius  Scipio,  which  is  still  preserved,  tells  us  how  he 
took  Corsica  and  Aleria,  and  how  on  his  return  to  Rome  he 
dedicated  a  well-deserved  temple  to  the  tempest  which  had 
almost  overwhelmed  him  in  the  Corsican  waters.^ 

But  the  absence  of  the  Roman  fleet  in  Corsica  and  Sardinia 
proved  a  serious,  if  only  a  temporary,  drawback  to  the  pro- 
gress  of  the  Roman  arms  in  Sicily.  Rome  could  not  yet 
afford  so  to  dissipate  her  energy,  and  Hamilcar,  commander- 
m-chief  at  Panormus,  now  gave  evidence  of  a  vigour  and  a 
capacity  such  as  had  hitherto  not  been  witnessed  among 
either  of  the  contending  parties.  Hearing  that  the  Romans 
and  their  allies,  on  their  return  from  Egesta,  were  at  discord 
amongst  themselves,  he  surprised  and  cut  to  pieces  four 
thousand  of  the  enemy  in  their  camp  near  Himera.*    He 

'  Polyb.  i.  24,  5-7. 

2  See  Serviuson  ^n.  iv.  628,  quoted  by  Mommsen,  "  Ut  Corsica  esset  media 
inter  Romanos  et  Carthaginienses". 

^  Hie  cepit  Corsicara  Aleriamquc  iirbom, 
Dedit  terapestatibus  aidem  mereto. 
Nor  is  Ovid  backward  to  acknowledge  the  debt  of  gratitude  to  the  merciful 
storm  :— 

Te  quoque,  Tempestas,  meritam  delubra  fatemur, 
Cum  pcene  est  Corsis  obruta  chissis  aquis. 

M'..,y...i.24,3,4.  Ovid,  F«./^  vi.  193,  194. 


ENORMOUS  NAVAL  ARMAMENTS. 


93 


destroyed  the  town  of  Eryx  and  transferred  its  inhabitants 
bodily  to  the  neighbouring  fortress  of  Drepanum  ;  '  and  it  was 
doubtless  the  bold  front  he  showed  which,  in  the  foUowmg 
year  compelled  the  Romans  to  retire  from  before  Panormus, 
after  merely  convincing  themselves  of  the  strength  of  its 
fortifications.     The  other  events  of  the  two  years  which 
followed  the  battle  of  Mylae,  the  alternate  revolts  and  sub- 
jugations, the  taking  or  retaking  of  such  towns  as  Mytistratus, 
Enna,  Gela,  and  Camarina,-  were  not  such-although  the 
tide  of  success  was,  on  the  whole,  in  favour  of  the  Romans— 
as  to  promise  any  speedy  termination  of  the  land  war ;  while, 
as  regards  naval  affairs,  the  battle  of  Tyndaris,  fought  B.C. 
257    on  a  spot  only  a  few  miles  from  Mylae,  wherein  each 
party  claimed  the  victory,  left  things  pretty  much  as  they 

were.^  ,     ,       .^ 

But  the  lull  was  only  apparent,  for  both  sides  were 
straining  every  nerve  to  raise  such  a  navy  as  should  be  able 
by  sheer  strength  to  bear  down  all  opposition  to  it— the 
Romans  with  the  avowed  intention  of  fighting  their  way  mto 
Africa,  and  so  compelling  Carthage  to  submit  to  the  terms  of 
peace  which  they  might  be  willing  to  offer  her ;  the  Cartha- 
ginians with  the  hope  of  recovering  the  empire  of  the  seas 
which  had  now  been  half  torn  from  her,  and  of  excluding 
the  Romans,  if  not  from  the  whole  of  her  dependencies,  at 
all  events  from  her  home  domain  in  Africa.* 

The  material  results  in  the  way  of  shipping  obtained  by 
either  side  were  not  disproportionate  to  the  efforts  that  had 
been  made.  Probably  never,  either  before  or  after,  did  such 
vast  naval  armaments  put  to  sea.  The  most  important  naval 
combats  of  ancient  and  of  modern  times— the  battles  of  Arte- 
misium,  Salamis,  and  Naulochus,  of  Lepanto,  Trafalgar,  and 
Navarino— sink  into  insignificance,  as  far  as  mere  numbers  go, 
when  compared  with  that  of  Ecnomus.     Other  battles,  doubt- 


1  Diod.  Sic.  xxiii.  Frag.  9. 


2  Polyb.  xxiv.  10-13. 


»  Polyb.  XXV.  1-3;  Zouaras,  viii.  11,  12. 
♦Polyb.  XXV.  7-9;'XXvi.  1-3. 


94 


CARTHAGE  AND  THE  CARTHAGINIANS. 


BATTLE  OF  ECNOMUS. 


95 


less,  enlist  the  sympiithies  more  fully  on  one  side  or  the 
other,  or  interest  more  keenly  those  who  care  for  war  merely 
as  war.     The  stake  fought  for  at  Salamis  was  an  infinitely 
higher  stake,  and  was  fraught  with  vastly  more  momentous 
issues  for  the  whole  human  race;  for  it  was  the  cause  of 
Greek  freedom  and  civilisation  against  Asiatic  slavery  and 
barbarism.     At  Trafalgar  the  darling  scheme  of  the  heartless 
oppressor  of  all  Europe  was  for  ever  frustrated  by  the  crown- 
ing naval  victory  of  a  war  which,  the  worst  calumniators  of 
England  must  admit,  was  not  a  selfish  war.     In  all  these 
points— in   the   motives   of  the   combatants,    in   its   purely 
mihtary  or  scientific  interest,  and  in  its  results— the  battle  of 
Ecnomus  is  not  specially  remarkable.     It  is  impossible  to  give 
our  undivided  sympathies  to  either  side.     It  was  a  battle,  in 
the  main,  of  brute  force  and  not  of  consummate  skill ;  it  was 
not  decisive  even  of  the  result  of  the  war  of  which  it  formed 
so  bulky  a  part.     Still  less  can  it  attract  those  who  look  upon 
all  wars  except  those  waged  in  self-defence  or  for  purely 
moral  ends -all  wars,  that  is,  except  those  waged  ultimately 
in  the  interests  of  peace— with  horror  and  condemnation. 
Yet  men  are  men,  and  even  the  Carthaginian  mercenaries, 
though  their  employers  did  not  think  so,  were  worth  some- 
thing more  than  the  pay  they  earned  by  their  services ;  and 
size  is  size,  and  will  always,  apart  from  everything  else,  and 
whether  it  ought  to  or  not,  attract  to  itself  the  attention  of 
mankind.     And  from  the  point  of  view  of  mere  size— the 
number,  that  is,  of  its  ships  and  the  crews  who  fought  in 
them— the  battle  of  Ecnomus  is  certainly  entitled  to  a  con- 
spicuous place  in  history.     At  Artemisium,  no  doubt,  the 
number  of  Greek  and  Persian  vessels  engaged,  or  ready  to  be 
engaged,  must  have  been  greater  still,  but  they  were  triremes 
or  penteconters  only ;  while  at  Ecnomus  the  ships  engaged 
were,  in  the   main,  quinqueremes   or  hexiremes,   and   the 
Koman  fleet  carried  also  a  large  army  intended  for  land 
service  in  Africa.     The  vicissitudes  of  the  battle  are  some- 
what complicated ;  but  it  is  necessary,  for  one  who  would 


understand  aright  the  First  Punic  War  to  dwell  awhile  upon 
a  conflict  which  is  so  eminently  characteristic  of  it. 

The  Romans  set  sail  from  Messana  (b.c.  256)  with  330  ships, 
while  the  Carthaginians  mustered  the  still  more  portentous 
number  of  350  ships  in  their  famous  port  of  Lilybasum  ;  so 
that,  if  we  are  to  accept  the  deliberate  calculation  of  Polybius, 
who  assigns  300  rowers  and  120  marines  to  each  ship  of  war, 
nearly  300,000  men  must  have  met  in  the  battle  which 
ensued !  ^  The  direct  line  to  Africa  was  along  the  northern 
coast  of  Sicily ;  but  the  strength  of  the  Carthaginian  virgin 
fortresses  of  Panormus,  Drepanum,  and  Lilybaeum,  all  of 
which  were  on  the  north  or  north-west  of  the  island,  made 
the  Romans  prefer  the  southern  coast,  which  was  to  a  great 
extent  in  their  own  hands,  and  where  their  land  army  had 
assembled  ready  for  embarkation.  The  Carthaginians,  who 
knew  too  well  what  an  invasion  of  Africa  meant,  and  who 
felt  that  the  ravages  of  the  Roman  army  would  not  be  the 
worst  of  the  evils  that  it  would  involve,  moved  slowly  forward 
to  Heraclea  Minoa,  determined  to  crush  the  invaders  before 
they  could  leave  the  Sicilian  coast. 

The  Romans,  having  taken  on  board  their  legions  at 
Phintias,  divided  their  immense  fleet  into  four  squadrons. 
The  two  first  squadrons  formed  two  sides  of  an  equilateral 
triangle,  while  the  third,  having  behind  them  the  transports 
laden  with  cavalry,  formed  its  base.  To  the  rear  of  these 
again,  and  forming  at  once  a  rear  guard  and  a  reserve,  came 
the  fourth  squadron,  which  Polybius  calls,  from  the  impor- 
tant function  allotted  to  it,  the  Triarii.^  At  the  apex  of  the 
triangle,  their  prows  standing  out  to  sea,  and  pointing  the 
rest  of  the  fleet  the  way  to  Africa,  sailed  abreast  the  two 
monster  hexiremes— ships  as  large  probably  as  our  ships  of 
the  line— of  the  consuls  and  admirals  in  one,  M.  Atilius 
Regulus  and  L.  Manlius. 

The  whole  Roman  fleet  together  thus  formed  the  figure 


»  Polyb.  i.  xxvi.  7-9. 


a  Ibid.  i.  2G,  10-15. 


9ft 


CARTHAGE  AND  THE  CARTHAGlMANS, 


i 


called   in   nautical    manoeuvring   an   cviholon,  or   wedge,  a 
figure  said  by  Polybius  to  be  suited  to  energetic  action  and 
very  difficult   to   break   through.     On   the   other   hand,   it 
postulated  a  skill  in  seamanship,  and  a  confidence  in  their 
own  powers  both  of  attack  and  of  defence,  very  different 
from  that  which  marked  the  Roman  fleet  at  their  victory  at 
Mylae,  only  three  years  before,  i   The  Carthaginians,  reminded 
by  their  admirals -Hanno,  who  had  in  vain  attempted  to 
raise  the  siege  of  Agrigentum,  and  Hamilcar,  who  had  lately 
fought,  not  without  credit  to  himself,  at  Tyndaris— of  the 
momentous  issues  that  were  at  stake,  and  asked  to  choose 
whether  they  would  henceforward  fight  for  the  possession  of 
Sicily  or  in  defence  of  their  own  hearths  and  homes,  moved 
eastward  along  the  shore  in  good  spirits  and  order.'     They 
hove  in  sight  of  the  enemy,  as  it  would  seem,  to  the  west  of 
the  promontory   of  Ecnomus,-^  and  observing  the  fourfold 
division  of  the  Eoman  armament,  they  divided  their  own 
fleet  into  a  similar  number  of  squadrons. 

The  Carthaginian  admirals,  in  order  to  detach  the  first  two 
squadrons  of  the  Roman  fleet  from  the  third,  which  was  re- 
tarded by  the  transports,  arranged  that  the  part  of  their  line 
which  should  be  first  attacked  by  the  thin  end  of  the  Roman 
wedge  should  give  way  before  it  and  feign  a  flight.  The  strat- 
agem was  partially  successful,  for  the  flying  Carthaginian 
ships,  wheeling  round  suddenly,  closed  in  upon  the  sides  of 
the  Roman  triangle,  which  had  pursued  them  too  far,  and 
by  their  superior  rapidity  and  skill  seriously  threatened  its 
safety.  But  the  knowledge  that  they  were  fighting  under 
the  immediate  eye  of  the  consuls,  and  the  confidence  inspired 
in  them  by  the  possession  of  the  Raven,  enabled  the  Romans 

iPolyb.  i.  26,  16. 

^Zouaras,  viii.  12,  makes  the  battle  take  place  off  Heraclea  Minoa,  but  he 
gives  no  details ;  and  his  account  of  the  sequel  is  obviously  mythical,  intended 
to  set  forth  the  good  faith  of  the  Romans  and  the  bad  faith  of  the  Carthaginians. 
Polybms  clearly  implies  an  advance  of  the  Carthaginians  from  Heraclea  and  of 
the  Komans  from  Ecnomus,  but  the  exact  scene  of  the  batUe  must  remain  nn- 
♦certain. 


96 


CARTHAGE  AND  THE  CARTIFAG IMAXS. 


called   in    nautical    manaeiivring   an   cmbolon,  or   wedge,  a 
figure  said  by  Polybius  to  be  suited  to  energetic  action  and 
very  difficult   to    break    through.     On    the   other   hand,    it 
postulated  a  skill  in  seamanship,  and  a  confidence  in  their 
own  powers  both  of  attack  and  of  defence,  very  different 
from  that  which  marked  the  Roman  fleet  at  their  victory  at 
Mylae,  only  three  years  before. »    The  Carthaginians,  reminded 
by  their  admirals -Hanno,  who  had  in  vain  attempted  to 
raise  the  siege  of  Agrigentura,  and  Hamilcai-,  who  had  lately 
fought,  not  without  credit  to  himself,  at  Tyndaris— of  the 
momentous  issues  that  were  at  stake,  and  asked  to  choose 
whether  they  would  henceforward  fight  for  the  possession  of 
Sicily  or  in  defence  of  their  own  hearths  and  homes,  moved 
eastward  along  the  shore  in  good  spirits  and  order.'     They 
hove  in  sight  of  the  enemy,  as  it  would  seem,  to  the  west  of 
the  promontory  of  Ecnomus,-'  and  observing  the  fourfold 
division  of  the  Roman  armament,  they  divided  their  own 
lieet  into  a  similar  number  of  squadrons. 

The  Carthaginian  admirals,  in  order  to  detach  the  first  two 
squadrons  of  the  Roman  fleet  from  the  third,  which  was  re- 
tarded  by  the  transports,  arranged  that  the  part  of  their  line 
which  should  be  first  attacked  by  the  thin  end  of  the  Roman 
wedge  should  give  way  before  it  and  feign  a  flight.  The  strat- 
agem  was  partially  successful,  for  the  flying  Carthaginian 
ships,  wheehng  round  suddenly,  closed  in  upon  the  sides  of 
the  Roman  triangle,  which  had  pursued  them  too  far,  and 
by  their  superior  rapidity  and  skill  seriously  threatened  its 
safety.  But  the  knowledge  that  they  were  fighting  under 
the  immediate  eye  of  the  consuls,  and  the  confidence  inspired 
m  them  by  the  possession  of  the  Raven,  enabled  the  Romans 

1  Polyb.  i.  26,  16. 

2Zoiiaras,  viii.  12,  makes  tl.e  battle  take  place  off  Heraclea  Minoa,  but  he 
gives  no  details  ;  and  his  account  of  the  sequel  is  obviously  mythical,  intended 
to  set  forth  the  good  faith  of  the  Romans  and  the  bad  faith  of  the  Carthaginians. 
Polj-bius  clearly  implies  an  advance  of  the  Carthaginians  from  Heraclea  and  of 
the  Romans  from  Ecnomus,  but  the  exart  .scene  of  the  battle  must  remti\u  un- 
♦•frtam. 


N 


ROMAN  VICTORY. 


99 


to  hold  their  own,  till  Hamilcar,  in  sheer  exhaustion,  was 
compelled  to  save  himself  by  flight.     Meanwhile  a  fierce 
double  combat  had  been  raging  elsewhere.     Hanno,  who 
was  on  the  Carthaginian  right,  had  forborne  to  take  any 
part  in  the  first  onset,  but,  keeping  out  to  sea,  as  soon  as 
the  three  first  Roman  squadrons  had  got  well  past  him,  had 
fallen  upon  the  rear  guard.     **  Vcntum  erat  ad  Triarios," 
and,  for  a  time,  it  seemed  as  if  even  the  Triarii  would  give 
way.    The  Carthaginian  left,  which  had  hitherto  hugged  the 
shore  in  a  long  line  at  right  angles  to  the  rest  of  the  fleet, 
as  soon  as  they  had  got  well  behind  the  Roman  position 
attacked  the  ships  of  the  third  squadron,  which  were  im- 
peded by  the  transports.     These,  however,  slipped  the  ropes, 
and  did  battle  with  their  assailants.     There  were  thus  three 
distinct  sea-fights,  simultaneous  and  well  maintained.    Hamil- 
car, as  has  been  said,  was  the  first  to  give  way,  and  his  flight 
practically  decided  the  battle.     Manlius  remained  where  he 
was  to  secure  the  disabled  vessels  ;  but  Regulus  fell  back  to 
the  assistance  of  the  Triarii,  who  were  being  hard  pressed  by 
Hanno.     Hanno  was  put  to  flight,  and — Manlius  just  then 
coming  up — both  consuls  together  bore  down  on  the  left 
wing  of  the  enemy,  which,  had  they  only  been  less  afraid  of 
the  boarding  bridges,  must  ere  this  have  been  victorious.     A 
few  only  of  the  Carthaginian  ships  escaped,  but  the  Romans 
had  no  reason  to  despise  their  foes,  for,  once  more,  they 
owed  the  victory  not  so  much  to  their  naval  skill  as  to  their 
boarding   bridges.      Still,  their  victory  was   complete,  and 
there  was  now  nothing  left  to   bar  the  conquerors  from 
Africa.^ 

»  Polyb.  i.  27-28  :  Zonaras,  viii.  12. 


ICX) 


CARTHAGE  AND  THE  CARTHAGINIANS. 


INVASION  OF  AFRICA, 


lOI 


CHAPTER  VI. 

INVASION   OF  AFKICA.      REGULU8   AND    XANTHIPPU8, 

(256-250   B.C.) 

Invasion  of  Africa— Romans  overrun  Carthaginian  territory— Shortsightedness 
of  Carthaginians— Changes  necessary  in  Roman  military  system- Recall 
of  Manlius — Victory  of  Regiilus — Desperate  plight  of  Carthaginians- 
Terms  of  peace  rejected— Arrival  of  Xanthippus— He  is  given  the  command 
—His  great  victory  near  Adis— Joy  of  Carthaginians— Thank-offerings  to 
Moloch— Departure  of  Xanthippus — The  survivors  at  Clypea— Roman  fleet 
destroyed  in  a  storm — Carthaginian  reinforcements  for  Sicily— Romans 
build  a  new  fleet — Take  Panormus — Second  Roman  fleet  destroyed  in  a 
storm— Carthaginians  threaten  Panormus— Romans  build  a  third  fleet — 
Battle  of  Panormus — Part  played  by  elephants  in  First  Punic  War— Story 
of  embassy  and  death  of  Regulus — How  far  true  ? 

The  resolution  of  the  Roman  Senate  had  been  long  since 
taken.  In  fact,  as  we  have  said,  the  fleet  had  been  built 
for  the  express  purpose  of  transferring  the  war  to  Africa; 
but  it  is  hardly  to  be  wondered  at  that  when  the  hour  had 
come  for  carrying  out  so  perilous  a  resolution,  the  hearts  of 
some  among  the  Roman  soldiers  should  have  been  filled 
with  misgivings,  and  that  these  should  have  found  expres- 
sion in  the  mutinous  language  of  a  tribune.^  Xenophon 
has  told  us  how  anxiously  Cyrus  the  Younger  concealed 
from  the  Ten  Thousand  Greeks  the  real  nature  of  the 
perilous  venture  he  had  undertaken ;  and  how,  before  he 
revealed  to  them  the  fatal  secret,  he  took  care  so  far  to 
commit  them  to  the  enterprise  that  a  retreat  would  be 
then  not  less  dangerous  than  an  advance.     The  Romans 

»Floru«,  ii.  2,  17. 


were  now  entering  on  a  phase  of  the  great  contest  which 
to  them  must  have  seemed  hardly  less  perilous  than  the 
Anabasis  itself.     They  had  to  cross  a  sea  which  to  them 
was  as  unknown  and,   under  existing    circumstances,   as 
fraught  with  the  possibilities  of  mischief  as  the  trackless 
deserts  of  Mesopotamia.     They  were  to  enter  a  new  con- 
tinent, peopled  not  by  the  wild  ass  and  the  antelope  and 
the  scudding  ostrich  which  had  amused  the  Ten  Thousand 
Greeks    but,  as  popular  imagination  would  have  it,   and 
as  a  gi^ve  historian  had  related,  -  by  lions  and  by  dog- 
headed  monsters,   and   by  creatures   with    no  heads   and 
with  eyes  in  their  breasts  ".i     However,  threats  of  a  more 
summary  kind  used   by  Regulus  overpowered   these  fore- 
bodings of  distant  disaster  and  crushed  the  rising  mutiny, 
and  the  Roman  fleet,  after  it  had  been  revictualled  and  re- 
paired, stood  right  across  the  Mediterranean  to  the  nearest 
point  of  Africa,  a  distance  of  only  ninety  miles. 

The  Hermaean  promontory  is  the  north-eastern  horn  of  the 
Bay  of  Carthage.  Here  the  Romans  waited  awhile  to  muster 
their  forces.  It  was  the  precise  point  beyond  which— as  treaty 
after  treaty,  made  with  the  jealous  commercial  state,  had  stipu- 
lated—no Roman  ship  should  dare  to  pass,  whether  to  trade, 
to  plunder,  or  to  colonise ;  and  it  must  have  been  with  feelings, 
not  of  satisfaction  or  of  curiosity  alone,  that,  after  a  short  pause, 
the  Roman  fleet  began  to  penetrate  deeper  into  the  mysteries 
of  that  great  Carthaginian  preserve  by  coasting  along  till  they 
reached  a  town  which,  from  the  shield-shaped  eminence  on 
which  it  stood,  they  called  Clypea,  as  the  Greeks  had  already 
named  it  Aspia.  They  set  foot  without  opposition  on  African 
soil,  hauled  up  their  ships  upon  the  beach,  and,  as  though 
tlieir  stay  was  not  going  to  be  a  short  one,  threw  up  a  pali- 

I  Herod,  iv.  191;  cf.  Livy,  EpU.  xvii. ;   Val    Max.  i.  «,  ^9;    Floras    ii. 
220;   Zonaras,  viii.  13,  for  the  account  of  the  huge  serpen      120  feet  long, 
found  on  the  Bagr^das  and  besieged  by  the  Roman  army  with  their  ballista 
'n.e  skin  is  said  to  have  been  carried  to  Rome  and  to  have  been  preserved 
there  for  centuries ! 


1 


I02 


CARTHAGE  AND  THE  CARTHAGINIANS. 


SHORTSIGHTEDNESS  OF  CARTHAGINIANS.  103 


sade  around  them,  and  when  the  town  refused  to  surrender, 
they  besieged  and  took  it.    Meanwhile  the  Carthaginians  had 
been  forewarned  of  the  coming  danger.     Hanno,  after  his  de- 
feat at  Ecnomus,  had  made  straight  across  for  Carthage,  and, 
though  he  must  have  risked  his  life  in  so  doing,  had  bidden 
the  citizens  prepare  for  the  worst.     But  to  be  forewarned  was 
with  the  Carthaginians,  at  this  period  of  their  history,  not 
necessarily  to  be  forearmed :   their  best  armies  were  absent 
in  Sicily ;  their  navy  was  demoralised  and  half  destroyed,  and 
the  native  Libyans  were  in  a  state  of  chronic  disaffection. 
Had  the  Eomans  marched  at  once  upon  tlje  capital— without 
an  adequate  army  or  a  competent  general  as  it  then  was— it 
is  just  possible  that  it  might  have  fallen.     But  this  was  not 
to  be.     The  rich  territory  which  lay  between  Clypea  and  Car- 
thage was  too  tempting  and  too  easy  a  prey  for  the  needy 
Koman  soldiery.     It  had  now  quite  recovered  from  the  de- 
vastations of  Agathocles,  and  the  Komans,  strangers  as  yet, 
happily  for  themselves,  to  luxury,  contemplated  with  amaze- 
ment and  delight  the  pleasant  gardens  and  the"  opulent  palaces 
of  the  merchant  princes  of  Carthage,  which  had  sated  the 
greed  of  the  mercenaries  of  Agathocles  fifty  years  before.^ 
Nor  did  their  hands  spare  what  their  eyes  admired.      The 
palaces  were  ransacked  of  their  valuables,  and  then  ruthlessly 
set  on  fire ;  the  cattle  were  driven  in  vast  herds  towards  the 
Koman  camp ;  and  twenty  thousand  of  the  inhabitants  of  the 
surrounding  country  found  themselves  collected  in  the  Roman 
ships  to  be  sold  into  slavery.'- 

Nor  had  the  Carthaginians,  in  the  interval  which  had 
elapsed  since  the  invasion  of  Agathocles,  grown  less  fatally 
distrustful  of  their  own  subjects.  They  still  forbade  the  sub- 
ject cities  to  surround  themselves  with  walls,  not  because, 
like  the  Spartans,  they  thought  that  a  living  rampart  of  men 
was  a  better  protection  than  any  masonry,  but  because  they 
had  good  reason  to  suspect  that  such  defence  might  be  turned 


aoainst  themselves.  Accordingly,  Regulus  passed  with  facil- 
itv  from  village  to  village,  or  from  town  to  town,  till,  as  the 
Komans  boasted,  he  had  nearly  doubled  the  number  of  two 
hundred  townships  which  Agathocles  had  conquered  before 

^But  just  now  came  from  Rome  the  astounding  order, 
which  may  well  have  aroused  the  misgivings  even  of  the 
triumphant  Roman  army,  that  one  of  the  two  consuls  was 
to  return  home  at  once  with  his  troops  and  his  ships,  leaving 
the  other  in  Africa  with  what  Polybius  calls- one  would 
think  with  a  touch  of  irony-a  "sufficient  force''  to  bring 
the  war  to  a  conclusion.^      It  was  not  so  much  that  the 
Roman  Senate  actually  underestimated  the  difficulty  of  con- 
quering Carthage,  as  that  it  did  not  occur  to  a  body  of  so  con- 
servative a  frame  of  mind,  that,  now  that  the  scale  of  their 
warfare  had  been  so  enlarged,  it  might  be  advisable  to  make 
a  corresponding  alteration  in  all  the  conditions  under  which 
they  carried  it  on.     The  principle  that  every  soldier  is,  above 
all  and  before  all  things,  a  citizen,  and  that  he  ought  not  to 
forego  any  of  his  civil  rights  or  duties  for  a  longer  time  than 
is  absolutely  necessary,  is  in  itself  a  noble  principle,  and  one 
which  modern  states,  with  their  overgrown  and  appalhng  stand- 
ing armies, would  do  well  to  remember.     But  the  rule  that  an 
army  should  always  return  to  Rome,  either  to  go  into  winter 
quarters  or  to  be  disbanded,  was  a  practical  apphcation  of 
the  principle  the  advantages  of  which  must  have  been  out- 
weighed  by  the  disadvantages,  even  in  the  early  struggles 
of  the  Roman  repubUc ;    while  the  maxim  of  state  policy 
that  the  commander-in-chief,  whatever  his  talents  and  what- 
ever  the  complication  of  his  military  plans,  should  as  soon 
as  a  particular  day  of  the  year  came  round,  be  superseded 
by  a  civil  magistrate,  whatever  his  military  incapacity,  was 
a  maxim  which,  though  it  may  have  acted  well  enough  m 
a  border  warfare  against  a  discontented  Latin  or  Etruscan 


1  Diod.  Sic.  XX.  8. 


«Polyb.  i.  29,  1-7. 


1  Florus.  ii.  2.  19. 


aPolyb.  i.  29,  8. 


I04 


CARTHAGE  AND  THE  CARTHAGINIANS. 


town,  had  broken  down  completely  in  the  Samnite  wars,  and 
would  be  absolutely  fatal  in  the  far  more  gigantic  struggle 
against  Carthage.^ 

But  the  Roman  Senate,  whatever  its  practical  ability  and 
courage  in  carrying  out  the  current  business  of  the  state,  was 
not  more  farsighted  than  other  deliberative  assemblies,  and 
needed  the  bitter  teaching  of  experience  to  bring  home  to  them 
what  seems  to  us  so  obvious  a  truth.     Its  orders  were  obeyed 
without  a  murmur,  and  Manlius  set  ofif  for  Rome,  with  his 
prisoners,  his  army,  and  his  fleet,^  leaving  Regulus  behind 
him,  the  heir  to  that  strange  inheritance  of  a  reputation  for 
military  rashness  and  disaster  on  the  one  hand,  and  for  dis- 
interested patriotism  on  the  other,  which,  immortalised  as  it 
has  been  by  Horace,  has  gone  the  round  of  the  world,  and 
will  doubtless  survive  the  most  convincing  demonstration  of 
its  groundlessness  by  pitiless  critics. 

The  army  with  which  Regulus  was  expected,  as  it  would 
seem,  to  complete  the  conquest  of  Africa  amounted  only  to 
fifteen  thousand  infantry  and  five  hundred  cavalry.      But 
the  Carthaginians,  however  short  sighted,  had  not  been  idle 
since  his  arrival.      They  had  appointed  Hasdrubal,  son  of 
Hanno,  and  Bostar  generals  with  equal  powers;   and,  as 
though  this  division  of  responsibility  was  not  in  itself  suffi- 
ciently prejudicial  to  their  cause,  they  now  sent  for  a  third 
from  Sicily,  Hamilcar,  a  man  of  proved  ability,   but  who 
was  intended  not  to  overrule  his  less  experienced  colleagues, 
but  only  to  have  an  equal  voice  with  them  1    Their  collective 
wisdom  came  to  the  patriotic  resolution— they  could  hardly 
have  come  to  any  other—"  to  go  to  the  help  of  the  country  ".s 
The  point  immediately  threatened  was  Adis,  a  town  of  some 
importance ;  and  to  raise  its  siege  the  Carthaginians  occupied 
a  hilly  district  which  seemed  indeed  to  threaten  the  Roman 
lines,  but  which  far  more  efifectually  prevented  those  occupy- 
ing it  from  making  use  of  the  arm  in  which  they  were  really 


1  See  Monimsen,  ii.  p.  60. 

^  Ibid.  i.  30,  3. 


«  Polyb.  i.  29,  10. 


SHORTSIGHTEDNESS  OF  ROMANS, 


105 


strong,  their  elephants  and  cavalry.  The  Romans  were  not 
slow  to  perceive  this  mistake,  and  in  spite  of  the  strenuous 
resistance  of  some  of  the  mercenaries,  assaulted  and  carried 
the  position,  while  the  Carthaginian  cavaky  and  elephants 
extricated  themselves,  as  best  they  could,  from  the  broken 
ground,  and  as  soon  as  they  reached  the  plain  saved  them- 
selves by  flight.  The  Romans  now  fell  to  devastating  the 
country  with  redoubled  energy  and  with  even  less  of  caution 
than  before.  Tunis  itself,  an  important  town  in  sight  of  the 
capital,  fell  into  their  hands,  and  Regulus  encamped  on  the 
banks  of  the  Bagradas  in  the  heart  of  what  was  then  the  most 
fertile  country  in  the  world. 

The  prospects  of  the  Carthaginians  looked  desperate  in- 
deed. Their  only  available  army  had  been  defeated,  and 
what  the  Romans  had  spared  in  then:  devastations,  the 
Numidians,  a  people  always  on  the  move  and  always  eager 
for  plunder,  carried  off.  If  the  Romans  had  chastised  the 
country  districts  with  whips,  the  Numidians,  maddened 
with  oppression  as  well  as  thirsting  for  booty,  now  chas- 
tised them  with  scorpions.  All  the  inhabitants  who  could 
flee  took  refuge  in  the  capital,  and  the  vast  increase  of  popu- 
lation was  already  threatening  the  city  with  the  famine  and 
the  pestilence  which  are  usually  the  last  outcome  and  not  the 
forerunners  of  a  siege.^ 

Regulus,  seeing  their  miserable  plight  and  anxious  lest  his 
successor,  who,  according  to  Roman  custom,  might  be  soon 
expected,  should  reap  the  glory  of  the  war  which  he  had  so  far 
conducted  prosperously,  offered  to  negotiate  for  peace.  The 
proposal  was  joyfully  accepted ;  but  Regulus,  intoxicated  with 
success,  offered  the  Carthaginians  terms  which  could  scarcely 
have  been  harder  if  the  Romans  had  been  within  their  walls. 
The  conquered  people  were  to  acknowledge  the  supremacy  of 
Rome,  to  form  an  offensive  and  defensive  alliance  with  her,  to 
give  up  all  their  ships  of  war  but  one,  to  cede  not  Sicily  only 
—for  that  the  Carthaginians,  acknowledging  the  fortune  of 

1  Polyb.  i.    31,  2,  3. 


Ill 


lo6 


CARTHAGE  AND  THE  CARTHAGINIANS, 


war,  wonld  have  been  glad  to  do — but  Corsica  and  Sardinia 
and  the  Lipari  Islands  also,  to  surrender  the  Roman  deserters, 
to  ransom  their  own  prisoners,  to  pay  all  that  it  had  cost  the 
Eomans  to  bring  them  to  their  knees,  and  a  heavy  tribute  be- 
sides !  Terms,  intolerable  in  themselves,  were  made  still  more 
intolerable  by  the  insolent  bearing  of  the  Plebeian  consul  to- 
wards those  whom  he  looked  upon  as  prostrate  before  him.  He 
had  already  written  to  Bome  that  he  had  "  sealed  up  the  gates 
of  Carthage  with  terror,"  ^  and  now  he  told  the  ambassadors 
roughly  that  "men  who  were  good  for  anything  should  either 
conquer  or  submit  to  their  betters  ".^  The  Eomans,  when  after 
the  battle  of  the  ^gatian  Isles  they  had  to  recoup  themselves, 
as  best  they  could,  for  fifteen  more  years  of  tedious  warfare, 
for  the  loss  of  four  fleets,  and  for  the  humiliation  which  befell 
this  very  Eegulus  so  soon  afterwards  in  Africa,  did  not  propose 
such  ruinous  conditions  as  these;  and  Scipio  himself,  after 
Zama,  if  only  because  so  many  of  the  tiger's  teeth  had  been 
already  drawn,  did  not  think  it  necessary  to  clip  its  claws  as 
well.  It  argues  an  insensate  ignorance  on  the  part  of  the  Eo- 
mans of  what  was  truly  great  in  their  antagonists,  if  they 
thought  that  they  would  accept  such  terms.  The  spirit  of  the 
ambassadors  rose  with  their  adversity.  They  refused  even  to 
discuss  the  conditions  offered  them,  and  the  Carthaginian  Sen- 
ate determined  to  die,  fighting  bravely  with  arms  in  their  hands, 
rather  than  sign  voluntarily  their  own  death- warrant.^  Be  the 
story  of  the  subsequent  heroism  and  self-sacrifice  of  Eegulus 
ever  so  true,  a  serious  abatement  must  be  made  in  estimating 
his  qualities  both  of  head  and  heart,  for  the  insolence  and  in- 
fatuation which  he  displayed  on  this  critical  occasion. 

The  moment  at  which  the  Carthaginians  were  obliged 
to  give  up  all  hopes  of  peace  was  also,  luckily  for  them, 
the  precise  moment  at  which  a  recruiting  officer  happened 
to  return  from  Greece  with  a  band  of  soldiers  of  fortune 


1  Zonaras,  viii.  13.  ^  Diod.  xxiii.  Frag.  10. 

3  Poly b.  i.  31,  8;  Dioil.  xxiii.  Frag.  xiL 


COMMAND  GIVEN  TO  XANTHIPPUS. 


107 


whom  he  had  induced  to  place  their  swords  at  the  disposal 
of  the  rich  republic.      Amongst  these  was  Xanthippus,  a 
Ucediemonian  of  inferior  grade,  but  one  who  had  been  weU 
schooled  in  war  by  the  admirable  training  which  the  Spartan 
discipline  still  gave,  and  by  the  troublous  times  m  which 
the  whole  of  Greece  was  involved.    Observing  the  excellence 
of  the  Carthaginian  cavalry  and  the  number  of  the  Cartha- 
ginian elephants,  and  hearing  also  the  story  of  the  recent 
defeat,  he  remarked  casuaUy.  as  the  story  goes,  to  his  friends, 
that  the  Carthaginians  had  been  conquered  not  so  much  by 
the  enemy  as  by  themselves,  or  by  the  blunders  of  their 
generals.    The  words  were  caught  up  and  ran  from  mouth 
to  mouth  in  the  eager  and  anxious  city.     Before  long  they 
reached  the  ears  of  the  government,  probably  of  the  dreaded 
Hundred  themselves.      The  Hundred,  seldom  backward   if 
our  accounts  are  trustworthy,  to  Usten  to  anythmg  to  the 
prejudice  of  the  instruments  they  employed,  summoned  Xan- 
thippus before  them.     He  justified  what  he  said  by  argument 
and  pledged  his  word  that  if  only  the  Carthaginians  would 
keep  to  the  plains  and  utUise  that  in  which  their  real  strength 
lay.  they  would  be  victorious.     It  is  little  creditable  to  the 
insight  either  of  the  Carthaginian  government  or  generals  that 
they  should  have  required  a  Greek  soldier  of  fortune  to  ap- 
prise them  of  the  mistake  they  had  made ;   but  there  seems 
no  reason  to  doubt  the  plain  statement  of  Polybius. 

The  command,  but  not  as  yet  the  sole  command,  was  en- 
trusted to  Xanthippus.  His  confidence  was  contagious,  and 
there  ran  through  the  city  the  joyful  news  that  now  the  hour 
had  come  and  the  man.  Confidence  grew  into  enthusiasm 
when  men  saw  the  way  in  which  Xanthippus  handled  his 
troops,  and  contrasted  it  with  the  sorry  performances  of  the 
other  generals.  A  cry  was  raised  for  instant  battle ;  for  aU 
were  convinced  that  no  evil  could  befall  them  under  such  a 
leader  as  Xanthippus.  A  council  of  war  was  held,  but  the 
popular  enthusiasm  carried  everything  before  it;  and  the 
other  generals,  waiving  their  own  claims,  and  sharing,  as  it 


io8 


CARTHAGE  AND  THE  CARTHAGINIANS, 


THANK-OFFERINGS  TO  MOLOCH. 


109 


■M 


would  seem,  in  the  general  enthusiasm,  handed  over  the 
undivided  responsibility  to  Xanthippus.^ 

The  Carthaginian  army,  reinforced  by  the  addition  of  the 
recruits  from  Greece,  numbered  twelve  thousand  infantry, 
with  four  thousand  cavalry,  and  a  formidable  array  of  one 
hundred  elephants.  Kegulus,  surprised  at  the  novel  sight  of 
a  Carthaginian  army  encamping  on  the  plains,  hesitated  for 
a  moment,  as  though  there  was  something  more  in  this  change 
of  tactics  than  met  the  eye,  and  moving  cautiously  forward, 
pitched  his  own  camp  at  a  distance  of  a  mile  from  them. 
But  finding  that  the  Carthaginians  meant  to  fight,  and  flushed 
with  his  hitherto  unbroken  success,  he  drew  up  his  army  in 
order  of  battle.  His  small  body  of  cavalry  he  placed,  as 
usual,  on  the  wings,  but  his  infantry  he  massed  much  more 
closely  together  and  in  much  deeper  formations  than  was 
common  among  the  Romans,  thinking  that  they  could  thus 
be  better  able  to  resist  the  onset  of  the  elephants.  At  last 
Xanthippus  ordered  the  elephants  to  charge,  while  the  cavalry 
were  to  attack  and  then  to  close  in  on  the  wings  of  the  enemy. 
The  Roman  horse,  outnumbered  in  the  proportion  of  four  to 
one,  took  to  flight  without  striking  a  blow,  and  the  elephants, 
rushing  wildly  into  the  foremost  ranks  of  the  Roman  infantry, 
laid  them  low  in  every  direction,  and  trampled  them  to  death 
by  scores.  The  main  body,  however,  stood  firm,  and  when 
the  elephants  turned  aside  towards  the  flanks,  it  found  itself 
face  to  face  with  the  Carthaginian  centre,  which  had  not  yet 
drawn  the  sword.  Attacked  in  front  by  the  infantry,  on  the 
flanks,  which  the  flight  of  their  own  cavalry  had  left  un- 
protected, by  the  Numidian  cavalry,  and  on  the  rear  by  the 
elephants,  the  majority  of  the  Roman  legionaries  stood  their 
ground  nobly,  as  they  did  under  similar  circumstances  at  the 
Trebia  forty  years  later,  and  died  where  they  were  standing. 
A  few  took  to  flight;  but  the  flight  of  foot  soldiers  from 
Numidian  cavalry  over  level  ground  only  meant  a  shght  pro- 

1  Polyb.  i.  32, 


longation  of  the  miserable  struggle  for  life.  Regulus  himself, 
at  the  head  of  six  hundred  men,  surrendered  to  the  conquerors, 
and  of  the  whole  army  two  thousand  only,  who  had  at  the 
first  onset  defeated  the  mercenaries,  and  after  pursuing  them 
to  their  camp  had  taken  no  other  part  in  the  battle,  escaped 
to  Clypea  with  the  news  of  the  disaster.^ 

Clypea  was  the  only  spot  in  the  whole  of  the  country  which 
the  Romans  had  so  easily  overrun  that  they  could  now  call 
their  own.     The  Carthaginians  first  spoiled  the  slain,  and 
then  leading  the  Roman  consul  himself  and  the  other  survivors 
in  chains,  returned  in  triumph  to  the  capital.     It  was  the  first 
pitched  battle  which  they  had  fairly  won ;  but  that  one  battle 
had  reversed  the  whole  fortune  of  the  war.     The  Roman  army 
had  been  all  but  annihilated,  and  its  miserable  remnant  was 
besieged  upon  the  spot  where  they  had  first  landed.     The 
inhabitants  of  the  country  districts  could  now  return  to  their 
homes   and   rebuild   their   shattered   homesteads;  and   the 
richness  of  the  incomparable  soil,  with  its  abundant  irrigation, 
would  soon  efface  all  traces  of  the  invaders.     The  citizens 
themselves  once  again  breathed  freely,  for  they  were  delivered 
from  the  prospect  of  an  immediate  siege,  the  last  horrors  of 
which,  in  the  shape  of  sickness  and  starvation,  they  had 
already  begun  to  taste.     What  wonder,  as  Polybius  says,  if, 
in  the  exuberance  of  their  joy,  all  ranks  alike  gave  themselves 
up  to  feasting  and  thanksgivings  to  their  gods? 2 

But  what  kind  of  thanksgiving  did  the  Carthaginian  deities 
delight  to  receive,  and  the  Carthaginian  worshipper  bring 
himself  to  give?  We  know  from  Diodorus^  that  when 
Agathocles  was  threatening  Carthage  fifty  years  before,  two 
hundred  children  of  the  noblest  Carthaginian  families  had 
been  offered  alive  to  appease  the  angry  Moloch,  and  three 
hundred  men  had  willingly  devoted  themselves  for  the  same 
purpose,  if  haply  they  so  might  save  the  city  from  the  im- 
pending siege.     And,  again,  a  httle  later,  to  celebrate  a  victory 

1  Polyb.  i.  33,  34.  ^  ibid.  i.  34, 12 ;  36, 1. 

SDiod.  zz.  14. 


no 


CARTHAGE  AND  THE  CARTHAGINIANS. 


ROMAN  FLEET  DESTROYED  IN  A  STORM, 


III 


i! 


I 


over  the  same  Agathocles,  a  similar  thank-offering  of  the  most 
beautiful  among  their  captives  had  been  offered  to  the  same 
bloodthirsty  god.  In  that  last  case,  indeed,  the  sacrifice  had 
recoiled  upon  the  sacrificers;  for  the  flames  in  which  the 
wretched  victims  were  being  consumed,  fanned  by  the  wind 
which  just  then  sprang  up,  caught  the  sacred  chapel  which 
stood  near  the  altar  of  burnt-offerings.  Thence  it  spread  to 
the  tent  of  the  general,  who,  according  to  Carthaginian  cus- 
tom, must  have  been  presidingat  the  sacrifice,  and  then  leaping, 
with  a  speed  which  cut  off  escape,  from  tent  to  tent  of  wat- 
tled reeds,  it  enveloped  the  whole  camp  in  a  lambent  circle 
of  fire,  and  offered  to  the  fire-god  a  holocaust  of  his  own  most 
devout  worshippers.^  Nor  can  we  doubt  that  the  greater 
agony  through  which  the  Carthaginians  had  now  passed, 
and  the  still  more  unlooked-for  triumph  by  which  they  had 
issued  from  it,  were  marked  by  the  same  horrible  offerings  on 
a  more  imposing  scale.  There  stood  the  huge  brazen  god 
with  arms  outstretched  to  receive  his  offerings,  as  though  a 
father  to  clasp  his  children  to  his  breast.  But  the  arms  sloped 
treacherously  down  towards  the  ground,  and  the  victim  placed 
upon  them  rolled  off  into  a  seething  cauldron  of  fire  below, 
his  cries  drowned,  as  in  the  vale  of  Hinnom,  by  the  rolling 
of  drums  and  the  blare  of  trumpets.  This  was  the  end,  no 
doubt,  of  some  of  the  noblest  among  the  Roman  captives. 
For  Moloch  was  a  jealous  god.  No  alien  children,  bought 
with  money  and  reared  up  for  human  sacrifice,  would  he 
accept.  He  allowed  no  substitutes,  nor  would  he  take  from 
his  worshipper  that  which  cost  him  nothing,  or  cost  him 
money  alone.^  An  only  child,  a  first-bom  child,  a  child 
remarkable  for  its  beauty,  its  wealth,  or  its  noble  birth,  this 
was  the  offering  which  touched  the  fire-god's  heart ;  and  the 
parents  who  had  sacrificed  their  own  children  to  avert  the 
siege,  would  now,  not  unnaturally,  come  forward  to  give  the 
noblest  among  the  Roman  captives  as  thank-offerings  to  the 


prod  who  had  heard  their  prayer  and,  as  they  believed,  delivered 
them  from  their  distress. 

Xanthippus  was  the  hero  of  the  hour ;  and  if  the  Spartan 
soldiers  of  fortune  were  as  fond  of  money  as  we  know  that  the 
Spartan  kings  and  nobles,  in  defiance  of  the  laws  of  Lycurgus, 
had  for  the  most  part  been  before  him,  he  must  have  had  an 
opportunity  such  as  had  been  given  to  few  of  his  country- 
men of  satisfying  his  utmost  cravings  with  the  gold  of  the 
opulent  republic.     But  the  head  of  Xanthippus  was  not  turned 
by  his  success.     He  knew  the  Carthaginians  better  perhaps 
than  they  knew  themselves,  and  determined  to  return  to  his 
own  home  before  the  popularity  which  he  had  earned  should 
change  into  envy.     That  he  acted  wisely  in  so  doing  is  evident 
from  the  story  that  the  Carthaginians  sent  him  back  in  a  ship 
which  was  not  seaworthy.^     The  story  is  doubtless  a  malicious 
invention,  but  it  could  hardly  have  been  fathered  upon  a 
people  whose  gratitude  for  favours  received  was  either  deep 

or  lasting. 

The  Romans,  when  they  heard  of  the  disaster  which  had 
befallen  Regulus,  fitted  out  a  large  fleet  for  the  rescue  of 
the  survivors  (b.c.  255);  while  the  Carthaginians,  rightly 
judging  that  the  resolution  of  Rome  would  not  be  broken 
by  any  one  calamity,  however  great,  also  set  to  work  to  build 
a  new  fleet  which  should  protect  them  from  a  second  invasion. 
But  in  vain  did  they  endeavour  to  reduce  Clypea  before  the 
Romans  could  reach  it.  The  desperate  courage  of  the  small 
garrison  repelled  all  assaults,  and  enabled  it  to  hold  out  till 
the  ensuing  summer,  when  the  Roman  fleet  arrived.  A 
naval  battle  took  place  off  the  Hermaean  promontory.  The 
Romans  gained  the  day,  and  took  on  board,  at  their  leisure, 
the  defenders  of  Clypea  who  had  so  well  earned  their  Uves. 

They  had  well  earned  their  lives,  but  they  were  not  long 
to  enjoy  them;  they  turned  their  backs  with  joy  upon 
Africa,  but  they  were  not  to  see  Italy.    The  armament  had 


1  Diod.  XX|  G.'>. 


"Ibid.  14. 


JPolyb.  L  36,  2-4 ;  Zonaras,  viii.  13i. 


112 


CARTHAGE  AND  THE  CARTHAGINIANS. 


reached  Camarina  in  safety,  and  was  about  to  round  Pachynus, 
and  to  sail  home  through  the  Straits  of  Messana,  when  a 
terrific  storm,  such  as  is  common  in  those  parts  and  at  that 
time  of  the  year,  broke  upon  them.     Some  of  the  Roman 
ships  foundered  in  the  open  sea,  more  were  dashed  to  pieces 
against  the  sharp  rocks  and  numerous  promontories  of  that 
iron-bound  coast,  and  the  shore  was  strewed  for  miles  with 
wrecks  and  corpses.     Out  of  three  hundred  and  forty  ships 
it  is  said  that  only  eighty  escaped;  and  what  must  have 
given  an  additional  sting  to  the  calamity  was  the  conscious- 
ness that  it  might  have  been  avoided.    The  pilots,  probably 
the  only  persons  on  board  who  had  had  real  experience  of 
the  sea,  or  who  knew  what  ugly  weather  was,  had  warned 
the  admirals  of  the  dangerous  storms  to  which  the  south 
of  Sicily  was  exposed  after  the  rising  of  the  tempestuous 
Orion.  ^     Along  the  northern  shore  they  would  be  in  calm 
water.    But  the  maritime  experience  acquired  in  five  years 
wherein  nothing  had  gone  wrong  with  them  had  taught  the 
Romans,  as  they  fondly  thought,  that  there  was  nothing 
in  the  terrors  of  the  sea  with  which  Roman  courage  could 
not  cope ;  and  the  admirals  were  deaf  to  the  voice  of  the 
weather-wise  pilots  who  shook  their  heads  at  dangers  which 
could  neither  be  seen  nor  handled.     Moreover,  they  wished 
to  make  the  most  of  their  recent  victory,  and  by  its  prestige 
to  bring  over  to  themselves  a  few  small  towns,  on  the  south 
coast  of  Sicily,  which  still  wavered  in  their  allegiance.    The 
prize  was  small,  as  Polybius  significantly  remarks,  and  the 
stake  large  ;  but  they  staked,  and  lost  it.^ 

Elated  as  they  were  by  the  rapid  departure  of  the  Roman 
fleet  from  Africa,  the  spirit  of  the  Carthaginians  must  have 
risen  higher  still  when  they  heard  of  its  sudden  and  com- 
plete destruction.  Like  Athens  or  like  Venice,  Carthage 
might  well  call  herself  by  the  proud  title  of  "  Bride  of  the 

'Cf.  Horace,  Epod,  xv.  7,  "naulis  infestus  Orion".    Virg.  jBn,  i.  636, 
"  subito  assurgens  fluctu  nimbosus  Orion  ". 
'Polyb.  i.  37 ;  Eutropius,  ii.  22. 


THE  ROMANS  TAKE  PANORMUS, 


"3 


Sea,"  and  her  citizens,  like  the  Vikings  of  after  times,  might 
well  boast  that  they  were  "  friends  of  the  sea  and  enemies  of 
all  that  sailed  upon  it".  It  must  have  rejoiced  the  hearts 
of  the  Carthaginians  that  the  sea  had  at  length  avenged 
itself  even  when  their  arms  had  failed,  upon  those  who — to 
used  the  forcible  expression  of  the  admiral  Callicratidas— had 
"  dared  to  have  dalliance  with  it  ".^  The  war  might  now  be 
once  more  transferred  to  Sicily,  and  thither  Hannibal  was 
sent  with  all  the  available  land  forces,  with  one  hundred 
and  forty  elephants,  and  with  a  fleet  which  was  to  co-operate 
with  the  army.  He  made  straight  for  LilybaBum,  and,  taking 
the  field,  prepared  to  ravage  the  open  country. 

With  unconquerable  resolution,  however,  the  Romans  de- 
termined to  fit  out  a  new  fleet  to  replace  the  one  that  had 
been  destroyed;  and  the  miracle  of  speed  which  we  have 
noticed  before  is  said  to  have  been  repeated  again.  Within 
three  months  two  hundred  and  twenty  vessels  were  built 
from  the  keel,  and  were  ready  for  action. 2 

The  two  consuls,  A.  Atilius  and  Cn.  Cornelius  Scipio 
Asina,  who  had  been  released  from  his  captivity,  picking  up 
on  their  way  the  few  vessels  which  had  escaped  to  Messana 
from  the  general  wreck,  made  for  Panormus  (b.c.  254),  and 
in  the  hour  of  their  humiliation  hazarded  an  attack  upon 
its  strong  fortifications  which  they  had  shrunk  from  making 
even  after  their  victory  at  Mylse ;  and,  what  is  more  surpris- 
ing, they  took  it  with  ease.  A  tower  which  commanded 
the  fortifications  towards  the  sea  was  first  destroyed.  This 
disaster  put  the  new  city  into  the  hands  of  the  Romans, 
and  the  old  at  once  surrendered.  Never  was  a  war  more 
fertile  in  vicissitudes  and  surprises  than  had  been  the  first 
nine  years  of  this.  Here  were  the  Romans  stronger  and 
more  energetic  after  a  defeat  than  after  a  victory  ;  taking  by 
a  coup  de  main  an  almost  virgin  fortress,  which  had  never 
yet  been  taken  but  by  Pyrrhus  ;  baffling  all  the  calculations 


*  XeU.   Nell.  i.  6,  16,  iiot\av  tV  *aAoTTOi». 

8 


2  Polyb.  i.  38,  1-G. 


"4 


CARTHAGE  AND  THE  CARTHAGINIANS. 


CARTHAGINIANS  THREATEN  PANORMUS. 


J15 


H 


of  a  not  inexperienced  foe,  and  then  sailing  back  to  Komo 
as  though  nothing  extraordinary  had  happened,  leaving  only 
a  small  garrison  in  what  had  been  the  Carthaginian  capital 
of  the  island,  the  head-quarters  of  its  armies  and  its  fleets.^ 

In  the  following  year  (b.c.  253),  the  Komans  tempted 
fortune  again  by  reconnoitring  the  African  coast.  They 
landed  here  and  there,  and  ravaged  the  surrounding  country, 
but  with  no  result  proportionate  to  the  danger  they  ran; 
and  they  ended,  owing  to  their  want  of  maritime  experience, 
by  falling  into  the  Syrtis,  whose  name  expresses  the  power 
with  which  an  unlucky  vessel  coming  within  its  reach  is 
sucked  into  its  deadly  embraces.  The  vessels  ran  aground, 
and  were  rescued  only  by  a  sudden  rise  of  the  sea,  which 
the  crews  helped  by  throwing  overboard  their  valuables. 
The  moment  they  were  extricated  from  their  danger,  like 
animals  that  have  been  in  the  toils,  they  made  their  way 
back  to  Panormus,  only  too  thankful  if  they  could  escape 
the  pursuit  of  the  enemy. 

But  the  worst  was  still  to  come.  In  crossing  from 
Panormus  to  Italy  they  were  overtaken,  ofiF  the  promontory 
of  Palinurus,  by  another  storm,  which,  as  it  must  have 
seemed,  could  not  now  let  even  the  sea  to  the  north  of 
Sicily  alone  if  Romans  were  to  be  found  in  it  Never  since 
the  tempest  had  raged  day  after  day  on  the  southern  coast 
of  Magnesia,  and  strewn  the  coasts  of  Thessaly  and  Eubcea 
with  the  wrecks  of  the  vast  Persian  fleet,  had  the  god  of  the 
sea  shown  himself  so  decided  a  partisan  in  a  naval  contest, 
or  demanded  so  costly  a  series  of  sacrifices.  The  Roman 
spirit  at  length  began  to  show  some  symptoms  of  giving 
way.  At  all  events  the  Senate  determined  not  again  at 
present  to  tempt  the  sea,  but  to  depend  upon  their  land 
forces ;  and  for  the  next  two  years  the  war  was  carried  on 
under  conditions  not  very  dissimilar  to  those  under  which 
it  had  been  begun.* 


The  Carthaginians  were  now  once  more  able  to  carry  the 
war  into  Sicily,  and  the  large  army  which  they  sent  under 
Ilasdrubal  to  Lilybaeum  had  that  within  it  which  seemed 
able,  for  the  time  at  least,  to  demoralise,  nay,  even  to  para- 
lyse, their  foes.^  The  havoc  wrought  by  the  elephants 
amongst  the  troops  of  Regulus  in  the  battle  near  Carthage 
had  been  duly  reported  to  the  Roman  armies  in  Sicily,  and  it 
had  lost  nothing  in  the  transmission.  To  be  knocked  down, 
and  then  trampled  to  pieces  by  a  furious  beast  against  which 
neither  fraud  nor  force  could  avail  aught,  would  be  terrible 
enough  to  any  well-regulated  mind;  but  the  fear  which  it 
seems  to  have  inspired  completely  unnerved  the  Romans.  It 
was  not  death  itself — for  that  they  would  have  faced  gladly  in  a 
hundred  fair  battle-fields  or  forlorn  hopes  ;  it  was  the  instru- 
ment and  the  manner  of  death  that  they  feared.  They  refused 
to  face  the  elephants,  much  as  the  bravest  troops  now-a-days 
might  refuse  to  measure  their  collective  strength  against  the 
brute  power  of  a  steam  engine,  or  as  men  armed  with  muzzle- 
loaders  might  demur,  however  great  their  valour,  to  standing 
up  against  the  cold  and  cruel  mechanism  of  a  mitrailleuse. 

Once  and  again  did  the  two  armies  face  one  another  at  a 
few  furlongs'  distance,  in  the  territory  of  Selinus,  and  once 
and  again  did  they  part  company  without  coming  to  blows. 
The  Romans  were  determined,  if  possible,  to  avoid  a  battle, 
and  clung  steadfastly  to  the  hills  where  their  experience  in 
Africa  had  taught  them  that  the  one  hundred  and  forty  ele- 
phants would  be  useless,  and  where  the  Carthaginians  there- 
fore could  not  attack  them  with  any  hope  of  success.  There 
were  symptoms,  too,  of  serious  disaffection  and  discontent 
among  the  Roman  oflScers ;  and  once  again  it  was  clear  to 
the  Roman  Senate  that  the  sea  itself  would  be  less  terrible 
than  such  an  indefinite  and  purposeless  prolongation  of  the 
war.  They  accordingly  reconsidered  their  resolution,  and 
began  to  build  a  third  fleet  (b.c.  251).'- 


» Polyb.  i.  3«.  6-10 ;  Zouarus.  viil  14. 


aPolyb.  i.  39, 1-7. 


iP)lyh,l  39,  11,12. 


2  Ibid.  i.31),  i:Mr.. 


ii6 


CARTHAGE  AND  THE  CARTHAGINIANS. 


BATTLE  OF  PANORMUS. 


117 


,:  I' 


Hasdrubal  meanwhile,  encouraged  by  what  he  thought 
the  cowardice  of  the  Komans,  issued  from  Selinus,  and 
proceeded  to  carry  ofif  the  rich  harvests,  just  then  ripe,  from 
under  the  eyes  of  the  Koman  army  at  Panormus.  Caecilius 
Metellus  was  in  command  there,  a  man  of  prudence  and 
self-restraint,  but  able  to  strike  a  vigorous  blow  when  there 
was  occasion  for  it.  When  Hasdrubal  and  his  elephants 
had  crossed  the  river  near  the  city — a  step  for  which  he 
had  been  anxiously  waiting— he  sent  forth  his  light  troops 
in  such  numbers  as  to  induce  the  Carthaginians  to  draw 
up  in  line  of  battle.  In  front  of  the  city  wall  ran  a  broad 
and  deep  ditch,  within  which  the  light  troops,  after  they 
had  provoked  an  attack  from  Hasdrubal,  and  should  find 
themselves  hard  pressed,  were  warned  to  take  shelter. 
Here  they  would  find  fresh  weapons  awaiting  them,  thrown 
down  by  the  townsmen  from  the  walls  above,  and,  safe 
under  their  protection,  would  be  able  to  shower  missiles 
upon  the  advancing  elephants.  The  order  of  Metellus  was 
carried  out  to  the  letter,  and  the  result  answered  his  ex- 
pectations. The  elephant-drivers — Indians,  Polybius  here 
and  elsewhere  calls  them— eager  to  assert  their  independ- 
ence of  Hasdrubal,  or  to  win  special  credit  for  themselves, 
advanced  to  close  quarters  before  the  word  of  command 
was  given.  The  light  troops  gave  way,  and  leaping  down 
into  the  ditch,  received  the  unwieldy  monsters,  which  came 
blundering  on  to  its  very  edge,  with  showers  of  darts  and 
burning  arrows.  Unable  to  vent  their  rage  on  their  assail- 
ants in  the  ditch,  the  elephants  rushed  wildly  back  on  the 
Carthaginian  army,  and  wrought  amongst  them  the  havoc 
which  the  Eomans  had  feared  for  themselves.  Now  was  the 
moment  for  Metellus.  Unobserved  by  the  enemy,  he  had 
massed  the  main  body  of  his  army  close  behind  the  gate  of 
the  town.  He  sallied  out  in  force,  charged  the  enemy,  who 
were  already  in  confusion,  on  the  flank,  and  routing  them  com- 
pletely, drove  them  headlong  back  towards  Selinus.  It  was 
the  greatest  pitched  battle  of  the  war,  and  restored  confidence 


to  the  Komans  at  the  time  when   they  needed  it  most 

sorely.^ 

But  we  must  dwell  for  a  moment  on  the  fate  of  the 
elephants  which  had  played  so  important  a  part  in  the  battle 
itself,  and  whose  terrors  exercised  so  critical  and  so  charac- 
teristic an  influence  on  this  part  of  the  First  Punic  War. 
Ten  of  the  elephants  had  been  taken  prisoners  during  the 
battle,  with  their  drivers.      The  drivers  of  the  remainder 
had   been  either  thrown  to  the  ground  by  the  elephants 
themselves  or  killed  by  the  weapons  of  the  Komans,  and 
the  monsters  were  still,   after  the  battle,   rushing  wildly 
about,   no  Koman   daring   to  lay   hands  on   them.      The 
promise  of  their  lives  to  the  captured  drivers  induced  some 
among  them  to  exercise  their  moral  control  when  physical 
force  was  out  of  the  question,  and  in  time  the  panic-stricken 
creatures,  one  hundred  and  twenty  in  number,  were  reduced 
to  order.     It  was  determined  to  send  them  to  Kome  to  grace 
the  well-deserved  triumph  of  Metellus ;    but  it  was  no  easy 
matter  to  convey  them  across  the  stormy  Straits  of  Messana. 
Huge  rafts  were  lashed  together,  earth  and  herbage  were 
scattered  over  the  planks,  and  high  bulwarks  carried  round 
the  whole;  and  the  sagacious  animals  allowed  themselves  to 
be  ferried  quietly  across  the  straits  under  a  total  misconcep- 
tion as  to  the  operation  which  they  were  undergoing.     They 
marched  in  stately  procession  up  the  Sacred  Way,  and  were 
drawn  thence,  like  so  many  captured  kings  or  generals  before 
and  after  them,  to  the  place  of  execution,  the  Koman  Circus. 
There,  after  being  baited  with  '♦  arms  of  courtesy,"  to  familiar- 
ise the  people  and  the  soldiers  that  were  to  be,  with  their 
formidable  appearance,  they  received  the  death-blow  from 
more  formidable  weapons ;    and  the  fatal  appetite  for  blood 
which  was  then  just  beginning  to  show  itself  among  the 
Roman  populace  must  have  been  sated  to  the  full  by  so 
gigantic  and  horrible  a  sacrifice.      The  noble  family  of  the 

\  Polyb.  I.  40  ;  cf.  Diod.  xxiii.  14 ;  Florus,  ii.  2,  27,  28. 


i 


ill 


f 


II 


ii8 


CARTHAGE  AND  THE  CARTHAGINIANS, 


Metelli  always  cherished,  as  well  they  might,  the  memory 
of  the  great  battle  of  Panormus  among  their  most  precious 
heirlooms,  and  coins  of  theirs  are  still  extant  representing 
the  formidable  beast  which  their  ancestor  had,  by  his  victory 
at  this  critical  point  of  the  war,  robbed  of  half  its  terrors.^ 

It  was,  probably,  about  this  time  that  an  embassy  appeared 
at  Rome  from  Carthage  to  negotiate,  if  possible,  a  peace,  but 
anyhow  an  exchange  of  prisoners.  It  was  accompanied  by 
Regulus,  who  had  been  languishing  for  five  years  in  a  Cartha- 
ginian prison,  and  who  came  upon  his  parole  to  return  to  Car- 
thage if  his  mission  should  prove  unsuccessful.  Every  one 
knows  the  beautiful  touches  with  which  the  story  of  what  fol- 
lows has  been  filled  in  by  the  genius  of  Horace  2  and  of  other 
late  poets  and  orators ;  how  Regulus  refused  to  enter  the  city 
as  a  citizen,  or  the  Senate  house  as  a  senator,  since  he  had 
lost  his  right  to  both  on  the  day  when  he  became  a  captive ; 
how,  when  at  length  he  brought  himself  to  speak  before  the 
Senate,  he  spoke  in  terms  such  as  no  Roman  had  ever  heard 
before.  "  Let  those  who  had  surrendered  when  they  ought 
to  have  died,  die  in  the  land  which  had  witnessed  their  dis- 
grace ;  let  not  the  Senate  estabhsh  a  precedent  fraught  with 
disaster  to  ages  yet  unborn,  or  buy  with  their  gold  what  ought 
only  to  be  won  back  by  arms.  He  was  old,  and  in  the  short 
time  of  life  that  still  remained  to  him  could  do  no  good  service 
to  his  country,  while  the  generals  who  would  be  exchanged 
for  him  were  still  hale  and  vigorous ; "  how,  when  he  saw 
the  Senate  still  wavering  between  pity  for  him  and  their  sense 
of  duty  to  their  country,  he  nailed  them  to  their  purpose  by 
telling  them  he  had  taken  a  slow  poison  which  was  even  then 
coursing  through  his  veins ;  and  how,  last  of  all,  he  strode  ofif, 
with  his  eyes  indeed  fixed  upon  the  ground,  lest  he  should  look 
upon  his  sorrowing  wife  and  children,  but  with  a  step  as  light 
and  a  heart  as  free  as  though  he  were  going  for  a  holiday  to 

>  Polyb.  i.  40 ;  Livy,  I'JpU.  xix.  ;  Eutropiiis,  ii.  24  ;  Zonaras,  viii.  14. 
«Orf«,  iii.  5.      Cf.  Siliiis  Italicus,   Pun.  vi.  346-402;   Livy,  /CpU.  xvili  ; 
Val.   Max.  i.  1,  14  ;    Eutropiiis,  ii.  25 ;   Zonaras,  viii.  15. 


STORY  OF  REGULUS. 


tig 


his  country  estate.  It  is  an  ideal  picture  of  a  brave  man  bear- 
ing up  under  a  great  misfortune,  and  striving,  as  best  he  could, 
to  wipe  out  disgrace ;  and  as  an  ideal  picture  we  are  content 
to  let  it  pass.  A  nation  has  a  right  to  its  patriotic  national 
ideals,  and  Roman  history  would  not  be  Roman  history  at  all 
without  its  Brutus  and  its  Cincinnatus,  its  Fabricius  and  its 

Regulus. 

But  it  is  otherwise  with  the  sequel  to  the  story,  with  that 
which  not  only  idealises  the  Roman  character,  but  sets  it  ofif 
by  blackening  that  of  its  rivals,  as  if  it  was  the  Carthaginians 
who  enjoyed  a  monopoly  of  cruelty,  and  as  if  the  Romans 
themselves  had  always  behaved  with  ordinary  humanity  to 
a  conquered  foe— a  foe  like  C.  Pontius,  for  instance,  far  more 
generous  and  high-spirited  than.Regulis  himself.      This  we 
are  bound  to  scrutinise  carefully  and  to  mete  out  stern  justice 
to  those  who  seem  to  deserve  it.      We  could  hardly  wonder 
if,  under  the  curcumstances,  Regulus  had  been  put  to  death 
as  soon  as  he  was  taken  prisoner  by  a  nation  which  must  have 
been  stung  to  the  quick  by  his  insolent  bearing  in  the  hour  of 
his  success,  and  which  showed  so  little  mercy  to  its  own  de- 
feated generals ;  but  it  is  so  far  from  being  true  that  Regulus 
was  put  to  death  with  horrible  tortures  by  the  Carthaginians, 
that  there  is  reason  to  believe  that  he  died  a  natural  death, 
and  that  the  story  of  the  tortures  was  invented  to  cover  those 
which  had  been  really  inflicted  on  two  noble  Carthaginian 
prisoners  by  a  Roman  matron.      No  writer  before  the  time 
of  Cato  knows  anything  of  the  cruel  death  of  Regulus.  and, 
when  once  the  legend  had  been  set  going,  we  find  that  there 
are  almost  as  many  dififerent  versions  as  there  are  authors  who 
refer  to  it.     Moreover,  the  silence  of  Polybius,  the  most  trust- 
worthy of  historians,  who  relates  the  exploits  of  Regulus  m 
detaU,  and  whose  chief  fault  is  that  he  is  too  didactic- seldom 
adorning  a  tale,  but  always  ready  to  point  a  moral— is  in  itself 
sufficient  to  outweigh  the  vague  rhetoric  and  the  impassioned 
poetry  of  the  late  Republic. 

On  the  other  hand,  as  has  been  akeady  hinted,  we  have 


I20 


CARTHAGE  AND  THE  CARTHAGINIANS, 


the  authority  of  a  fragment  of  Diodorus  Siculus  for  a  story, 
which,  when  we  remember  his  anti-Carthaginian  bias,  we 
can  scarcely  suppose  that  he  either  invented,  or  reported  on 
insufficient  evidence,  of  the  shocking  cruelties  inflicted  on 
Bostar  and  Hamilcar,  two  Carthaginians  given  over  by  the 
Eoman  Senate  to  the  wife  of  Eegulus,  as  hostages  for  the 
safety  of  her  husband.^     Eegulus  died— so  clearly  implies 
Diodorus— a  natural  death ;  but  his  widow,  thinking,  in  her 
vexation,  that  there  had  been  neglect  or  cruelty  on  the  part 
of  the  Carthaginians,  ordered  her  sons  to  fasten  the  two 
captives  into  a  cask  of  the  smallest  possible  dimensions, 
and  kept  them  there  five  days  and  nights  without  food  or 
water,  till  Bostar,  happily  for  himself,  died  of  the  torture 
and  the  starvation.     But  this  was  not  the  worst.     Hamilcar 
was  a  man  of  extraordinary  strength  of  constitution.     And 
what  the  poet  of  the  ^neid,  in  the  play  of  his  imagination, 
attributes  to  Mezentius,   "the  despiser  of  the  gods,"  the 
most  formidable  and  the  most  barbarous  of  the  opponents 
of  iEneas,  that  a  Eoman  matron  did  to  Hamilcar : 

Mortua  quin  etUm  jungebat  corpora  vivis. 

In  that  same  cask  she  kept  the  living  and  the  dead  for  five 
more  days,  by  a  cruel  kindness  supplying  Hamilcar  with 
just  so  much  food  as  might  serve  to  keep  life  in  him  and 
enable  him  to  realise  the  horrors  of  the  situation.  At  last 
the  advanced  putrefaction  of  the  body  roused  the  pity  of 
even  the  servants  of  the  Atilii.  They  brought  the  matter 
before  the  tribunes  of  the  people,  and  Hamilcar  came  forth 
from  his  living  death  and  was  protected  from  further  violence 
by  the  more  merciful  people.  To  palliate  the  story  of  the 
foul  cruelty  of  the  widow  of  Eegulus,  for  which  the  Eomans 
at  large  were  certainly  not  responsible,  was  invented,  as 
seems  likely,  the  story  of  the  cruel  death  of  Eegulus  himself. 

»Diod.  Sic,  xxiv.  Frag.  1. 


CARTHAGINIAN  FORTRESSES  IN  SICILY, 


121 


CHAPTEE  VII. 


HAMILCAR  BARCA   AND  THE   SIEGE   OP  LILYBiEUM. 

(B.C.    250-241.) 

Fortresses  remaining  to  Carthaginians  in  Sicily— Siege  of  Lilybseum— Its 
origin  and  situation— Early  siege  operations— Carthaginians  run  the  block- 
ade—Hannibal the  Rhodian— Carthaginian  sortie— Distress  of  Romans 
— Tlie  consul  Claudius— Battle  of  Drepanum- Claudian  family— Roman 
reinforcements  for  siege  of  Lilybaeura  lost  at  sea— Romans  seize  Eryx— 
Hamilcar  Barca— He  occupies  Mount  Ercte— Exhaustion  of  Romans— 
Culpable  conduct  of  Carthaginians— Genius  of  Hamilcar— His  plans 
—His  enterprises  —He  transfers  his  camp  from  Ercte  to  Eryx— Romans 
build  one  more  fleet  — Lutatius  Catulus— The  Carthaginian  plan— Battle 
of  iEgatian  Isles— Magnanimity  of  Hamilcar— Terms  of  peace— Roman 
gains  and  losses— Carthaginian  losses  and  prospects— Contest  only  de- 
ferred. 

The  victory  which  the  Eomans  had  won  before  Panormus 
nerved  them  to  make  a  strenuous  effort  for  the  expulsion  of 
their  enemies  from  Sicily.  The  Carthaginians  were  now 
hemmed  up  in  the  north-western  corner  of  the  island;  and 
of  all  their  former  possessions,  the  three  fortresses  of  Lily- 
bseum, Eryx,  and  Drepanum  alone  remained  to  them.  If 
the  first  of  these  could  by  any  means  be  taken,  the  other 
two  would  not  offer  any  prolonged  resistance.  The  war 
might  then,  once  again,  be  transferred  to  Africa,  and  the 
Eomans,  whose  proud  boast  it  was  that  they  first  learned 
from  their  enemies  and  then  surpassed  them,  would  be 
able  to  prove  to  the  Carthaginians  that  this  war  was  no 
exception  to  the  rule.  Fourteen  years  had  passed  since 
the  war  had  broken  out,  and  both  sides  were  fully  alive 
to  the  vital  importance  of  the  crisis  at  which  it  had  arrived. 


122 


CARTHAGE  AND  THE  CARTHAGINIANS. 


SIEGE  OF  LILYBMUM. 


"3 


With  the  siege  of  LilybaBura,  B.C.  250,  opens  the  last 
scene  of  the  First  Punic  War.  It  is  the  last  scene,  but 
a  long  and  tedious  one.  The  siege  is  one  of  the  longest 
known  in  history.  Strictly  historical  as  it  is,  it  equals  in 
length  the  mythical  siege  of  Troy,  and  the  semi-mythical 
siege  of  Veii.  The  Romans  distinguished  themselves  in 
it  by  their  heroic  perseverance,  and  by  little  else;  but  it 
was  that  kind  of  heroic  perseverance  which  lay  at  the 
root  of  most  of  what  they  achieved,  and  is  not,  after  all, 
so  far  removed  from  genius.  The  Carthaginian  defence  was 
marked  by  all  the  versatility  and  inventiveness,  the  prudence 
and  the  daring,  which  characterise  the  Phoenician  race; 
above  all,  it  was  marked  by  the  appearance  on  the  scene  of 
at  least  one  real  military  genius,  the  great  Hamilcar  Barca. 

Lilybaeum  was  built  upon  the  promontory  which  formed 
the  extreme  western  point  of  Sicily.  It  was  the  point  near- 
est to  Africa  and  directly  fronted  the  Hermaean  promontory. 
It  was,  therefore,  so  long  as  it  remained  in  the  hands  of 
the  Carthaginians,  the  most  important  support  to  theii 
power  in  Sicily.  It  would  be  a  standing  menace  even  to 
their  home  rule  in  Africa  as  soon  as  it  should  pass  into 
the  hands  of  their  enemies.  The  fortress  itself  was  not 
of  great  antiquity.  It  owed  its  origin  to  the  fall  of  the 
adjoining  Motye  only  fifty-four  years  before.  Motye  had 
been  destroyed  by  Dionysius,  tyrant  of  Syracuse,^  but  the 
Carthaginians,  with  the  buoyancy  of  their  nation,  at  once 
consoled  themselves  for  its  loss  by  founding  a  new  settle- 
ment on  the  promontory  of  Lilybaeum,  the  superior  ad- 
vantages of  which  they  had  hitherto  seemed  to  overlook. 
In  the  interval  that  had  elapsed  since  that  time,  it  had 
grown  into  an  exceedingly  strong  fortress,  probably  the 
strongest  which  the  Carthaginians  possessed.  Just  before 
the  beginning  of  the  siege  it  received  an  important  addition 
to  its  population.     All  the  inhabitants  of  SeHnus  were  trans- 


'  Diod.  x\\.  47  53.      See  above,  p.  ,''•2. 


ferred  to  it,  and  if  Diodorus  is  to  be  believed,  it  contained  now 
a  population  of  sixty  thousand  men  capable  of  bearing  arms.^ 
It  possessed  a  fine  harbour,  to  the  capabilities  of  which  the 
name  given  it  by  the  Arabs  in  mediaeval  times  of  Marsa  Allah, 
or  Harbour  of  God,  still  bears  witness  (Marsala).  But  the 
entrance  to  it  was  rendered  difficult  by  the  constant  winds 
that  blew  off  the  headland,  and  by  the  treacherous  sand-banks 
and  sunken  reefs  which  lay  off  the  shores ;  and  these,  if  they 
were  dangerous  to  the  inhabitants  who  knew  them  well,  would 
be  doubly  dangerous  to  an  enemy  who  did  not.^ 

Pyrrhus,  a  few  years  before,  had  overrun  all  the  rest  of 
Sicily  with  ease ;  but  the  impetuosity  of  his  assault  had  been 
beaten  back  by  the  solid  walls  of  Lilybaeum.^  WouJd  the 
Romans  succeed  where  Pjnrhus  had  failed  ?  They  saw  that 
a  place  so  situated  and  so  defended  could  only  be  attacked 
with  any  hope  of  success  by  a  strong  army  and  a  strong  fleet 
at  once,  and  they  supplied  them  ungrudgingly. 

Two  consular  armies,  consisting  of  five  legions  and  two 
hundred  vessels,  appeared  before  the  place.  The  first  attack 
was  directed  against  the  wall  which  stretched  from  sea  to 
sea  right  across  the  peninsula  on  which  the  city  was  built, 
and  the  immediate  success  obtained  by  the  Romans  was 
such  as  appeared  to  promise  an  early  termination  of  the 
siege.  By  regular  approaches  the  Romans  worked  their  way 
up  to  the  city  wall,  undermined  some  of  its  towers,  and  when 
these  had  fallen,  brought  up  their  battering-rams  to  threaten 
the  whole  line  of  defence.  But  Himilco,  the  commander  of  the 
garrison,  was  a  man  of  energy  and  of  fertility  of  resource. 
By  building  a  second  wall  behind  the  first  he  made  the  weaken- 
ing of  the  first  to  be  of  small  importance.  He  met  the  mining 
operations  of  the  enemy  by  countermines,  and  he  quelled,  by 
his  address  and  personal  influence  over  the  better  disposed  of 

iDiod.  xxiv.  Frag.  1. 

«Polyl).  i.  42,  7 ;  cf.  Virgil,  ^w.  iii.  706, 

Et  vada  dura  lego  saxis  LilybeTa  csecis. 
sDiotl.  xxii.  Frag.  14. 


124  CARTHAGE  AND  THE  CARTHAGINIANS, 


HANNIBAL  THE  RHODIAN. 


125 


the  mercenaries,  a  formidable  conspiracy  which  had  broken 
out  among  them  to  betray  the  town  to  the  Romans.  ^  Poly  bius 
recalls  with  patriotic  pride  the  name  of  Alexion,  an  Ach»an 
soldier  of  fortune,  who,  by  his  fidelity  to  his  employers,  saved 
LilybaBum  from  faUing  into  the  hands  of  the  Romans,  as 
he  had  formerly  saved  Agrigentum,  its  freedom  and  its  laws, 
from  some  treacherous  Syracusan  mercenaries.' 

Meanwhile  the  Carthaginians,  knowing  the  weakness  of 
their  naval  force  ofif  Lilybaeum,  and  fully  conscious  that  the 
place  could  not  hold  out  unless  relieved  from  home,  made 
vigorous  efforts  to  throw  succour  into  it.     Hannibal,  the  son 
of  Hamilcar,  was  despatched  with  all  haste  to  Sicily,  with 
fifty  ships  and  ten  thousand  troops.     He  moored  his  fleet 
among  the  iEgatian  Isles  opposite  to  Lilybaeum,  waiting  for 
the  moment  when  he  should  be  able  to  face,  with  some 
slight  chance  of  success,  the  double  dangers  of  the  Roman 
squadron,  and  the  rocks  and  reefs  that  girt  in  the  harbour. 
A  favouring,  although  a  violent,  wind  sprang  up.     He  spread 
every  inch  of  his  canvas,  and  massing  his  troops  on  deck  to 
be  ready  for  an  engagement,  with  that  happy  rashness  which 
IS  the  truest  prudence,  he  made  his  way  in  safety  through 
the  narrow  entrance,  while  the  Roman  guard-ships  remained 
at  anchor  close  by,  the  sailors  stupidly  looking  on,  aghast  at 
his  rashness,  and  expecting  to  see  him  dashed  to  pieces  upon 
the  rocks.     The  sea  walls  of  the  city  were  thronged  with 
the  eager  inhabitants,  hoping,  as  it  seemed,  against  hope, 
that  some  few  of  the  ships  might,  by  a  lucky  chance,  pass' 
safely  through ;  and  amid  their  loud  cheers  Hannibal  rode 
into  the  harbour  under  fuU  sail,   without  losing  a  single 
vessel,  and  deposited  in  safety  his  ten  thousand  troops  and 
his  stores  of  provisions.     Those  who  have  read  the  thrilling 
story,  as  told  by  Lord  Macaulay,  of  the  siege  of  Londonderry, 
and  who  can  recall  his  picture  of  the  "  Mount  joy  "  and  the 
"  Phoenix  "  forcing  the  boom  in  Lough  Foyle,  and  saving 


1 


the  heroic  and  famished  garrison  from  the  most  hideous 
form  of  death,  or  perhaps  from  that  which  is  still  worse  than 
death,  can  best  realise  the  enthusiasm,  as  described  briefly 
but  emphatically  by  Polybius,  with  which  the  inhabitants 
greeted  the  successful  termination  of  the  bold  venture  of 
Hannibal.^  After  revictualling  the  place,  that  he  might  not 
unnecessarily  himself  consume  any  of  the  provisions  which  he 
had  brought,  Hannibal,  availing  himself  of  the  darkness  of  the 
night,  and  probably  carrying  with  him  the  Numidian  cavalry, 
which  could  no  longer  be  of  service  in  the  closely  blockaded 
town,  once  more  threaded  the  dangerous  passages  and  joined 
Adherbal,  the  admiral,  at  Drepanum,  fifteen  miles  away.^ 

The  example  of  Hannibal  was  contagious.  A  Rhodian 
mercenary,  of  the  same  name,  volunteered  with  a  single 
vessel  to  do  as  he  had  done.  Again  and  again  he  ran  the 
blockade,  and  found  his  way  out  in  safety,  as  though  he  bore 
a  charmed  life,  through  the  midst  of  the  Roman  vessels 
which  were  drawn  up  at  the  entrance  of  the  harbour  for  the 
very  purpose  of  preventing  his  escape.  Doubtless  he  held 
the  clue  to  the  dangerous  navigation  of  the  straits,  which, 
now  that  the  buoys  were  removed,  no  enemy  could  discover. 
Each  venturesome  visit  breathed  fresh  courage  into  the 
garrison,  and  spread  fresh  despondency  in  the  blockading 
fleet,  while  it  enabled  the  Rhodian  to  communicate  to  the 
Carthaginian  government  the  wants  and  wishes  of  their 
beleaguered  subjects.  The  Romans  tried  to  block  up  the 
entrance  to  the  harbour  by  sinking  ships  filled  with  stones  in 
its  narrowest  part ;  but  the  depth  of  the  sea  and  the  violence 
of  the  current,  helped  by  opportune  tempests,  carried  them 
away  and  opened  the  passage  again.  It  seemed  that  the  sea 
was  never  going  to  desert  its  favourites,  when,  in  an  unlucky 
moment,  a  Carthaginian  quadrireme  ran  ashore  upon  a  part 
of  the  mole  which  the  Romans  had  just  sunk,  and  fell  into 
their  hands.     They  immediately  manned  it  with  their  own 


J  Zonaras,  viii.  15. 


«  Polyb.  i.  42,  43. 


1  Polyb.  i.  44. 


»  Polyb.  i.  46,  1 ;  cf.  Diod.  xxiv.  Fr.  1. 


I 


126 


CARTHAGE  AND  THE  CARTHAGINIANS. 


men  and  lay  m  wait  for  the  return  of  the  Ehodian.  He  had 
run  the  blockade  once  too  often ;  and  in  trying  to  force  his 
way  out  he  was  followed  by  a  vessel  whose  speed  and  build 
convmced  h.m  that  she  must  be  of  Carthaginian  workman- 
ship, though  the  rowers  who  propelled  her  were  clearly 
Bomans  Fmdmg  that  he  could  not  escape  by  flight  he 
turned  boldly  round  and  charged  the  enemy'  But  a  tireme 
had  no  chance  agamst  a  quadrireme:  it  was  taken  prisoner 

It^Ah  r'r."'  ^^'"^''"'■'  "'''^^  henceforward  formed 
part  of  the  blockadmg  squadron  of  the  very  fortress  which  it 
nad  done  so  much  to  relieve.' 

MeanwhUe  Himilco.  the 'commander  in  Lilyb«um,  en- 
couraged  by  the  supplies  and  reinforcements  he  had  received 
as  weU  as  by  the  inactivity  and  cowardice  of  the  Eoman  gulS 
sh^s.  determmed  to  sally  out  in  force  at  the  head  of  twenty 
thousand  men.  m  hopes  of  destroying  the  Eoman  mUitary 
engmes  After  a  desperate  hand-to-hand  conflict,  and  much 
lo  s  of  bfe  on  both  sides,  he  was  driven  back.»  But  a  second 
aUempt  proved  more  successful.  Taking  advantage  of  a 
violent  wmd,  he  set  fire  in  three  places  to  the  Koman  Lgines 

Tarl^edTrfl''"  'T  """'  ^^^''^'^'^  *°  '''^  «-•     TheTnd 
earned  the  flames  from  one  to  the  other,  and  consumed  the 

rams.     The  Eomans  found  that  aU  the  labour  hitherto  el 

SrLnH  V  i°  T'"'*-  """  ''^g«  •''*°  *  blockade.' 

The  condition  of  the  blockading  army  was  not  an  enviable 

one     A  plague  had  broken  out  in  their  camp,  occasioned 

"^r  want     K  "f  n'^  *'""'''^'  P""y  "^y  *b«  wantXrS 
-a  want  which  all  the  efforts  of  their  zealous  ally,  Hiero  of 

Syracuse,  could  not  meet.    The  Eomans  were  ordin^^ily  ve^e 

m  r*  T^'^"  "'""'"°'  ^"PP^y  °f  '»«'''  which  they  t 
tiU  very  late^  received  from  the  Sicilian  flocks  and  herd^ 
had  not  mended  matters.     They  lost  from  this  cause,  as  weli 


Polyb.  i.  46,  47. 
»l»olyb.  I  48  ;  Zonaras,  viii  16. 


-'Ibid.  i.  45. 
*Diod.  xxiv.  Fr.  1. 


THE  CONSUL  CLAUDIUS. 


127 


as  other  incidents  of  the  war,  within  a  few  days,  if  Diodorus 
Siculus  may  be  believed,  not  less  than  ten  thousand  men ;  and 
now,  to  complete  the  tale  of  their  misfortunes,  P.  Claudius  was 
sent  out  to  take  the  command  (b.c.  249),  a  man  who  proved  to 
be  as  incompetent  as  he  was  arrogant,  and  who  mistook,  if  our 
accounts  do  not  do  him  injustice,  severity  for  discipline,  vio- 
lence for  strength,  and  childish  weakness  for  manly  courage. 

Despising  alike  the  consuls  who  had  preceded  him  and 
the  officers  who  served  under  him,  the  new  consul  first 
renewed  the  attempt  to  block  up  the  mouth  of  the  harbour, 
as  though  a  Claudius  must  succeed  where  others  had  failed ; 
and  when  the  waves  showed  that  they  had  no  more  respect 
for  patrician  than  for  plebeian  blood,  as  though  the  siege  of 
Lilybffium  was  not  enough  to  occupy  his  energies,  he  deter- 
mined to  attack  Drepanum,  fifteen  miles  away,  in  hopes  of 
taking  Adherbal  and  his  fleet  there  by  surprised  His 
generals  remonstrated,  and  the  sacred  chickens— so  the 
augurs  reported— refused  to  eat.  "If  they  will  not  eat, 
they  shall  drink,"  said  he,  and  ordered  them  to  be  flung  into 
the  sea.2  It  is  possible  that  this  story  may  have  been  in- 
vented to  account  for  the  calamity  that  followed ;  but  the  words 
attributed  to  Publius  have  a  genuine  Claudian  ring  about  them. 
Neither  gods  nor  men  should  stay  a  Claudius  from  his  purpose ! 
The  generals  were  browbeaten  into  compliance.  Ten  thousand 
troops  had  just  arrived  from  Rome ;  Claudius  put  the  best 
of  them  on  board  his  vessels  to  serve  as  marines,  and  there  was 
no  lack  of  volunteers  for  the  enterprise,  not  probably  because 
they  trusted  the  abilities  of  the  consul,  but  because  anything 
seemed  better  than  a  blockade  which  was  no  blockade  at  all. 

The  fleet  set  out  at  midnight,  and  by  daybreak  its  fore- 
most ship  had  reached  the  entrance  of  the  harbour  of  Dre- 
panum. The  surprise  was  complete.  Adherbal,  knowing 
well  how  hard  pressed  the  Romans  were  at  Lilybaeum,  ig- 
norant that  they  had  been  reinforced,  and  ignorant  also  of 

1  Polyb.  i.  49  ;  Diod.  xxiv.  Frag.  2. 

« Cicero,  De  Nat.  Deorum,  ii.  3 ;  Livy,  MpU.  xix. ;  Florus,  ii.  2.  29. 


I 


128 


CARTHAGE  AND  THE  CARTHAGINIANS. 


DEFEAT  OF  THE  ROMANS. 


129 


the  chaoracter  of  the  new  consul,  had  never  dreamed  that 
they  would   molest  him   at  Drepanum.      He   who  would 
attempt  it  must  be  either  a  fool  or  a  military  genius,  and 
Eome,  in  this  war  at  all  events,  had  not  been  fertile  of 
either.     A  respectable  mediocrity   had   hitherto   been   the 
order  of  the  day  alike  among  the  Romans  and  the  Cartha- 
ginians.     But  Adherbal  was  not  disconcerted.     Determined 
not  to  be  besieged,  like  Himilco  at  Lilybaeum,  he  set  his 
rowers  to  their  work,  and  summoning  by  the  sound  of  the 
trumpet  the   mercenaries  from  the  city  to  the  beach,  he 
addressed  them  in  a  few  stirring  words,  and  then  distributing 
them  over  his  ships,  he  led  the  way  in  his  own  ship  out  o*f 
one  side  of  the  sickle-shaped  harbour  of  Drepanum,  while 
Claudius  was  still  hovering  near  the  entrance  of  the  other.  1 
Surprised  at  this,  and  fearing  now  in  his  turn  to  be  enclosed 
between  a  hostile  navy  and  a  hostile  town,  Claudius  turned 
round,   hoping  to   make  his  way  out   of  the   harbour   by 
the   way  he   had   entered  it.      But   the   signal  could   not 
reach  the  whole  of  the  long  column  round  the  headland  at 
once,  and  it  was  with  difl5culty  that  the  consul  got  all  his 
ships  out  of  the  trap  into  which  he  had  drawn  them,  and 
arranged  them  in  line  of  battle  close  along  the  coast,  their 
prows  pointing  towards  the  fleet  of  Adherbal,  which  was 
abready  in  line,  and  ready,  with  superior  forces,  to  bear  down 
upon  them.     In  the  battle  which  ensued  we  hear  nothing 
of  the  Ravens  of  Duillius.     When  the  ships  did  close  with 
one  another  there  was  hard  and  free  fighting,  for  the  decks 
carried  the  pick  of  either  army ;  but  in  every  other  respect— 
the  build,  the  number,  and  the  speed  of  their  ships,  the 

experience  of  their  rowers,  and  the  space  for  manoeuvring 

the  advantage  was  with  the  Carthaginians.  The  Roman  ships, 
when  hard  pressed,  could  not  retire  behind  the  line,  for  there 
was  no  room  left  between  it  and  the  shore ;  and  for  the  same 
reason  they  could  not  give  help  to  one  another  in  their  distress 
The  consul,  as  he  was  the  first  to  fall  into  the  trap,  so  was  he 

1  Polyb.  l  49. 


first  to  wriggle  out  of  it.  He  took  to  flight,  and  his  example 
was  followed  by  the  thirty  ships  nearest  to  him.  It  was  well, 
perhaps,  that  he  did  so ;  for  the  whole  of  the  remainder,  ninety- 
three  in  number,  fell  into  the  hands  of  the  Carthaginians, 
who,  it  is  said,  did  not  lose  a  single  vessel. ^ 

Whether  Publius  cared  aught  for  the  lives  he  had  thus 
thrown  away  we  are  not  told ;  but  probably  his  sister,  some 
years  afterwards,  expressed  with  tolerable  accuracy  the 
family  feeling  for  the  loss  of  the  mere  rabble  of  the  fleet. 
She  was  taking  part  as  a  Vestal  Virgin  in  a  procession,  and 
when  the  crowd  pressed  upon  her  more  closely  than  she 
liked,  she  was  heard  to  exclaim  that  she  wished  her  brother 
were  alive  to  get  rid  of  some  more  of  them  at  sea. 2  Loud 
must  have  been  the  curses  of  the  Roman  army  at  Lilybaeum 
when  the  consul  brought  back  the  news  of  his  own  defeat 
and  flight;  and  deep  certainly  was  the  resentment  of  the 
Roman  Senate  at  his  reckless  incapacity.  He  was  recalled ; 
and  being  ordered  to  nominate  a  Dictator  in  his  stead, 
ho  named,  with  true  Claudian  efi&rontery,  a  freedman  of  his 
family,  M.  Claudius  Glycia;  but  he  was  shortly  after  put 
on  his  trial,  and  met  with  the  punishment  which  he  deserved.^ 

The  blockade  of  Lilybaeum,  such  as  it  was,  was,  for  the  time, 
practically  at  an  end,  and  the  Romans  were  more  anxious  to 
keep  the  troops  who  were  already  there  from  starving  than  to 
supplement  their  number  or  to  make  the  blockade  effective. 
A  fleet  of  eight  hundred  merchant  vessels,  laden  with  supplies 
of  every  kind,  and  convoyed  by  one  hundred  and  twenty  ships 
of  war,  was  despatched  from  Rome,  and  reached  Syracuse  in 
safety.  Anxious  to  take  on  board  the  provisions  offered  him  by 
the  ever-zealous  Hiero,  the  consul,  L.  Junius  Pullus,  lingered 
awhile  at  Syracuse  with  half  his  fleet,  while  he  sent  forward 
the  other  half  towards  their  destination.*  Why  the  Romans, 
with  their  bitter  experience  of  the  dangers  of  the  sea,  did  not 
attempt  to  forward  the  provisions  by  land,  with  Hiero's  help. 


1  Polyb.  i.  50,  51. 
»  Polyb.  i.  2,2. 


2Livy,  A>t7.  xix.  ;  Aulus  Gellius,  x.  6. 
*  Polyb.  i.  52,  4  ;  53,  4-8. 


130 


CARTHAGE  AND  THE  CARTHAGINIANS, 


MOUNT  ERYX. 


131 


we  may  well  wonder.    Perhaps  the  Nuraidian  cavalry,  who 
had  been  set  free  from  Lilybaeura,  were  too  formidable. 

But  the  Carthaginians  were  on  the  look-out  for  them. 
Abherbal,  admiral  at  Drepanum,  was  determined  to  push 
his  victory  to  the  utmost.  After  sending  as  trophies  to 
Carthage  the  ships  which  he  had  taken,  he  despatched  his 
vice-admiral  Carthalo  first  to  LilybsBum,  to  attack  the  re- 
mainder of  the  Roman  fleet  which  had  taken  refuge  there, 
and  thence  to  Heraclea,  to  await  the  arrival  of  the  provision 
ships.  The  advanced  portion  of  the  Roman  convoy,  hearing 
of  the  approach  of  Carthalo,  and  unable  to  offer  battle  or  to 
take  to  flight,  ran  into  the  nearest  roadstead  on  that  inhospit- 
able coast,  and  protected  themselves,  as  best  they  could,  by 
the  military  engines  planted  on  the  cliffs  above.  Carthalo,  not 
caring  to  run  unnecessary  risk,  and  content  to  bide  his  time, 
kept  watch  at  the  mouth  of  a  river  hard  by  till  they  should  bo 
obliged  to  move.  Meanwhile  the  other  portion  of  the  Roman  fleet 
had  left  Syracuse,  had  rounded  Pachynus,  and  were  sailing 
quietly  along  the  coast  in  ignorance  of  the  close  proximity  of 
their  own  and  of  the  enemies*  ships.  To  prevent  the  junction  of 
the  two  fleets  Carthalo  advanced  to  meet  them,  and  they,  too, 
knowing  their  weakness,  made  for  the  nearest  shore,  a  spot 
which,  unfortunately  for  them,  had  neither  harbour  nor  road- 
stead, and  was  exposed  to  every  wind  that  blew.  Carthalo,  sure 
of  his  game,  now  lay-to  in  the  offing,  half  way  between  them, 
pinning  with  his  small  fleet  the  two  much  larger  ones  to  the 
shore ;  but  the  weather-wise  Carthaginian  pilots  saw  the  signs 
of  a  coming  storm,  and  warned  the  admiral,  while  there  was  yet 
time,  to  make  for  shelter.  He  sailed  round  Pachynus  eastward 
and  was  in  calm  water,  leaving  the  storm  to  take  care  of  the 
Romans.  And  the  storm  did  take  care  of  them.  Some  of  the 
crews,  indeed,  escaped  to  land,  but  the  eight  hundred  ships 
were  broken  into  fragments,  "  not  a  plank  of  them  remaining," 
says  Polybius,  **  which  could  be  used  again,"  and  for  miles 
along  the  coast  the  hungry  foam  was  discoloured  by  the  corn 
intended  for  the  famishing  Roman  army  before  LilybsBum.^ 

1  Polyb.  i.  63,  64  ;  Diod.  xxiv.  Frag.  1. 


When  this  sad  news  reached  Rome — the  destruction  of  a 
third  fleet  by  the  waves  and  the  undisputed  mastery  of  the  sea 
won  back  by  the  Carthaginians  in  the  fifteenth  year  of  the  war 
(B.C.  249)— there  were  symptoms  of  despondency  even  in  the 
Roman  Senate ;  but  the  consul  Junius  was  among  those  who 
had  escaped  from  the  wreck,  and  he  made  his  way  to  Lily- 
baBum,  burning  by  some  signal  achievement  to  wipe  out  the 
blame  which  he  felt  might  be  thrown  upon  him.^  Nor  was  he 
disappointed.  A  few  miles  to  the  north  of  Drepanum,  between 
it  and  Panormus,  and  standing  back  a  little  from  the  coast, 
rises  a  mountain  then  called  Eryx,  and  now  known  by  the 
name  of  St.  Giuliano.  It  stands  by  itself,  and  rising  to  a 
height  of  some  two  thousand  feet  in  solitary  grandeur,  is  so  im- 
posing an  object  that  ancient  geographers  and  historians  men- 
tion it  in  the  same  breath  as  iEtna,  which  is  really  four  times 
its  height.2  Right  on  its  summit  stood  a  temple  of  immemorial 
antiquity,  dedicated  to  Venus,  and  celebrated  for  the  wealth 
which  it  had  amassed  and  had  managed  to  retain  amidst  the 
vicissitudes  of  all  the  conflicts  that  had  raged  around  it.  It 
had  been  taken  and  retaken  many  times  in  the  long  contest 
between  Dionysius  of  Syracuse  and  Carthage,  and  more  re- 
cently it  had  fallen  before  the  assault  of  Pyrrhus ;  but,  revered 
alike  by  Sicilians  and  Phoenicians,  by  Greeks  and  Romans,  it 
had  escaped  plunder  even  at  the  hands  of  the  adventurous 
prince  who  did  not  spare  the  wealthy  sanctuary  of  Proserpine  at 
Locri.^  Half-way  up  the  mountain  was  a  city  which  was  not 
so  proof  against  all  the  storms  that  blew  as  was  the  temple  on  its 
top,  for  it  had  been  partially  destroyed  by  the  Carthaginians 
in  this  war,  and  its  inhabitants  transferred  to  Drepanum ;  * 
but  heaps  of  its  buildings  must  have  still  remained,  and  it 
was  evidently  still  an  important  position  for  defence.     Of  this 

1  Polyb.  i.  55,  1-6 ;  Zonaras,  viii.  16. 

2  Polyb.  i.  65,  7;  cf.  Virg.  .£n.  lii.  701,  "Quantus  Athos  ant  qiiantus 
Eryx  ". 

»  Plutarch,  Pyrrhus,  22;   Appian,  Sam.  12. 
*  Diod.  xxiii.  Frag.  9 ;   Zonaras,  viiL  16. 


ija 


CARTHAGE  AND  THE  CARTHAGINIANS, 


MAMILCAk  BAkCA. 


133 


i 


natural  stronghold — mountain,  fallen  city,  and  temple — one  ol 
the  only  three  strongholds  that  still  remained  to  the  Cartha- 
ginians in  Sicily,  the  consul  Junius  managed  to  get  possession 
by  a  sudden  attack,  and  held  it  firmly  against  any  similar 
surprise  from  the  enemy  in  the  closely  adjoining  Drepanum.' 
Such  was  the  general  condition  of  affairs  (b.c.  247)  when 
the  great  Hamilcar,  "the  man  whom  Melcarth  protects," 
appeared  upon  the  scene,  and,  young  as  he  was,  almost  a 
boy, 2  threw  into  the  war  an  energy  and  an  ability  which, 
if  only  it  had  been  employed  before,  or,  if  only  it  had 
been  adequately  supported  even  now  by  Carthage,  would 
probably  have  changed  the  issue  of  the  First  Punic  War. 
Hamilcar  Barca  was  the  head  of  the  great  family  named 
after  him  the  Barcine — the  word  Barca  is  the  same  as  the 
Hebrew  Barak — and  well  did  Hamilcar  justify  the  name 
which  succeeding  ages  have  always  coupled  with  his  and 
with  his  alone  of  his  family,  by  the  "lightning"  rapidity 
with  which,  in  this  the  sixteenth  year  of  the  war,  he  would 
now  sweep  the  Italian  coast  with  his  privateers,  now  swoop 
down  and  carry  off  a  Roman  outpost,  and  anon  would  seize 
a  stronghold,  which  the  terror  of  his  name  alone  rendered 
impregnable,  under  the  very  eyes  of  an  opposing  army. 
Equally  great  as  an  admiral  and  a  general,  after  ravaging 
the  Roman  coasts  from  Locri  to  Cumae,  he  landed  suddenly 
in  the  neighbourhood  of  Panormus,  and  seized  the  com- 
manding elevation  called  Ercte,  now  Monte  Pellegrino.  This 
hill,  like  Eryx,  rises  to  a  height  of  about  two  thousand  feet, 
but,  unlike  it,  on  two  of  its  sides  rises  sheer  from  the  sea ;  a 
third  side  rises  equally  perpendicular  from  the  plain,  while 
on  the  fourth  alone,  which  directly  faces  Panormus,  at  a 
distance  of  a  mile  and  a  half,  is  the  plateau  at  all  accessible. 
This  stronghold  Hamilcar  seized,  and  this  he  held  for  three 
years  in  sight  of  the  Roman  garrison  at  Panormus,  and  in 
the  near  view  of  a  fortified  camp  placed  almost  at  its  base,  in 

1  Polyb.  i.  55,  9.  10 ;  Diod.  xxiv.  Frag.  1. 

•Corn.  Nepos,  Hamilcar,  i.  ;    "admodom  adolescentulus "• 


spite  of  all  the  efforts  of  the  Romans  to  dislodge  him,  and, 
when  he  left  it,  he  left  it  only  of  his  own  free  will  to  occupy 
a  similar, though  a  less  advantageous,  position  elsewhere.^ 

The  place  was  admirably  adapted  for  his  purpose.  At  its 
base  was  a  little  cove  into  which  his  light  ships  might  run 
laden  with  the  spoils  of  Italian  or  Sicilian  towns,  accessible 
from  the  high  ground  occupied  by  his  troops,  but  not  accessible 
from  any  place  on  shore.  There  was  an  abundant  spring 
of  water  on  the  very  summit,  and  above  the  precipitous  cliffs 
that  under-pinned  the  mountain  was  a  broad  plateau  which 
in  that  delicious  climate  Hamilcar  found  that,  even  at  such 
an  elevation,  he  could  cultivate  with  success.  A  rounded  top 
which  crowned  the  whole  was  a  post  of  observation  command- 
ing the  country  round,  and,  in  case  of  need,  would  serve  as  an 
acropolis,  where  no  one  of  the  defenders  need  die  unavenged.^ 

But  neither  the  success  of  the  consul  Junius  at  Eryx,  nor 
the  presence  of  a  master  spirit  among  the  enemies— which 
the  Romans  could  not  fail  to  see — could  now  rouse  the 
Senate  to  take  the  active  measures  which  the  times  re- 
quired. The  drain  upon  the  resources  of  the  State  had 
been  too  enormous.  The  muster-roll  of  the  citizens  had 
fallen  in  the  last  five  years  from  297,000  to  251,000— a 
sixth  part  of  the  whole.^  The  As,  the  unit  value  among 
the  Romans,  which  had  originally  weighed  twelve  ounces 
of  copper,  had  now  fallen,  as  Phny  tells  us,  to  two  ounces, 
to  one-sixth,  that  is,  of  its  former  value.**  The  State  was 
bankrupt,  and  the  Senate  could  neither  make  up  their  minds 
to  withdraw  altogether  from  the  war,  nor  yet  to  prosecute 
it  with  the  necessary  vigour.  They  still  made  believe  to 
continue  the  blockade  of  Lilybasum ;  but  the  seas  were  open 
to  the  Carthaginians,  and  every  one  knew  that  as  long  as 
the  seas  were  open  to  them  they  might  laugh  at  all  the 
efforts  of  the  Roman  armies. 

Nor  were  the  Carthaginians  on  their  part  more  self-sacri- 


1  Polyb.  i.  66,  1,  2. 
*Livy,  Epit.  xviii.  and  xix. 


2  Ibid.  i.  56,  4-10. 

*  Pliny,  JJist.  Nat.  xxxiii.  13. 


134 


CARTHAGE  AND  THE  CARTHAGINIANS. 


ficing  or  more  far-sighted.  Finding  that  the  Romans  had 
retired  from  the  sea— not  to  save  the  blood  of  their  citizens, 
for  that  they  rarely  risked,  nor  yet  to  save  the  blood  of 
their  mercenaries,  for  that  they  cared  not  for,  but  to  save 
their  gold,  of  which  there  must  still  have  been  a  large 
supply,  if  not  in  the  treasury,  at  all  events  in  the  pockets 
of  the  ruling  citizens— they  cut  down  their  navy  by  a 
wretched  economy  to  the  narrowest  possible  dimensions, 
and  were  quite  content,  if  only  they  could  supply  with  food 
their  heroic  garrisons  at  Lilybaeum  and  at  Drepanum,  not  to 
make  an  effort  to  reconquer  any  of  the  places  which  had  so 
recently  belonged  to  them.  Having  lighted  at  last  upon  an 
able  general,  they  would  not,  indeed,  interfere  with  his  making 
the  best  use  he  could  of  the  small  band  of  mercenaries  whom 
they  had  given  him  at  so  much  a  head,  and  so  far  as 
they  were  concerned,  he  might  utilise  his  few  ships  to  collect 
supplies ;  but  not  to  them  must  he  look  henceforward  for 
more  ships  or  men.  The  war,  or  his  part  of  the  war  at  all 
events,  must  henceforward  support  itself.  If  Hamilcar,  they 
argued,  was  successful  in  his  venturous  enterprises,  so  much 
the  better  for  them ;  if  unsuccessful,  he  and  not  they  lost. 

Hence  the  five  or  six  long  and  listless  years  of  war  which 
followed  the  appointment  of  Hamilcar ;  discreditable  enough 
to  the  governments  of  the  contending  states,  but  redounding 
to  the  honour  of  that  one  heroic  soul  who,  learning  from 
the  past  the  lesson  which  no  Carthaginian  general  had  yet 
been  able  to  learn,  applied  it  to  the  exigencies  of  the  moment, 
with  a  patience,  a  perseverance,  and  an  energy  which  seemed 
more  than  human ;  and  conscious  all  the  time,  as  it  would 
seem,  that  his  efforts  were,  for  the  present  at  least,  fore- 
doomed to  failure,  was  yet  content  to  sacrifice  himself  if 
only  he  might  prepare  the  way  for  vengeance  in  the  re- 
moter future.  What  mattered  it  if  Sicily  were  to  be  lost  ?  A 
greater  Sicily  might  be  found  beyond  the  seas  in  Spain;  a 
new  world  might  be  called  into  existence  to  redress  the 
balance  of  the  old.      In  that  great  coming  struggle  Africa 


PLANS  OF  HAMILCAR, 


«35 


should  turn  back  the  tide  of  aggression  upon  Europe,  and 
Rome,  not  Carthage,  should  tremble  for  her  safety.  Hamil- 
car Barca  was  not  far  wrong.  The  genius  of  the  son  carried 
out  what  the  father  had  planned  and  had  prepared.  The 
army  of  Hannibal,  welded  by  the  spark  of  his  genius  out 
of  the  most  unpromising  materials  into  one  homogeneous 
and  indissoluble  whole,  was  the  legitimate  counterpart  of  the 
small  band  of  mercenaries  trained  so  painfully  by  Hamilcar. 
The  ultimate  result  of  Hamilcar's  patient  struggles  on  Mount 
Ercte  was  the  victorious  march  of  Hannibal  on  Rome. 

But  we  must  explain  a  little.     Hamilcar  saw  that  the 
real  defect  under  which  the  Carthaginians  had  laboured  all 
along  had  been  the  want  of  a  trustworthy  infantry.     Their 
cavalry  was  excellent ;  their  elephants  more  than  once  had 
borne  down  all  before  them  ;   their  ships  had  been  beaten, 
not  by  skill  but  by  brute  force.     But  as  long  as  they  were 
without  a  body  of  infantry  who,  man  for  man,  could  stand 
up  against  the  Roman  legionaries,  so  long  it  was  impossible 
that  they  could  beat  their  enemies.     The  mercenaries  who 
formed  the  bulk  of  the  Carthaginian  armies  had  sold  their 
services  to  Carthage  for  gold.      What  wonder  if  they  trans- 
ferred their  services  at  the  critical  moment  to  those  who 
would   appraise  them   more  highly?      What   wonder  that 
LilybfiDum  had  been  all  but  betrayed,  and  that  the  temple 
of  Eryx  itself  was  on  the  point  of  being  seized  by  Gallic 
deserters  from  the   Carthaginian   army?      To  the  task   of 
remedying  these  defects  Hamilcar  addressed  himself  with 
a  patience  and  a  self-restraint  which  is  the  more  surprising 
the  more  conscious  he  must  have  been  of  his  own  super- 
lative talents  for  aggressive  war  upon  a  mighty  scale.      By 
enforcing  strict  discipline  at  any  price ;   by  never  fighting  a 
battle,  and  therefore  never  risking  a  defeat ;  by  maintaining  a 
daily  and  hourly  warfare  with  the  Roman  outposts,  he  gradu- 
ally trained  his  troops  to  face  the  terrors  of  the  Roman  presence, 
as  the  Romans  on  their  part  had  at  last  trained  themselves  to 
face  the  terrors  of  the  elephants.  Knowing  that  he  could  expect 


136 


CARTHAGE  AND  THE  CARTHAGInIANS. 


HAMILCAk  OCCUPIES  ERYX, 


ni 


no  efficient  aid  from  Carthage,  he  determined,  if  possible, 
to  save  her  in  spite  of  herself.  To  attach  the  mercenaries  to 
Carthage  by  ties  of  gratitude  or  respect  or  patriotism  was  impos- 
sible ;  but  it  might  not  be  impossible  to  attach  them  to  himself 
by  that  close  tie  which  always  binds  soldiers  to  a  general  whom 
they  can  alike  fear  and  trust  and  love,  and  then  to  utilise  that 
attachment  not  for  his  own  but  for  his  country's  good. 

How  nobly  Hamilcar  carried  out  his  resolve  every  action 
of  his  life  proves.     Day  after  day  he  would  sally  from  his 
mountain  fastness,  like  a  lion  from  its  den,  on  the  fair  plains 
of  Sicily.     Unobserved  or  unattacked  he  would  pass  by  the 
Roman  camp  placed  at  the  foot  of  the  mountain,  and  return 
with  the  supplies  necessary  to  keep  his  small  force  from 
starving.     Once  we  hear  of  him  even  at  Catana,  on  the  east 
coast  of  the  island.^     His  galleys,  in  the  same  way,  would 
harry  or  alarm  the  coast  of  Italy  even  as  far  as  CumjB. 
Never  was  a  more  harassing  warfare  waged,  and  yet  there  is 
little  to  record.     Polybius  remarks,  that  it  is  as  impossible 
for  the  historian  to  do  more  than  state  these  general  facts, 
as  it  is  for  the  spectator  at  a  prize-fight  either  to  see  or  to 
describe   the  blows  rained   by  practised   pugilists   on   one 
another  when  the  contest  is  nearing  its  end.     They  know, 
perhaps,  the  strength  and  the  skiU  of  the  combatants ;  they 
hear  the  heavy  thud,  and  they  see  the  lightning  lunge ';  they 
note  the  result,  but  they  cannot  accurately  observe  or  re- 
count the  process.     So  was  it  with  Hamilcar;   and  yet  it 
must  be  remembered  that  the  struggle  was  hardly  at  present 
a  Hfe  and  death  struggle,  for  the  Romans  seem  never  to 
have  tried    seriously  to   beard   the  lion   in   his  den,   and 
Hamilcar,  with  his  handful  of  troops,  can  hardly  have  hoped 
to  raise  the  siege  of  Lilybaeum.     At  most  he  might  distract 
the  attention  of  the  Romans  and  impede  their  progress. 

So  things  might  have  gone  on  for  ever,  when  Hamilcar 
(B.C.  244)  surprised  even  the  Romans— though  by  this  time 

1  Diod.  xxiv.  Frag.  2. 


they  could  hardly  have  been  surprised  at  anything  Hamilcar 
did — by  voluntarily  abandoning  the  stronghold  endeared  to 
him  by  three  years  of  hair-breadth  escapes  and  romantic  ad- 
ventures, and  attacking  Mount  Eryx,  a  stronghold  which  lay 
nearer  indeed  to  the  beleaguered  Carthaginian  cities  of  Dre- 
panum  and  LilybaBum,  but  in  all  other  respects  was  less 
advantageous,  and  at  that  very  time  was  held  in  force  by  the 
Romans.  He  managed  to  dislodge  the  garrison  from  the 
ruined  city  half-way  up  the  mountain,  but  he  failed  in  all  his 
efforts  to  take  the  temple  on  the  summit,  occupied  as  it  then 
was  by  a  band  of  Gallic  deserters  who  had  been  taken  into  then- 
pay  by  the  Romans,  and  who,  since  they  carried  their  lives 
in  their  hands,  were  prepared  to  sell  them  as  dearly  as  pos- 
sible.^ Here  then,  once  more,  was  Hamilcar  on  an  isolated 
hill,  two  miles  from  the  coast,  and  therefore  beyond  the  reach 
of  immediate  succours  from  his  galleys,  with  a  band  of  despe- 
rate enemies  above  him,  and  a  Roman  army  encamped  below  I 
Well  might  it  seem  that  a  single  strenuous  effort  on  the  part  of 
the  Romans  might  bring  Hamilcar  to  his  knees,  or  that  at  all 
events  he  might  be  starved  into  a  surrender.  But  this  was  not 
to  be.  Fortwo  more  years  did  Hamilcar  hold  out  in  this  most 
impossible  of  situations,  fighting,  says  Polybius,  like  a  royal 
eagle,  which,  grappling  with  another  eagle  as  noble  as  himself, 
stops  only  to  take  breath  from  sheer  exhaustion,  or  to  gather 
fresh  strength  for  the  next  attack.^  The  war  was  fought  out 
elsewhere,  and  its  issue  was  decided  by  men  of  other  mould 
and  making  than  the  royal  soul  of  Hamilcar. 

What  the  Romans  thought  of  the  general  who  had  so  long 
baffled  all  their  efforts  in  the  war  which  was  now  drawing  to 
its  conclusion,  and  who  was  to  spend  the  rest  of  his  life  in 
preparing  for  a  still  greater  war,  is  clear  enough  from  their 
acts;  but  hardly  anywhere  is  it  stated  in  so  many  words. 
It  is  strange  that,  playing,  as  Hamilcar  did,  so  large  a  part 
in  one  of  the  most  stirring  periods  of  Roman  history,  he  is 

1  Pol>  b.  i.  ItS,  2,  3  :  Diotl.  xxiv.  Frag.  2 ;  Zonaras,  viii.  16. 
«Polyb.  L  58.  G-9. 


n 


I 


»38 


CARTHAGE  AND  THE  CARTHAGINIANS, 


hardly  ever  alluded  to  in  their  literature.  It  would  be  difficult 
to  imagine  any  one  whose  character  and  exploits  would  be  a 
fitter  subject  for  poetry ;  yet  not  one  of  the  great  poets  of 
the  Augustan  age  mentions  so  much  as  his  name.  Cicero,  in 
the  whole  of  his  voluminous  writings,  refers  to  him  once 
only,  and  then  it  is  to  attribute  to  him  something  which 
belongs  not  to  him  but  to  his  much  older  namesake,  the 
defender  of  Panormus.^  Cornelius  Nepos  devotes  to  him 
only  one  of  the  most  meagre  of  his  chapters;  and  of  the 
latter  annalists  some,  as  Appian,  speak  only  of  his  rule  in 
Spain,  while  others  pass  him  over  altogether.  If  Livy's 
account  of  the  First  Punic  War  had  been  preserved  to  us,  we 
can  hardly  doubt  that,  following  closely  as  he  did  in  the  foot- 
steps of  Polybius,  he  would  have  fiUed  in  with  brilliancy  the 
admirable  outline  left  us  by  his  master.  But  that  not  even 
so  would  full  justice  have  been  done  to  Hamilcar,  we  may 
perhaps  infer  from  the  fact  that  the  Epitomes  of  the  lost 
books  of  Livy  which  have  come  down  to  us  do  not  even 
mention  his  name  nor  those  of  any  of  the  places  with  which 
he  was  most  connected.  It  is  all  the  more  worth  while, 
therefore,  to  notice  the  fact  that  in  Livy's  account  of  the 
Second  Punic  War  there  are  two  incidental  touches  which 
seem,  almost  in  spite  of  himself,  to  reveal  to  us  the  opinion 
which  he  had  formed  of  the  great  Carthaginian  general.  In 
the  first  passage — which  he  puts  into  the  mouth  of  Hanno, 
the  violent  leader  of  the  anti-Barcine  faction  at  Carthage — 
we  are  told  that  the  Carthaginians  regarded  Hamilcar  "  as  a 
second  god  of  war".*  In  the  second,  he  remarks  parentheti- 
cally, but  with  real  pathos,  when  describing  a  campaign  in 
Spain,  "  this  place  is  rendered  famous  by  tiie  death  of  the 
great  Hamilcar".^ 

It  must  have  long  since  been  apparent  to  the  Roman 
Senate  that  unless  they  could  fit  out  a  fleet  more  efifective 
than  any  that  had  preceded  it,  Drepanum  and  Lilybaeum 

»  acero,  De  Of.  iU.  26.  «  Livy,  xxi.  10 :  "  Mara  alter  ". 

'Ibid.  zxiv.  41. 


EFFORTS  OF  ROMANS. 


m 


might  hold  out  for  ever,  and  that  while  they  held  out  their 
own  hold  on  the  rest  of.  Sicily  must  be  precarious.  They  had 
built  four  fleets  since  the  war  began,  and  all  had  been  utterly 
destroyed ;  with  what  conscience  could  they  now  propose  to 
throw  more  public  money  into  the  gulf,  and  to  commit  them- 
selves to  the  mercies  of  the  hostile  and  insatiable  sea  ?  Even 
if  they  should  decree  a  property  tax,  it  was  doubtful — such 
was  the  general  distress — whether  it  could  be  levied.  But 
where  public  enterprise  failed,  it  should  be  recorded,  to  the 
eternal  credit  of  the  Romans,  that  private  citizens  were 
forthcoming  who  volunteered,  either  singly  or  in  combina- 
tion, to  furnish  ships  of  war  to  make  up  another  fleet.  If 
the  venture  should  prove  successful,  the  State  might  repay 
them,  should  it  like  to  do  so,  at  its  own  time.  If  it  failed,  as 
every  fleet  had  failed  before,  they  would  have  done  nothing 
more  than  their  duty,  and  duty  must  be  its  own  reward.^  A 
good  model  was  found  in  the  Rhodian's  vessel  which  had 
been  captured  ofif  Lilybaeum ;  and,  as  if  to  complete  the  dra- 
matic history  of  this  unlucky  craft,  the  very  trireme  which  had 
performed  such  prodigies  of  speed  and  daring  for  the  Cartha- 
ginians in  the  siege  of  Lilybaeum  was  now  to  reproduce  itself 
in  the  shape  of  200  Roman  vessels,  which  should  raise  the 
siege  of  that  very  town  and  bring  the  war  to  its  conclusion.^ 
The  consul,  C.  Lutatius  Catulus,  took  the  command  of  this 
pre-eminently  patriotic  armament  early  in  the  year  b.c.  242 ; 
and  once  again  Roman  ships  of  war  were  to  be  seen  riding  in 
the  harbours  of  Drepanum  and  Lilybaeum.  Hamilcar  could 
now  no  longer  receive  supplies  by  sea,  and  unless  he  could 
break  out  in  force,  his  surrender  was,  as  it  seemed,  only 
a  question  of  time;  but  the  Carthaginians,  hearing  of  the 
danger,  and  finding  to  their  surprise  that  a  Roman  navy 
was  again  in  Sicilian  waters,  made  for  the  first  time  a  serious 
effort  to  support  him.  For  four  long  years  Hamilcar  had 
borne  the  brunt  of  the  conflict,  without  receiving  supplies  of 


iPolyb.  i.  69,  6.  7. 


•Ibid.  I  69.  a 


1^6 


Carthage  and  The  CAkTHAOtNtANS, 


BATTLE  OF  MGATIAN  ISLES. 


141 


i 


men  or  money  from  home,  and,  now  that  they  were  about  to 
lose  him,  the  Carthaginians  awoke  to  a  consciousness  of  his 
true  value.  But  a  fleet  could  not  be  built  in  a  day,  even  by 
the  Carthaginians ;  and  by  the  time  the  transports — for  they 
were  transports  rather  than  ships  of  war — reached  Sicily, 
Catulus  had,  by  dint  of  constant  training,  transformed  his 
landsmen  into  tolerably  experienced  sailors. ^ 

In  March  of  the  following  year  (b.c.  241),  Hanno,  the  Car- 
thaginian admiral,  made  for  Hiera,  one  of  the  iEgatian  Isles, 
in  hopes  of  being  able  from  thence  to  communicate  with 
Mount  Eryx.  His  plan  was  to  land  his  heavy  cargo  of  corn 
there,  to  take  on  board  instead  the  pick  of  Hamilcar's  men, 
and  above  all  the  great  Hamilcar  himself,  and  then,  and  not 
till  then,  to  fight  a  decisive  action. 2  Catulus  had  already 
selected  the  best  from  among  the  Boman  troops  before 
LilybaBum  to  serve  the  same  purpose  on  board  his  ships; 
and  he  now  made  for  iEgusa,  the  principal  of  the  /Egatian 
Isles,  with  the  intention  of  cutting  ofif  Hanno  from  the  shore, 
and  bringing  on  a  general  action. 

On  the  morning  of  his  intended  attack  a  strong  wind  sprang 
up  from  the  west,  the  very  thing  which  the  Carthaginians 
needed  to  carry  them  rapidly  into  Drepanum.  To  intercept 
them  the  Bomans  would  have  to  contend  against  wind  and 
tide  as  well,  and  from  this  even  the  bravest  mariners  might 
shrink.  Catulus,  or  rather  the  praetor,  Q.  Valerius — for  Ca- 
tulus was  laid  up  by  a  wound — knew  the  odds  against  him, 
and  hesitated  for  a  moment  to  face  the  risk ;  but  reflecting 
that  if  he  did  not  strike  a  blow,^  the  enemy  would  be  able 
to  take  Hamilcar  on  board,  and  that  Hamilcar  was  more 
formidable  than  any  storm,  he  determined  to  close  with  the 
lesser  of  two  dangers.  Down  came  the  Carthaginian  ships, 
heavy  with  their  cargo  of  corn,  but  flying  before  the  wind  with 

1  Polyb.  I  69,  9-12.  « Ibid.  i.  60.  3-5. 

3  Valerius  Maxiinus,  11,  8,  2:  "Consulern  ea  pugna  in  lectic&  claudum 
Jacuiase  ;  .se  autem  omnibus  imperatoriis  partibus  fuuctum".  The  triumph  was 
adjudged  to  the  Consul.     Cf.  Eutropius,  ii.  27. 


all  their  sails  spread,  and  the  rowers  using  their  oars  as  well. 
When  they  saw  the  Bomans  venturing  out  on  such  a  sea  to  in- 
tercept them,  they  struck  sails,  and  prepared  for  action.  But 
the  battle  was  over  almost  as  soon  as  it  began.  After  the  first 
shock,  the  well-made  slightly-built  Boman  ships,  with  their 
practised  crews  and  their  veteran  soldiers,  obtained  an  easy  vic- 
tory over  the  awkward  and  heavily  laden  Carthaginian  vessels, 
with  their  inexperienced  rowers  and  their  raw  recruits.  Fifty 
of  the  Carthaginian  ships  were  sunk  and  seventy  taken,  the  re 
mainder  escaping  with  the  help  of  an  opportune  wind  to  Hiera.^ 

This  great  victory,  the  victory  of  the  Egatian  Isles, 
ended  the  war.  Both  sides  had  played  their  last  card,  and 
the  Carthaginians  had  lost.  Their  spirit  was  not  altogether 
broken  ;  but  it  was  impossible  to  fit  out  a  new  fleet  in  time  to 
relieve  Hamilcar,  and  they  wisely  resolved,  by  utilising  his 
great  name  and  the  indefinite  possibiUties  of  his  future  when 
driven  to  stand  at  bay,  to  obtain  more  favourable  terms  than 
would  otherwise  have  been  offered  them.  We  could  hardly 
wonder  if  Hamilcar  had  declined  the  thankless  duty,  and  had 
left  the  task  of  surrendering  Sicily  to  those  who  far  more  than 
himself  were  responsible  for  it.  But  no  thought  of  self  seems 
ever  to  have  entered  his  great  soul.  For  his  faithful  band  of  fol- 
lowers and  their  honour  he  was  jealous  ;  but  of  his  own  feelings 
of  outraged  pride  and  righteous  indignation  we  hear  nothing. 
He  rejected  with  scorn  the  ungenerous  proposal  of  Catulus 
that  his  troops  should  give  up  their  arms  und  pass  under  the 
yoke  ;  and  it  was  arranged  that  when  peace  should  have  been 
concluded,  they  should  depart  with  aU  ihe  honours  of  war.2 

The  terms  of  peace  were  then  agreed  upon  by  Catulus 
and  Hamilcar,  subject  to  the  subsequent  ratification  by  the 
Boman  people.  The  Carthaginians  were  to  surrender  Sicily 
to  the  Bomans,  and  to  bind  themselves  not  to  wage  war 
on  Hiero  or  his  allies  ;  they  were  to  restore  the  prisoners 
they  had  taken  without  ransom,  and  to  pay  within  the  next 

»  Polyb.  i.  60,  6  and  61  ;  Zonaras,  viii.  17  ;  Florus,  ii.  2,  33-37. 

«  Polyb.  i.  62,  1-6 ;  Corn.  Nepos,  Hamilcar,  L  5 ;  ii.  1 ;  Zonaras,  viii.  17. 


143 


CARTHAGE  AND  THE  CARTHAGINIANS, 


OAINS  AND  LOSSES, 


M3 


I 


twenty  years  a  war  indemnity  of  2200  talents.^  The  Roman 
people  were  not  satisfied  with  these  conditions;  but  the 
plenipotentiaries  who  were  sent  out  to  the  spot  contented 
themselves  with  raising  the  indemnity  by  half  as  much  again, 
while  they  halved  the  time  in  which  it  was  to  be  paid.^  The 
easy  terms  thus  granted — so  far  easier  than  those  demanded 
by  Regulus  fifteen  years  before  in  the  hey-day  of  his  success 
— are  to  be  explained  partly,  no  doubt,  by  the  exhaustion  of 
the  Komans  themselves,  but  partly  also  by  the  dread  they  felt 
as  to  what  Hamilcar  might  still  dare,  if  driven  to  desperation. 
As  such  it  is  the  noblest  homage  paid  by  the  conquerors  to  the 
military  genius  of  the  "  unconquered  general  of  the  conquered 
nation  ".^  Two  individuals,  and  two  only  in  the  whole  course  of 
Roman  history,  seem  by  the  mere  fact  of  their  existence  to 
have  inspired  real  terror  into  the  Roman  heart.  The  one  was 
Hamilcar  Barca,  the  other  his,  perhaps,  still  greater  son. 

So  ended  the  First  Punic  War;  the  longest  war,  says 
Polybius,  the  most  continuous,  and  the  greatest  which  the 
world  had  then  seen ;  *  and  it  may  be  questioned,  even  now, 
whether  there  has  ever  been  a  war  in  which  the  losses  were 
so  frightful,  and  the  immediate  gain  to  either  party  so  small. 
The  Romans  had  indeed  gained  Sicily ;  but  Sicily  with  the 
one  exception  of  the  dominions  of  Hiero,  which  were  still 
to  belong  to  him  and  not  to  the  Romans,  was  then  drained 
of  everything  which  made  it  worth  having.  Its  territories 
had  been  ravaged,  its  population  swept  away,  its  towns  de- 
stroyed one  after  the  other.  Greek  as  well  as  Phoenician 
enterprise  and  civilisation  had  been  almost  blotted  out.  The 
island  has  never  entirely  recovered  its  prosperity.  Its  soil 
is  still  in  great  part  uncultivated.  Its  population  is  one  of 
the  most  degraded  m  Europe.  To  set  against  this  equivo- 
cal gain,  the  Romans  had  lost  seven  hundred  ships  of  the 
line,  containing  not  less  than  seventy  thousand  men,  and 
army  after  army  had  fallen  victims  to  starvation,  to  pestilence 
or  the  sword. 


The  Carthaginians,  on  their  part,  had  lost  five  hundred 
ships  of  war,  but  the  crews  which  manned  them,  and  the 
soldiers  who  formed  the  staple  of  their  armies,  were  such 
as,  in  their  callous  indififerenoe,  they  could  bear  to  part 
with;  for  more  were  to  be  had  for  money  from  their  still 
vast  recruiting  ground.  The  richness  of  their  soil,  and  the 
abundance  of  then:  irrigation,  had  already  repaired  the  injury 
done  by  Regulus.  They  had  been  driven  indeed  from  Sicily ; 
but  had  not  the  Phoenicians  been  driven  before,  in  like 
manner,  from  Crete,  from  Cyprus,  and  from  Asia  Minor? 
What  mattered  it  if,  with  the  enterprise  and  buoyancy  of 
their  race,  they  could  still  found  new  colonies,  and  build 
up  a  new  empire  in  countries  whither  the  Romans  had  never 
penetrated,  and  of  which  they  had  hardly  yet  heard  the 
names  ? 

Everything  portended  an  early  renewal  of  the  conflict  on 
a  more  gigantic  scale.  Rome  by  crossing  the  narrow  straits 
of  Messana  had  entered  on  her  career,  for  good  and  evil, 
of  universal  conquest  and  aggression.  Carthage  was  still 
mistress  of  the  western  half  of  the  Mediterranean,  and  had 
no  intention  of  voluntarily  retiring  from  it.  More  than  this : 
Hamilcar  Barca  was  still  alive — Hamilcar  Barca  with  his 
patience  and  his  genius,  with  his  burning  patriotism  and  his 
thirst  for  revenge ;  above  all,  with  his  infant  son. 


»  Polyb.  i.  62,  7-9. 
3Cf.  Ibid.  iii.  9.  7. 


«Ibid.  i.  63,  1-8. 
Mbid.  i.  63,4. 


'I 


144 


CARTHAGE  AND  THE  CARTHAGINIANS, 


SIGNIFICANCE  OF  MERCENARY  WAR. 


145 


CHAPTER  VIII. 

HAMILCAR   BARCA   AND   THE    MERCENARY    WAR. 

(B.C.    241-238.) 

Events  between  First  and  Second  Punic  War— Significance  of  mercenary  war- 
Weakness  of  Carthaginian  government— Symptoms  of  mutiny— Revolt  of 
mercenaries  and  native  Africans — Hanno  and  Hamilcar  Barca — The  Truce- 
less  War — Its  atrocities  and  termination. 

The  twenty-two  years  which  separated  the  First  from  the 
Second  Punic  War  were  not  years  of  rest  to  either  Rome  or 
Carthage.  The  Carthaginians  had  barely  concluded  peace  when 
they  found  that  they  had  to  face  dangers  far  more  terrible 
and  foes  more  implacable  than  any  they  had  met  with  in  the 
twenty- three  years*  war  from  which  they  had  just  emerged. 

The  Romans,  on  their  part,  busied  themselves  in  or- 
ganising their  newly  conquered  province;  in  appropriating 
to  themselves,  with  shameless  meanness  and  injustice,  the 
island  of  Sardinia,  the  oldest  foreign  possession  of  the  Car- 
thaginians, and  that  which,  next  after  Sicily,  had  been  the 
object  of  her  most  jealous  precautions ;  in  suppressing 
lUyrian  piracy  and  extending  their  northern  frontier  from 
the  Apennines  to  the  Alps.  Let  us  bridge  over  the  interval 
between  the  war  of  Hamilcar  and  the  war  of  Hannibal,  not  by 
describing  these  events  in  detail,  but  by  touching  on  them 
just  so  far  as  they  bring  into  clear  hght  the  dealings  of  either 
nation  with  their  dependencies,  or  as  they  directly  influenced 
the  mightier  struggle  which  was  looming  in  the  distance. 

A  war  with  barbarians  is  seldom  worth  minute  descrip- 
tion, and  this  Libyan  war  is  in  itself  no  exception  to  the 
rule.     Yet  it  deserves  much  more  attention  than  is  usually 


given  to  it ;  first,  because  it  illustrates  forcibly  the  dangers 
to  which  any  state  is  exposed  which  depends  mainly  or 
wholly  on  mercenaries  for  her  protection;  and  secondly, 
because  it  takes  us,  as  it  were,  behind  the  scenes,  and, 
perhaps,  more  than  any  other  portion  of  this  history,  brings 
into  clear  rehef  the  vices  and  the  virtues,  the  strength  and 
the  weakness  of  the  Carthaginian  rule. 

The  great  Hamilcar,  during  his  three  years  of  warfare  at 
Mount  Ercte,  had  managed  to  make  the  war  support  itself ; 
but  during  the  last  two  years  at  Eryx,  when  he  was  cut 
off  from  the  sea,  and  was  hard  pressed  by  enemies  alike  on  the 
peaks  above  and  in  the  plains  below  him,  he  had  found  it 
dif&cult  enough  to  procure  the  bare  necessaries  of  life  for  his 
troops,  and  he  had  been  able  to  pay  them  by  promises,  and 
promises  only.     That  he  was  able  to  keep  his  band  of  fickle 
barbarian  followers  in  so  dangerous  a  position  for  a  couple  of 
years  without  remunerating  them  for  their  services,  and  yet 
without  any  symptom  of  mutiny  or  insubordination  on  their 
part,  is  not  the  least  striking  testimony  to  his  commanding  per 
sonal  qualities.     When  the  war  was  finished,  he  handed  them 
over,  with  spirits  still  unbroken,  to  Gisco,  the  Carthaginian 
commander  at  LilybsBum,  and  to  Gisco  fell  the  disagreeable 
duty  of  transporting  them  to  Africa,  and  of  informing  the  home 
government  of  their  obligations  towards  them.     Gisco  was 
equal  to  the  emergency ;  but  not  so  the  government.     Bjiow- 
ing  the  men,  and  knowing  also  those  with  whom  he  had  to 
deal,  Gisco  arranged  to  send  the  troops  by  detachments,  so 
as  to  give  the  authorities  the  opportunity  of  either  paying 
them  off  separately,  or,  if  that  could  not  be  done,  at  all 
events  of  disarming  and  dispersing  to  their  homes  the  first 
detachment  before  the  second  should  have  set  foot  in  Africa. 
But  the  party  then  in  power  at  Carthage  were  at  once  short- 
sighted and  unscrupulous.     They  neither  paid  the  mercen- 
aries their  arrears  of  pay,  nor  told  them  boldly  that  they 
could  not  do  so.     They  brought  the  first  detachment  into  the 
capital  to  await  the  amval  of  the  others,  and  then,  when 

10 


146 


Carthage  and  the  Carthaginians, 


kEVOLT  OF  MERCENARIES. 


idleness  and  dissipation  had  produced  its  natural  result,  they 
sent  them  to  the  town  of  Sicca,  a  town  noted  for  its  licen- 
tiousness,^ with  their  wives,  their  children,  and  their  baggage ; 
though  these  might  have  been  invaluable  as  securities  for  their 
good  behaviour,  and  though  the  mercenaries  had  themselves 
wished  to  leave  them  behind.  Prolonged  inactivity  at  Sicca 
gave  rise  to  more  serious  disturbances,  and  then,  to  make 
matters  worse,  the  government  sent  to  them  not  Hamilcar,  or 
Gisco  the  soldier's  friend,  but  Hanno,  whom  they  might  well 
consider  the  soldier's  enemy ;  and  that,  not  to  pay  them  off,  but 
to  sue  for  a  remission  of  a  part  of  what  was  due  to  them.^ 

The  malcontent  mercenaries  had  been  drawn  from  all  the 
nations  which  served  as  a  recruiting  ground  to  the  once  rich 
republic.  There  were  to  be  found  amongst  them  Greeks  and 
Iberians,  Libyans  and  Ligurians ;  slingers  from  the  Balearic 
Isles  and  runaway  Greek  slaves.  So  motley  a  gathering — 
each  man  speakings  as  the  Carthaginians,  fearful  of  revolt, 
were  anxious  that  he  should,  his  own  language  only — would  be 
slow  to  apprehend  the  purport  of  any  elaborate  explanations 
which  might  now  at  length  be  offered  them  as  to  the  difficul- 
ties of  their  employers.  But  they  would  not  be  slow  to  un- 
derstand the  upshot  of  the  whole,  that  they  were  not  to 
receive  their  pay,  or  to  catch  up  any  mutinous  expressions, 
such  as  **  Smite  him,  smite  him !  "  which  were  soon  to  be 
heard  with  ominous  frequency  in  their  camp.  "  Let  the 
government  send  them  some  one  who  had  served  in  Sicily,  who 
knew  their  rights  and  wrongs,  and  not  a  Hanno  who  neither 
knew  nor  cared  aught  for  them."*  Things  assumed  a  more 
threatening  aspect.  The  mutineers  to  the  number  of  twenty 
thousand  marched  for  Carthage  and  pitched  their  camp  near 
Tunis ;  and  the  government,  thoroughly  frightened,  began 
to  cringe  when  they  could  no  longer  threaten,  and  sent  out 
provisions  to  be  sold  at  a  nominal  price  in  the  hostile  camp. 
This  only  made  the  mutineers  despise  them  the  more.     New 


147 


II 


^  Valerius  Maximus.  ii.  6,  15. 


«Polyb.  LU6. 


•Ibid.  i.  67. 


promises  and  new  concessions  were  met  by  new  and  more 
exorbitant  demands.  It  was  no  longer  merely  the  arrears 
of  pay,  it  was  the  price  of  the  horses  which  they  said  that 
they  had  lost,  and  the  cost  of  their  maintenance  as  rated  by 
themselves,  which  they  threateningly  demanded.  In  their 
anger  they  began  to  express  distrust  even  of  Hamilcar ;  if  he 
had  not  been  neglectful  of  their  interests,  their  claims  they 
thought  must,  ere  this,  have  been  fully  satisfied.  Gisco, 
who  was  the  favourite  of  the  hour,  was  at  last  sent  to  them 
in  accordance  with  their  demand ;  but  he  was  as  unsuccess- 
ful in  effecting  a  compromise  as  Hanno. ^ 

It  was  too  late.     The  mutiny  had  come  to  a  head.     It  had 
found  leaders  in  Spendius,  a  runaway  Campanian  slave,  in 
Matho,  an  African,  who  had  served  with  distinction  in  Sicily, 
and  in  Autaritus,  a  Gaul.^    Gisco,  who,  in  a  fit  of  impatience 
at  the  insolence  of  their  demands,  had  let  slip  the  wish  that 
the  malcontents  would  lay  their  demands  before  Spendius 
and  not  before  him,  was  taken  at  his  word.     He  was  thrown 
into  chains ;  the  money  he  had  brought  with  him  was  seized, 
and  the  war  began.     Messengers  were  at  once  despatched  by 
Spendius  and  Matho  to  the  peoples  of  Africa  summoning 
them  to  liberty ;  the  joyful  news  spread  from  village  to  village, 
and  was  enthusiastically  responded  to  by  the  natives.     The 
love  of  the  inhabitants  of  the  Barbary  States  for  personal 
ornaments  attracts  the  notice  of  even  the  passing  traveller  in 
Africa  at  the  present  day.     No  woman.  Bedouin  or  Berber, 
is  so  poor  or  her  habitation  so  squalid  that  she  does  not 
carry  on  her  person  earrings  or  ankle  rings,  necklaces  or 
bracelets,  which  are  often  of  fine  workmanship  and  of  intrin- 
sic value.     But  the  Libyan  women  to  whom  Matho's  sum- 
mons came,  and  who  had  seen  their  husbands  or  parents 
torn  from  their  homes  if  they  could  not  pay  the  exorbitant 
tribute  levied  on  them  by  the  Carthaginian  government,  or 
half  ruined  by  it  if  they  could,  were  eager  now  to  sell  their 
trinkets  and  their  jewels,  everything,  in  fact,  which  could 


ipoiyb.  L  ea. 


*  Ibid.  I  69  and  77, 1. 


I4ft 


CARTHAGE  AND  THE  CARTHAGINIANS. 


HANNO  AND  HAMILCAR  BARCA. 


149 


i 


il 


be  turned  into  the  sinews  of  war.'     Men  flowed  in  so  plenti- 
fully that  the  rebel  generals  were  able  at  once  to  begin  the 
siege  of  Utica  and  Hippo  Zarytus,  the  two  places  which, 
alone  of  the  surrounding  African  and  Phoenician  cities,  had 
hitherto  signalised  themselves  by  their  attachment  to  the 
oppressor.*     Money  was  so  abundant  that  Spendius  was 
able  not  only  at  once  to  discharge  all  the  arrears  of  pay  to 
his  troops,  but  also  to  meet  all  the  immediate  expenses  of 
the  war.     The  Carthaginian  government  had  never  yet  been 
in  such  sore  distress.     In  a  moment,  they  had  been  cut  otf 
from  the  rich  districts  which  supplied  them  with  food,  which 
filled  their  treasury  with  money,  and  their  armies  with  their 
best  troops.     They  had  no  ships,  for  their  last  fleet  had  just 
been  destroyed  in  Sicily,  and  they  had  no  independent  allies, 
for  it  was  the  fate  of  Carthage— the  fate,  it  must  be  added, 
she  too  well  deserved — never  to  possess  any.     It  was  use- 
less to  treat  for  peace  with  men  who  were  loaded  with  the 
accumulated  wrongs  of  centuries,  and  were  burning  for  re- 
venge.    The  natives  remembered   the  crucifixion  of  three 
thousand  of  their  countrymen,  the  finale  of  their  partial  and 
unsuccessful  attempt  at  revolt  during  the  invasion  of  Regulus 
a  few  years  before  ;  ^  and  they  were  determined  that  this  re- 
volt should  be  neither  partial  nor  unsuccessful     Bitterly  must 
the  Carthaginians  have  rued  their  cruelty  when  they  reaped 
its  natural  consequences,  when  they  found  that  the  proverb 
"  as  many  slaves,  so  many  enemies,"  was,  in  their  case,  no 
figure  of  rhetoric,  but  the  stem  and  simple  truth. 

Among  the  magistrates  who  had  acquired  the  special  con- 
fidence of  the  governing  clique  at  Carthage  by  the  amount 
of  money  which  they  had  squeezed  out  of  the  subject  com- 
munities, no  one  was  more  conspicuous  than  Hanno,  and 
he  it  was  whom  they  now  selected  for  the  chief  command 
in  the  Libyan  war,  a  sad  omen  of  the  character  which  it  was 
likely  to  assume.     Hanno  was  the  personal  enemy  of  Hamil- 

*  Polyb.  I  ?2,  4.  5.  « Ibid.  i.  70,  9, 

'Appian.  Sic.  Frag.  3. 


car,  and  was  as  incapable  as  he  was  self-confident.  If  he 
won  a  partial  success,  he  failed  to  follow  it  up.  He  forgot 
that  he  was  fighting  no  longer  with  nomadic  tribes,  who  after 
a  reverse  would  fly  for  three  days  without  intermission,  carry- 
ing their  homes  with  them,  but  with  men  led  by  the  veterans 
of  Hamilcar,  who  did  not  know  what  it  was  to  be  defeated, 
who  had  learned  at  Eryx,  says  Polybius,  to  renew  the  com- 
bat three  times  over  in  a  single  day,  and  who  would  feign  a 
retreat  only  that  they  might  charge  again  with  irresistible 
force.'  Deceived  by  some  such  simple  feint  as  this,  the 
incompetent  Hanno,  having  won,  as  he  thought,  a  complete 
victory,  allowed  his  camp  to  be  surprised  and  taken.  The 
government  in  its  distress  was  obliged  to  apply  to  Hamilcar, 
the  man  whom  they  had  treated  so  ill  in  Sicily,  and  whom 
they  had  treated  worse  still  in  the  persons  of  his  trusted 
veterans  when  the  war  was  over.*  But  Hamilcar,  still  placing 
his  country  before  all  else,  consented  to  serve  the  govern- 
ment which  had  betrayed  him.  He  induced  or  compelled 
the  easy-going  citizens  to  enlist,  and  having  got  together  a 
force  of  seventy  elephants  and  ten  thousand  men,  he  managed 
to  slip  through  the  armies,  which,  stationed  as  they  were,  one 
at  Utica  and  the  other  at  Tunis,  had  almost  cut  Carthage  ofif 
from  Africa  ;  and  then  by  his  strict  discipline,  by  his  energy, 
and  by  his  influence  with  the  Numidian  chiefs,  especially 
with  one  called  Naravus,^  he  defeated  the  enemy  in  a  pitched 
battle,  and  overrunning  the  country,  recovered  several  towns 
which  had  revolted,  and  saved  others  which  were  being 
besieged.  Deserters,  some  of  them,  doubtless,  veterans  of 
his  own,  came  over  to  his  side ;  the  spell  of  his  genius  and 
of  their  attachment  to  him  overpowering — as  in  the  case  of 
Marshal  Ney  after  Napoleon's  escape  from  Elba — all  other 
obligations,  even  those  of  immediate  self-interest.  Nor  was 
this  all.  His  kind  treatment  of  four  thousand  of  his  prisoners 
of  war,  some  of  whom  he  allowed  to  enlist  in  his  service,  while 
the  rest  he  dismissed  to  their  homes  on  their  simple  promise 


1  Polyb.  i.  74,  7. 


« Ibid.  i.  75,  L 


»Ibid.  i.  78, 1. 


II 


I50 


CARTHAGE  AND  THE  CARTHAGINIANS. 


THE  TRUCELESS  WAR, 


151 


It 


not  to  serve  against  Carthage  during  the  war,  was  something 
so  unlike  anything  which  the  natives  had  before  experienced 
at  the  hands  of  the  Carthaginians,  that  Spendius  and  Matho, 
fearing  wholesale  desertions,  determined  to  cut  down  their 
bridges  and  burn  their  boats,  by  involving  the  whole  force  in 
an  act  of  atrocity  which  not  even  Hamilcar  could  forgive. ^ 

Panic  is  always  cruel,  and  the  panic  of  barbarians,  if  less 
culpable,  is  far  more  uncontrollable  than  the  panic  of  civil- 
ised men.     By  a  well-laid  plan  Spendius  and  Matho  contrived 
to  create  such  a  panic.     Those  who  counselled  moderation 
were  greeted  with  the  cry  of  "  Treason,  treason  1 "  or  "  Smite 
him,  smite  him  !  "  and  when  in  this  way— just  as  in  the 
French  Eevolution  the  Girondists  fell  before  the  Jacobins, 
and  the  more  moderate  of  the  Jacobins  themselves  before  the 
more  violent— a  reign  of  terror  had  been  established,  the 
Irreconcilables  carried  everything  their  own  way.      Gisco, 
"  the  soldier's  friend,"  lay  ready  to  their  hand.     He  and  his 
company  of  seven  hundred  men  were  led  out  to  execution, 
and  having  been  cruelly  mutilated,  were  thrown,  still  living, 
into  a  ditch  to  perish.     To  an  embassy  from  Carthage  sent 
to  ask  for  their  bodies,  the  only  answer  was  a  blunt  refusal, 
and  a  warning  that  if  any  more  embassies  were  sent,  they 
should  fare  as  Gisco  had  fared.     Thenceforward  all  native 
Carthaginians  who  fell  into  their  hands  would  be  put  to  death, 
while  others  who  did  not  belong  to  the  hated  nation  should 
be  sent  back    to  the  city  with  their  hands  cut  off.     The 
mercenaries  were  as  good  as  their  word,  and  from  that  day 
forward  the  war  deserved  the  name  by  which  it  was  known  in 
history,  the  "  war  without  truce,"  or  the  "  Inexpiable  War  ".« 
Upon  its  horrors  we  need  not  here  dwell.     The  world  has 
been  supping  so  full  of  horrors  of  late  during  the  terrible 
struggle  which  has  devastated  some  of  the  fairest  countries 
of  Europe  and  of  Asia,  that  we  are  not  disposed  to  linger 
unnecessarily  on  the  atrocities  of  the  Mercenary  War.     Suf- 


fice it  to  say  that  Hamilcar  was  driven  to  make  reprisals  for 
the  barbarities  of  the  Libyans  by  throwing  his  prisoners  to 
be  trampled  to  death  by  the  elephants,  and  the  war  was 
henceforward,  in  the  Uteral  sense  of  the  word,  internecine. 
The  Carthaginian  government  managed,  even  in  this  supreme 
hour,  to  thwart  Hamilcar  by  allowing  his  inveterate  enemy 
Hanno,  discredited  as  he  was,  to  share  the  command  with 
him.     Nor  was  it  tiU  after  the  quarrels  which  ensued  had 
led  to  many  reverses ;  till  the  news  arrived  of  the  total  de- 
struction of  their  own  ships  in  a  storm,  of  the  revolt  of  Hippo 
Zarytus  and  of  Utica,  the  towns  which  alone  had  been  faith- 
ful to  Carthage  in  the  invasions  of  Agathocles  and  Regulus  ; » 
above  aU,  till  the  news  had  come  of  the  insurrection  of  the  mer- 
cenaries in  Sardinia,  and  the  probable  loss  of  that  fair  island, 
that  the  Carthaginians  allowed  the  voice  of  thearmy  to  beheard, 
and  committed  to  Hamilcar  once  again  the  sole  command. 

Hamilcar  soon  penned  the  Libyans  in  their  fortified  camp 
near  Tunis,  and  so  effectually  cut  them  off  from  all  supplies 
that  they  were  driven  to  eat  first  their  prisoners  and  then 
their  slaves ;  and  it  was  not  till  they  had  begun  to  look  wist- 
fully upon  one  another  that  some  of  the  chiefs,  with  Spendius 
at  their  head,  came  forth  to  ask  for  the  parley  which  they 
had  themselves  forbidden.     Hamilcar  demanded  that  ten  of 
the  mercenaries,  to  be  named  by  himself,  should  be  given 
up  while  the  rest  of  the  army  should  be  allowed  to  depart 
unkrmed  with  one  garment  each.     This  having  been  agreed 
upon  Hamilcar  immediately  named  Spendius  and  his  feUow- 
legates,  and   threw   them   into   chains.'^      The   rebel   army 
thinking,  as  well  they  might,  that  Hamilcar  had  been  guilty 
of  sharp  practice,  flew  to  arms.     They  were  still  forty  thou- 
sand in  number,  but  they  were  without  leaders,  and  they 
were  exterminated  almost  to  a  man.     Matho  still  held  out  at 
Tunis,  and  when  Spendius  was  crucified  by  Hamilcar  in 
front  of  its  waUs,  Matho,  by  a  sudden  sally  on  the  other  side 


ii 


1  Polyb.  i.  80,  3-9. 


•Ibid.  I  81. 


1  Polyb.  i.  82,  8. 


»Ibid.  i.  86, 


152 


CARTHAGE  AND  THE  CARTHAGINIANS. 


CONDUCT  OF  ROMANS. 


153 


r 


hi 


f!f'f 


of  the  town,  took  a  Carthaginian  general  prisoner,  and 
shortly  afterwards  crucified  him  with  fifty  others  on  the  very 
spot  which  had  witnessed  the  last  agonies  of  Spendius.  A 
horrible  interchange  of  barbarities  I  But  we  are  tempted  to 
remark  that  they  took  place  two  centuries  before,  and  not 
twenty  centuries  after,  Christ.  The  army  of  Matho  was  soon 
afterwards  cut  to  pieces.  The  rebel  chief  himself  was  taken 
prisoner,  and,  after  being  led  in  triumph  through  the  streets 
of  the  capital,  was  put  to  death  with  terrible  tortures  (b.o. 
241-238).  So  ended  the  Truceless  War,  after  a  duration 
of  three  years  and  four  months,  with  the  total  extermination 
of  those  who  had  made  it  truceless ;  **  a  war,"  says  Polybius, 
and  he  says  truly,  "  by  far  the  most  cruel  and  inhuman  of 
which  he  had  ever  heard ; "  1  but  we  are  again  tempted  to 
remark  that  he  had  not  seen,  or  perhaps  imagined,  such 
scenes  as  those  at  Batak  and  Kezanhk. 

»Poiyb.  i.  aa^j. 


CHAPTER  IX. 

HAMILCAR   BARCA   IN   AFRICA   AND   SPAIN. 

(B.C.   238-219.) 

Conduct  of  Romans  during  Mercenary  War— They  appropriate  Sardinia 
and  Corsica — Peace  and  war  parties  at  Carthage— Hamilcar's  command — 
He  takes  Hannibal  with  him— He  crosses  to  Spain  —Advantages  of  his 
position  there— His  administration  and  death— His  character— Administra- 
tion of  Hasdrubal  — New  Carthage  founded— Early  career  of  Hannibal— 
His  vow  and  its  significance- Remissness  of  Romans— Rising  of  Gauls  in 
Italy— Its  suppression— Hannibal  besieges  Saguntum— War  declared  be- 
tween  Rome  and  Carthage. 

During  the  desperate  struggle  for  life  on  the  part  of  the 
Carthaginians  which  has  just  been  related,  the  Romans 
had,  on  the  whole,  behaved  with  moderation,  or  even  with 
generosity,  to  their  conquered  foe.^  Had  it  pleased  them 
to  make  one  more  effort  and  once  again  to  risk  a  Roman 
army  upon  African  soil,  when  they  were  invited  to  do  so  by 
the  revolted  Uticans,  and  by  the  mercenaries  themselves, 
there  can  be  Uttle  doubt  that  Carthage  would  have  fallen  and 
that  there  would  have  been  no  Second  and  no  Third  Punic 
War  to  relate;  and  had  they  dreamed  of  what  lay  deep 
hidden  in  Hamilcar's  breast,  or  of  the  vast  miUtary  genius 
which  was  being  reared  amidst  those  stormy  scenes  in  his 
infant  son,  no  exertion  would  have  appeared  too  great  to 
make,  and  no  danger  too  desperate  to  dare,  even  to  the 
cautious  Roman  Senate.  Was  it  that  the  exhaustion  con- 
sequent on  the  twenty-three  years'  war  was  even  greater 
than  is  commonly  supposed,  and   that  the  Romans  were 

1  Polyb.  i.  88.  5. 


154 


CARTHAGE  AND  THE  CARTHAGINIANS. 


BASENESS  OF  ROMANS. 


155 


m 


bound  over  to  keep  the  peace  by  the  stress  of  necessity? 
Or  was  it  that  the  Senate,  true  to  its  traditional  policy, 
would  not  venture  upon  African  conquest  till  they  felt  sure 
that  they  were  leaving  behind  them  no  enemy  nearer  home, 
no  Illyrian  pirates  to  sweep  their  western  coasts,  and  no 
Gauls  who,  from  their  seats  on  this  side  the  Alps,  might  again 
descend  on  Rome?  Or,  once  more,  was  it  that  somethin" 
of  the  courtesy  and  magnanimity  of  Pyrrhus — exotic  plant 
though  it  was  in  the  breast  of  his  Roman  antagonists— still 
lingered  on  in  so  uncongenial  a  soil  ?  This  we  do  not  know : 
but  we  do  know  that  when  the  revolted  mercenaries  in 
Sardinia  had  done  to  all  the  Carthaginians  on  whom  they 
could  lay  hands  what  their  brother  mercenaries  in  Africa  had 
done  to  their  hated  masters  there ;  and  when  the  native 
Sards,  those  unconquered  Troglodytes  of  the  mountains, 
called  by  the  expressive  name  of  the  "  Insane,"  ^  had  driven 
the  mercenaries  in  their  turn  to  Rome  as  suppliants  for 
Roman  aid,  the  Senate  at  first  remained  true  to  its  treaty 
engagements,  and  refused  to  interfere  in  the  internal  affairs  of 
the  Carthaginian  empire.  They  had  begun  the  late  disastrous 
war  by  supporting  the  freebooting  murderers  of  Sicily ;  they 
would  not  signalise  its  termination  by  supporting  a  similar 
band  of  infuriated  soldiers  of  fortune  in  Sardinia.  Had  the 
Romans  really  wished  at  that  time  to  annex  Sardinia,  they 
might  have  found  a  decent  pretext  when  the  Carthaginians 
threw  into  chains  certain  unprincipled  Italians,  who,  for  pur- 
poses of  their  own,  were  trading  with  the  rebels  in  Africa. 
But  they  contented  themselves  with  a  remonstrance,  and 
when  the  Carthaginians  set  their  prisoners  free  the  Romans 
returned  the  courtesy  by  liberating  all  the  Carthaginian 
prisoners  whom  they  still  retained,  by  forbidding  their  subjects 
to  trade  with  the  mercenaries,  and  by  allowing  the  Carthaginian 
recruiting  officers  to  enlist  recruits  even  in  Italy  itself.'-^ 
But  when  the  genius  of  Hamilcar  had  saved  Carthage  and 

1  Floras,  il  6.  35.    The  Greeks  also  called  them  fjiaiy6fitva. 
Tolyb.  i.  83.  6-12, 


an  expedition  was  being  fitted  out  by  the  government  to 
recover  its  revolted  province,  the  Romans,  professing  to 
believe  that  the  armament  was  intended  to  act  against 
themselves,  and  hatching  up  various  fictitious  grievances, 
threatened  the  Carthaginians  with  instant  war  if  they  dared 
to  molest  those  who  had  thrown  themselves  on  their  protec- 
tion.^ It  was  an  act  of  unblushing  and  yet,  at  the  same 
time,  hypocritical  effrontery  on  the  part  of  the  Romans, 
hardly  less  base,  and  certainly  more  inexcusable,  than  had 
been  their  support  of  the  Mamertines.^  But  the  Carthaginians 
had  no  choice  but  to  submit  to  the  right  of  the  strongest,  and 
they  gave  up  not  Sardinia  only,  but  such  parts  of  Corsica  as 
they  had  ever  claimed,  and  were  compelled  also  to  atone  for 
their  warlike  intentions  by  paying  an  indemnity  of  twelve 
hundred  talents  to  the  outraged  and  peace-loving  Romans.^ 
Hamilcar  once  more  showed  his  greatness  by  submitting  to 
the  inevitable ;  but  the  iron  must  have  entered  into  his  soul 
more  deeply  then  ever,  and  he  must  have  bound  himself  by 
still  more  binding  oaths,  if  such  could  be  found,  to  drink  the 
cup  of  vengeance  to  the  dregs  when  the  time  should  come,  or 
to  perish  in  the  attempt. 

It  might  have  been  thought  that  the  incapacity  of  the 
governing  classes  at  Carthage  and  the  double  disasters  which 
they  had  brought  upon  the  country  would  have  so  seriously 
discredited  them  that  Hamilcar  Barca  and  his  Patriotic 
Party  would,  for  a  time,  at  all  events,  have  been  supreme  in 
the  State ;  but  so  far  was  this  from  being  the  case  that,  while 
Hamilcar  was  returning  redhanded  from  his  desperate  victory 
which  had  saved  the  State,  the  party  of  Hanno  was  strong 
enough  and  impudent  enough  to  place  the  deliverer  upon 
his  trial.  He  had  been — they  did  not  scruple  to  assert — the 
cause  of  the  Mercenary  War,  for  he  had  made  promises  of 
pay  to  his  troops  which  he  had  not  been  able  to  perform  I  * 

1  Polyb.  i.  88,  8-10.  » Ibid.  iii.  28,  1-4. 

*  Polyb.  iil  10,  3,  and  27,  8  ;  Zonaras,  viil  18. 
^Appian,  Ilisp.  4. 


156 


CARTHAGE  AND  THE  CARTHAGINIANS, 


But  it  was  beyond  the  power  or  the  impudence  even  of  the 
Carthaginian  Peace  Party  to  find  him  guilty,  and  the  indict- 
ment  seems  to  have  fallen  by  its  own  weight  or  its  own 
absurdity.     There  had  been  sharp  conflicts  for  some  time 
past  between  the  War  and  the  Peace  Party,  between  the 
reformers  and  the  reactionaries,  at  Carthage ;  and  the  events 
of  the  last  few  years  had  made  the  distinction  between  them 
sharper  still.     Around  Hanno— called,  one  would  think  in 
irony,  Hanno  the  Great— gathered  all  that  was  ease-loving, 
all  that  was  short-sighted,  all  that  was  selfish  in  the  great 
republic.     The  commercial,  the  capitalist,  the  aristocratical 
interests  seem,  on  the  whole,  to  have  followed  his  lead. 
Around  Hamilcar  Barca,  on  the  other  hand,  gathered  all  that 
was  generous  and  far-sighted  ;  all,  in  fact,  who  were  not  con- 
tent to  live  in  peace,  knowing  that  after  them  would  come  the 
deluge.     Jewish  Kings,  and  those  by  no  means  the  worst 
of  theur  race,  were  often  consoled  when  they  heard  on  their 
repentance  that  the  evil  should  come  not  in  their  own  but  in 
their  sons*  days.     Not  so  was  Hamilcar  Barca,  and  not  such 
his  followers.     But  he  was  the  head  of  a  minority  only,  and 
finding  that  it  was  impossible  to  bring  the  majority  over  to 
his  way  of  thinking,  or  to  reform  them  by  pressure  from 
without,  he  determined  to  accept,  or,  it  may  be,  to  demand,  a 
post  in  which  he  could  serve  his  country  more  effectually.^ 

He  obtained  from  the  fears,  the  hatred,  or  the  hopes  of 
those  opposed  to  him,  the  command  of  the  army,  an  appoint- 
ment which,  for  different  reasons,  must  have  been  equally 
acceptable  to  his  friends  and  his  enemies.  The  accounts 
which  we  have  of  these  times  are  meagre  and  obscure,  and 
come  almost  exclusively  from  the  reports  of  the  party  hostile 
to  the  great  "  Barcine  faction,"  for  so  Livy,  full  of  Boman 
pride  and  Koman  prejudices,  too  indolent  2  to  inquire  into, 

1  Appian,  Hisp.  6. 

»Uvy,  xxi.  2  and  passim,  Diodoms  (xxv.  Frag.  1)  improves  upon  livy, 
and  calls  the  party  of  Hamilcar— some  of  the  noblest  patriots  who  ever  lived 
— «Toi/)€/a  T&y  Toyripordrwy  iyBpiinrtur,  a  band  of  the  most  worthless  fellows. 


PEACE  AND  WAR  PARTIES  AT  CARTHAGE.  157 

and  too  opinionated  to  estimate  aright  what  was  really  great 
in  the  Carthaginian  character,  calls  the  disinterested  and 
the  patriotic  supporters  of  Hamilcar.  But  it  is  clear,  even 
from  these  reports,  that  Hamilcar  received  the  command 
with  autocratic  powers,  subject  only  to  removal  by  the 
voice  of  the  collective  Carthaginian  people.  That  he  was 
independent  of  the  home  government  was  as  much  to  their 
advantage  as  his.  They  were  saved  the  trouble  of  supplying 
him  with  men  and  money,  and,  if  necessary,  they  could  dis- 
avow any  awkward  acts  of  his,  while  he  was  saved  from  the 
cabals  and  intrigues  with  which,  had  they  had  the  chance, 
the  government  might  have  hampered  his  movements. 

The  army  with  which  Hamilcar  started  from  Carthage  was 
not  a  large  one.  But  if  armies,  like  names,  are  to  be  weighed 
rather  than  counted,  no  army,  surely,  ever  contained  so  much 
military  genius,  or  was  destined  itself  to  achieve  and  to  give 
birth  to  other  armies  which  should,  in  their  turn,  achieve  such 
astonishing  results.  For  the  army  which  was  led  by  Hamil- 
car carried  with  it  also  Hamilcar's  son ;  the  father,  spurred 
on  by  the  memory  of  his  hundred  exploits  which  had  ended 
in  a  failure  more  honourable  to  him  than  any  victory;  the 
son,  barely  nine  years  old,  with  his  future  all  before  him,  but 
stimulated  by  the  nascent  consciousness  of  his  own  ability,  by 
the  ambition  to  emulate  his  father's  fame,  and  by  the  hatred 
of  his  father's  foes, — a  hatred  hardly  perhaps  increased,  but 
certainly  elevated,  deepened,  consecrated  by  the  solemn  vow 
which,  at  that  father's  bidding,  he  had  just  sworn  upon  the 
altar,  never  to  be  a  friend  to  the  Eomans.  Hamilcar  first 
stamped  out  the  embers  of  the  Libyan  revolt  which  were  still 
smouldering  in  the  country  to  the  west  of  Carthage,  and  then, 
accompanied  by  the  fleet,  made  his  way  slowly  along  the 
Mauritanian  coast  towards  the  immediate  goal  of  his  long- 
cherished  schemes.  When  he  reached  the  Pillars  of  Hercules 
(bo.  237),  on  his  own  undivided  responsibility,  he  crossed  the 
straits  and  set  foot  in  another  country  and  another  continent. 

It  was  a  bold  step,  but  it  was  a  wise  one.     If  Carthage  was 


> 


158 


CARTHAGE  AND  THE  CARTHAGINIANS, 


HAMILCAR  CROSSES  TO  SPAIN. 


»59 


ikif 


to  be  saved  at  all  from  the  ruin  which  Hamilcar  and  all  keeiv 
sighted  men  saw  impending  over  it,  it  must  be  by  Hamilcar 
and  Hamilcar's  army.     But  where  in  Africa  could  he  raise  an 
army,  and  how,  when  it  was  raised,  could  he  have  fed  it 
there?     The  merchant  princes  of  the  city  who,  under  the 
pressure  of  necessity,  had  enrolled  themselves  in  his  ranks  to 
defend  their  all,  had  returned  to  their  businesses  or  their  plea- 
sures as  soon  as  the  immediate  danger  was  over.    His  own 
veterans,  and  thousands  of  other  Libyans  who  under  his 
training  might  have  become  as  valuable  as  they,  had  been,  by 
the  most  tragic  of  necessities,  exterminated  by  Hamilcar  him- 
self in  the  late  war ;  and  he  could  hardly  hope  just  then  to 
enhst  others  who  could  serve  him  as  their  predecessors  might 
have  done.    A  few  of  his  Sicilian  officers,  indeed,  still  followed 
the  banner  of  their  chief,  and  a  few  devoted  friends  and  mem- 
bers of  his  family  were  left  behind  at  Carthage,  and  these 
last,  if  they  held  no  office  in  the  state,  showed  that  they  could 
do  more.     If  they  were  not  allowed  to  govern,  their  ability 
and  their  patriotism  yet  gave  them  the  divine  right  to  rule. 
Of  this  nothing  could  deprive  them ;  and,  hke  the  Medici  at 
Florence,  or  the  Dukes  of  Orange  in  the  Netherlands,  this 
half-outlawed  Barcine  family  actually  received  foreign  em- 
bassies and  concluded  foreign  treaties,  as  an  independent  body, 
co-ordinate  with  the  Senate  itself  I     But  officers  alone  cannot 
make  an  army,  and  the  Barcine  family,  powerful  as  it  was, 
could  not  induce  the  money-loving  Carthaginian  merchants 
to  untie  their  purse-strings  in  support  of  the  distant  and 
chimerical  projects  of  Hamilcar.     Nothing  could  be  done  at 
Carthage  without  money ;  and  it  was  necessary  for  Hamilcar, 
if  he  would  hold  his  own,  not  only  to  pay  his  troops,  but  to 
remit  large  sums  to  Carthage  in  order  to  keep  his  supporters 
there  together  and  to  maintain  his  influence.^ 

Now  it  must  have  seemed  to  the  eager  eye  of  the  Cartha- 
ginian patriot  as  though  Spain  had  been  created  for  the  very 

*  Appian,  Hup.  5, 


purpose  of  supplying  all  these  various  and  conflicting  wants. 
It  was  from  Spain,  if  from  anywhere,  and  by  Hamilcar,  if  by 
any  one,  that  Carthage  might  be  saved. 

The  previous  history  of  the  Spanish  peninsula,  and  its  im- 
memorial connection  with  the  Phoenicians,  the  fathers  of  the 
Carthaginian  race,  were  all  in  favour  of  Hamilcar's  projects. 
It  was  from  Tarshish,  or  Tartessus,  the  district  abutting  on 
the  very  straits  which  he  had  to  cross,  that,  as  far  back  as 
the  time  of  Solomon,  had  come  the  strange  animals  and  the 
rich  minerals  which  were  landed  in  the  harbours  of  Phoenicia 
proper,  and  which  had  so  enlarged  the  ideas  and  transformed 
the  instincts  of  the  untravelled  and  exclusive  Israelites.^     It 
was  from  Tartessus,  as  the  story  went,  that  some  Phoenician 
sailors  had  once  returned  to  their  native  country  laden  with 
so  much  wealth  that  they  were  fain  to  take  the  lead  off  their 
very  anchors  and  to  put  silver  on  them  in  its  stead.     What 
wonder,  after  this,  that  we  are  told  that  '*  silver  was  Uttle 
accounted  of  in  the  days  of  Solomon  "  ?    In  more  recent  times 
Gades,  on  almost  the  same  spot,  itself  a  Phoenician  colony, 
and  boasting  of  a  splendid  temple  to  Melcarth,  the  patron  god 
of  both  Tyre  and  Carthage,  had  served  as  an  emporium  for 
the  products  aUke  of  the  Scilly  Isles  and  the  Niger.    For 
centuries  Phoenicians  had  thus  found  in  Spain  what,  centuries 
after,  Spain  herself  was  destined  to  find  in  Mexico  and  Peru ; 
and  it  was  principally  to  maintain  their  connection  with  this 
Eldorado  that  that  long  line  of  factories,  known  in  later  times 
as  the  MctagonitcB  Urbes,  had  been  planted  at  equal  distances 
on  the  most  suitable  points  on  the  barren  Mauritanian  coast. 

The  names  of  places  in  Spain— which,  in  spite  of  the  strange 
contortions  they  have  undergone  in  the  lapse  of  centuries,  still 
embalm  within  themselves  an  imperishable  record  of  the  suc- 
cessive waves  of  foreign  invasion  that  have  swept  over  the 
peninsula— recall,  perhaps  most  forcibly,  the  earliest  wave 
of  all,  the  prolonged  and  peaceful  invasions  of  the  enter- 

iSee  thia  admirably  brought  out  in  Stanley's  Jewish  Church,  chap.  xxvi.  p. 
182-187. 


i6o 


CARTHAGE  AND  THE  CARTHAGINIANS. 


HAMILCAR  IN  SPAIN. 


I'i 


pnsmg  and  gainseeking  PhoBnicians.    Merida  and  Murviedro 
and  Saragossa  recaU  the  Romans ;   Carthagena  recalls  the 
Carthaginmns;    Tarifa  and  Valladohd,   Gibraltar  and  the 
Guadalquivir,  the  Arabs;    whUe  the  Guadiana  (Wady-al- 
Anas)  m  one  strange  compound,  immortalises  at  once  the 
mvasions  of  both  Roman  and  Arab.    But  Seville  and  Cadiz 
and  Carmona  in  modem  Spain.  Tartessus  and  Carteia  in 
ancient  bnng  us  direcUy  back  to  the  time  when  the  extreme 
east  and  the  extreme  west  of  the  Mediterranean  formed  as 
yet  parts  of  one  peaceful  trading  community.     Seville,  or 
as  the  Romans  caUed  it.  Hispalis.  in  the  low  country  of 
Andalusia   ,8  nothing  but  the  Shefelah  or  "low  country" 

ft«  w  K  f.'l?^'..''^''  ""^""^^^^  "•  »**««  «'  Cadiz  is 
the  Hebrew  "  Kaddu-."  Milton's  "  Gadire."  a  fortress.  Car- 
mona 18  the  Hebrew  "  Cherem."  a  fruitful  field;  Tartessus 
as  has  been  aheady  mentioned,  is  the  Tarshish  of  the  Hebrew 
prophets  and  chroniclers;  while  Carteia  is  the  Canaanitish 
Kirjathaim.  "the  two  cities";  and  by  the  first  part  of  its 
name  cairies  ns  back  to  perhaps  the  oldest  city  in  the  world. 

w  fj^f  «■*!       ''^"'  "  "''y  «^«°  ^^^^  'I'e  Father  of  the 
iJaithful  first  entered  the  Promised  Land 

The  Greeks  no  less  than  the  Phoenicians  had  their  share 
of  the  inexhaustible  spoUs  of  Spain.    It  was  from  one  of 
the  ports  of  Tartessus.  "a  virgin  port,"  as  Herodotus  calls 
It  that  in  B.O.  630  a  certain  Samian.  driven  thither  by  stress 
of  weather  or  by  a  special  providence.i  had  returned  laden 
with  wealth  to  his  native  country,  and  had  given  that  stimu- 
lus to  the  Greek  imagination  and  to  the  thirst  for  geographi- 
cal discovery  which  in  the  foUowing  century,  carried  thither 
he  adventurous  Phocaans.  who  in  their  turn  became  the 
fnends  of  its  king  and  shared  largely  in  his  wealth.*    It  was 
no  shght  .^vantage  for  Hamilcar's  purposes,  that  the  con- 
nection of  Spam  with  Carthage  had  hitherto  been  commercial 
only  and  not  imperial ;  otherwise  the  deadly  hatred  which  ao- 

'Ibid.  1. 18, 


lei 


i 

1 


companied  the  spread  of  the  Carthaginian  rule  in  Africa  mus 
have  sprung  up  in  Spain  as  well,  and  Hamilcar  would  have 
had  as  much  to  do  in  pulling  down  as  in  building  up  and 
his  great  constructive  genius  would  not  have  had  free  play 
It  was  into  such  a  land  of  promise  that  Hamilcar  now 
passed.     Its  gold  and  silver  mines,  worked  henceforward  by 
Phoenician  enterprise  and  skill,  yielded  many  times  as  much 
as  they  had  ever  yielded  before.     With  part  of  the  produce 
Hamilcar  paid  the  Spaniards  themselves  who  had  flocked  to 
his  standard  ;  but,  as  with  his  Libyan  followers  at  Ercte  and 
at  Eryx,  it  was  the  spell  of  his  personal  influence,  far  more 
than  the  gold  he  was  now  able  to  promise  and  to  give  them 
which  kept  them  ever  afterwards  indissolubly  attached  to  him' 
Part  he  remitted  annually  to  Carthage,  as  the  price  he  paid  to 
her  for  being  allowed  to  carry  out  his  schemes  for  her  safety 
and  her  empire.    His  soldiers,  his  generals,  his  own  son-in-law 
Hasdrubal,  and  his  own  son,  Hannibal,  intermarried  with  the 
natives  and  made  their  interests  one  with  their  own.    For  nine 
long  years— years  to  which  Polybius,  unfortunately,  has  de- 
voted scarcely  as  many  hues  i— Hamilcar  worked  steadily  on 
with  his  eyes,  indeed,  fixed  upon  the  distant  goal,  but  using  no 
unworthy  means  in  order  to  reach  it;  and  when  the  end 
was  almost  in  view,  when  it  seemed  that  he  might  himself 
carry  out  his  magnificent  schemes,  he  died  a  soldier's  death, 
fighting,  sword  in  hand,  and  left  to  the  "lion's  brood," ^  as 
he  loved  to  caU— and  well  might  he  caU— his  sons,  the  rich 
but  the  dangerous  heritage  of  his  genius,  his  valour,  and  his 
undying  hatred  to  Rome. 

Of  all  the  foreign  nations— Phoenician,  Roman,  Gothic, 
Vandal,  Arab— which  have  occupied  any  considerable  part 
of  Spain,  two,  and  two  only,  have  governed  it  in  its  own 

'Polyb.   ii.   1,   5-8;  Livy,  xxi.  1;  Corn.  Nepos.  Hamilcar,   iv.   2;   Val 
Max.  IX.  3,  3  ext 

^Val  Maxiiuus.  ix.  3.  2  ext.:  "Quatuor  enim  puerilis  mtatis  filios 
iniuens  ejusdem  numeri  catulos  leoninos  in  perniciera  imperii  nostri  alere 
pe  prsedicabat", 

II 


ft 


162 


CARTHAGE  AM)  THE  CARTIIAGIMANS. 


interests,  and,  in  spite  of  ditTerences  of  creed  and  of  race, 
have  governed  it,  on  the  whole,  with  toleration,  with  humanity, 
and  with  good  faith.     The  one  was  the  Barcine  family  of 
Carthage,  the  other  the  Ommiade  Khalifs  of  Arabia.     Of  the 
hero-prophet,  sprung  eight  centuries  later  from  the  kindred 
Arabian  stock,  it  was  remarked  by  the  ambassadors  who  had 
been  sent  to  him  in  his  exile  at  Medina,  that  they  had  seen 
the  Persian  Chosroes  and  the  Roman  Heraclius  sitting  upon 
their  thrones,   but  never  had  they  seen  a  man  ruling  his 
equals   as   did   Mohammed.      Like    Mohammed,    Hamilcar 
Barca  never  sat  upon  a  throne.     He  was  a  simple  citizen  of 
Carthage ;  hated  or  feared  by  many,  probably  by  a  majority 
of  his  fellow-citizens,  thwarted  by  them  whenever  they  could 
thwart  him,  and  carrying  on  his  patriotic  projects  in  his 
solitary  strength  in  that  distant  country,  half  rebel  and  half 
runaway,  half  subject  and  half  sovereign.     We  know  all  too 
little  of  his  heroic  struggles  in  Sicily,  of  his  death-grapple  with 
the  revolted  Libyans,  and  of  the  achievements  of  the  last  nine 
years  of  his  life,  ahke  in  peace  and  war,  in  Spain.    Did  we  know 
more  the  world  would,  in  all  probability,  admit  that,  in  capa- 
city if  not  in  performance,  in  desert  if  not  in  fortune,  he  was 
the  equal  of  his  wonderful  son.  But  we  know  at  least  enough 
to  justify  the  judgment  passed  half  a  century  later  by  one  who 
was,  assuredly,  no  friend  to  Carthage,  and  yet  who,  in  spite 
of   his   narrow    Roman   prejudices,    and   his   *' Dclcnda  est 
Carthago;'  judging  solely  by  the  traces  he  saw  in  Spain  of 
what  the  great  man  had  done,  pronounced  emphatically  that 
there  was  **  no  king  like  Hamilcar  ". 

Hamilcar  died  in  battle  in  the  year  h.c.  228.  His  son 
Hannibal  was  not  then  quite  nineteen  years  of  age,  and  was 
too  young  at  once  to  succeed  his  father ;  but  the  command 
did  not  pass  out  of  the  family.  It  devolved  on  Hasdrubal, 
the  son-in-law  and  faithful  companion  of  Hamilcar,  one  who 
was  endowed  with  something  of  his  military  talents  and 
with  no  small  part  of  his  influence  over  men.*     The  empire 

ipolyb.  ii.  1,  9;  Livy.  xxi.  2. 


EARLY  CAREER  OF  HANNIBAL. 


163 


which  Hamilcar  had  founded  in  Spain  Hasdrubal  organised 
and  enlarged.     Above  all,  he  gave  it  a  capital  in  New  Car- 
thage,!  a  town  which,  from  its  admirable  situation  on  the 
south-east  coast,  from  its  convenient  harbour,  and  from  its 
proximity  to  some  rich  silver  mines  which  were  just  then 
discovered,^  seemed  destined  to  be  all  that  its  proud  name 
implied,  and  to  spread  the  Phoenician  arts  and  empire  in 
Europe  and  the  Ocean  beyond,  even  as  the  Old  Carthage 
had   spread  them  over   the   Mediterranean   and   in   Africa. 
Tribe  after  tribe  of  Iberians  solicited  the  honour  of  enrol- 
ling themselves  as  subjects  of  a  power  which  knew  how  to 
develop  their  resources  in  the  interest  of  the  natives  as  much 
as  in  its  own  ;  which  found  them  work  to  do  and  paid  them 
well  for  doing  it;  and  when   Hasdrubal,  b.c.  221,  in  the 
eighth  year  of  his  command,  feU  by  the  hand  of  a  Celtic 
assassin,3  he  had  extended,  in  the  main  by  peaceful  means, 
the  rule  of  the  Barcides  from  the  Boetis  to  the  Tagus. 

Hannibal,  "the  grace  or  favour  of  Baal,"  was  now  in  his 
twenty-sixth   year.     The   soldiers   unanimously  proclaimed 
him  commander-in-chief,  and  their  choice   was  ratified  by 
the  Carthaginian  government.     He  was  still  young  for  the 
Herculean  task  which  lay  before  him ;  but  he  was  strong 
in  the  blood  of  Hamilcar  which  was  flowing  in  his  veins, 
strong  in  the  training  which  he  had  received,  strong,  above 
all,  in  the  consciousness  of  his  religious  mission ;  none  the 
less  so  that  the  secret  of  it  remained  locked  in  his  own 
breast  till  all  chance  of  fulfilling  it  in  its  entirety  had  passed 
away  for  ever.     It  was  not  till  he  was  an  old  man,  living  in 
exile  at  the  court  of  King  Antiochus,  but,  even  so,  an  object 
of  suspicion  and  of  terror  alike  to  the  Syrian  king  and  to  the  Ro- 
man Senate,  that  he  told  the  simple  story  of  that  which,  far 
more  than  military  ambition,  more  even  than  the  love  of  coun- 

»  Polyb.  ii.  13. 

2Ai,.te.s.  their  discoverer,  was  wor.s1iippe<l  by  the  Carthaginians  as  a  hero. 
I  <)lyi».  X.  10. 

M'olyb.  ii.  36;  Appian,  J/isp.  8. 


II 


\\\ 


164 


CARTHAGE  AXD  THE  CARTIlACtlNIANS. 


try  and  the  consciousness  of  his  supreme  ability,  had  been  the 
ruling  motive  of  his  life.  In  his  ninth  year,  so  he  told  Antio- 
chus,  when  his  father,  Hamilcar,  was  about  to  set  out  for  his 
command  in  Spain,  and  was  sacrificing  to  the  supreme  God  of 
his  country,  he  bade  the  attendants  withdraw,  and  asked  the 
little  Hannibal  if  he  would  like  to  go  with  him  to  the  wars.  The 
boy  eagerly  assented.  '*  Lay  your  hand  then,"  said  Hamilcar, 
"on  the  sacrifice  and  swear  eternal  enmity  to  the  Romans." 
Hannibal  swore,  and  well  indeed  did  he  keep  his  oath.i 

This  story,  striking  as  it  is  in  itself  and  known,  perhaps, 
more  widely  than  any  other  story  of  the  ancient  world— out- 
side of  the  sacred  writings  of  the  Hebrews— is  more  striking 
still  when  we  look  at  it  in  the  light  of  its  antecedents,  its 
surroundings,  and  its  remote  consequences. 

First,  it  is  absolutely  authentic.  It  comes  to  us  from 
Hannibal's  own  lips  towards  the  close  of  his  eventful  Ufe,  at 
a  time  when  he  could  have  had  no  temptation  to  say  aught 
but  the  nteral  truth.  We  read  it  therefore,  not  as  we  are 
obliged  to  read  almost  everything  else  we  are  told  about  him, 
with  the  feeling  that,  whether  true  or  not,  it  comes  to  us 
through  a  medium  which  forbids  our  assuming  it  to  be 
wholly  true.  We  seem  to  be  brought  face  to  face  with  the 
Phoenician  hero,  and  to  be  reading  not  so  much  what  was 
spoken  by  his  lips,  as  what  was  engraven  on  his  heart. 

Secondly,  the  story  is  essentially  Semitic  in  its  character. 
We  are  transported  in  imagination,  not  so  much  to  Spain, 
or  Gaul,  or  Italy,  or  Asia  Minor,  or  Armenia,  which  were 
the  vast  field  of  Hannibal's  subsequent  exploits ;  nor  even 
to  Carthage  where  he  had  spent  his  early  youth,  but  to 
Phoenicia  itself,  to  the  country  where  Jew  and  Canaanite 
and  Carthaginian  meet  on  common  ground.  We  seem  to 
breathe  the  atmosphere  in  which  the  hasty  vow  was  taken 
to  exterminate  the  whole  tribe  of  Benjamin  for  the  otfence 
of  a  single  city,  and  was  not  taken  only,  but  carried  out  to 

•Polyb.   iii.  11;  Uvy,  xxi.    1;   xxxv.  19;   Corn.   Nep.   llann.  '2;  Appiuu, 


HANNIBAL'S  VOW, 


165 


the  bitter  end.  We  are  with  the  wild  Gileadite  who  vowed 
that  he  would  sacrifice  whatever  should  meet  him  first  on 
his  return  from  the  wars,  and  who  did  "  according  to  his 
vow,"  even  though  that  something  was  dearer  to  him  than 
life  itself.  We  are  with  Saul,  eager,  for  his  oath's  sake,  to 
hand  over  to  destruction  his  own  first-born  son,  the  heir  of 
his  kingdom  and  his  name.  We  are  with  Samson  and  with 
Samuel,  bound  even  before  their  birth  to  the  life-long  Naza- 
ritic  vow,  their  strength,  their  welfare,  and  their  moral 
greatness  depending  on  its  strict  fulfilment. 

Third  and  lastly,  how  far-reaching  were  its  consequences ! 
"One  memorable  instance,"  says  an  eloquent  writer — to 
whom  it  were  diflficult  to  say  whether  ancient  or  modern, 
sacred  or  profane  history  owes  most— "one  memorable  in- 
stance of  a  Phoenician  vow  has  been  handed  down  to  us, 
so  solemn  in  its  origin,  so  grand  in  its  consequences,  that 
even  the  vows  of  the  most  sacred  ages  need  not  fear  com- 
parison with  it."  1  His  words  are  perhaps  inside  the  truth. 
What  the  consequences,  immediate  and  remote,  of  Hanni- 
bal's vow  were,  we  need  not  here  inquire,  for  they  form  the 
contents  of  the  remainder  of  this  volume.  A  second  Punic 
War  might,  nay,  doubtless  would,  have  taken  place,  had  there 
been  no  vow  of  immortal  hate.  But  how  different  would  it 
have  been  from  the  Second  Punic  War !  Hannibal  himself 
would  hardly  have  been  Hannibal  without  that  which  nerved 
his  patriotism,  his  patience,  and  his  courage  from  the  moment  ^ 
that  he  took  its  obligations  upon  him,  even  to  his  latest  breath. 

It  suits  the  purposes  of  Livy  to  say  that  Hannibal  was  a 
man  "  of  worse  than  Punic  faith,  with  no  reverence  for  what 
was  true  or  sacred,  serving  no  God,  and  keeping  no  oath ".2 
The  accusation  is  untrue  in  every  point ;  but  even  Livy  must 
have  himself  admitted  that  to  this  oath,  at  least,  he  was  true, 
that  this  God,  at  least,  he  reverenced,  and  that  this  religious 
mission  he  kept  before  his  mind  and  carried  out  to  the  best 

1  Stanley's  Jewish  Church,  chap.  xiii.  p.   292. 
«Livy,  xjci.  4. 


i66 


CARTHAGE  AND  THE  CARTHAGINIANS, 


of  his  superlative  ability,  from  that  day  even  to  the  day  of 
his  death.  From  his  earliest  infancy  Hannibal  must  have 
drunk  in  the  stirring  stories  which  came  from  Sicily  with 
each  successive  vessel,  of  the  perilous  adventures,  and  the 
heroic  endurance  of  his  father  on  Mount  Ercte  and  Mount 
Eryx.  As  a  child  of  six  or  seven  years  old  he  must  have  set 
ijyes — probably  for  the  first  time  in  his  life — upon  that  father 
returning  from  Sicily,  disappointed,  but  not  disheartened, 
only  to  hear  that  he  was  at  once  called  off  to  do  battle  a 
second  time  for  his  native  land,  and  that,  not  upon  some 
distant  mountain  top  against  his  Roman  enemies,  but  be- 
fore the  very  gates  of  Carthage,  against  her  own  most  ill- 
treated  servants,  and  his  own  most  faithful  followers.  At 
nine  years  of  age  had  come  the  crisis  of  the  child's  life, 
his  solemn  vow.  From  that  time  till  he  was  eighteen  years 
of  age,  with  the  consciousness  of  his  vow  upon  him,  he  had 
watched  in  silence  the  patient  development  of  his  father's 
far-sighted  designs.  From  eighteen  to  twenty-five  his  had 
been,  in  the  main,  the  hand  to  strike,  and  the  will  to  carry 
out,  while  Hasdrubal's  had  been  the  mind  to  plan  and  the 
right  to  command ;  ^  and  now  in  his  twenty-sixth  year  he 
was  called  upon  to  stand  alone,  to  enter  upon  his  great 
inheritance  of  obligation ;  and  by  his  patience  and  his  im- 
petuosity, by  his  powers  of  persuasion  and  of  command,  by 
his  energy  and  his  inventiveness,  by  his  arts  and  by  his  arms, 
to  redeem  his  early  pledge. 

But  why  had  the  Romans  been  looking  calmly  on  while 
the  Barcine  family  were  winning  back  for  themselves,  and 
for  the  state  at  large,  in  Spain,  all,  and  more  than  all,  that 
they  had  lost  in  Sicily  ?    Partly  because  they  knew  too  little 

>Livy,  loe,  cU»  Corn.  Nep.  Hannibal,  8:  "  Equitatui  omni  prafuit"; 
Livy,  xxi.  4:  "Neque  Hasdrubal  alium  queraquam  prscficere  malle  ubi  quid 
fortiter  ac  streiiue  ageudum  esset".  The  reported  return  of  Hannibal  to  Car- 
thage during  a  portion  of  Hasdrubal's  rule  in  Spain,  and  his  summons  thence 
by  Hasdrubal  (Livy,  xxi.  3-4),  is  almost  certainly  the  invention  of  the  annalist 
Q.  Fabius  Pictor,  whom  Livy  here  copied.  Polybius  says  nothing  of  it :  indeed 
he  implies  the  reverse. 


REMISSNESS  OF  ROMANS. 


167 


of  Spain  to  trouble  themselves  about  what  was  going  on  there ; 
partly  because  they  were  thankful  that  Hamilcar,  whom  they 
feared  so  much,  could  find  such  ample  employment  for  his 
abilities  in  a  country  from  which,  under  any  circumstances, 
as  they  thought,  they  need  fear  so  little.  When  at  length 
their  attention  was  arrested  by  the  rapid  progress  of  Hasdru- 
bal, they  contented  themselves  with  forming  an  alliance  with 
one  or  two  half-Greek,  half-Spanish  states  there,  and  with 
binding  Hasdrubal,  so  far  as  a  treaty  could  bind  him,  not  to 
push  his  conquests  beyond  the  line  of  the  Ebro  ^— as  though 
such  a  treaty  could  do  anything  else  than  show  their  own 
weakness  and  short-sightedness,  and  encourage  Hasdrubal  to 
push  his  conquests  fearlessly  up  to  the  imaginary  line,  leaving 
ulterior  measures  to  the  circumstances  which  might  require 
them  !  Such  formal  declarations  of  mutual  suspicion,  whether 
they  refer  to  Spain  or  to  Central  Asia,  bind  no  one,  and  de- 
ceive no  one,  and  they  rarely  survive  the  particular  emer- 
gency which  seems  to  call  for  them. 

There  was,  however,  one  good  reason  why  the  Romans 
should  not  at  that  time  do  more  than  attempt  to  fix  paper 
boundaries  to  the  Carthaginian  dominion  in  Spain,  and  why 
they  should  be  content  if  only  they  could  postpone  the  begin- 
ning of  the  great  contest  for  a  year  or  two,  even  by  the  most 
flimsy  of  guarantees.  They  had  to  face  a  formidable  enemy 
nearer  Rome.2  The  whole  of  the  region  to  the  north  of  the 
Apennines  and  the  Rubicon  still  belonged  to  the  Gauls,  and 
one  of  their  tribes,  the  Boii,  who  dwelt  between  the  Apen- 
nines and  the  Po,  frightened  at  the  work  of  the  popular 
champion  Flaminius— the  division  of  the  lands  which  had 
once  belonged  to  their  Senonian  brethren  amongst  the  poorer 
citizens  of  Rome— and  fearing  that  their  own  turn  would  come 
next,  determined  to  anticipate  the  evil  day.  Sixty  years  had 
passed  since  the  terrible  slaughter  of  the  Boii  at  Lake  Vadimo; 
and  during  these  sixty  years  the  population  had  repaired  its 


1  Pulyb.  iii.  27;   Livy,  xxi.  6. 


'i  I'olyb.  ii.  22,  10,  11. 


i68 


CARTHAGE  AND  THE  CARTHAGINIANS. 


HANNIBAL  BESIEGES  SAGUNTUM. 


169 


losses,  had  forgotten  its  defeats,  or,  if  it  remembered  tlicm, 
remembered  them  only  to  desire  their  revenge.  The  In- 
subrians  who  dwelt  beyond  the  Po  promised  their  aid,  and 
rumour  said  that  their  number  was  being  continually  aug- 
mented by  the  arrival  of  fresh  bands  of  Gauls  from  beyond 
the  Alps.^  A  movement  amongst  the  Gauls  was  known 
by  a  name  of  terror  (tumultus)  even  in  the  later  days  of 
the  Republic,  and  at  this  time  the  memories  of  the  Allia 
and  of  the  burning  of  Rome  were  too  fresh  to  allow  the 
Roman  Senate  to  take  any  half  measures.  A  Gallic  man 
and  woman  were  buried  alive  by  order  of  the  Senate  in 
the  Ox  market,  in  hopes  of  thus  fulfilling  the  dread  oracle 
which  promised  a  share  of  Roman  soil  to  the  Gauls.  A 
levee  en  masse  of  the  military  resources  of  the  confedera- 
tion was  decreed ;  and  those  actually  under  arms  in  various 
parts  of  the  Roman  dominions  are  said  by  Poly  bins  to  have 
reached  the  astonishing  number  of  170,000  men.'-  "Against 
such  a  nation  under  arms,"  as  Poly  bins  significantly  adds, 
Hannibal  was  on  the  point  of  marching  with  20,000  men  !  2 
But  the  terrors  of  the  Gauls  were  destined  on  this  occa- 
sion (B.C.  225)  soon  to  pass  away.  The  Transalpine  bar- 
barians who  fought,  many  of  them,  stark  naked,  with  two 
javelins  (gcBsa^)  in  their  hands,  or  with  swords  that  bent 
at  the  first  blow,  fell  an  easy  prey  to  the  skilful  disposi- 
tions of  the  Roman  armies.  Surrounded  by  the  two  consuls 
near  Telamon  in  Etruria,  they  were  almost  exterminated, 
and  the  Roman  Capitol  was  filled  with  the  standards  and 
the  golden  necklaces  and  the  bracelets  which  were  the 
trophies  of  the  victory.*     The  Romans  followed  up  their 

J  Polyb.  u.  22,  1 ;  23,  1. 

2  Ibid.  ii.  24,  17.     The  total  number  of  men  able  to  bear  arm.s  he  makes 
700,000  ;  besides  70,000  cavalry. 

3  Hence  called   Gaesatse  ;    not  as  Polybius  says,    because   they  served  as 
mercenaries  (ii.  22,  1).     Cf.  Virgil,  ^neid,  viii.  661 :— 

duo  quisque  Alpina  coruscant 

Gresa  manu,  scutis  protecti  corpora  longia. 
*  Polyb.  ii.  31,  5. 


V 


success  with  vigour,  and  transferred  tlie  war  into  the 
enemy's  country.  The  Boians  suffered  the  fate  which 
they  had  anticipated  and  which  they  had  in  vain  tried  to 
avert,  and  the  name  of  Italy  might  be  now  extended,  on 
the  east  of  the  peninsula  at  all  events,  to  the  line  of  the  Po. 

In  the  following  year,  C.  Flaminius,  a  man  whose  name 
has  been  already  mentioned,  and  of  whom  we  shall  hear 
again  at  a  critical  point  in  the  Second  Punic  War,  led  a 
Roman  army,  for  the  first  time  in  their  history,  across  that 
river,  and  attacking  the  Insubrians,  took  their  capital  city, 
Milan ;  ^  while  Marcellus,  the  consul  of  the  year  b.c.  223,  was 
able  to  dedicate,  in  the  temple  of  Jupiter  Feretrius,  the  spolia 
opima  which  he  had  taken  in  single  combat  from  the  Gallic 
chieftain.  The  Romans  riveted  their  grasp  on  their  new 
conquests  by  founding,  more  suOy  two  new  colonies,  Placentia 
and  Cremona,  on  either  side  of  the  Po,  and  by  completing 
that  imperishable  monument  of  their  organising  and  con- 
structive genius,  the  Flaminia  Via,  the  great  military  road  of 
Northern  Italy,  from  Rome  to  Ariminum.2  ^or  were  these 
precautions  taken  a  moment  too  soon ;  for  before  the 
Romans  had  established  themselves  firmly  on  the  line  of  the 
Po,  Hannibal  was  on  the  Ebro ;  and  to  the  surprise  of  the 
Roman  Senate,  and  the  terror  of  not  a  few  among  the  Roman 
citizens,  it  was  now  apparent  for  the  first  time  that  the  ap- 
proaching contest  might  possibly  be  waged,  not  in  Africa  for 
the  possession  of  Carthage,  but  in  Italy  for  the  possession 
of  Rome. 

But  we  must  now  return  to  Hannibal.  During  the  first 
two  years  of  his  command  (b.c.  221-219)  the  young  general 
had  crossed  the  Tagus,  and  had  reduced  the  whole  of  Spain 
to  the  south  of  the  Ebro  to  submission.  But  there  was  one 
exception.  The  town  of  Saguntum,  a  Greek  colony— so  the 
inhabitants  boasted — from  Zacynthus,^  and  near  the  site  of 

»  Polyb.  ii.  34.  15.  2  Pdyb.  iii.  46.  4.  5 ;  Livy,  KpU.  xx. 

^Cf.  Stralx>,  iii.  p.  159;  Livy,  xxi.  7,  .says  that  there  were  also  ilutuliuus 
among  the  fountlers. 


170 


CARTHAGE  AND  THE  CARTHAGINIANS. 


the  modern  Murviedro  (Muri-veteres),  though  far  to  the  south 
of  the  Ebro,  had  formed  an  alliance  with  Rome ;  and  Has- 
drubal,  nay,  Hannibal  himself,  had  up  to  this  time  forborne  to 
attack  it.  Hannibal  knew  that  he  could  choose  his  own 
time  for  picking  a  quarrel,  and  now  the  ground  seemed 
clear  before  him.  To  the  Roman  ambassadors  who  came  to 
warn  him  not  to  attack  an  ally  of  theirs,  he  gave  an  evasive 
answer,  and  referred  them  to  the  Carthaginian  Senate,  while 
he  prosecuted  the  preparations  for  the  siege  with  redoubled 
vigour.  With  what  powers  of  heroic  endurance  Spaniards 
can  defend  themselves  in  their  walled  towns,  all  history,  the 
names  of  Numantia  and  Saragossa  above  all,  can  testify. 
No  other  Indo-Germanic  nation  can  be  compared  with  them 
in  this  respect.  To  find  a  parallel  we  must  have  recourse 
to  some  branch  of  the  great  Semitic  stock,  to  the  Tyrians  or 
the  Carthaginians  themselves,  to  the  Jews  or  to  the  Arabs. 
For  eight  months  the  Saguntines  held  out,  and  when  they 
could  hold  out  no  longer,  the  chiefs  kindled  a  fire  in  the 
market-place,  and  threw  into  it  first  their  valuables  and  then 
themselves.  Hannibal,  who  had  been  seriously  wounded  in 
the  course  of  the  siege,  divided  a  portion  of  the  booty 
amongst  his  troops ;  another  portion  he  despatched  to  Car- 
thage, in  hopes  of  committing  those  who  received  it  beyond 
the  hope  of  recall  to  his  great  enterprise.^  He  then  retreated 
into  winter  quarters  at  New  Carthage,  and  dismissing  his 
Spanish  troops  to  the  enjoyments  of  their  homes  for  the 
winter,  bade  them  return  to  the  camp  at  the  approach  of 
spring,  prepared  for  whatever  it  might  bring  forth. 

The  Romans  had  by  their  dilatoriness  allowed  Saguntum 
to  fall,  but  they  were  now  not  slow  in  demanding  satisfaction 
for  it.  An  embassy  was  sent  direct  to  Carthage  demanding 
the  surrender  of  Hannibal,  the  author  of  the  outrage,  on 
pain  of  instant  war.  The  Romans  fondly  hoped  that  the 
Carthaginian  peace  party  would  seize  the  opportunity  of 

iPolyb.  iii.  15;  Uvy,  xxL  14,  15;  Florus,  ii.  (5,  6. 


WAR  DECLARED. 


171 


compassing  their  chief  end  at  the  easy  price  of  the  sur- 
render of  so  troublesome  a  servant,  or  master,  as  was 
Hannibal.  But  the  gold  of  Hannibal  had  done  its  work, 
and  was  more  potent  that  Hanno's  honeyed  tongue.  The 
peace  party  dared  hardly  to  mutter  their  half-hearted  coun- 
sels ;  and  when  Q.  Fabius,  the  chief  of  the  embassy,  held 
up  his  toga,  saying,  "  I  carry  here  peace  and  war ;  choose 
ye  which  ye  will  have  !  " — "  Give  us  whichever  you  please," 
rephed  the  Carthaginians.  "  War,  then,"  said  Fabius  ;  and 
the  decision  was  greeted,  as  is  usual  in  times  of  such  excite- 
ment, by  the  short-sighted  acclamations  of  the  masses.^ 
They  feel  the  enthusiasm  of  the  moment ;  they  do  not  realise 
its  tremendous  responsibility.  They  see  with  their  minds' 
eye  the  pomp  and  pride  and  circumstance  of  war ;  they  do 
not  see  its  horrors  and  its  devastations.  They  hear  the  din 
of  preparation ;  they  are  deaf,  till  it  is  too  late,  to  the  cry  of 
agony  or  to  the  wail  of  the  bereaved ;  else,  war  would  never, 
as  experience  proves  it  so  often  is,  be  welcomed  as  a  boon ; 
it  would  be  submitted  to  only  as  the  most  dire  necessity. 

The  die  was  now  cast,  and  the  arena  was  cleared  for  the 
foremost  man  of  his  race  and  his  time,  perhaps  the  mightiest 
military  genius  of  any  race  and  of  any  time — one  with  whom 
in  this  particular  it  were  scant  justice  to  compare  either 
Alexander  or  Caesar,  or  Marlborough  or  Wellington,  and  who, 
immeasurably  above  him  as  he  is  in  all  moral  qualities,  may, 
on  the  score  of  military  greatness,  be  named  without  injustice 
in  tlie  same  breath  as  Napoleon,  and  Napoleon  alone. 


iPolyb.  iiL  33,  1-4. 


172 


CARTHAGE  AND  THE  CARTHAGINIANS, 


CHAPTER  X. 

SECOND   PUNIC    WAR. 

(B.C.  218-201.) 

PASSAGE  OF  THE  RHONE  AND  THE  ALPS,  d.c.  218. 

Preparations  of  Hannibal— He  determines  to  go  by  land— NuuiUrs  of  his  army 
—His  march  through  Gaul— His  passage  of  the  Rhone— Vagueness  of 
ancient  writers  in  geographical  matters— Passage  over  Alps  selected  by 
Hannibal— Route  by  which  he  approached  it— Tlie  first  ascent— Valley  of 
the  Isire— The  main  ascent— The  summit— Hannibal  addresses  his  troops 
— Tlie  descent— Interest  attaching  to  the  passage  of  the  Alps— Its  cost  and 
results— The  "  War  of  Hannibal ". 

There  was  still  a  brief  interval  of  preparation  before  the 
rival  nations  could  meet  in  battle  array,  and  Hannibal 
utilised  it  to  the  utmost.  It  was  late  in  the  year  B.C.  219. 
He  had  already,  as  has  been  mentioned,  dismissed  his 
Spanish  troops  for  the  winter  to  their  homes,  well  assured 
that  they  would  return  with  redoubled  ardour  in  the  spring. 
But  the  hours  of  his  own  enforced  retirement  were  not  given 
to  idleness.  He  took  measures  for  the  safety  of  Spain  dur- 
ing his  absence  by  garrisoning  it  with  fifteen  thousand  trusty 
Libyans,  while  Libya  he  garrisoned  with  as  many  trusty 
Spaniards,  thus  making,  in  a  certain  sense,  each  country  a 
security  for  the  good  behaviour  of  the  other,  i  The  supreme 
command  in  Spain  he  committed  to  his  younger  brother, 
Hasdrubal ;  and  during  the  winter  friendly  messages  passed 
and  repassed  between  New  Carthage  and  the  chieftains  of 
Transalpine  and  Cisalpine  Gaul.^     It  is  said  tha-  negotiations 


iPolyb.  iii.  33,  5-8 ;  Livy,  xjii.  'Zl'£L 


»Polyb.  iii.  34,  1-6. 


to 


IH 


•JO 


40 


I  TA  l.Y 

TO    UJ.rSTR.VTE    THE 
SEIOND  rUNIC  WAK. 


^ 


I     I 


As; 


as 


/.Itlltll.ltil,   •  I.,,,  I,       >\    /.•         liUl.j.l.  S.\i)'ll.         '.'j/,'/".-!     *    ■    ■■• 


/.. ../ 


I 


HANNIBAL  RESOLVES  TO  ATTACK  BY  LAND.        173 


l! 


\ 


l! 


were  carried  on  even  with  Antigonus,  King  of  Macedonia, 
to  arrange  for  a  combined  attack  on  Italy  from  east  and  west 
at  once. 

But   was   Italy   to   be   reached   by   land   or   sea?    The 
Phoenicians  had  not  yet  lost  their  maritime  skill ;  the  sea  was 
their  home ;  and,  had  the  Carthaginians  so  willed  it,  a  fleet 
might  have  been  collected  in  the  harbour  of  New  Carthage 
which,  probably,  could  have  bidden  defiance  to  any  that  the 
Romans  could  have  raised  against  it.     The  dangerous  Sicilian 
waters,  which  had  proved  so  fatal  in  the  First  Punic  War, 
might  be  avoided  in  the  Second ;  and  even  if  the  Carthaginian 
mariners  had  not  the  heart  to  take  the  passage  across  the 
open  sea  to  Italy,  a  coasting  voyage  of  some  few  days  might 
have  landed  them  safely  in  one  of  the  Ligurian  or  North 
Etruscan  harbours ;  and,  as  the  event  proved,  the  Romans 
would  have  then  been  ill-prepared  to  receive  them.     Why, 
then,  did  Hannibal,  the  greatest  product  of  the  Phoenician 
race,  perhaps  of  all  the  Semitic  races— and  certainly  the 
noblest  embodiment  of  the  national  spirit  and  will  of  Carthage 
—  prefer  a  land  journey  which  involved  the  crossing  of  broad 
and  rapid  rivers,  of  lofty  and  of  unknown  mountain  chains, 
and  amid  races  proverbial  for  their  fickleness  and  faithless- 
ness ;  a  journey  which  would  take  months  instead  of  days, 
and  which,  if  it  failed  at  all,  must  fail  altogether?    Was  it 
that  the  Carthaginian  government  was  backward  or  unable 
to  supply  the  ships,  or  was  it  that  Hannibal  miscalculated 
the  distance  and  under-estimated  the  dangers  of  the  route 
which  he  chose  ?     Perhaps  both  in  part.     It  is  no  slur  upon 
the  military  qualities  of  the  great  Carthaginian  to  suppose 
that  he  did  not  fully  realise  the  difficulties  of  the  task  he 
was  undertaking,   a   task   which  no  description  given  by 
interested   and  friendly  mountaineers  could   have  brought 
adequately  home  to  him.     But  what,  no  doubt,  especially 
determined  him  to  make  the  attempt  was  the  alliance  which 
he  had  already  concluded  with  the  formidable  tribes  of  Gaul 
itself  and  of  Northern  Italy.     More  than  once  in  history  these 


\\ 


174 


CARTHAGE  AND  THE  CARTHAGINIANS. 


'\\ 


same  Gauls,  unaided  and  undisciplined,  by  their  mere  numbers 
and  their  valour,  had  imperilled  the  very  existence  of  Rome ; 
and  of  what  might  they  not  be  capable  when  fighting  for  their 
own  existence  against  her  ever-encroaching  power,  and  when 
led  on  by  himself,  with  his  Libyan  and  Spanish  veterans  to 
form  the  nucleus  of  his  army,  and  with  his  Numidian  horse 
to  scour  the  country,  or  to  follow  up  a  defeat?     Swooping 
down  from  the  Alps  on  the  rich  fields  of  Italy,  his  numbers 
swelled  by  the  reinforcements  he  would  have  gathered  in  his 
course  from  Farther  Gaul,  he  would,  by  a  first  success,  rally  all 
their  brethren  in  Hither  Gaul  to  his  standard.    The  basis  of  his 
operations  for  the  Italian  war  would  then  be  no  longer  Spain 
or  Gaul,  but  Italy  itself;    and  it  would  be  strange  indeed  if 
the  Samnites  and  the  Etruscans,  the  Umbrians  and  the  Lucan- 
ians,  whom  Rome  had  so  recently  and  so  hardly  conquered, 
did  not  flock  to  his  standard  as  he  swept  victoriously  on 
towards  the  south  to  wreak  condign  vengeance  on  the  common 
oppressor  of  them  all.     Such  were  the  hopes,  not  altogether 
ill-founded,  with  which  Hannibal  undertook  the  gigantic  en- 
terprise that  astonished  and  still  astonishes  the  world. 

One  circumstance  there  was,  unknown  probably  to  any 
but  to  his  most  intimate  friends,  which  must  have  impressed 
a  mind  so  religious  as  was  Hannibal's  with  the  conviction  that 
where  human  foresight  failed,  as  fail  sometimes  it  must,  in 
the  task  which  lay  before  him,  he  would  be  supported  by  a 
power  which  was  not  his  own.  In  the  course  of  the  winter 
which  had  just  passed,  he  had  left  his  head-quarters  at  New 
Carthage  that  he  might  visit  Gades.  It  was  a  religious 
pilgrimage ;  for  at  Gades,  as  has  been  already  mentioned, 
was  the  famous  temple  of  Melcarth,  the  patron  of  Phoenicians 
wheresoever  they  might  be  found ;  and  there  upon  the  altar 
of  the  god  to  whom  his  father  had  sacrificed  eighteen  years 
before  when  leaving  Carthage,  he  too  now  made  his  offerings 
when  on  the  point  of  starting  on  an  expedition  more  distant 
and  more  perilous  still.  There  too  he  renewed  the  solemn 
vow  which  for  eighteen  years  he  had  cherished  in  his  heart, 


II 


THE  DREAM  OF  HANNIBAL. 


«75 


and  which  he  was  now  about  to  redeem  in  face  of  all  the 
world.     He  rejoined  his  army  at  New  Carthage  and  was 
already,  as  it  would  seem,  nearing  the  Ebro,  the  boundary, 
as  by  treaty  fixed,  between  Carthage  and  Rome,  the  point 
from  which,  when  once  it  was  passed,  there  would  be  no 
return ;  when  in  the  dead  of  night — so  he  told  his  constant 
companion  Silenus— he  dreamed  that  he  was  summoned  by 
the  supreme  god  of  his  country  to  the  council  of  all  the  gods 
and  goddesses,  who,  then  and  there,  laid  upon  him  the  task 
of  invading  Italy,  and  assigned  him  a  guide  for  the  journey. 
The  guide  bade  him  follow  where  he  led  and  look  not  behind 
him.     Hannibal  obeyed  for  a  time ;  but  at  last  curiosity  pre- 
vailed, and  looking  back  he  saw  a  huge  and  shapeless  monster 
wreathed  with  serpents,  which  moved  ever  onwards,  laying 
vineyards  and  plantations  and  houses  prostrate  in  its  wild 
and  irresistible  career.     In  amazement,  he  asked  what  this 
monstrous  form  might  be.     "  It  is  the  Devastation  of  Italy," 
said  his  guide.     **  March  straight  on,  and  care  not  for  what 
lies  behind  thee."     And  so,  conscious  that  he  was  carrying 
the  devastation  of  Italy  in  his  train,  and  that  each  step  would 
bring  him  nearer  to  the  fulfilment  of  his  vow,  he  prepared  to 
go  straight  on  through  angry  torrents  and  over  lofty  mountain 
chains  at  the  bidding  of  the  god  of  his  fathers. ^ 

The  army  with  which  he  had  set  out  from  New  Carthage 
early  in  the  summer  of  B.C.  218,  consisted  of  ninety  thousand 
foot,  of  twelve  thousand  horse,  and  of  thirty-seven  elephants ; 
a  force  far  smaller  than  that  which  the  Carthaginians  had 
often  employed  before  in  their  petty  conflicts  with  the  Si- 
cihan  Greeks.^  He  crossed  the  Ebro,  and,  not  without  heavy 
loss  to  himself,  subdued  the  hostile  Spanish  tribes  beyond  that 
river  who,  so  far  as  a  treaty  could  make  them  so,  were  already 


1  Cicero,  De  JJiv.  i.  24 ;  Livy.  xxi.  22 ;  Silius  Italicus,  iii.  158-213. 

3  The  numbers  given  in  the  text  rest  on  the  statement  inscribed,  on  a  brazen 
pillar,  in  the  temple  of  Juno  Laeinia,  by  Hannibal  himself,  just  before  he  left 
Italy  for  Africa.  This  inscription  was  read  by  Polybius.  Polyb.  ii.  33,  18, 
^nd  56,  4. 


i| 


176 


CARTHAGE  AND  THE  CARTHAGINIANS, 


HANNIBAL'S  PASSAGE  OF  THE  RHONE. 


177 


f"ainSt?r''  ""^' ''  *'^tK°'»''»«  believed,  a  fcrm  bulwark 
against  Carthaginian  encroachments.  Leaving  Hanno  with  ».n 

tho„sandfootandonethousandhorsetoholdtLco„„n^^ 
he  had  conquered  he  actually  sent  back  to  their  homes tn 
thousand  more  of  his  already  much-thinned  army,  men  whom 

ftearted  and  therefore  cared  not  to  retain  in  hisservice      Then 
confident  m  those  that  remained,  and  in  the  future,  he  crossed 
the  Pyrenees,  and  passing  by  Ruscino  (RoussillonT;  Zt 
opposition  from  the  Gallic  tribes,  reached  Ihe  Rhone  n  sa  ety  f 
The  Romans,  as  behindhand  in  their  arms  as  in  the  r 
diplomacy.^'  still,  it  would  seem,  believed  that  the  con  J 
which  was  beginning  would  be  fought  out  at  a  distance  from 
their  own  shores.     Had  not  the  battle-field  of  the  contendrn^ 
forces  been  fixed  by  treaty  many  years  beLe    n  nS "f 
Spam,  and  was  not  P.  Cor.  Scipio  about  to  proceed  th'ther  ™ 
due  course  with  sixty  ships  and  with  an  army  to  confine  the 

consul,  Tib.  Sempron.us,  was  to  cross  into  Sicily,  to  transfer 
the  war  thence  to  Africa,  and  to  bring  it  to  a  rapid  concln 
sion  there  by  besieging  Carthage  itself  ?^3    Scip'o  as  had  b^in 

Marseilles,  learned  to  his  extreme  surprise  that  Hannibal  had 
ah-eady  crossed  the  Ebro  and  the  Pyrenees,  and  was  in  fult 
march  through  Gaul.     The  truth  now  da;ned  Zn  h  m 
He  sent  out  three  hundred  of  his  bravest  cavalry  wHh  Ce  "o 
guides  to  look  for  Hannibal,  and  they  soon  metLr  bund    'd 

a  iTe  pir    T  t°  ""^  '"''  '''^''^''^'^  by  HannSf:' 
^o  thf  ^r   ;  ^^!  '°'°"°''''  ''^'"^  ^°«"«d  the  Romans 

the  ?aH>i       '^''  """^  ^r"^*^  *«  ^^''^-^'i^g  Numidians  to 
the  Carthaginian  camp;  but  they  took  back  to  their  genera! 

the  starthng  news  that  Hannibal  had  already  left  the  Rhone 

behind  him,  and  that  they  had  seen  the  Carthaginians  en! 

'  Polyb.  iii.  35  and  40;  Livy,  xxi.  23-24 


camped  on  its  eastern  side.^  Had  Scipio  reached  the  Rhone  a 
week  sooner,  as  he  might  well  have  done,  he  would  have  found 
allies  there,  whose  aid,  combined  with  the  advantages  of  their 
position,  might  have  enabled  him  to  check  the  further  advance  of 
the  Carthaginians ;  for  though  Hannibal,  by  his  previous  nego- 
tiations, had  cleared  the  way  for  himself  to  the  river's  edge,  yet, 
owing  to  the  difficulty  of  getting  boats  to  cross  it,  he  had  given 
the  smouldering  opposition  time  to  blaze  forth,  and  a  large  force 
of  Gauls  had  assembled  on  the  other  side  to  oppose  his  passage. 
Well  knowing  that  a  prolonged  delay  might  render  the 
Alps  impassable  for  that  year,  and,  if  for  that  year,  perhaps 
for  ever,  Hannibal  had  sent  Hanno  by  night  with  a  consid- 
erable force  two  short  days'  march  up  the  river  to  a  point 
whence  he  could  cross  unopposed.  After  a  brief  pause  to 
refresh  his  men,  Hanno  moved  down  the  left  of  the  stream 
and  kindled  the  beacon  fires  for  which  Hannibal  was  anxi- 
ously waiting.  He  had  already  laden  with  his  light-armed 
horsemen  the  boats  which  he  had  hired  from  the  natives, 
while  the  canoes  which  he  had  extemporised  were  filled  with 
the  most  active  of  his  infantry,  and  he  now  gave  the  order 
to  put  across.  The  signal  was  obeyed  with  alacrity;  and 
the  horses  swam  the  stream,  attached  by  ropes  to  the  boats 
which  carried  their  riders.  Down  poured  the  barbarians  in 
disorder  from  their  fortified  camp,  fully  confident  that  they 
could  bar  the  passage;  but  the  flaming  camp  behind  them, 
and  the  fierce  onset  of  Hanno's  force  upon  their  rear,  showed 
them  that  they  had  been  out-generalled,  and  they  fled  in  con- 
fusion, leaving  Hannibal  to  transport  the  rest  of  his  army  in 
peace.2  The  army  rested  that  night  on  the  Italian  side  of  the 
river,  and  on  the  following  day  the  most  unwieldy,  and  not 
the  least  sagacious  part  of  his  force,  the  thirty-seven  elephants, 
were  cajoled,  as  at  Messana,  in  the  First  Punic  War,  after 
the  battle  of  Panormus,  into  entrusting  themselves  to  a  raft. 
Some,  in  their  Wind  panic,  leapt  into  the  mid  river  drown- 

1  Polyb.  iii.  45 ;  Livy,  xxi.  29. 
-Polyb.  iii.  42.  43  ;  Livy,  xxi.  27-28. 
12 


178 


CARTHAGE  AND  THE  CARTHAGINIANS. 


ing  their  drivers ;  but  raising  instinctively  their  trunks  above 
their  heads,  they  reached  the  opposite  bank  in  safety.^ 

But  the  real  difficulties  of  the  undertaking  were  only 
now  beginning.  The  assurances  given  by  the  Boian  or  the 
Insubrian  messengers  who  had  just  arrived,  that  the  moun- 
tain passes  were  not  so  difficult,  and  the  few  inspiriting 
words  addressed  by  Hannibal  to  his  troops,  fell  upon  will- 
ing because  upon  ill-informed  ears.  How  little  accurate 
knowledge  of  the  localities  through  which  he  had  to  pass 
Hannibal  can  have  gained  even  by  the  most  careful  inquiries 
is  evident  from  the  obscurity  which  has  always  hung  over 
his  march  itself.  That  march  riveted  the  attention  of  the 
world ;  it  was  described  by  eye-witnesses,  and  one  great 
historian,  at  least,  who  lived  within  fifty  years  of  the  events 
he  was  recording,  took  the  trouble  to  go  over  the  ground 
and  verify  for  himself  the  reports  which  had  reached  him. 
Yet  many  of  its  details,  and  even  its  general  direction,  are 
still  matters  of  dispute.  The  fact  is  that  the  ancients,  even 
the  most  observant  of  them,  had  no  eye  for  the  minute  ob- 
servation of  nature,  and  no  wish  to  describe  its  phenomena 
in  detail.  Happy  epithets  indeed,  which  live  for  all  time, 
we  find  in  the  poets  of  ancient  as  well  as  of  modern  times, 
but  there  is  little  minute  analysis  even  in  them,  while,  with 
historians  and  other  prose  writers,  stock  epithets  almost 
always  do  duty.  An  island  is  always,  or  nearly  always, 
lofty,'^  a  mountain  pass  always  inaccessible,  a  mountain  slope 
always  shppery  and  little  more.  It  may  be  doubted  whether 
in  the  whole  range  of  classical  Hterature  half-a-dozen  land- 
scapes have  been  so  accurately  described  as  to  enable  us  to 
identify  them  in  anything  like  detail.  Accordingly  there  is 
hardly  a  pass  in  the  whole  Western  Alps  which  has  not  been 
made — as  though  they  were  cities  contending  for  the  honour 

1  Polyb.  iii.  46,  12 ;  Livy.  xxi.  38. 

*Cf.  Virgil,  Mn.  iii.  76:  "Mycouo  e  celsa,"  an  island  which  really  lies 
very  low,  and  is  actually  called  *'  huniilis,"  by  Ov.  Met.  vii.  463 ;  cf.  jKa. 
ix.  716:  "Prochyta  alta".  See  the  remarks  ol  Ihni:,  lioman  Hist.  ii.  171- 
173 ;  and  Arnold,  iii.  p.  478,  479. 


DISPUTES  ABOUT  PASSAGE  OVER  THE  ALPS.        179 


of  a  Homer's  birth — to  lay  claim,  with  some  show  of  reason, 
to  be  the  scene  of  Hannibal's  march.  Yet  broad  geographical 
facts,  and  a  few  data  of  time  and  place  given  by  Polybius, 
enable  us,  in  the  light  of  recent  researches,  to  restrict  the 
choice  to  two,  if  not  to  one,  of  the  total  number.^ 

The  route  by  the  sea  coast,  though  it  presented  the  fewest 
physical  difficulties,  Hannibal  avoided,  probably  because  to 
enter  Italy  by  it  would,  he  thought,  involve  him  in  im- 
mediate collision  with  the  Ligurians  as  well  as  the  Roman 
armies,  and  would  allow  the  Gauls  to  await  the  issue  of 
his  first  attack,  instead  of  compelling  them  to  throw  in 
their  lot  at  once  for  better  or  worse  with  him.  The  pass 
over  the  Cottian  Alps,  Mont  Genevre,  which  seems  to  be 
the  route  supported  by  Livy  and  by  Strabo,  was  nearest 
indeed  to  the  spot  where  Hannibal  had  crossed  the  Rhone ; 
but  the  approaches  to  it  were  difficult,  and  it  would  have 
landed  Hannibal  in  the  territory  of  the  Taurini,  a  Ligurian 
tribe  which  was  just  then  at  war  with  his  friends  the 
Insubrians.^'  The  Great  St.  Bernard  and  the  Simplon  are 
much  too  remote  for  the  distances  given,  with  much  pre- 
cision, by  Polybius.  The  choice,  therefore,  seems  narrowed 
to  the  two  intermediate  passes  of  the  Little  Mont  Genis,  to 
the  north  of  the  Cottian,  and  the  Little  St.  Bernard,  to  the 

*See  especially  DissertcUion  on  the  Passage  of  Hannibal  over  the  Alps,  by 
Wickhara  and  Cramer  (1820) ;  The  March  of  Hannibal  from  the  RhoTie  to  the 
Alps,  by  H.  L.  Long  (1831) ;  Italian  Valleys  of  the  Pennine  Alps,  by  S.  W. 
King  (1858) ;  The  Alps  of  Hannibal,  by  W.  J.  Law  (1866).  General  Melville 
was  the  earliest  mo<lern  advocate  of  the  Little  St.  Bernard  route.  He  was 
followed  by  De  Luc  in  1818,  and  Long  and  Law  have  endorsed  and  confirmed 
their  conclusions.  Among  recent  historians  of  Rome,  Niebuhr,  Arnold,  Momm- 
8en,  and  Ihne  are  unanimous  for  the  Little  St.  Bernard ;  and  the  discovery 
of  elephants'  bones  on  this  pass,  reported  as  far  back  as  1769,  by  the  advocate 
of  another  route,  is  an  additional  confirmation  of  the  view  taken  in  the  text. 
The  chief  modern  advocate  of  the  Mont  Cenis  route  is  the  Rev.  R.  Ellis  (1867), 
and  his  views  are  adopted  by  Ball  in  his  Alpine  Guide,  p.  55-56.  Antonio 
(jallenga,  the  historian  of  Piedmont,  still  supports  the  claims  of  Mont  Genevre, 
while  several  French  and  German  writers— Desgrauges,  Duparcq,  and  Zander — 
|)rcfer  the  Monte  Vise  route 

*Uvy.  xxi.  39. 


iSo 


CARTHAGE  AND  THE  CARTHAGINIANS, 


north  of  the  Graian  Alps.  Mont  Cenis  appears  to  ha^ve 
been  unknown  to  the  ancients  as  a  practicable  passage; 
moreover  it  would,  like  Mont  Gen^vre,  have  brought  Han- 
nibal down  among  hostile  Ligurian  tribes.  The  Little  St. 
Bernard,  on  the  other  hand,  was  not  only  the  easiest  of 
approach  and  one  of  the  lowest  available  passes,  being  only 
7000  feet  high,  but  once  and  again  in  history  it  had  already 
poured  the  Celts  of  the  north  upon  the  plains  of  Italy.  It 
was  in  fact  the  highway  between  Transalpine  and  Cisalpine 
Gaul.  Where  Celtic  tribes  had  passed  before,  the  expected 
ally  and  deliverer  of  the  Celts  might  well  pass  now,  and  with 
this  hypothesis  nearly  all  the  facts  given  by  Poly  bins  will  be 
found  to  agree.  On  the  Italian  side  of  the  pass  lay  the  Salas- 
sians,  the  hereditary  friends  of  the  Insubrians,  who  would  give 
their  messengers  as  they  passed  to  and  fro  a  safe  conduct,  and 
would  secure  to  Hannibal  himself  the  rest  and  refreshment 
which,  after  his  own  passage,  he  would  so  sorely  need.* 

But  if  we  conclude,  as  the  evidence  on  the  whole  seems 
to  entitle  us  to  do,  that  the  Little  St.  Bernard  was  the  pass 
selected  by  Hannibal,  there  is  still  some  difficulty  in  deter- 
mining the  route  by  which  he  approached  it.  He  had 
crossed  the  Ehone  at  a  spot  **  nearly  four  days*  journey 
from  the  sea,"  probably  "the  reach,"-  above  Roquemaure. 
He  marched  thence,  we  are  told,  "  four  days  up  the  river," 
to  the  spot  where  the  Isere  joins  the  Rhone,  the  apex  of 
the  triangle,  afterwards  called  the  "  Island  of  the  AUo- 
broges,"  and  compared  by  Polybius,  with  his  rough  geo- 
graphical notions,  to  the  delta  of  the  Nile.^  It  was  then, 
as  now,   populous   and   well  cultivated,  and   Hannibal,  it 

1  The  contest  ou  the  subject  was  hot  even  in  the  time  of  Livy  (xxi,  38) ; 
yet  it  is  clear  from  him  that  CsbHus  Antipater,  who  followed  the  account  of 
Silenus,  the  companion  of  Hannibal,  adopted  the  Little  St.  Bernard  route. 
The  "Cremonis  jugum,"  there  spoken  of,  is  clearly  "the  Cramout,"  the 
mountain  on  the  Italian  side  of  the  Little  St.  Bernard,  rising  on  the  left  side 
of  the  Baltea  valley,  between  it  and  the  Alle'e  Blanche. 

'Polyb.  iii.  42,  1,  Kara  rriv  airA^f  ftuatv, 

»Polyb.  iii.  49,  6-7;  cf.  Uvy,  xxi.  31. 


ISLAND  OF  THE  ALLOBROGES. 


i8i 


would  seem,  preferred  to  continue  his  march  northward 
through  its  champaign  country  rather  than  to  take  the 
shorter  route  eastward  by  following  at  once  the  mountain 
valley  of  the  Isere.  There  would  be  enough  of  mountain 
climbing  later  on.  Accordingly  he  followed  the  course  of 
"  the  river  " — a  phrase  which  can  hardly  mean  anything  but 
the  Rhone — northward,  as  far  probably  as  Vienne ;  then,  tm:n- 
ing  eastward,  he  took  the  part  of  one  of  two  rival  brothers 
whom  he  found  contending  for  the  throne,  and  so  obtained 
from  him  supplies  of  food  and  clothing  and  trusty  guides. ^ 
Then,  once  more  striking  the  Rhone  where  it  leaves  the 
frontiers  of  Savoy,  he  reached  the  first  outwork  of  the  Alps, 
probably  the  Mont  du  Chat,  a  chain  4000  feet  high.2 

Hannibal  had  taken  ten  days  to  cross  the  Island  of  the 
Allobroges,  and  had  hitherto  met  with  no  difficulty  or  mishap 
of  any  kind  ;  but  here,  where  the  great  physical  difficulties 
began,  the  first  symptoms  of  open  hostility  appeared  also. 
The  native  guides  had  returned  to  their  master,  and  amidst 
the  precipitous  ravines  the  Numidian  cavalry  were  no  longer 
formidable.  The  one  track  over  the  mountains,  the  Chevelu 
Pass,  was  occupied  by  the  mountaineers  in  force  ;  but  Han- 
nibal, learning  that  it  was  their  practice  to  return  to  their 
homes  for  the  night,  lighted  his  camp  fires,  as  usual,  at 
nightfall,  and  leaving  the  bulk  of  his  army  behind,  climbed 
the  steep  in  the  darkness  with  the  most  active  of  his  troops 
and  occupied  the  position  which  had  just  been  vacated  by 
the  natives.  Slowly  and  toilfully  on  the  following  day  his 
army  wound  up  the  pass,  aware  that  Hannibal  was  waiting 
to  receive  them  at  its  head,  but  exposed  to  loss  and  to 
annoyance  at  every  step  from  the  attacks  of  the  enemy  who 
moved  along  the  heights  above.  The  path  was  rough  and 
narrow,  and  the  horses  and  the  sumpter  animals,  unused  to 
such  ground  and  scared  by  the  confusion,  lost  their  footing, 
and  either  rolled  headlong  down  the  precipices  themselves,  or 

1  Polyb.  iii.  49.  8-12;  Livy,  xxi.  31. 
•-ipolyb.  iii.  50,  1. 


l82 


CARTHAGE  AND  THE  CARTHAGINIANS. 


.:* 


jostling  against  their  fellows  in  the  agony  of  their  wounds, 
rolled  them  down  with  the  baggage  which  they  earned.  To 
an  army  crossing  a  lofty  mountain,  baggage  and  provisions 
are  a  matter  of  life  and  death,  and  Hannibal  risked  his  own 
life  and  those  of  his  few  brave  followers  to  save  the  rest. 
Charging  along  the  heights,  he  put  the  enemy  to  flight,  and 
the  immediate  peril  was  surmounted.  He  then  attacked  the 
town  (Bourget?)  which  lay  at  the  farther  end  of  the  pass. 
Its  inhabitants  were  still  on  the  mountains,  but  he  found 
within  its  walls  a  supply  of  provisions  for  three  days,  and 
recovered  some  of  his  horses  and  men  who  had  been  taken 
prisoners  in  the  passage. ^  It  was  not  likely  that  he  would 
be  molested  by  these  mountaineers,  at  all  events,  again. 

For  the  next  three  days  Hannibal  followed  the  Tarentaise, 
or  the  rich  valley  of  the  Isere,  which  he  had  struck  on  his 
descent  from  the  pass,  and  there  was  now  no  symptom  of 
hostility  or  opposition.  On  the  fourth  day,  the  people  whose 
homesteads  he  was  passing  presented  themselves  to  him 
bearing  garlands  and  branches  of  trees,  the  signs  of  goodwill, 
and  proffering  provisions,  nay,  even  hostages,  as  pledges  of 
their  sincerity.  But  the  wary  Carthaginian  was  not  to  be 
deceived  by  a  foe  who  offered  him  gifts.  On  the  other  hand, 
it  would  not  do  roughly  to  refuse  the  alliance  which  they 
offered  him,  for  that  would  be  to  make  them  enemies  at 
once  and  to  prevent  the  tribes  beyond,  who  might  be  better 
disposed,  from  joining  him;  on  the  other  hand,  he  would 
trust  nothing  to  them.  He  received  them  kindly,  accepted 
their  provisions  and  their  hostages,  but  pursued  his  march 
as  one  prepared  for  treachery.  The  cavalry  and  beasts  of 
burden  led  the  way,  and  at  some  distance  behind  came 
Hannibal  himself  with  his  infantry.  They  were  now  enter- 
ing the  defile  which  leads  up  to  the  main  mountain  wall  of  the 
Alps,  the  one  barrier  which  still  separated  Hannibal  from  the 
land  of  his  hopes,  and  the  cliffs  rose  more  precipitously  above, 

1 1'olyb.  iii.  50,  51  ;  Livy,  xxl  33. 


THE  MAIN  ASCENT. 


183 


and  the  torrent  (the  Rcclus)  foamed  more  angrily  below,  as 
they  neared  the  spot  where  both  would  be  left  behind.^ 

Hardly  were  the  infantry  well  entangled  in  the  defile, 
when  the  stones  which  came  thundering  down  from  the 
heights  above  showed  that  the  barbarians  had  at  length 
thrown  off  the  mask.  The  destruction  of  the  whole  army 
seemed  imminent ;  but  Hannibal  drew  up,  or  rather  drew 
back,  his  part  of  it  to  an  escarpment  of  white  rock,2  which  rose 
in  a  strong  position  facing  the  entrance  of  the  gorge,  far 
enough  back,  it  would  seem,  to  be  out  of  reach  of  the  de- 
scending stones,  but  not  so  far  as  that  he  could  not  keep  the 
attention  of  the  enemy  concentrated  on  himself.  The  cavalry 
and  sumpter  animals  at  the  head  of  the  column  pressed  on 
almost  unmolested  till  they  emerged  into  more  open  and 
therefore  safer  ground.  Had  it  only  occurred  to  the  barba- 
rians to  direct  their  attacks  on  them,  the  horses  plunging,  in 
their  terror,  on  that  narrow  and  treacherous  pathway  would 
have  precipitated  each  other  into  the  abyss  below.  The 
white  gypsum  rock— Za  roche  blanche  as  it  is  called  by  the 
natives— still  stands  conspicuous  in  front  of  the  grey  limestone 
mountain  which  towers  above  it ;  and  here,  if  at  no  earlier 
point  in  the  route,  the  traveller  may  well  feel  that  he  is 
treading  the  very  ground  which  Hannibal  trod,  and  looking 
upon  the  solemn  assemblage  of  peaks  and  pinnacles,  of 
mountain  torrent  and  of  mountain  valley,  on  which  his  eager 
eye  must  have  rested  in  this  supreme  moment  of  anxiety  and 
peril.  Here  Hannibal  stood  to  arms,  with  half  his  forces, 
the  whole  night  through ;  and  the  following  morning  every- 
thing like  organised  resistance  had  disappeared  from  the 
cliffs  which  flanked  the  pass.  And  on  the  ninth  day  the 
whole  cavalcade  reached  the  summit  in  safety. 

It  was  only  nine  days  since  Hannibal  had  begun  the  first 
ascent  of  the  Alps,  but  they  were  days  of  hard  work  and 
danger,  and  he  now  rested  for  a  time  to  recruit  his  troops, 

»  Polyb.  iii.  52 ;  Livy,  xxi.  34. 

2Polyb.  iii.  53,  5,  irepi  «  kevKontrpov  itxvpov. 


iS4 


CARTHAGE  AND  THE  CARTHAGINIANS, 


HANNIBAL  ADDRESSES  HIS  TROOPS. 


185 


f» 


and  to  allow  stragglers  to  rejoin  him.  But  no  stragglers 
came.  Those  who  had  dropped  behind  from  exhaustion  or 
from  their  wounds,  on  such  a  route,  were  not  hkely  to  be 
heard  of  more.  Only  some  beasts  of  burden  which  had 
lagged  behind,  or  had  sHpped  down  the  rocks,  had,  in  the 
struggle  for  bare  life,  managed  to  regain  their  feet,  and 
following  instinctively  the  footprints  of  the  army,  now  came 
draggling  in  one  after  the  other,  half-dead  from  starvation 
and  fatigue.^  It  was  a  sorry  spot  on  which  to  recruit.  It  was 
late  in  October  ;  the  snows  were  gathering  thick  on  the  peaks 
above  the  Col ;  and  the  troops  who  had  been  drawn  from 
burning  Africa  or  from  sunny  Spain  shivered  in  the  mountain 
air  which  is  keen  and  frosty  even  in  the  height  of  summer. 
Eest  only  gave  them  time  to  recollect  the  difficulties  through 
which  they  had  so  hardly  passed,  and  to  picture,  perhaps 
to  magnify,  the  perils  which  were  still  to  come. 

Symptoms  of  despondency  appeared ;  but  Hannibal,  seizing 
the  opportunity,  called  his  troops  together  and  addressed 
them  in  a  few  stirring  words.  There  was  one  topic  of  con- 
solation and  only  one.  Below  their  feet  lay  one  of  the 
Italian  valleys,  and  winding  far  away  among  its  narrow  lawns 
and  humble  homesteads  could  be  seen  the  silver  thread  of 
one  of  the  feeders  of  the  Baltea  torrent  which  leapt  forth  from 
where  they  stood.  It  seemed  in  the  clear  atmosphere,  which 
Alpine  climbers  know  so  well,  that  they  had  but  to  take  a  step 
or  two  down,  and  to  be  in  possession.  "  The  people  who  dwell 
along  that  river,"  cried  Hannibal  in  the  inspiration  of  the 
moment,  "  are  your  sworn  friends.  Ye  are  standing  already, 
as  ye  see,  on  the  Acropohs  of  Italy ;  yonder,"  and  he  pointed 
to  the  spot  in  the  far  horizon,  where,  with  his  mind's  eye,  he 
could  see  the  goal  of  all  his  hopes,  and  the  object  of  his 
inextinguishable  and  majestic  hate,  "yonder  lies  Rome." 

It  is,  doubtless,  difficult  to  reconcile  the  exact  phrases  re- 
ported to  have  been  used  by  Hannibal  with  the  very  limited 

»  Polyb.  iii.  53,  9-10  ;  Livy,  xxi.  35. 


view  to  be  obtained  from  the  Little  St.  Bernard, ^  and  the  story 
has  accordingly  been  treated  by  modern  historians,  sometimes 
as  an  argument  for  preferring  one  of  the  rival  routes,  such  as 
that  over  the  Mont  Cenis,  sometimes  as  a  mere  flourish  of 
rhetoric.     It  is  therefore  well  to  remark  that  the  general 
truth  of  the  story  rests  on  the  authority  not  only  of  the 
brilliant  and  imaginative  Livy,  but  of  the  sober-minded  and 
strictly  accurate  Polybius.     Nor  is  it  Ukely  that  the  greatest 
general  of  ancient  times,  and  he,  one  who  knew  the  hearts  of 
men,  as  Hannibal  undoubtedly  did,  would  neglect  the  oppor- 
tunity, the  unparalleled  opportunity,  which  the  summit  of 
the  Alps  afforded  him  of  bidding  his  soldiers  derive  fresh 
hopes  for  the  future  from  the  perils  which  they  had  already 
undergone  and  from  the  prize  which  seemed  to  lie  beneath 
their  feet.     The  proclamations  of  the  great  modern  master  of 
the  art  of  war — that,  for  instance,  in  which  he  told  his 
soldiers  of  the  *'  forty  centuries  which  looked  down  upon 
them  from  the  pyramids  "—may,  perhaps,  seem  to  us  who 
read  them  coolly  at  this  distance  of  time,  and  who  have  been 
able  to  gauge  the  true  character  of  the  man  who  framed  them, 
to  contain  much  of  vapid  rhetoric  and  to  be  as  offensive  as 
they  are  unreal.     But  they  did  not  seem  so  to  the  soldiers  to 
whom  they  were  addressed,  nor  to  the  feverish  and  lacerated 
nation  which  lay  behind  them,  nor  even  to  the  affrighted 
peoples  of  Europe,  whose  common  happiness  and  safety  they 
menaced.     On  the  contrary  it  is  not  too  much  to  say,  that 
the  proclamations  of  Napoleon  did  as  much  as  the  glamour  of 
his  victories,  or  the  charms  of  his  personal  presence,  to 
disguise  from  his  own  country  the  load  of  misery  which  he 
brought  upon  her,  and  to  throw  a  veil  over  his  reckless 
disregard  of  human  life,  his  colossal  meanness,   his  insin- 
cerity,  his   ingratitude.     Hannibal,  as  forgetful  of  self  as 
Napoleon  was  absorbed  in  it,  and  having  to  hold  in  hand 
the  soldiers  not  of  one  but  of  many  nations,  could  not  afford  to 

'  Folyb.    ill.    54,   J,    riji'  t»/s  'IraAta?  tvapytiay  .   .   .  ii^iiKt-vfityof  awToi?  tu  wtpl 

r'ov  lldiov  ntiia;  Livy,  xxi.  35,  ''  Italian!  ostentat  subjectosque  Alpinis  monti- 
bus  circumpadanos  caiiipos". 


liBU 


111 


r86 


CARTHAOE  AND  THE  CARTHAGINIANS. 


neglect  any  help  which  Nature  offered  him  in  his  arduous,  his 
almost  impossible,  enterprise.  We  may  well  believe,  there- 
fore, that  he  made  the  most  of  this.  The  spirits  of  his  men 
rose  at  his  words,  and  on  the  morrow  the  descent  began. 

After  a  toilsome  climb  the  first  steps  of  a  descent  are 
always  pleasantly  deceptive,  and  there  was  now  no  sign  of 
an  enemy,  unless  indeed  a  few  skulking  marauders  might  be 
so  called.  But  the  descent  was  not  less  dangerous,  and 
perhaps  still  more  destructive,  than  the  ascent.  The  Alps 
rise  more  sheer  from  the  plain  on  the  Italian  than  on  the 
French  side,  and  the  slope  is  almost  everywhere  steeper. 
The  snow  too  began  to  fall,  hiding  dangers  which  would 
otherwise  have  stared  them  in  the  face.  A  false  step  on 
such  a  gradient  would  have  been  fatal  anyhow,  and  the 
curtain  of  snow  made  false  steps  to  be  both  numerous  and 
inevitable.  The  army  had  to  cross  what  seems  to  have  been, 
in  the  greater  cold  which  was  then  prevalent  throughout 
Europe,  a  glacier  or  an  ice  slope  covered  with  a  thin  coating 
of  newly  fallen  snow.  This  was  soon  trampled  into  a  solid 
sheet  of  ice,  on  which  the  men  kept  slipping  and  rolling 
down,  while  the  beasts  of  burden,  breaking  through  the 
bridges  of  frozen  snow,  which  concealed  crevasses  beneath, 
stuck  fast,  and  were  frozen  to  death.  At  last,  the  head  of 
the  column  reached  a  projecting  crag  round  which  neither 
man  nor  beast  could  creep.  An  avalanche  or  a  landslip  had 
carried  away  some  three  hundred  yards  of  the  track,  and 
even  the  eye  of  Hannibal  failed  to  discover  a  practicable 
route  elsewhere.*     Destruction  stared  the  army  in  the  face ; 

>  The  gorge  below  La  Tuile,  in  the  valley  of  the  Baltea,  corresponds  in  a 
most  reniarkable  manner  with  the  description  of  Polybius.  Though  it  is  only 
some  4000  feet  alwve  the  level  of  the  sea,  it  is  often  choked  with  masses  of 
frozen  snow  the  whole  summer  through  ;  and  avalanches  descending  into  it 
firom  the  peaks  of  Mont  Favre  above,  sweep  the  road,  which  formerly  ran  along 
the  left  bank  of  the  torrent,  for  a  distance  of  300  yards,  i.e.  exactly  the  stadium 
and  a  half  of  Polybius.  This  old  road  has  been  lon^'  .since  al)andoned,  and  a 
new  one  has  been  constructed  which,  being  on  the  right  bank  of  the  torrent,  is 
secure  from  the  danger  which  all  but  proved  fatid  to  Hannibal  (see  the 
uuthorities  referred  to  above,  p.  180j. 


<  > 


THE  DESCENT  OF  THE  ALPS. 


187 


but  Hannibal  drew  them  off  to  a  kind  of  hog's  back,  from 
which  the  snow  had  been  just  shovelled,  and  pitching  his 
camp  there,  directed  his  men  with  such  engineering  skill, 
and  with  such  implements  as  they  could  muster,  to  repair 
the  broken  passage.  Never  was  an  Alpine  road  made  under 
greater  difficulties ;  but  the  men  worked  for  their  lives,  and, 
by  the  following  day,  the  horses  were  able  to  creep  round 
the  dangerous  spot,  and  to  descend  till  they  found  a  scanty 
herbage.  The  elephants,  owing  to  their  uncouth  appearance, 
had  hitherto  enjoyed  immunity  from  the  attacks  of  the 
natives ;  but  they  too  now  had  their  share  of  suffering.  It 
was  three  whole  days  before  the  roadway  was  sufficiently 
wide  and  strong  for  them  to  pass. 

On  the  high  Alps  on  which  they  then  were,  neither  tree 
nor  pasture  could  be  found, ^  and  from  regions  of  arctic  rigour 
these  inhabitants  of  the  torrid  zone  made  their  way  down, 
half  dead  with  cold  and  hunger.  The  massive  trees  which 
the  Carthaginians  felled  and  burned  to  soften  the  rocks,  and 
the  rivers  of  vinegar  with  which  Hannibal  melted  them  in 
this  dangerous  spot,  exist  only  in  the  imagination  of  Livy 
and  those  who  followed  him.  So  astounding  was  the  miracle 
of  the  crossing  of  the  Alps,  that  it  is  no  matter  of  surprise  if 
other  lesser  miracles  were  believed  to  have  accompanied  it. 
After  the  great  danger  had  been  surmounted,  the  descent 
became  more  practicable.  The  eyes  of  the  perishing  soldiers 
w^ere  soon  gladdened  with  the  sight  of  umbrageous  trees,  of 
upland  lawns,  and  even  of  human  habitations,  and  three  days 
saw  them  safe  in  the  valley  of  Aosta  below. 

The  passage  had  been  accomplished ;  and  twenty-two 
centuries  have  failed  to  exhaust  the  interest  and  the  admira- 
tion with  which  the  world  regards  alike  the  exploit  itself 
and  the  hero  who  could  plan  and  execute  it.  The  volumin- 
ous literature  %vhich  the  nineteenth  century  has  produced  in 

I'olyb.     iii.    55,     9,    rcAcwf  aStfSpa  xai  \fnka  wavT    ivri ;     cf.     eX.    COU.     Li\y, 

xxi.  37;  Juvenal,  Sat.  x.  153:  "Diducit  scopulos  et  moutem  rumpit  aceto'  ; 
Appian,  Hann.  4;  Pliny,  Hx9t.  Nat.  xxxiii.  3. 


it 


1 88 


CARTHAGE  AND  THE  CARTHAGINIANS, 


\ 


almost  every  European  language  on  the  one  subject  of  the 
passage  of  the  Alps  is  a  striking  proof  of  this.  The  great 
epic  poet  who  appreciated,  if  any  Roman  did,  the  grandeur  of 
the  city  which  his  countrymen  had  destroyed,  and  who  was 
able  by  his  genius  to  turn  the  blind  fear  and  hatred  with 
which  they  still  regarded  its  memory  into  a  romantic  and 
almost  a  filial  attachment — for  had  not  Carthage  given  shelter 
to  the  wandering  -^neas  and  laid  her  Queen  at  his  feet? — 
speaks,  in  a  spirited  passage,  of  Carthage,  not  as  pouring 
down  ruin  on  Home  through  the  Alps  which  she  had  burst 
open,  but  rather  as  "  hurling  those  opened  Alps  themselves 
in  dire  destruction  on  the  city  "  : — 

Adveniet  justum  pugnse,  ne  arcessite,  tempus. 
Cum  fera  Carthago  Komanis  arcibus  olim 
Exitium  magnuin  atque  Alpes  imniittct  apertas.^ 

It  is  a  splendid  licence  of  language ;  but  it  may  be  questioned 
whether  it  would  have  seemed  any  licence  at  all,  either  to 
the  panic-stricken  population  who  saw  Hannibal  with  their 
own  eyes  swoop  down  upon  them  from  the  Alps  with  ever- 
gathering  strength,  or  to  their  descendants  who  had  only 
heard  of  it  from  their  grandsires. 

The  passage — twelve  hundred  stadia  of  mountain  climbing 
— had  been  accomplished ;  but  was  it  worth  the  price  which 
had  been  paid  for  it  ?  Of  the  army  which  had  crossed  the 
Pyrenees  scarcely  half  had  lived  to  cross  the  Alps.  Without 
provisions,  without  a  commissariat,  without  even  an  assured 
base  of  operations,  or  the  certainty  of  reinforcements,  Han- 
nibal was  about  to  enter  on  a  war  which  stands  forth  with- 
out a  parallel  in  ancient  history.  With  twenty  thousand 
foot  and  six  thousand  horse  he  was  about  to  attack  a  power 
which  had  only  lately  put  into  the  field  to  serve  against 
the  Gauls  an  army  of  a  hundred  and  seventy  thousand  men. 
And  in  what  condition  was  this  handful,  this  forlorn  hope,  of 
soldiers?  The  cold  and  hunger,  and  exposure  and  fatigue, 
of  fifteen  days*  mountaineering  had  done  their  work  with 

1  Virg.  .«».  X.  11  13. 


THE  PASSAGE  ACCOMPLISHED. 


189 


them.  "  They  had  been  reduced  to  the  condition  of  beasts," 
says  the  accurate  and  unimaginative  Greek  historian ;  ^  **  they 
looked  not  like  men  but  like  their  phantoms  or  their  shadows," 
said  the  Roman  general  who  was  about  to  meet  them  in  the 
field,  and,  as  he  thought,  like  shadows  to  sweep  them  away. 
Under  any  general  but  Hannibal,  and,  it  may  almost  be 
added,  with  any  enemy  who  were  not  so  dilatory  as  the 
Romans,  the  remnant  of  the  Carthaginian  army  would  have 
conquered  the  Alps  only  to  perish  in  the  plains  of  the  Po. 
That  Hannibal  crossed  the  Alps  is  a  marvel ;  but  that  with 
troops  so  weakened  he  was  able  after  a  few  days'  delay  to 
chastise  the  hostile  barbarians,  to  take  from  them  their  city 
of  Turin,  to  force  some  of  them  to  join  his  army,  and  then  to 
face  all  the  power  of  Rome,  is  a  greater  marvel  still. 2 

It  is  difl&cuh  throughout  this  period  of  the  war,  and,  in- 
deed, throughout  the  whole  of  it,  to  withdraw  the  attention 
even  for  a  moment  from  its  presiding  genius.  With  sound 
judgment  did  the  Romans,  w^ho  calumniated  his  character 
and  tried  sometimes  to  make  light  even  of  his  abilities,  call 
the  war  which  was  now  beginning,  not  the  Second  Punic 
War,  but  the  War  of  Hannibal.  His  form  it  was  which 
haunted  their  imaginations  and  their  memories;  his  name 
was  for  centuries  the  terror  of  old  and  of  young  alike.  Nearly 
two  hundred  years  later  the  frivolous  and  the  pleasure-loving 
Horace  pays  Hannibal  the  homage  of  a  mention  which  is 
always  serious  and  often  awe-stricken.  Once  in  his  Odes  he 
is  "  the  perfidious,"  but  three  times  over  he  is  "  the  dread 
Hannibal " ;  and  rising,  with  a  thrill  of  horror,  in  spite  of 
himself,  into  epic  dignity,  he  compares  the  march  of  the 
Carthaginian  through  Italy  to  the  careering  of  the  east  wind 
over  those  Sicilian  waters  which  had  engulfed  so  many 
Roman  fleets,  or  to  that  most  terrible  and  magnificent  of 
sights,  the  rush  of  the  flames  through  a  blazing  forest  of  pines.^ 

»  Polyb.  iii.  60, 1-6,  ©lof  ijroT.d.jpiwfiei'ot  wdvrfi  Jivay;  Livy,  xxi.  40,  "effigies, 
immo  umbrs  hominuai ". 

a  Polyb.  iii.  60;  Livy.  xxi.  39.  ^Hor.  Ode,  iv.  4,  41  44. 


igo 


CARTHAGE  AND  THE  CARTHAGINIANS. 


SEMPRONIUS  RECALLED  FROM  SICILY. 


igi 


til 


I 


>i'. 


II'' 


CHAPTER  XI. 

BATTLES  OP  TREBIA  AND  TKASIMENE. 

(B.C.  218-217.) 

P.  Scipio  returns  from  Gaul  to  Italy— Seuiprouius  recalled  from  Sicily- Kittle 
of  the  Ticinus— Hanuibal  crosses  the  Po— He  is  joiue<i  by  the  Gauls- 
Retreat  of  Scipio  to  the  Trebia— Hannibal  selects  his  ground  and  time- 
Battle  of  the  Trebia— Results  of  the  victory— Hannibal  crosses  the  Apen- 
nines—The marshes  of  the  Arno— Position  of  the  Roman  armies— Flaminius 
and  his  antecedents— Despondency  at  Rome— Resolution  of  Flaminius— 
He  follows  Hannibal  from  Arretiura— Livy  and  Polybius  compared— Posi- 
tion chosen  by  Hannibal— Battle  of  the  Trasimene  lake— Death  of  Flaminius. 

It  is  time  now  to  ask  what  the  Romans  were  doing  to  meet 
the  storm.  Publius  Scipio,  after  his  encounter  with  the 
enemy's  cavalry  on  the  Rhone,  had  marched  up  the  river 
to  the  camp  which  Hannibal  had  just  left,  and  discovering 
that  he  was  already  off  for  Italy  had  flattered  his  soldiers,  and 
perhaps  himself,  by  representing  his  march  as  a  flight.  He 
showed,  however,  that  he  was  himself  aHve  to  the  gravity  of 
the  occasion  by  returning  at  once  to  Italy,  while  he  sent  his 
brother  Cneius  with  the  bulk  of  his  army  on  to  Spain. ^  Had 
Scipio  been  a  man  of  commanding  ability,  had  he  been  a 
Hannibal,  he  might  have  taken  the  responsibility  upon  him 
self  of  overruling  the  orders  of  the  Senate  and  diverting  the 
whole  expedition  from  the  country  which,  as  circumstances 
had  proved,  did  not  then  need  it  to  that  which  needed  it  im- 
mediately and  imperatively.  Had  he  hastened  back  by  sea 
with  all  his  force  from  Marseilles  to  Genoa,  he  might  have 
pushed  up  at  once  through  the  friendly  Ligurian  tribes  to  the 

'  Polyb.  iii.  49,  1-4  ;  Uvy,  iii.  32  and  39. 


base  of  the  very  pass  over  which  Hannibal  was  crossing,  and 
have  overwhelmed  him  on  his  first  arrival.  If  the  struggle 
should  be  prolonged,  it  was  doubtless  all-important  that  a 
force  should  be  sent  to  Spain  to  harass  Hasdrubal  and  to 
prevent  the  despatch  of  reinforcements  to  Hannibal.  But  if 
the  bold  venture  of  a  general  who  knew  how  to  face  responsi- 
bility had  succeeded,  as  it  well  might,  there  would  have  been 
no  Hannibal  and  no  Hannibal's  army  to  reinforce.  Anyhow 
the  Roman  Senate  could  very  soon  have  raised  fresh  legions 
for  the  service  in  Spain.  As  it  was,  Publius  landed,  not  with 
his  army  at  Genoa,  but  with  a  few  attendants  only  at  Pisa, 
and  thence  made  his  way  across  the  Apennines  to  Placentia.^ 
He  found  it  as  diflicult  to  believe  that  the  Hannibal  whose 
quarters  he  had  so  lately  occupied  on  the  Rhone  was  already 
with  his  heterogeneous  army  safe  across  the  Alps,  as  Hannibal, 
in  his  turn,  to  believe  that  the  general  who  had  been  dallying 
at  Marseilles,  while  he  crossed  the  Rhone  unmolested,  was 
already  back  in  Italy,  and  was  nearing  the  Po. 

As  for  the  Senate,  the  last  message  that  had  reached  them 
from  Spain  had  told  them  of  the  taking  of  Saguntum,  and 
they  had  accordingly  despatched  troops  who  were  to  stop 
Hannibal  at  the  Ebro.  The  news  they  now  received  was  to 
the  effect  that  Hannibal  had  crossed,  not  the  Ebro  only,  but 
the  Pyrenees,  the  Rhone,  and  the  Alps,  and  he  might  be  ex- 
pected at  any  moment  across  the  Po.  They  now  awoke — 
they  could  not  help  awaking-^to  the  character  of  the  war. 
Orders  were  sent  to  Sempronius  to  return  at  once  from  Sicily 
for  the  protection  of  Italy.  It  must  have  been  a  bitter  disap- 
pointment to  him.  In  the  southern  seas  the  war  had  opened 
prosperously  enough  for  Rome.  The  old  alliance  with  Hiero 
of  Syracuse  had  been  renewed ;  an  attempt  of  the  Cartha- 
ginian fleet  on  Lilybaeum,  their  last  stronghold  in  the  First 
Punic  War,  had  been  foiled,  and  the  fleet  defeated;  Sem- 
pronius himself  had  visited  Malta,  that  ancient  settlement  of 
tlie  Phoenician  race,  and  liad  taken  it  for  ever  from  Carthage  ; 

>  Polyb.  iii.  56,  5. 


(I 


192 


CARTHAGE  AND  THE  CARTHAGINIANS. 


BATTLE  OF  THE  TWIN  US. 


193 


m 


1 


':     ' 


I    I 


and  he  was  now  about  to  organise  a  descent  on  Africa  itself, 
when  the  order  came  to  return.  He  obeyed  with  a  heavy 
heart,  and  sending  his  troops,  some  by  land  and  some  by 
sea,  bade  them  rejoin  him  at  Ariminum,  an  important  town 
on  the  Adriatic,  situated  just  where  the  great  Flaminian  road 
ends  and  the  plain  of  the  Po  begins.^ 

But  meanwhile  Scipio  and  Hannibal  had  come  into  coUi- 
sion,  and  the  first  Koman  blood  in  the  great  duel  had  been 
shed.  The  Carthaginian  troops,  it  would  seem,  did  not 
recover  their  spirits  after  their  five  months'  -  journey  from 
New  Carthage  and  their  terrible  passage  of  the  Alps  as  soon 
as  the  restless  energy  of  their  leader  required ;  but  Hannibal, 
allowing,  as  it  is  reported,  his  Gallic  prisoners  to  secure  their 
liberty  by  fighting  in  single  combat  in  presence  of  his  men, 
bade  the  latter  observe  how  brave  souls  always  preferred 
victory  or  death  to  a  life  of  dishonour.^  In  fact,  the  third 
alternative  was  no  longer  open  to  his  army,  for  retreat  was 
out  of  the  question.  The  example  of  the  Gauls  did  its  work, 
and  Hannibal's  words  drove  the  lesson  home.  From  the 
valley  of  the  Dora  Baltea  he  advanced  towards  the  Po ;  but 
turning  aside  westward  to  chastise  the  Taurini,  he  gave  Scipio 
time  to  cross  that  river  near  Placentia,  and  to  throw  a  bridge 
over  the  Ticinus,  a  stream  which,  issuing  from  the  Lake  Ver- 
banus  (Maggiore),  flows  southward  into  the  Po  near  Pavia. 

Not  far  from  the  Ticinus  the  armies,  or  a  part  of  them, 
met  in  battle.  Both  generals  had  led  out  their  cavalry  in 
person  to  make  a  reconnaissance  in  force.  Scipio,  to  com- 
pensate, as  he  hoped,  for  his  inferiority  in  that  arm,  had  also 
taken  some  Ught  infantry  with  him  ;  but  these  proved  one 
of  the  causes  of  his  defeat.  Fearing  to  be  trampled  under 
foot  by  the  cavalry,  they  retired  behind  their  supports.  The 
Gallic  horse,  who  formed  his  centre,  gallantly  withstood  the 
charge  of  the  bridled  Spanish  cavalry  of  Hannibal.     But  the 

1  Polyb.  iU.  61,  8-11 ;  Livy,  xxl.  49-52. 
aPolyb.  iii.  56,  3  ;  Livy,  xxi.  '66. 
3  Polyb.  iii.  62  :  Livy,  xxi.  42. 


bridleless  Numidian  cavalry,  on  which  he  most  relied,  and 
which  he  had  placed  upon  his  wings,  outflanking  the  enemy, 
and  riding  round  towards  their  rear,  first,  fell  on  the  retreat- 
ing infantry,  and  dealt  them  the  very  death  which  they  had 
tried  to  avoid ;  then,  charging  in  their  peculiar  fashion,  some- 
times  in  twos  and  threes,  sometimes  in  a  compact  mass,  they 
fell  on  the  Roman  centre.     This  decided  the  conflict.     Scipio 
received  a  dangerous  wound,  and  was  only,  as  it  is  said,  res- 
cued by  his  son,  a  youth  of  seventeen,  who  risked  his  own  to 
save  his  father's  life,  and  lived  to  conquer  Hannibal  at  Zama, 
to  finish  the  war,  and  to  win  the  proud  name  of  Africanus.i ' 
The  retreat  of  the  Romans,  though  a  hasty  retreat,  was 
not  a  rout ;  but  it  was  ominous  of  what  was  to  follow.     It 
proved  the  superiority  of  the   Numidian  cavalry  to  any 
which  the  Romans  could  bring  against  them ;  and,  seeing 
that  the  plains  of  Lombardy  would  always  give  them  the 
advantage,  Scipio  determined  to  place  the  Po  between  him- 
self and  the  enemy.     He  crossed  in  safety ;  but  a  party  of 
six  hundred  men  who  were  left  behind  to  cover  the  retreat 
and  to  cut  down  the  bridge,  fell  into  Hannibal's  hands. 
Unable  to  cross  the  river  there,  Hannibal  marched  up  its 
left  bank  till  he  found  a  convenient  place.     He  there  threw 
a  bridge  of  boats  across,  and  then  marching  down  on  its 
right  side,  crossed,  as  it  would  seem,  the  Trebia  also,  and 
pitched  his  camp  six  miles  to  the  south  of  Placentia,  under 
the  strong  walls  of  which  Scipio's  army  lay  entrenched.2 

The  whole  country  to  the  north  of  the  Po,  with  the 
exception  of  the  recently  planted  colony  of  Cremona,  was 
now  lost  to  the  Romans.  Abready,  before  the  battle  of  the 
Ticinus,  the  Ligurians  and  the  Gallic  tribes  along  the  Upper 
Po  had  joined  Hannibal;  and  now  embassies  flowed  in  from 
almost  all  the  remaining  tribes  of  Cisalpine  Gaul,  offering 
their  alliance.  The  Boii,  frightened  at  the  planting  of  Mu- 
tina  in  their  midst,  had  already,  in  the  spring  of  the  year, 

1  Polyb.  iii.  65  ;  Livy,  xxi.  46. 

2  Polyb.  iii.  66;  Livy,  xxi.  47. 

13 


ii 


194 


CARTHAGE  AND  THE  CARTHAGINIANS. 


taken  up  arms  against  the  Romans ;  and  it  was  well  for  Romw 
that  they  had  done  so ;  otherwise  Hannibal  might  have  found 
no  Roman  army  in  the  whole  north  of  Italy  to  oppose  his 
progress.  These  same  Boii  now  appeared  in  Hannibal's  camp, 
bringing  with  them  as  a  peace-ofifering  the  Roman  triumvirs 
who  had  been  sent  to  divide  their  lands.  Hannibal  received 
the  Gallic  chieftains  kindly,  and  bade  them  retain  their 
prisoners  as  security  for  themselves.  Another  band  of  2200 
Gauls,  who  were  serving  in  the  Roman  army,  seeing  which 
way  the  tide  had  turned,  rose  by  night,  murdered  their 
officers,  and  went  over  in  a  body  to  Hannibal,  who,  knowing 
that  they  were  now  committed  to  his  cause  past  all  recall, 
sent  them  to  their  respective  states  to  fan  the  revoli* 

Scipio  was  now  alarmed  for  his  safety ;  better,  he  thought, 
the  exposed  hill-sides  than  the  fortified  camp  before  Placentia, 
if  only  he  could  quit  himself  of  these  Gauls,  so  formidable 
as  enemies,  so  doubly  formidable  as  allies.  Accordingly  he 
broke  up  his  camp  by  night,  put,  as  it  would  seem,  the 
Trebia  between  himself  and  Hannibal,  and  marching  south- 
ward, took  possession  of  some  high  ground  formed  by  a  spur 
of  the  Northern  Apennines.*-^  It  was  a  perilous  operation, 
for  his  line  of  retreat  took  him  near  to  Hannibal,  who  dis- 
covered the  movement  before  it  was  completed;  and  had 
not  the  Numidian  horsemen  sent  in  pursuit  turned  aside 
to  plunder  the  deserted  camp,  it  might  have  fared  ill  witli 
the  whole  Roman  army.  But  the  hills  to  the  west  of  the 
Trebia,  on  which  Scipio's  camp  now  lay,  protected  him  at 
all  events  from  the  dreaded  cavalry,  and  he  could  afford  to 
wait  patiently  for  the  arrival  of  Sempronius  from  Sicily. 

1  Polyb.  iiL  67 ;  Livy.  xxL  4a 

« It  is  a  moot  question  whether  the  battle  of  Trebia  was  fought  on  the  east 
or  the  west  of  the  river.  Niebuhr,  Arnold,  and  Ihne  are  in  favour  of  the 
eastern;  Vaudincourt  and  Mommsen  of  the  western  bank.  The  ancient 
authorities  are  not  explicit ;  but  Polybius,  67,  9  ;  68.  4,  etc.  seems  to  point  to 
the  former  supposition,  and  it  is.  at  all  events,  clear  that  Livy  so  understood 
him.  In  any  case  several  difficulties  remain  which  admit  only  of  partial 
explanation. 


HANNIBAL  SELECTS  HIS  GROUND, 


195 


Why  Hannibal  did  not  seize  what  seems  to  have  been  a 
golden  opportunity,  and  thrusting  himself  between  the  two 
armies,  crush  Sempronius  as  he  crossed  the  level  country, 
so  favourable  for  cavalry,  between  Ariminum  and  the  Trebia, 
must  remain  a  mystery.     But  the  junction  was  effected  with- 
out any  opposition  from  him,  and  he  now  found  himself 
confronted  by  two  consular  armies  of  forty  thousand  men. 
Scipio,  impeded  by  his  wound,  and  apprehensive  of  the 
result,  as  one  who  had  abready  felt  the  weight  of  Hannibal's 
arm,  was  for  delay.     Sempronius,  on  the  contrary,  was  eager 
to  fight,  for  if  Rome  could  not  be  defended  by  two  con- 
sular armies,  it  might  well  seem  that  she  could  not  be  de- 
fended at  all.     A  petty  success  won  by  his  cavalry  over  some 
squadrons  of  Numidian  horse,  who  were  harrying  the  country, 
made  him  doubly  confident.     Hannibal  knew  his  man,  and 
knew  also  that  the  consular  elections  at  Rome  were  not  far 
off.    If  a  battle  was  not  fought  in  the  next  few  days,  it 
would  be  fought,  not  by  Sempronius,  but  by  his  successor. 
Accordingly,  he  laid  all  his  plans  for  the  battle,  which  he 
knew  he  could  at  any  moment  force  on.^ 

In  the  plain  of  the  Trebia,  and  on  the  eastern  side  of  it, 
where  Hannibal  still  lay,  was  a  watercourse  overgrown  with 
bulrushes  and  brambles,  and  deep  enough  with  its  steep 
banks  to  hide  even  cavalry.  It  was  the  very  place  for  an 
ambuscade,  for  no  one  would  expect  an  ambush  in  a  country 
which  seemed  to  the  ordinary  glance  so  level  and  unbroken. 
Hannibal  saw  his  chance,  and  here,  during  the  night,  he 
placed  his  brother  Mago,  with  two  thousand  horse  and  foot 
whom  he  had  picked  out  for  the  purpose.  Mago  was  young 
and  adventurous,  and  sprang  at  the  task  assigned  him.  At 
dawn  of  day  Hannibal  sent  his  Numidian  horse  across  the 
river,  with  orders  to  ride  up  to  the  enemies'  camp  and  draw 
them  out.  Sempronius  was  ready  to  be  caught;  and  the 
Numidian  horse  falling  back,  as  they  had  been  instructed. 


A  Polyb.  iii.  67,  68 ;  Livy,  xxi.  48  and  52. 


igd 


CARTHAGE  AND  THE  CARTHAGINIANS. 


across  the  river,  drew  the  Roman  horse  and  foot,  flushed 
with  their  apparent  success,  after  them.^ 

It  was  mid- winter.  Heavy  rain  had  fallen  on  the  previous 
night,  and  the  swollen  waters  of  the  Trebia  rose  to  the  breasts 
of  the  soldiers  as  they  made  their  way  across.  When  they 
reached  the  opposite  bank  they  found  themselves  face  to 
face  with  Hannibal's  army.  Sleet  was  falling  fast,  and  the 
wind  blew  icily  cold  over  the  plains  which  lay  between  the 
eternal  snows  of  the  Alps  and  those  which  had  lately  fallen 
on  the  Apennines.  In  the  hurry  of  the  call  to  arms  the 
Romans  had  taken  no  breakfast :  and  now,  faint  with  hun- 
ger and  numbed  with  the  cold,  they  stood  on  the  river's 
bank  with  the  day's  work  still  all  before  them.  Hannibal, 
on  the  contrary,  had  ordered  his  men  to  take  their  break- 
fasts by  their  firesides,  and  then  buckling  on  their  armour 
and  saddling  their  horses,  to  remain  in  the  shelter  of  their 
tents  till  the  signal  should  be  given.  Hastily  throwing  for- 
ward his  light-armed  troops  and  sharp-shooters,  to  occupy 
the  attention  of  the  enemy,  he  now  drew  up  his  main  line 
of  battle  immediately  behind  them  ;  his  Gallic,  Spanish, 
and  African  troops  in  the  centre,  and  his  cavalry  and  ele- 
phants on  the  wings.  The  light-armed  troops  having  played 
with  the  Romans  for  a  time,  fell  back  between  the  intervals 
of  the  maniples  behind,  and  the  four  thousand  Roman 
cavalry,  finding  themselves  suddenly  exposed  to  the  attacks 
of  more  than  double  their  number,  broke  and  fled,  leaving 
the  dreaded  Numidian  cavalry  to  attack  the  infantry  on 
their  now  unprotected  flanks.  Many  of  the  Roman  infantry 
stood  their  ground  nobly,  and  for  a  short  time  kept  the  con- 
flict doubtful ;  but  Mago,  starting  up  from  his  ambuscade, 
fell  upon  their  rear.  Surrounded  as  they  were  on  every 
side,  one  body  of  ten  thousand  men  yet  fought  their  way 
with  the  courage  of  despair  through  the  Carthaginian  ranks 
in  front,  and  managed  by  a  circuitous  route  to  make  their 


1  Polyb.  iii.  71 ;  Livy,  xxi.  51 


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CARTHAGE  AND  THE  CARTHAGINIANS. 


across  the  river,  drew  the  Eoman  horse  and  foot,  flushed 
with  their  apparent  success,  after  them.^ 

It  was  mid- winter.  Heavy  rain  had  fallen  on  the  previous 
night,  and  the  swollen  waters  of  the  Trebia  rose  to  the  breasts 
of  the  soldiers  as  they  made  their  way  across.  When  they 
reached  the  opposite  bank  they  found  themselves  face  to 
face  with  Hannibal's  army.  Sleet  was  falling  fast,  and  the 
wind  blew  icily  cold  over  the  plains  which  lay  between  the 
eternal  snows  of  the  Alps  and  those  which  had  lately  fallen 
on  the  Apennines.  In  the  hurry  of  the  call  to  arms  the 
Komans  had  taken  no  breakfast :  and  now,  faint  with  hun- 
ger and  numbed  with  the  cold,  they  stood  on  the  river's 
bank  with  the  day's  work  still  all  before  them.  Hannibal, 
on  the  contrary,  had  ordered  his  men  to  take  their  break- 
fasts by  their  firesides,  and  then  buckling  on  their  armour 
and  saddling  their  horses,  to  remain  in  the  shelter  of  their 
tents  till  the  signal  should  be  given.  Hastily  throwing  for- 
ward his  light-armed  troops  and  sharp-shooters,  to  occupy 
the  attention  of  the  enemy,  he  now  drew  up  his  main  line 
of  battle  immediately  behind  them  ;  his  Gallic,  Spanish, 
and  African  troops  in  the  centre,  and  his  cavalry  and  ele- 
phants on  the  wings.  The  light-armed  troops  having  played 
with  the  Romans  for  a  time,  fell  back  between  the  intervals 
of  the  maniples  behind,  and  the  four  thousand  Roman 
cavalry,  finding  themselves  suddenly  exposed  to  the  attacks 
of  more  than  double  their  number,  broke  and  fled,  leaving 
the  dreaded  Numidian  cavalry  to  attack  the  infantry  on 
their  now  unprotected  flanks.  Many  of  the  Roman  infantry 
stood  their  ground  nobly,  and  for  a  short  time  kept  the  con- 
flict doubtful ;  but  Mago,  starting  up  from  his  ambuscade, 
fell  upon  their  rear.  Surrounded  as  they  were  on  every 
side,  one  body  of  ten  thousand  men  yet  fought  their  way 
with  the  courage  of  despair  through  the  Carthaginian  ranks 
in  front,  and  managed  by  a  circuitous  route  to  make  their 

1  Polyb.  iii.  71 ;  Livy,  xxi.  54. 


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BATTLE  OF  THE  TREBIA. 


199 


way  to  Placentia ;  but  the  rout  of  the  remainder  was  com- 
plete. In  vain  they  tried  to  reach  the  river  which  they  had 
crossed  so  imprudently  in  the  morning,  for  they  were  ridden 
down  as  they  fled  by  the  Numidian  cavalry  who  seemed  to 
be  everywhere  amongst  them,  or  were  trampled  to  death  by 
elephants.  A  mere  remnant  escaped  across  the  river,  and 
were  saved  from  further  pursuit  by  the  violence  of  the  storm. ^ 

Well  might  Hannibal  rejoice  at  the  victory  which  he  had 
won.  He  had  beaten  two  Boman  armies;  the  difficulties 
and  the  dangers  and  the  disasters  of  his  march  from  Spain 
had  been  crowned  by  a  triumphant  success ;  and  it  was 
doubtful  whether  any  force  remained  to  bar  his  march 
upon  Borne.  In  vain  did  Sempronius  try  to  disguise  the 
magnitude  of  the  disaster  which  had  overtaken  him.  He 
had  fought  a  battle,  so  he  sent  word  to  Bome,  and  it 
was  only  the  storm  which  had  prevented  him  from  winning 
a  decisive  victory.  How  came  it  then,  people  asked — and 
well  they  might  ask — that  Hannibal  was  in  possession  of 
the  field  of  battle,  that  the  Gauls  had  joined  him  to  a  man, 
that  the  Boman  camp  had  been  broken  up,  and  that  the 
Boman  armies — all  that  remained  of  them — were  cowering 
in  the  fortified  camp  before  Placentia  or  behind  the  walls 
of  Cremona;  while  Hannibal's  cavalry  were  scouring  the 
fair  plains  of  Lombardy  ?  ^  The  truth  was  too  clear ;  but 
the  spirit  of  the  Boman  Senate  showed  no  signs  of  breaking. 
They  prepared  even  now  to  take  the  ofifensive.  Armaments 
were  despatched  to  the  remotest  corners  of  their  dominions, 
to  Tarentum,  for  instance,  to  Sicily,  and  to  Sardinia ;  a  new 
navy  was  fitted  out,  the  consular  elections  held,  and  four 
more  legions  levied ;  "  for,"  says  Polybius  emphatically,  "  the 
Bomans  are  never  so  terrible  as  when  real  terrors  gird  them 
in  on  every  side  ".* 

Hannibal  with  difficulty  restrained  his  desire  to  reap 
at  once  the  fruits  of  bis  victory.     He  failed,  indeed,  in  an 


1  Polyb.  iU.  72-74  ;  Livy,  xxi.  74-77. 

sibid.  iii.  75,8. 


«Polyb.  iu.  75. 1-3. 


200 


CARTHAGE  AND  THE  CARTHAGINIANS. 


attempt  to  take  by  surprise  Emporium,  a  position  which, 
commanding  as  it  did  the  commerce  of  the  Lower  Po,  sup- 
plied the  Koman  colonies  of  Cremona  and  Placentia  with  the 
necessaries  of  life,  almost  beneath  his  eyes.  But  he  was 
more  successful  in  an  attack  upon  Victumviae,  a  town  on  the 
frontiers  of  Liguria,^  and  the  defeated  consuls  took  advantage 
of  his  temporary  absence  to  fall  back  from  Placentia  on 
Ariminum,  thus  abandoning  to  his  tender  mercies  the  whole 
of  the  plain  to  the  south  of  the  Po. 

At  the  first  approach  of  spring,  Hannibal  attempted  to 
cross  the  Apennines  ;  but  a  storm  more  terrible  even  than 
those  of  the  Alps  drove  him  back  to  his  winter  quarters.'-^ 
The  Gauls,  disappointed  in  their  hopes  of  immediate  plunder, 
had  already  begun  to  plot  against  him ;  and  whether,  as  the 
Romans  said,  to  provide  for  his  own  safety,  or,  as  is  much 
more  likely,  to  be  able  to  observe  what  was  going  on  amidst 
the  more  undisciplined  portion  of  his  followers,  himself  unob- 
served the  while,  he  would,  with  Phoenician  adroitness,  often 
put  on  a  disguise  and  wear  false  hair.^  Well  aware  that  if 
he  wished  to  win  the  day,  policy  must  do  for  him  more  even 
than  his  sword,  he  dismissed  the  Italians  whom  he  had 
taken  prisoners  to  their  homes,  assuring  them  that  he  came 
as  their  deliverer  from  the  common  oppressor.  The  Koman 
citizens,  on  the  other  hand,  he  kept  in  close  confinement, 
giving  them  only  what  was  necessary  to  support  life.*  At 
last  the  spring  began  in  earnest,  and  Hannibal  made  a  second, 
and  this  time  a  successful,  attempt  to  cross  the  Apennines, 
which  lay  immediately  to  the  south  of  his  position.  Two 
routes  alone  seemed  to  have  been  deemed  practicable  by  the 
newly  elected  consuls  for  his  advance  into  Central  Italy. 
The  one  was  by  the  Central  Apennines  in  the  direction  of 
Faesulae;  the  other  along  the  coast  of  the  Adriatic.  Cn. 
Servilius  lay  at  Ariminum,  prepared  to  block  the  one  against 

1  Livy.  xxi.  57.  Mbid.  xxl.  58. 

»Polyb.  iii.  78,  1,  2  ;  Livy,  xxu.  1 ;  Appian,  Hann.  6. 
«Polyb.iii.  77.3-7. 


THE  MARSHES  OF  THE  ARNO, 


20I 


his  passage ;  Flaminius  at  Arretium,  in  the  heart  of  Etruria, 
to  block  the  other. i  But  Hannibal  did  not  confine  himself 
to  any  authorised  routes,  nor  did  he  care  to  strike  only  when 
he  could  do  so  by  the  recognised  laws  of  war.  His  genius 
could  dispense  with  both.  Accordingly  he  crossed  the  Apen- 
nines where  they  approached  the  western  coast  of  Italy,  near 
the  head  waters  of  the  Macra,  and  reached,  without  serious 
difficulty,  the  plains  of  the  Arno  near  Lucca. 

The  region  which  lies  between  Lucca  and  Fsesulae  is  inter- 
sected by  lakes,  and  the  melting  of  the  snows  on  the  hills 
had  then  caused  the  Arno  to  overflow  its  banks,  making  the 
whole  one  vast  morass.     How  would  his  army  stand  this 
renewal  of  horrors  in  the  very  land  of  promise  ?      Of  the 
fidelity  and  courage  of  his  Libyan  and  Spanish  veterans 
Hannibal  was  well  assured,  but  as  regards  the  Gauls,  his 
newly  formed  allies,  it  was  far  otherwise.     He  placed  them, 
therefore,  in  the  middle  of  his  line  of  march  that  they  might 
be  encouraged  by  the  troops  who  led  the  van,  or  be  driven 
back  to  their  duty,  if  they  tried  to  turn  homeward,  by  Mago 
and  his  cavalry,  who  were  to  bring  up  the  rear.     For  four 
days  and  three  nights  the  army  went  on  toiling  through  the 
water  or  the  mud,  unable  to  find  a  dry  spot  on  which  they 
could  either  sit  down  or  sleep.     The  only  rest  they  got  was 
on  such  baggage  as  they  could  pile  together,  or  on  the  bodies 
of  the  beasts  of  burden  which  day  by  day  died  in  numbers. 
The  Gauls,  driven  forward  by  Mago's  cavalry,  over  ground 
which  was  all  the  more  difficult  to  pass  from  the  trampling 
it  had  already  undergone,  and  unused  to  fatigue,  stumbled 
amidst  the  deep  morass,  and  fell  to  rise  no  more.     Disease 
attacked  the  horses  and  carried  away  their  hoofs.    Hannibal 
himself,  tortured  with  ophthalmia,  rode  on  the  one  elephant 
which  had  survived  the  last  year's  campaign,  and  escaped 
only  with  the  loss  of  an  eye.2 

At  last  the  invading  army  reached  the  high  ground  of 

» Polyb.  iii.  77. 1-2. 

"Polyb.  iii  79;   Livy,  xxu.  2;  cf.  Corn.   Nepos,  Hann.  iv.  3. 


CARTHAGE  AND  THE  CARTHAGINIANS. 


Faesulae,  and  there  Hannibal  learned,  one  would  think  with 
surprise,  that  the  consuls  were  still  at  their  respective  stations 
some  fifty  miles  apart,  and  with  the  Apennines  between 
them.  Servilius,  it  would  seem,  was  still  expecting  the 
attack  of  Hannibal  on  his  front  at  Ariminum  when  the 
Carthaginians  had  already  crossed  the  mountains  and  had 
shown  themselves  in  his  rear  at  FsbsuIsb.  The  other  con- 
sul, Flaminius,  was  at  Arretium,  to  the  south  of  the  cen- 
tral chain  of  the  Apennines,  and  lying,  as  he  did,  between 
Hannibal  and  the  probable  line  of  his  advance  on  Rome, 
was  likely  to  bear  the  brunt  of  his  assault. 

Flaminius  was  a  marked  man  in  more  ways  than  one. 
Of  a  plebeian  family,  he  had  long  since  incurred  the  deadly 
hatred  of  the  patricians  by  preferring  the  interests  of  the 
citizens  at  large  to  those  of  their  order ;  a  senator,  he  was 
hated  by  the  Senate  because  he  had  supported  a  law  which 
forbade  senators  to  amass  large  sums  by  trading  with  mer- 
chant vessels.^  Sixteen  years  before,  as  tribune  of  the  people, 
he  had  carried,  in  spite  of  the  interested  opposition  of  the  aris- 
tocracy, a  law  for  the  division  of  the  conquered  Gallic  territory 
in  Umbria  amongst  the  poorer  citizens.  In  the  year  of  his  first 
consulship  (B.C.  223)  he  had  crossed  the  Po — the  first  Roman 
general  who  had  ever  done  so — and  had  carried  the  war  into 
the  territory  of  the  Insubrian  Gauls.  The  hostile  Senate  in- 
deed had  even  then  marshalled  against  him  a  long  array 
of  omens  and  portents,  and  had  endeavoured  to  recall  him 
from  the  very  field  of  battle.  The  letter  of  recall  was  duly 
deUvered  to  him ;  but,  like  Amru,  when  bent  on  adding  Egypt 
to  the  vast  dominions  of  the  successors  of  the  Prophet,  or  like 
Nelson  when  bidden  to  retire  at  the  battle  of  Copenhagen,  he 
declined  to  see  what  he  felt  had  better  remain  unseen.  He 
left  the  letter  unopened  till  the  battle  was  fought  and  won, 
and  then  told  the  Senate  that  the  gods  themselves  had  pro- 
nounced in  his  favour  and  had  overruled  their  prodigies. 
Such  a  man  the  Senate  might  fear  as  well  as  hate,  and 

iLivy,  xxi.  63. 


OPPOSITION  TO  FLAMINIUS. 


203 


envy  as  well  as  fear.  But  no  efforts  and  no  malice  of  theirs 
could  now  blot  out  those  splendid  monuments  of  his  recent 
censorship,  the  Circus  and  the  great  military  road  which,  to 
this  day,  bears  his  name.^  And  now,  in  the  year  217 — a  year 
80  big  with  the  destinies  of  Rome — the  popular  favour  secured 
for  him,  in  spite  of  all  the  old  opposition,  a  second  consulship. 
If  the  wave  of  destruction  which  was  breaking  over  Italy  was 
to  be  driven  back  at  all,  his,  the  people  were  determined, 
should  be  the  hand  to  do  it. 

The  winter  at  Rome  had  passed  amidst  gloom  and  doubt ; 
the  augurs  and  the  priests  alone  had  a  good  time  of  it,  and 
their  hands  were  full  enough.  The  general  anxiety  gave 
birth  to  portents,  and  was,  in  its  turn,  increased  by  them. 
When  Flaminius  was  elected  consul,  the  omens  increased  in 
number  and  in  horror.  In  the  vegetable  market,  an  infant 
six  months  old,  shouted  "  Triumph  "  ;  in  the  cattle  market, 
an  ox  rushed  up  the  stairs  of  a  house  to  the  third  storey  and 
threw  itself  out  of  the  window  ;  fiery  ships  were  seen  in  the 
heavens ;  and  from  all  parts  of  Italy  stories  of  terrible  ap- 
pearances came  dropping  in,  which  lost  nothing  as  they 
passed  from  mouth  to  mouth.2  Once  previously  the  Senate 
had  attempted  to  annul  the  appointment  of  their  enemy  to 
the  mastership  of  the  horse,  because  a  mouse  had  been  heard 
to  squeak  during  the  election;  and  now,  when  the  very 
atmosphere  seemed  charged  with  portents,  when  showers 
of  stones  were  falling,  bucklers  gleaming  in  the  heavens, 
the  statues  of  the  god  of  war  perspiring,  and  strange  and 
unheard-of  creatures  coming  to  the  birth,^  it  needed  no 
prophetic  insight  to  foresee  that  the  proper  obstacle  would 
be  forthcoming  on  the  day  of  Flaminius's  entry  on  his  office, 
and  that,  if  rehgious  awe  could  avail  aught,  the  consul  elect 
would  never  become  consul  in  reality. 

Impatient  of  such  chicaneries,  Flaminius  took  the  law 
into  his  own  hands,  and  making  light  of  the  sacred  rites 


1  livy,  ICpit.  XX. 


8  Livy,  xxi.  62  ;  Zonaras,  viil  20. 
'  Livy,  xxil  1. 


204 


CARTHAGE  AND  THE  CARTHAGINIANS. 


which  he  would  have  to  perform  on  his  entry  into  oflBce, 
went  off  to  the  camp  at  Ariminum  before  the  Ides  of  March 
came.  Legates  were  sent  to  recall  him,  but  he  heeded  them 
not.  Evil  omens,  so  the  Senate  said,  pursued  him  even 
now.  When  he  offered  his  first  sacrifice,  as  consul,  the 
victim  escaped  from  the  altar  and  sprinkled  the  bystanders 
with  its  blood.  When  he  had  fallen  back  to  Arretium,  and 
the  time  came  for  him  to  break  up  his  camp  there,  and  to 
follow  Hannibal  in  his  march  on  Kome,  as  he  was  in  duty 
bound  to  do,  even  then  the  malice  of  the  Senate,  or  the  folly 
of  the  annalists,  represents  the  gods  as  still  taking  part  against 
him.  It  was  clear  that  the  man  whom  the  gods  intended  to 
destroy  they  first  drove  mad.  Flaminius  ordered  the  stan- 
dard-bearer to  advance ;  but  the  standard,  it  was  said,  stuck 
fast  in  the  ground.  He  mounted  his  horse,  and  it  straight- 
way threw  him.^  The  annalists  forgot,  or  they  did  not 
know,  that  the  greater  the  terrors  which  the  science  of  the 
augurs  put  in  his  way,  the  greater  was  the  credit  due  to  him 
for  despising  them  when  duty  called.  It  is  difficult  to  say 
how  far  this  army  of  angry  portents  may  have  paralysed 
the  Roman  legionaries  when  they  found  themselves  sur- 
rounded in  the  defiles  of  Lake  Trasimene.  It  is  not  difficult 
to  see  that,  if  it  did  so,  it  was  the  aristocracy,  and  not  the 
legionaries,  who  were  to  blame ;  for  it  was  the  aristocracy 
who,  for  their  own  selfish  ends,  had  long  been  working  on 
popular  superstition  to  crush  the  true  friend  of  the  people. 

Hannibal  had  advanced  from  FaBsulsB,  laying  waste  with 
fire  and  sword  the  rich  plains  of  Etruria.  The  plunder,  and 
the  slaughter,  and  the  smoke  of  burning  homesteads,  with 
which  he  attempted  to  draw  the  consul  from  the  shelter  of 
his  camp  to  risk  a  battle,  might  have  roused  a  man  who  was 
less  hot-headed  than  his  enemies  represent  Flaminius  to  have 
been.  But  it  was  not  till  Hannibal  had  marched  leisurely 
by  his  camp,  and  went  devastating  on  towards  Rome,  that 
Flaminius  left  his  position  and  followed  him.     It  was  not, 

ilivy,  XX  ii.  3;  cf.  Cicero,  Dt  Div.  L  36. 


FLAMINIUS  FOLLOWS  HANNIBAL, 


205 


as  Polybius  imagined,  mortified  pride  at  the  fancied  slight 
which  Hannibal  had  shown  him ;  1  still  less  was  it,  as  the 
annalists  tell  us,  and  as  the  circle  of  the  Scipios  perhaps 
believed,^  the  selfish  desire  to  win  the  credit  of  a  victory, 
before  his  colleague  could  come  up,  which  made  Flaminius 
follow  so  closely  on  Hannibal's  steps.  On  the  contrary,  he 
had  taken  care  to  inform  his  colleague  at  Ariminum  of  Han- 
nibal's appearance  at  FaesulaB  as  soon  as  he  had  learned  it 
himself.  It  was  surely  now  his  simple  duty  to  delay,  by 
any  means  in  his  power,  what  seemed  to  be  the  victorious 
march  of  the  Carthaginians  on  the  unprotected  capital. 
Hannibal  knew  better  than  the  detractors  of  Flaminius  what 
Flaminius  was  bound  to  do.  He  knew  that  he  could  do 
nothing  else  but  follow  him  closely,  and  he  laid  his  plans  and 
chose  his  ground  with  his  own  consummate  skill.  He  had 
violated  all  the  rules  of  war  by  leaving  a  hostile  force  of 
sixty  thousand  men  in  his  rear  and  upon  his  line  of  com- 
munications. It  remained  for  him  now  to  justify  his  temer- 
ity by  success,  and  the  greatest  sticklers  for  the  rules  of  war 
will  admit  that  he  did  it  with  a  vengeance. 

We  owe  to  Livy  an  admirable  description,  evidently  drawn 
from  personal  observation,  of  the  position  selected  by  Han- 
nibal, as  well  as  a  vivid  account  of  the  great  battle  of  which 
it  was  the  scene.^  The  account  given  by  Polybius,  on  the 
contrary,  would  seem,  unhke  his  almost  invariable  practice, 
to  be  at  second  hand.  It  is  deficient  in  clearness,  and  is 
diflicult  to  reconcile  even  with  the  salient  physical  features 
of  the  spot.*  The  student  of  the  Punic  Wars  is  so  often 
compelled,  in  this  part  of  his  work,  to  compare  the  Greek 
and  Roman  historians  together  to  the  disadvantage  of  the 
Roman,  to  contrast,  for  instance,  the  conscientious  truthful- 
ness and  rigid  impartiahty  of  the  one  with  the  brilliant  ex- 
aggerations and  unfair  reticences  of  the  other,  that  it  is  well 
to  call  special  attention  to  a  part  of  the  history  wherein  the 


iPolyb.  Ui.  81,  82. 
•  Livy,  xxii.  4,  6. 


^Zonaras,  viii.  23. 
*Polyb.  iii.  83. 


206 


CARTHAGE  AND  THE  CARTHAGINIANS. 


graphic  and  lifelike  narrative  of  Livy,  and  the  beauty  of  his 
style — and  it  is  often  incomparably  beautiful — is  in  nowise 
inconsistent  with  the  closest  adherence  to  the  actual  facts. 

Hannibal  had  reached  the  shores  of  Lake  Trasimene. 
Near  its  northern  margin  ran  the  high  road  from  Cortona  to 
Perusia,  and  above  the  road  rose  a  line  of  undulating  hills 
which  at  two  points,  the  one  near  the  tower  now  called  Bor- 
ghetto,  and  the  other  near  the  small  town  of  Passignano, 
approach  the  lake  so  closely  as  to  cut  ofif  what  lies  between 
them  from  the  outer  world.  Between  these  two  points  the 
hills  retreat  from  the  lake  in  the  form  of  a  semicircle,  leaving 
between  themselves  and  it  a  plain  which  seems  broad  by 
contrast  to  its  narrow  entrance  and  outlet.^  Along  these 
retreating  hills  Hannibal  placed  the  main  part  of  his  army, 
and  the  plain  which  they  enfold  was  the  scene  of  the  terrible 
catastrophe  which  followed.  On  the  spur  near  Passignano 
and  the  hills  behind  it  he  stationed,  in  a  conspicuous  position, 
his  Gallic  cavalry  and  his  veteran  Libyans  and  Spaniards. 
Near  Borghetto,  and  on  either  side  of  the  road  which  de- 
scends into  the  plain,  but  carefully  concealed  from  those  who 
might  pass  along  it  by  some  broken  ground,  were  his  Gallic 
infantry  and  his  Numidian  cavalry.  On  the  hills  to  the 
north  of  the  plain,  or  rather  behind  their  crests,  were  placed 
the  light-armed  troops  and  the  Balearic  slingers.  Flaminius 
reached  the  hills  which  shut  in  the  lake  late  in  the  evening, 
too  late,  it  would  seem,  to  attempt  to  pass  them  then  ;  but, 
next  morning,  before  it  was  broad  daylight,  and  without 
sending  scouts  forward  to  see  that  the  farther  end  of  the  pass 
was  clear,  he  continued  the  pursuit. 

It  was  a  fatal  mistake.  In  heavy  marching  order,  and  with- 
out a  thought  of  danger,  the  Eoman  army  entered  the  valley 
of  death  and  moved  along  the  road  that  skirted  the  margin 
of  the  lake.  A  thick  curtain  of  mist  hung  over  the  lowlands 
which  the  army  was  crossing,  and  hid  from  view  the  bases 

1  See  the  description  of  the  battle  ground  given  by  Sir  John  Cam  Uobhousa 
in  his  "  Notes  and  Illustrations  to  Childe  Harold,"  canto  iv.  stanza  63. 


y         BATTLE        V 

OF 

LAKE  TRASIMENE. 

S  B.C.2I7. 


%fl"% 


%A!W^' 


?*A#^v 


Cartfuig  inians 

A    Numidian     Cuvalry     and 

Gallic  Infantry 
B    Light  Troops  and  Baleares 
Q   Spanish    ami   Libyan    In- 
fantry ( Ifannihal 


J 


206 


CARTHAGE  AND  THE  CARTHAGINIANS, 


graphic  and  lifelike  narrative  of  Livy,  and  the  beauty  of  his 
style — and  it  is  often  incomparably  beautiful — is  in  nowise 
inconsistent  with  the  closest  adherence  to  the  actual  facts. 

Hannibal  had  reached  the  shores  of  Lake  Trasimene. 
Near  its  northern  margin  ran  the  high  road  from  Cortona  to 
Perusia,  and  above  the  road  rose  a  line  of  undulating  hills 
which  at  two  points,  the  one  near  the  tower  now  called  Bor- 
ghetto,  and  the  other  near  the  small  town  of  Passignano, 
approach  the  lake  so  closely  as  to  cut  ofif  what  lies  between 
them  from  the  outer  world.  Between  these  two  points  the 
hills  retreat  from  the  lake  in  the  form  of  a  semicircle,  leaving 
between  themselves  and  it  a  plain  which  seems  broad  by 
contrast  to  its  narrow  entrance  and  outlet.^  Along  these 
retreating  hills  Hannibal  placed  the  main  part  of  his  army, 
and  the  plain  which  they  enfold  was  the  scene  of  the  terrible 
catastrophe  which  followed.  On  the  spur  near  Passignano 
and  the  hills  behind  it  he  stationed,  in  a  conspicuous  position, 
his  Gallic  cavalry  and  his  veteran  Libyans  and  Spaniards. 
Near  Borghetto,  and  on  either  side  of  the  road  which  de- 
scends into  the  plain,  but  carefully  concealed  from  those  who 
might  pass  along  it  by  some  broken  ground,  were  his  Gallic 
infantry  and  his  Numidian  cavalry.  On  the  hills  to  the 
north  of  the  plain,  or  rather  behind  their  crests,  were  placed 
the  light-armed  troops  and  the  Balearic  slingers.  Flaminius 
reached  the  hills  which  shut  in  the  lake  late  in  the  evening, 
too  late,  it  would  seem,  to  attempt  to  pass  them  then  ;  but, 
next  morning,  before  it  was  broad  daylight,  and  without 
sending  scouts  forward  to  see  that  the  farther  end  of  the  pass 
was  clear,  he  continued  the  pursuit. 

It  was  a  fatal  mistake.  In  heavy  marching  order,  and  with- 
out a  thought  of  danger,  the  Eoman  army  entered  the  valley 
of  death  and  moved  along  the  road  that  skirted  the  margin 
of  the  lake.  A  thick  curtain  of  mist  hung  over  the  lowlands 
which  the  army  was  crossing,  and  hid  from  view  the  bases 

1  See  the  description  of  the  battle  ground  given  by  Sir  John  Cam  Hobhouse 
in  his  *'  Notes  and  Illustrations  to  Childe  Harold,"  canto  iv.  stanza  63. 


-^         BATTLE        V, 

OF 

LAKE  TRASIMENE. 

B.C. 217.  r 


kAm^' 


CSH  ''ait/uiiiiHtniis 

A    Numiihiin     Ca7'a/fy     and 
iiaiiic  Infantry 

B    Ltt^t  Troops  and  Baleares 
Q^   Spanish    ami   Libyan    In- 
fantry {  Hannibal 


BATTLE  OF  THE  TRASIMENE  LAKE, 


209 


of  the  adjoining  hiUs,  while  their  tops  were  catching  the 
first  rays  of  the  rising  sun.     With  grim  delight,  and  in  a 
fever  of  expectation,  must  the  soldiers  of  Hannibal,  as  they 
saw  above  the  mist  the  whole  crest  of  the  hiUs,  and  each  glen 
and  hoUow  which  lay  between  their  folds,  crowded  with  their 
brothers  in  arms,  have  listened  to  the  tramp  of  the  thirty 
thousand  men  whom  they  could  hear  but  could  not  see,  as 
they  passed  along  a  few  hundred  yards  below,  each  step 
making  the  destruction  of  the  whole  more  sure.     As  soon  as 
the  rear  of  the  Koman  army  had  got  weU  within  the  passage, 
Hannibal  gave  the  signal.     The  Gauls  and  Numidian  cavalry 
hastened  down  and  closed  up  the  entrance,  while  the  passage 
out  was  already  blocked   by  the  GaUic  cavahy  and   the 
veterans.    And  now  from  all  sides,  from  above  and  from 
below,  from  the  front  and  from  the  rear,  the  battle-cry  arose, 
and  the  enemy  were  upon  the  Romans.     It  was  a  carnage,' 
and  a  carnage  only.     There  was  no  time  or  space  to  form 
in  order  of  battle ;  orders  could  neither  be  given  nor  heard : 
the  men  had  hardly  time  to  adjust  their  armour  or  to  draw 
their  swords.     The  majority  stood  where  they  were,  and 
were  cut  down.     Six  thousand  who  led  the  van  fought  their 
way,  sword  in  hand,  in  a  compact  mass,  through  the  troops 
that  blocked  the  outlet,  and  reached  a  hillock,  where  they 
halted.     The  mists  still  hung  heavy  on  the  ground  below, 
and  half-ignorant  of  what  was  going  on  behind  them,  they 
waited  in  dread  suspense,  unable  to  help  their  comrades,  yet 
unable  also  to  tear  themselves  away  from  the  scene  of'  the 
conflict.     It  was  their  turn  now  to  hear  and  not  to  see.     At 
last,  as  the  sun  rose  higher  in  the  heavens,  the  mist  lifted 
and  revealed  the  extent  of  the  butchery  below.     For  three 
hours  the  slaughter  had  gone  on,  and  fifteen  thousand  Roman 
corpses  covered  the  ground  or  were  floating  on  the  waters. 
Some  in  their  terror  had  tried  to  swim  across  the  lake,  but 
were  drowned  by  their  heavy  armour ;  others  who  had  waded 
into  the  water  might  be  seen  standing  in  it  up  to  their  necks, 
and  begging  for  their  Uves,  tiU  the  cavalry  rode  in  and  struck 


2IO 


CARTHAGE  AND  THE  CARTHAGINIANS. 


ofif  their  heads.     Of  the  conquering  army  barely  fifteen  hun- 
dred had  fallen,  and  these  were  chiefly  Gauls,  the  troops 
whom  Hannibal  could  best  afford  to  lose.^     As  if  to  crown 
the  series  of  portents  which  had  ushered  in  this  disastrous 
battle,  we  are  told  that  while  the  carnage  was  at  its  height 
an  earthquake  took  place  which  was  felt  throughout  Italy, 
Gaul  and  the  adjacent  islands ;  which  laid  cities  level  with 
the  ground,  turned  rivers  from  their  courses,  and  drove  the 
sea  into  then-  vacant  beds.    But  such  was  the  ardour  of  the  vie- 
torious  Carthaginians,  and  such  the  bewilderment  of  the  panic- 
stricken  Romans,  that  it  passed  unheeded  by  them  both.* 

The  Roman  army  was  annihilated.     To  make  the  disaster 
more  complete,  the  six  thousand  infantry  who  had  so  gal- 
lantly fought  their  way  out  of  the  pass  were  overtaken  on  the 
following  day  by  Maharbal  and  forced  to  surrender ;  ^  while 
four  thousand  cavaky,  who  had  been  sent  forward  by  Servil- 
ius  as  his  forerunners  to  co-operate  with  Flaminius,  fell  also 
into  Hannibal's  hands.*    Flaminius  himself,  after  in  vain  try- 
ing to  play  the  general's  part  amidst  the  blind  panic  and  con- 
fusion,  had  died  a  soldier's  death,  fighting  bravely.     A  GaUic 
Insubrian,  recognising  him,  cried  aloud,  "  Yonder  is  the  con- 
sul who  has  slain  our  legions  and  ravaged  our  territory," 
and,  rushing  at  him,  ran  him  through  with  his  spear.^    In 
vain   did  Hannibal   search  for  his  body  to  give   him   the 
honourable   burial  which   he   never  refused   to    a    worthy 
foe.     Flaminius  may  not  have  been  a  great  general,  he  may 
have  been  impetuous  and  headstrong,  and  he  certainly  made 
one  fatal  mistake ;  but  amidst  the  calumnies  heaped  upon 
him  by  the  Senate,  and  the  gloom  which  always  gathers 
round  defeat,  we  can  safely  say  that  he  was  the  worthiest 
and  least  self-seeking  Roman  of  his  time.* 

1  Polyb.  iii.  84  ;  Livy.  xxii.  4-6 ;  Appian,  Hann.  10. 

aacero,  De  Div.  i.  35;  Livy,  xxii.  6;  Zonaras,  viii.  125. 

«Polyb.  iu.  84, 14.  *  Polyb.  iii  86,  1-3 ;  Livy.  xxii.  8. 

»Livy,  xxii.  6.  «  See  an  eloquent  passage  in  Arnold,  uL  p.  110. 


RECEPTION  OF  NEWS  AT  ROME. 


911 


CHAPTER  XII. 


HANNIBAL   OVERRUNS   CENTRAL   ITALY. 

(B.C.   217-216.) 

News  of  the  Trasiraene  defeat  reaches  Rome— Measures  of  the  Roman  Senate- 
Hannibal  marches  into  Picenum— Sends  despatches  to  Carthage— He  arms 
his  troops  in  the  Roman  fashion— Advance  of  the  Dictator  Fabius— His 
policy— Discontent  of  his  troops— Hannibal  ravages  Samnium  and  Cam- 
pania-Beauty and  wealth  of  Campania— Continued  inaction  of  Fabius— He 
tries  to  entrap  Hannibal  but  fails— Minucius  left  in  command— Is  raised  to 
equal  rank  with  Fabius-Is  saved  from  disaster  by  him-Services  of  Fabius 
to  Rome. 

At  Rome  no  efifort  was  made  to  disguise  the  extent  of  the 
calamity  which  had  overtaken  the  State.  The  attempt  had 
been  made  after  the  Trebia,  and  had  not  succeeded  then ;  still 
less  could  it  succeed  now.  The  only  man  who  might  have 
had  anything  to  gain  by  hiding  the  naked  truth  lay  unrecog- 
nised amidst  the  heaps  of  slain  in  the  fatal  valley.  It  was 
the  interest  of  the  survivors  to  blacken  his  memory,  not  to 
strew  flowers  upon  his  grave:  and  they  succeeded  in  the 
attempt.  Roman  senators,  even  then,  consoled  themselves 
for  the  defeat  by  the  reflection  that  it  was  the  presumptuous 
folly  of  their  private  foe  which  was  responsible  for  it ;  and 
Roman  orators  and  historians,  for  centuries  afterwards, 
pointed  their  morals  or  adorned  their  tales  by  reference  to 
the  well-deserved  fate  of  the  man  who  had  turned  traitor  to 
his  order  and  had  despised  the  gods. 

When  the  first  vague  rumour  of  the  disaster  reached  the 
city,  an  anxious  crowd  gathered  in  the  forum.  Towards  sun- 
set the  praetor  mounted  the  rostra,  and  simply  said,  "  We 


212 


CARTHAGE  AND  THE  CARTHAGINIANS, 


have  been  defeated  in  a  great   battle**.^    The   scene   of 
consternation  which  ensued  brought  home  to  the  few  survi- 
vors who  had  managed  to  reach  the  city,  more  vividly  than 
the  scene  of  slaughter  itself,  the  full  reality  of  what  had 
happened.     The  Senate  alone  preserved  its  dignity  and  its 
self-restraint.     Thinking  not  of  the  past,  but  of  the  present 
and  the  immediate  future,  they  sat,  day  after  day,  from  sun- 
rise to  sunset,  concerting  measures  for  the  defence  of  the  city. 
When,  three  days  afterwards,  indeed,  the  news  came  of  the 
capture  of  the  cavalry  of  Servilius,  a  loss  which  rendered 
his   whole   army — the   only  army  which   remained — unfit 
to  take  the  field,  their  presence  of  mind  did  forsake  them; 
but  it  was  for  a  moment  only.^    To  remedy  the  evils  of  a 
divided  command,  they  determined  to  revive  the  ofl&ce  of 
Dictator,  an  ofl&ce  disused  for  thirty-nine  years  past,  and 
therefore  quite  unknown  to  that  generation.     Their  choice 
fell  on  the  most  prudent  and  respected,  if  not  the  ablest,  of 
the  patricians,  Quintus  Fabius  Maximus,  Marcus  Minucius 
being  selected  as  his  Master  of  the  Horse.     A  slight  hitch 
occurred,  for  there  was  no  consul  present  who  could  nominate 
the  Dictator,  and  such  was  the  reverence  of  the  Romans  for 
the  forms  of  their  constitution,  even  in  this  time  of  terror, 
that  they  caUed  Fabius  Pro-Dictator  only.s    The  Pro-Dictator 
first  made  his  peace  by  vows  and  offerings  with  the  angry 
gods,  and  then  took  more  practical  steps  for  the  defence.     By 
his  order  the  walls  were  repaired  and  manned,  the  bridges 
over  the  rivers  were  broken  down,  the  country  through  which 
Hannibal's  advance  was  likely  to  take  place  was  turned  into 
a  desert,  and  everything  prepared  for  an  immediate  attack. 
Why  did  not  Hannibal  at  once  advance  on  Rome,  as  the 
most  cool-headed  of  his  opponents  expected  that  he  would  ? 
The  answer  is  the  same  that  must  be  given  on  a  yet  more 
critical  occasion  in  the  following  year.     He  knew  what  the 
Romans  themselves  hardly  yet  fully  knew,  that  every  Roman 
citizen  could,  when  occasion  required,  become  a  soldier ;  he 
1  Polyb.  iil  85,  8.  •  Ibid,  iil  86,  6.  »  Livy,  xxil  8. 


HANNIBAL  PLUNDERS  CENTRAL  ITALY, 


ai3 


knew  also  that  amidst  a  hostile  population — for  no  Italian  town 
had  as  yet  come  over  to  him— his  attack,  however  impetuous, 
must  break  upon  the  walls  of  the  city.     If  he  delayed  a  little 
longer,  and  allowed  his  victories  to  produce  their  natural 
result,  he  would  be  borne  back,  he  hoped,  upon  a  wave  of 
Italian  national  enthusiasm,  and,  bearing  the  banner  of  Italian 
independence,  would  strike  down  at  his  leisure  the  common 
oppressor.     Accordingly,  when  the   cup  which  he  had  so 
eagerly  desired  to  drain  seemed  to  be  at  his  lips,  he  wisely 
dashed  it  from  him.     Crossing  the  Tiber,  with  stern  resolve 
he  crossed  also  the  Flaminian  road,  which  must  have  seemed 
to  his  victorious  army  as  if  it  were  there  for  the  express 
purpose  of  inviting  an  immediate  march  on  the  capital ;  and 
hazarding  an  attack  upon  the  adjoining  Latin  colony  of  Spole- 
tium,  he  proved  to  demonstration  the  soundness  of  the  judg- 
ment he  had  formed  as  to  the  courage  of  the  Italians  behind 
stone  walls,  and  the  impossibility,  with  so  small  a  force  as  his 
own,  of  coping  adequately  with  it.     After  traversing  Umbria, 
he  crossed  the  Apennines  a  second  time,  and,  at  last,  laden 
with  the  plunder  of  Central  Italy,  he  entered  the  territory  of 
Picenum.     Here  the  Carthaginians  in  his  army  caught  sight, 
for  the  first  time  since  many  months,  of  their  native  element, 
the  sea ;  and  Hannibal  despatched  his  first  messenger,  with 
tidings  of  what  he  had  done,  to  the  Carthaginian  Senate. 
Never,  probably,  before  or  since,  did  a  general  send  despatches 
to  his  government  weighted  with  so  many  and  such  brilliant 
achievements.     From  New  Carthage  to  the  Adriatic,  what 
a  catalogue  of  dangers  met  and  overcome,  and  what  crowning 
victories !     The  Ebro,  the  Rhone,  and  the  Po ;  the  Pyrenees, 
the  Alps,  and  the  Apennines ;  the  Ticinus,  the  Trebia,  and  the 
Trasimene !     Well  can  we  believe,  what  we  are  expressly  told, 
that  such  news  disarmed  all  opposition  to  the  lion's  brood  at 
Carthage,  and  closed  the  mouths  even  of  the  peace  party. ^ 
In  the  enthusiasm  of  the  moment  all  parties  determined  to 

iPolyb.  iii.  87,  4,6. 


214 


CARTHAGE  AND  THE  CARTHAGINIANS. 


send  reinforcements  (why  had  they  not  taken  steps  to  do  so 
before  ?),  alike  to  Hasdrubal  in  Spain  and  to  Hannibal  in  Italy. 
Meanwhile  the  Phoenician  hero  rested  his  troops,  fatigued 
with  all  that  they  had  undergone,  in  the  plains  of  Picenum. 
They  lived  on  the  fat  of  the  land,  and  the  Numidian  horses, 
diseased  as  they  were  from  their  bad  or  their  scanty  food, 
soon  recovered  their  condition  when  they  were  groomed  day 
by  day  with  the  old  wine  of  Italian  vintages.^     Here,  too, 
Hannibal  took  the  opportunity — a  hazardous  one  even  for 
him  in  the  midst  of  a  campaign— of  arming  his  Libyan  and 
perhaps  some  of  his  Spanish  troops  in  the  Roman  fashion.^ 
The  victor  of  the  Trasimene  could  be  in  no  want  of  Roman 
suits  of  armour.     When  his  troops  had  been  sufficiently  re- 
cruited, and  were  again  eager  to  advance,  he  marched  at  his 
leisure  through  the  territories  of  the  Marrucini  and  Fren- 
tani,  the  Marsi  and  Peligni,  ravaging  them  as  he   went, 
and  at  length  pitched  his  camp  near  Argyrippa,  or  Arpi,  in 
Apulia.2     Every  Roman  citizen  able  to  bear  arms  who  fell 
into  his  hands  during  this  triumphal  progress,  Hannibal,  we 
are  told  by  Poly  bins,  ordered  to  be  put  to  the  sword,*  a  stern 
fulfilment,  if  the  charge  be  true— which  it,  probably,  is  not— 
of  his  early  vow.     But  it  was  part  payment  only ;  payment 
in  full  was  still  to  come. 

Fabius,  on  his  part,  after  levying  four  new  legions— the 
numbers  of  which  were,  for  the  first  time  in  Roman  history, 
under  the  pressure  of  necessity,  made  up  by  drawing  from 
the  ranks  of  freedmen — first  moved  northward  to  join  the 
army  of  Servilius,  which  he  had  summoned  from  Ariminum. 
The  consul  was  ordered,  before  coming  into  the  Dictator's 
presence,  to  dismiss  his  lictors,  and  was  then  sent  to  Ostia 
to  protect  the  Italian  coasts  from  the  Carthaginian  navy, 
which  had  lately  intercepted  a  convoy  of  provisions  in  dan- 
gerous proximity  to  Rome.^  Having  thus  duly  impressed 
his  troops  with  the  superior  majesty  of  his  office,  the  Dictator 


iPolyb.  iii.  88, 1. 
*  Polyb.  iii.  86, 11. 


•  Ibid.  iii.  87,  3.  « livy,  xxii.  9. 

•Livy.  xxii.  11 ;  cf.  Polyb.  iii.  88,  8,  9. 


POLICY  OF  FABIUS, 


215 


led  them  ofif  in  pursuit  of  Hannibal.  He  came  up  with  him 
at  Arpi,  and  Hannibal  immediately  offered  the  battle  which 
it  might  be  presumed  that  a  pursuing  army  under  a  successor 
of  Flaminius  would  at  once  accept. 

But  Fabius  had  made  up  his  mind  to  a  policy ;  a  policy 
inevitable  if  Rome  was  to  be  saved,  but  requiring  no  ordinary 
firmness  and  courage  to  carry  out.  That  policy  was  to  com- 
mit nothing  to  fortune,  to  follow  Hannibal  wherever  he  went, 
dogging  his  footsteps  constantly,  but  never  risking  a  battle, 
and  never,  so  far  as  human  foresight  could  prevent  it,  giving 
the  enemy  a  chance  of  taking  him  at  a  disadvantage.  In  vain 
did  Hannibal  order  the  richest  country  to  be  devastated  before 
the  Dictator's  eyes;  in  vain  did  he  shift  his  camp  rapidly 
from  place  to  place,  in  hopes  that  his  rapidity  might  wrest 
from  the  old  man  what  insults  and  annoyances  could  not. 
Never  close  to  Hannibal,  but  never  far  behind  him,  with 
admirable  resolution,  and  with  still  more  admirable  self- 
restraint,  did  Fabius  follow  his  foe  from  place  to  place,  always 
clinging  to  the  hills,  occasionally  cutting  ofif  stragglers,  or 
intercepting  the  booty  which  the  flying  Numidian  squadrons 
had  captured,  but  giving  no  chance  of  a  general  engagement. ^ 

It  was  not  in  flesh  and  blood — certainly  not  in  the  flesh 
and  blood  of  the  hot-headed  master  of  the  horse — to  submit 
patiently  to  this  for  ever.  The  name  of  "Lingerer" 
(Cunctator)— given  to  Fabius,  at  first  as  a  mark  of  approval 
by  those  who  blamed  Flaminius  for  his  rashness ;  the  name 
immortalised  by  the  poets,  who  sang  of  the  "  one  man  who 
by  his  lingering  had  saved  Rome";  the  name  which  has 
clung  to  him  ever  since  as  a  term  of  honour,  greater  even 
than  his  other  name  of  **  Greatest  " — became,  for  the  time,  a 
term  of  the  bitterest  reproach.  The  lingerer  was  called  a  do- 
nothing,  and  his  caution  was  put  down  to  cowardice,  or  even 
to  treachery.  '*  Hannibal's  lackey  " — so  the  soldiers,  aptly 
enough  from  their  point  of  view,  nicknamed  their  general — 
would  go  anywhere  if  his  master  gave  him  the  lead ;  without 

1  Polyb.  iii.  89  ;  livy,  xxii.  1^ 


2l6 


CARTHAGE  AND  THE  CARTHAGINIANS, 


it  he  would  go  nowhere.  But  the  old  Dictator  was  as  proof 
against  the  murmurings  of  his  soldiers,  and  the  mutinous 
speeches  of  his  own  Master  of  the  Horse,  Minucius,  as  he 
was  against  all  the  devices  of  Hannibal.  At  last,  wearied 
out  by  his  delay,  Hannibal  determined  that  Fabius,  if  he 
would  not  tire  himself  by  hard  fighting,  should  at  least  do 
so  by  hard  marching ;  and  leaving  Apulia  behind,  where  he 
had  already  taken  the  strongly  fortified  town  of  Venusia, 
he  marched  into  Samnium,  the  most  inaccessible  and  moun- 
tainous part  of  Italy,  ravaged  the  territory  of  Beneventum, 
in  its  very  centre,  took  Telesia  by  assault,  and  then  passed 
straight  on  out  of  Samnium  into  Campania.^ 

The  plains  of  Campania  were  certainly  the  most  fertile  and 
beautiful  plains  in  ancient  Italy ;  the  Italians  thought  them 
the  most  beautiful  and  fertile  in  the  world.  *'  Campania  the 
blessed,  where  all  human  delights  meet  and  vie  with  each 
other,"  says  Pliny  of  it  ;2  on  the  west,  a  succession  of  beauti- 
ful harbours  and  noble  cities  received  the  wealth  of  other 
countries,  and  gave  them  in  exchange  the  oil,  and  the  corn, 
and  the  wine  of  its  own  rich  interior.  Here  was  Naples, 
with  its  matchless  bay;  CumaB,  the  earliest  of  the  Greek 
colonies  in  Italy;  Nola  and  Puteoli,  Baiae  and  Nuceria. 
Here  was  Capua,  the  city,  if  second,  yet  second  only,  of 
Italian  cities,  to  Kome.  Here  were  those  Phlegraean  plains 
for  the  possession  of  which,  as  the  legend,  not  unreasonably, 
said,  the  gods  themselves,  the  deities  of  wine  and  com,  had 
contended,  and  from  the  gently  sloping  hills  came  the  far- 
famed  olives  of  Venafrum,  and  the  choicest  vintages  of  the 
ancient  world,  the  Surrentine  and  the  Massic,  the  Caecuban 
and  the  Calenian,  the  Formian  and  the  Falernian.  One  of 
two  things  was  evident.  In  defence  of  all  this  wealth  and 
beauty,  either  Fabius  must  at  length  risk  a  battle,  or  it  would 
be  clear  to  all  Italians  that  the  whole  of  Italy  was  at  Hanni- 


iPolyb.  iii.  90 ;  lavy,  xxii.  3. 

2 Pliny,  iiL  5,  9,  "Felix  ilia  Campania,  certamen  bamansB  voluptatis", 
Cf.  Strabo,  v.  234. 


HANNIBAL  IN  CAMPANIA, 


217 


bal's  mercy,  and  its  towns  would,  if  from  the  instinct  of  self- 
preservation  alone,  at  length  join  the  conquering  side. 

Fabius  had  followed  Hannibal  more  quickly  than  was  his 
wont,  and  his  troops  were  in  high  spirits,  for  they  thought 
that  their  general  was  at  length  in  earnest,  and  would  strike 
a  blow  rather  than  leave  Campania  to  fall  into  the  enemy's 
hands.     But   they  were  disappointed.     They  reached  the 
ridge  of  the  Caliculan  hills  which  overlooked  the  plain,  and 
then  they  sat  down  to  enjoy,  or  to  endure,  as  best  they  could, 
the  now  well-known  sight  of  devastated  fields  and  burning 
homesteads.^    Their  discontent  broke  out  with  twofold  force, 
and  it  was  evident  from  the  reception  which  they  gave  to  a 
mutinous  speech  of  Minucius,  that  the  soldiers  thought  the 
Master  of  the  Horse  would  make  a  better  commander  than 
the  Dictator ;  *  an  opinion  in  which  it  was  also  evident  that 
the  Master  of  the  Horse  himself  fully  coincided.    Aware  that 
the  discontent  of  the  army  had  spread  to  Home,  and  even 
to  the  aristocracy  whose  representative  he  was,  Fabius  yet 
held  on  steadfastly  to  his  purpose.     He  knew  that  Northern 
Campania,  with  all  its  riches,  could  not  support  the  Cartha- 
ginian army  through  the  winter,  and  that  Hannibal  must 
attempt  to  retreat  by  the  pass  through  which  he  had  ad- 
vanced.    He  could  not  cross  the  Vultumus  to  the  south  of 
the  Falernian  plain  which  he  had  been  devastating,  for  the 
stream  was  deep  and  rapid,  and  the  one  bridge  across  it  was 
protected  by  the  Roman  colony  and  garrison  of  Calisinum. 
Neither  could  he  march  northward  by  the  Appian  or  Latin 
roads  into  Latium,  with  much  hope  of  success,  for  these  roads 
bristled  with  faithful  Latin  colonies,  Cales  and  Suessa,  In- 
teramna  and   MintumaB,  Sesia  and  Fregellae,  which  would 
threaten  his  front,  while  the  Dictator  hung  upon  his  rear. 
Fabius  therefore  flattered  himself  that  he  had  caught  his 
enemy  as  in  a  trap,  and  placing  four  thousand  men  at  the 
head  of  the  pass  by  which  Hannibal  must  needs  retreat, 
drew  up  his  main  army  on  the  hills  near  its  entrance.' 

>  Polyb.  iii.  92,  4-7.  «  Livy,  xxii.  14, 16. 

9  Polyb.  iu.  92, 10-11 ;  Livy,  xxii.  15. 


2l8 


CARTHAGE  AND  THE  CARTHAGINIANS. 


MINUCIUS. 


219 


Laden  with   booty,   the  spoils  of    Campania,   Hannibal 
halted  just  below  him,  while  Fabius  made  all  his  disposi- 
tions to  repel  the  attempt  to  force  a  passage  which  would, 
doubtless,  be   made  on   the  following  day.     But  Hannibal 
had  no  intention  of  fighting  at  a  disadvantage,  or  indeed 
of  forcing  the  pass  at  all.     He  intended  to  march  quietly 
through  it.     Accordingly,  he  selected  from  the  vast  herds  of 
oxen  which  he  was  driving   towards  his  winter  quarters, 
two  thousand  of  the  strongest,  and  bidding  his  sutlers  cut 
as  many  faggots  of  dry  brushwood,  and  fasten  them  to  their 
horns,  he  ordered  that  when  the  night  was  well  advanced 
the  faggots  should  be  kindled,  and  the  oxen,  with  their 
horns  ablaze,  be  driven  up  the  hills  which  hung  over  the 
pass.    Maddened  with  fear  and  pain,  the  affrighted  beasts  ran 
wildly  up  the  steep  sides  of  the  valley,  and  Fabius  himself, 
as  well  as  the  four  thousand  men  upon  the  col,  imagined  that 
Hannibal  was  escaping  that  way  over  the  hills.     But,  true 
to  his  character,  the  Dictator  would  not  venture  out  of  his 
camp  until  he  could  see  clearly  what  lay  before  him  ;  while 
the  four  thousand  guards  who  did  move  hastily  along  the 
ridge  to  the  points  which  seemed  to  be  threatened,  when 
they  met  the  flaming  oxen  and  a  few  light-armed  troops  who 
accompanied  them,  came  to  a  halt  and  waited  for  day-light 
Meanwhile  Hannibal  led  his  army,  which  had  been  refreshed 
by  half  a  night's  sleep,  quietly  up  the  unguarded  pass,  and 
reached  AUifse  in  safety.^     Fabius  found  himself  outwitted, 
and  it  was  natural,  in  the  keenness  of  their  vexation,  that 
his  men   should  accuse  him  of  having  purposely  allowed 
Hannibal  to  escape.     It  was  an  accusation  which  shortly 
afterwards  seemed  triumphantly   brought    home    to    him, 
when  the  crafty  Phcenician  took  occasion  to  spare  his  pri- 
vate property,   while  he  wasted  all   around   with  fire  and 
8word.2    But  Fabius  was— so  the  Romans  believed — a  Han- 

1  Poiyb.  iii.  93,  94  ;  Livy,  xxii.  16. 17 ;  Appian,  Hann.  14-15. 

2  Livy,  xxi.  23 ;  cf.  il  29 ;  Thucyd.  ii.  13  ;  Tac.  Hist  v.  23,  "  NoU  arte 

lluCUQl  ", 


I 


:; 


nibal  in  his  way,  a  master  of  all  the  tricks  and  stratagems  of 
war,*  and  on  the  present  occasion  he  was  worthy  of  himself; 
for,  in  his  turn,  he  triumphantly  refuted  the  calumnies  of 
which  he  was  the  object,  by  ordering  his  estate  to  be  sold 
and  its  proceeds  to  be  devoted  to  the  redemption  of  the 
captives  taken  in  the  war.2 

Still  Fabius  clung  steadfastly  to  his  purpose.  He  fol- 
lowed Hannibal  northwards  to  the  Peligni,  and  when  his 
enemy  turned  southwards  again,  towards  his  proposed 
winter  quarters  in  Apulia,  and  he  himself  was  called  off  to 
Rome  to  perform  some  sacrifices  incidental  to  his  office,  he 
straitly  charged  Minucius  to  follow  his  policy,  and  on  no 
account  to  risk  a  battle  in  his  absence.  He  could  hardly 
have  expected  his  advice  to  be  followed.  Hannibal  had 
just  seized  Geronium,  a  town  in  the  extreme  north-west  of 
Apulia,  which  contained  a  considerable  supply  of  stores,  and 
he  had  encamped  under  its  walls,  intending  to  pass  the 
winter  there.  It  was  just  the  position  he  wanted.  Two 
parts  of  his  force  he  sent  out  each  day  to  forage  amidst  the 
rich  farms  in  the  neighbourhood,  while  the  third  remained 
in  camp  to  guard  it  from  any  sudden  attack. ^ 

Such  a  state  of  things  was  calculated  to  encourage 
Minucius  to  strike  a  blow.  Accordingly,  as  soon  as  Fabius 
had  turned  his  back,  he  moved  his  camp  lower  down  the 
hills  in  the  direction  of  the  enemy.  Hannibal,  in  his  turn, 
advanced  two  miles,  and  occupied  a  hill  rising  out  of  the 
plain ;  here  he  would  be  better  able  to  protect  his  foragers, 
and  to  provoke  the  enemy  to  a  conflict  at  his  own  time. 
He  had  long  since  formed  his  estimate  of  Minucius,  and 
when  he  threw  forward  a  portion  of  his  forces  to  a  hill  still 
nearer  to  the  enemy,  a  sharp  skirmish  took  place,  which 
ended  in  the  Romans  occupying  the  disputed  position.     En- 

1  Cf.  Cic.  De  Of.  I  30:  '*  Callidum  Hannibal  em  ex  Pcenorum ;  ex  nostris 
ducibusQ.  Maximum  accepimus  facile  celare,  tacere,  dissimulare,  insidiari, 
praecipere  hostiura  consilia  ". 

«  VaL  Max.  vil  40.  »  Polyb.  UL  100. 


ii 


220 


CARTHAGE  AND  THE  CARTHAGINIANS, 


POLICY  OF  FABIUS  JUSTIFIED. 


231 


couraged  by  this  first  success,  Minucius  made  a  descent  m 
force  upon  Hannibal's  foragers,  and  cut  many  of  them  to 
pieces.  Hannibal  found  himself,  for  the  first  time  m  his 
life,  in  the  midst  of  the  enemy,  yet  unable  to  take  the  field. 
He'  was,  so  at  least  his  enemies  thought,  penned  within  his 
own  camp,  and,  on  the  morrow,  he  made  a  hasty  retreat  to 
bis  old  position  at  Geronium,  fearing  lest  Minucius,  whose 
qualities  he  had  apparently  underrated,  should  take  it  by  a 
sudden  stroke,  and  thus  the  provisions  he  had  so  laboriously 
got  together,  should  fall  into  the  enemy's  hands.^ 

It  is  not  to  be  wondered  at,  that  when  the  news  of  this 
success  reached  Rome  the  delight  was  great,  and  out  of  all 
proportion  to  its  immediate  cause.     It  was  the  first  success 
which  the  Roman  arms  had  won  in  the  war,  and  it  seemed 
to  indicate  that  the  tide  had  at  length  begun  to  turn.     The 
fame  of  Minucius  was  in  everybody's  mouth,  and  as  he  rose 
in  the  popular  estimation,  so  did  the  Dictator  faU.     One 
stroke  of  good  luck  had  turned  the  heads  of  the  Romans 
more  completely  than  had  all  their  previous  misfortunes, 
and  they  took  one  of  the   most  incredibly  foolish  steps 
recorded  in  history.    They  did  not  try  to  depose  Fabius 
from  the  command  for  which  they  deemed  him  unfitted, 
but  they  raised  Minucius  to  an  equal  command  with  him.2 
For  the  first  time  in  Roman  history,  there  were  to  be  seen 
two  co-dictators,  differing  alike  in  temperament  and  in  policy, 
and  the  one  raised  to  an  equaUty  with  the  other,  simply 
because  of  the  difference  !     It  was  a  contradiction  in  terms, 
only  equalled  in  absurdity  in  more  modern  history  by  the 
spectacle  of  two  rival  Popes,  each  anathematising  the  other, 
yet  each  infallible.     It  has  been  said  by  a  high  miUtary  au- 
thority  that  one  bad  general  is  better  than  two  good  ones ; 
and  it  was  apparent  to  those  who  had  eyes  to  see  that  the 
sword  of  Hannibal  would  soon  arbitrate  between  such  con- 
flicting  clients. 

I  Polyb.  iii  101. 102  ;  livy.  xxii.  24, 
»  Polyb.  iii.  108  ;  livy,  xxii.  26, 


Fabius  returned  to  the  army  as  convinced  as  ever  of  the 
soundness  of  his  policy,  and  prepared  to  press  upon  his 
colleague  by  his  personal  influence  what  he  could  no  longer 
enforce  upon  him  by  superior  power.  Seeing  that  Minucius 
was  bent  on  fighting,  he  proposed  either  that  they  should 
take  the  command  of  the  whole  army  on  alternate  days,  or 
that  each  should  have  the  continuous  and  unfettered  control 
over  his  own  half  of  it.  Minucius,  possibly  vnth  a  slight 
distrust  of  himself,  under  the  new  responsibilities  of  com- 
mand, chose  the  latter  alternative,  and  Fabius,  doubtless 
thinking  it  better  to  risk  the  safety  of  two  than  of  four  legions 
on  a  single  cast,  was  of  the  same  mind.  Hannibal,  duly  in- 
formed by  his  prisoners  or  his  spies  of  the  arrangement 
which  had  been  made,  directed  his  attention  exclusively  to 
Minucius.  1  Near  the  camp  of  the  new  dictator  was  a  hill 
with  ground  below  it  which  presented  the  appearance  of  a 
general  level,  bare  of  trees ;  but  in  it,  as  in  the  level  ground 
near  the  Trebia,  Hannibal's  experienced  eye  had  discovered 
hollows  and  inequalities  which  might  hide  a  considerable 
force.  Here,  by  night,  he  concealed  some  five  thousand  foot 
and  five  hundred  horse,  and,  at  dawn  of  day,  he  sent  a  small 
body  of  active  troops  to  seize  the  hill  in  full  view  of  the 
Romans.  Minucius  took  the  bait.  In  the  engagement  which 
ensued  the  ambuscade  did  its  duty  well;  and  it  would  have 
fared  ill  with  the  army  of  the  new  dictator,  had  not  Fabius, 
observing  from  his  own  camp,  at  the  distance  of  a  mile,  what 
was  going  on,  come  up  at  the  right  moment  and  prevented 
its  retreat  from  being  turned  into  a  total  rout.  Minucius,  it 
is  said,  frankly  acknowledged  his  error,  joined  his  camp  to 
that  of  the  old  Dictator,  and  descended  gracefully  once  more 
into  his  proper  post  of  Master  of  the  Horse.* 

The  tables  were  now  completely  turned.  Fabius  was  the 
hero  alike  of  the  camp  and  of  the  city,  and  Hannibal  him- 
self remarked— so  at  least  the  Romans  fondly  believed — that 

iPolybw  iii.  104,  2;  livy,  xxii  27. 

«  Polyb.  iii.  104,  106 ;  livy,  ixiL  28^. 


\\ 


222 


CARTHAGE  AND  THE  CARTHAGINIANS. 


the  cloud  which  had  so  long  been  hanging  on  the  mountain 
sides  had  at  last  burst  in  a  tempest  of  wind  and  rain.  But 
the  six  months  of  the  Dictator's  short-lived  term  of  office 
were  drawing  to  a  close,  and  it  remained  to  be  seen  whether 
his  mantle  would  descend  on  those  who  were  to  succeed 
him.  He  had  done  great  things  in  those  six  months.  If  he 
had  not,  as  his  admirers  said,  altogether  saved  Home  by  his 
delay,^  he  had,  at  least,  given  her  a  brief  breathing  space. 
He  had  trained  raw  levies  to  look  the  warriors  of  Hannibal  in 
the  face — a  feat  to  which  they  were  quite  unequal  on  the 
morrow  of  the  Trasimene ;  and  by  allowing  Hannibal  to  de- 
vastate at  his  pleasure  the  Apulian  and  Campanian  plains, 
he  had  unintentionally  elicited  the  most  conclusive  proof  of 
the  hopelessness  of  Hannibal's  enterprise.  For,  even  now, 
no  Italian  city  had  revolted ;  the  serried  ranks  of  the  Italian 
Confederation  remained  unbroken,  and  it  was  clear  to  the 
keen-sighted  Phoenician  that  he  was  still  as  far  as  ever  from 
the  goal  of  his  hopes.  The  services,  therefore,  rendered  by 
the  Cunctator  to  Home  were  very  real  services,  even  if  they 
were  not  quite  what  his  advisers  represented  them  :  to  have 
escaped  from  Hannibal  without  a  crushing  defeat  was,  in 
those  times,  as  Livy  truly  remarks,  a  victory  in  itself. 


1  Cf.  Ennius,  "  Unus  homo  nobis  cunctando  restituit  rem  ". 
Fasti,  ii.  241.  242:— 

Scilicet  ut  posses  olim  tu,  Maxime.  naaci, 
Cui  res  cnnctando  restituenda  foret. 
He  is  imitated  by  Virgil,  jEn.  vi.  846  :- 

Maximu  ille  es, 
Unus  qui  nobis  cunctando  restituis  rem. 


Cf.  also  Ovid, 


ENERGY  OF  ROMANS. 


22? 


CHAPTER    XIII. 

BATTLE   OP   CANNfi.      CHARACTER   OP   HANNIBAL. 

(B.C.    216.) 

Energy  and  spirit  of  the  Romans-The  rival  armies  face  each  other  at  Cann»^ 
Nature  of  the  ground -The  double  command  of  iEmilius  Paullus  and 
Varro— Anxiety  at  Rome- Dispositions  of  Hannibal  for  the  battle— Battle 
of  Cannae-Number  of  the  slain-Panic  at  Rome-Measures  of  the  Senate 
-Course  of  the  war- Was  Hannibal  right  or  wrong  in  not  advancing  on 
Rome  now  ?— Greatness  of  Hannibal  and  of  Rome— Character  and  genius 
of  Hannibal— His  ascending  series  of  successes— His  influence  over  men- 
Sources  of  our  knowledge  of  him-Charge  against  him-Roman  feeling 
towards  him— Change  in  character  of  war  after  Cannro- Polybius  and 
Silenus. 

The  Roman  Senate  during  the  winter  which  followed  gave 
new  and  striking  proofs  of  their  confidence  in  their  own 
future  by  sending  legates  to  expostulate  with  the  Ligurians 
for  having  taken  the  part  of  Hannibal,  and  to  watch  the  ever- 
fickle  Gauls.  Nor  was  their  horizon  bounded  by  the  limits 
of  Italy.  With  the  truest  wisdom  they  despatched  reinforce- 
ments to  their  army  in  Spain  and  to  the  garrison  at  Lily- 
bsBum  ;  they  demanded  the  arrears  of  tribute  from  Illyria, 
and  they  sent  even  to  Philip,  King  of  Macedon,  ordering 
him  to  surrender  the  intriguer  Demetrius,  of  Pharos,  who 
had  taken  refuge  in  his  court.  The  help  which  was  offered 
them  by  the  Greek  cities  of  Italy  they  declined  with  thanks, 
for  it  would  have  looked  like  weakness  to  accept  it ;  but  they 
received  the  free-will  contributions  of  Hiero,  their  old  ally, 
and  placed  the  golden  statue  of  Victory,  which  he  sent  them! 
with  due  solemnity  in  the  Capitol.      It  was  the  omen  and 


224 


CARTHAGE  AND  THE  CARTHAGINIANS. 


not  the  gold  which  they  valued.*  But  party  spirit  still  ran 
high  in  the  city.  In  the  election  for  the  consulship  which 
had  just  taken  place,  other  qualifications  had  been  thought 
of  than  those  which  were  essential  in  this  supreme  hour; 
perhaps  for  the  simple  reason  that  the  Romans  did  not  yet 
realise  that  it  might  be  supreme.  L.  ^milius  Paullus,  who 
had  distinguished  himself  in  the  Illyrian  war,  was  the  suc- 
cessful candidate  on  the  patrician  side,  but  he  received  as 
his  colleague  P.  Terentius  Varro,  the  champion  of  the  ple- 
beians, a  man  who,  if  the  patrician  annalists  can  be  believed, 
was  not  only  of  humble  origin,  the  son  of  a  butcher,  but  had 
himself  worked  in  his  father's  business,  and  was  recom- 
mended to  the  suffrages  of  the  people  by  nothing  but  a  bully- 
ing manner  and  a  vulgar  impudence. ^  Varro  does  not  seem,  it 
is  true,  to  have  been  more  of  a  mihtary  genius  than  Flaminius, 
or  Sempronius,  or  Fabius ;  but  that  most  of  the  accusations  laid 
to  his  charge  are  unjust  is  proved  by  the  fact  that  he  had  held 
high  offices  before,  that  he  was  elected  now  in  what  no  one 
could  refuse  to  recognise  as  a  time  of  danger,  and  that  he  was 
employed  in  the  public  service  even  after  the  disastrous  name 
of  Cannae  had  been  indissolubly  connected  with  his  own. 

The  spring  found  the  hostile  armies  still  facing  each  other 
near  Geronium ;  but  Hannibal's  provisions  were  nearly  ex- 
hausted. Not  enough  for  ten  days  remained,  and  the  wasted 
country  could  yield  no  more.  He  began  to  look  out  for 
another  Koman  magazine  which  he  might  convert  to  his  own 
use ;  nor  had  he  far  to  go.  The  Boman  supplies  and  muni- 
tions of  war  for  Apulia  were  collected  in  large  quantities  at 
Cannae,  a  town  to  the  south  of  the  Aufidus,  about  half-way 
between  Canusium  and  the  sea.  With  strange  short-sighted- 
ness the  Roman  generals  of  the  preceding  year  had  neglected 
to  garrison  it  strongly ;  and  while  the  consuls  of  the  new  year 
were  levying  fresh  legions  at  Rome,  Hannibal,  by  one  of  his 
rapid  marches,  seized  and  appropriated  it  to  his  own  use,  as 

1  Polyb.  m.  106 ;  Livy,  xxii.  38  and  37. 
«  Cf,  Livy,  xxii.  26,  34.  39  ;  Zonaras,  x.  1« 


ROMAN  ARMY  AT  CANNM. 


he  had  seized  and  appropriated  Geronium  before  it.i     When 
at  length  .Emilius  and  Varro  assumed  the  command  TZ 

Tes^trme  Z  7'''  '''''t  ^---^^-s^the  alt  t 
thPvfhl    r  u  .  r'  ^°  ^  ^^^*^"-'    T^^  F^l^ian  method 
ttTi tcoS  '.  r  *"^'  ''""^  ^°^"^^^>  ''  ^-^  done  all 

i  not    tan.'  '       y.  '   "''  '^^''''''  *^^*  *^^  ^^-^-^  ^^ies 
could  not  stand  much  longer  the  strain  to  which  it  had  ex- 

posed  them.    Every  precaution  was  taken,  so  far  as  numbers 

sT2  f  b~;o  1  '•^'"^-  t  ^~  ^™^  ordina^ton! 
L^lii  f  r  T°''  '"'^  containing  four  thousand  two 
hundred  mfantry  and  two  hundred  cavalry.  The  army  whilh 
was  now  raised  consisted  not  of  two,  but  of  eight  le  Jnrand 

c^tirrr^'^'^^ 

cavalry.  The  Romans,  therefore,  could  hardly  now  be  accused 
0  under-estimating  so  far  as  mere  numbers  went,  the  S  y 
of  the  occasion.3  The  consuls  were  to  act  together,  anS  e 
of  the  previous  year  were  retained,  as  proconsuls,  tolt^tZ 
handlmg  the  vast  host.  Never  before  had  the  Romans  n  o 
large  an  army,  at  one  time  and  place,  into  the  field  and  the 

foro«  nn   \   t  .u  '  ^T""^^'-    ^^"  gi-and^total,  therefore,  of  the 

Lted  of  "  If'^  ''  ""^^^  "^^^*  «^^-  *o  depend  con! 

sisted  of  over  eighty  thousand  men.     They  found  Hannibal 

encamped  near  Cann.,  on  the  south  side  oMhe  lu£ 

Se  t  fi  1        7""'  ^^'  !^"  ''''''  ^'^^'^  -P  it«  course. 
Ihe  Aufidus,  alone  of  the  eastward   flowing  streams  of 

I  aly    draws  its  head  waters  from  the  west'of  tTe  hu^^^^ 

backbone  of  mountains  which  traverses  the  ^peninsula  and 

voTd^f  way  through  thorn,  conveys  to  the  Adriatt^hat 

Tan  sea      Thr  tT''^  'l'^^^  '^^^^^"^^  '^  *^^  ^yrrhe- 
' shaned  ,iZ  '  u^u^!"''  "^  '' boisterous,"  ^'  far  resounding," 
shaped  like  a  bull,"  so  well  known  to  readers  of  Horace 
and  given  by  the  poet  to  his  native  stream,  arelfbt"; 

» Polyb.  ui.  107,  1-5 ;  Livy.  xxii.  40-43.  2  Pojyb  a  107  «  7 

^  Polyb.  ill.  107,  9-15 ;  Livy.  xxii.  36.'  ^'  ''  ^' 

15 


226 


CARTHAGE  AND  THE  CARTHAGINIANS, 


RIVAL  ARMIES  AT  CANNM, 


227 


in  part,  the  product  of  the  childish  fancy  which  invests 
familiar  obiects  with  attributes  of  awe  and  grandeur  which 
do  not  properly  belong  to  them,  and  which  maturer  age 
happily  for  the  poetry  of  hfe,  is  not  altoge  her  ah  e  to 
shake  off ;  in  part,  they  are  justified  by  the  fact  tha    has 
iust  been   mentioned,  and  which  at  certain  times  of  the 
year  might  make  the  stream  impetuous  enough.    But  it  is 
clear  from  the  series  of  manoeuvres  which  took  place  before 
the  two  armies  became  locked  in  the  deadly  combat  now  to 
be  related,  that,  at  this  time  of  year  at  least,  the  stream  must 
have  been  fordable  even  to  within  a  few  miles  of  its  mouth. 
The  surrounding  country  was  level  and  suitable  to  the 
evolutions  of  cavalry,  and,  without  doubt,  had  for  this  reason 
been  selected  by  Hannibal.     PauUus.  seeing  this  is  said  to 
have  been  anxious  to  postpone  the  battle  tUl  he  should  have 
drawn  Hannibal  into  ground  of  his  own  choosing.    The 
historians.*  who  have  bepraised  PauUua  for  this,  forgot,  in 
their  eagerness  to  throw  all  the  blame  for  what  happened 
afterwards  on  the   butcher's  son.   that  the  orders  of  the 
authorities  to  fight  a  battle  at  once  were  stringent,  and  that 
it  was  not  likely  that  Hannibal  would,  by  any  artifices  of  the 
Boman  consuls,  be  drawn  off  from  a  position  selected  by 
himself,  well  fortified  and  weU  supplied.     It  was  impossible 
for  an  army  of  eighty  thousand  men  to  Unger  long  in  so 
exhausted  a  country  without  striking  a  blow  ;  and  to  linger 
there,  or  to  retreat  without  fighting,  would  have  been  alike 
fatal  to  the  Roman  cause  in  ApuUa.    The  evils  of  a  divided 
command  were  great  enough,  but  they  were  not  created  by 
Varro     They  were  even  diminished,  to  a  certain  extent,  in 
thi»  case,  by  the  arrangement  that  the  consuls  should  take  the 
supreme  command  on  alternate  days ;  and  when  Varro.  on 
his  day,  pushed  his  camp  nearer  to  the  foe  he  was  encour- 
aged in  his  resolve  to  force  on  a  battle  by  a  success  which 
he  won  over  some  skirmishers  and  light  cavalry  who  had 
been  sent  to  bar  his  progress.'    Minucius  had  met  with  a 
1  Cf.  Uvy.  xxu.  44 ;  Appum.  Hann.  18-19.  •  Polyb.  ui.  110,  4-7. 


ike  first  success  near  Geronium,  and  Sempronius  had  done 
the  same  at  the  Trebia.     Was  it  not  possible  that  like  effects 
might  be  produced  by  like  causes,  and  that  a  deep-laid  design 
of  Hannibal  might  have  had  more  to  do  with  each  than  the 
prowessof  the  Eomans  ?    But  thisdid  not  strike-so  remarked 
the  patrician  annalists,  wise  after  the  event— the  mind  of  Varro 
The  next  day  belonged  to  Paullus,  and  he  signalised  his  com- 
mand by  throwing  a  third  of  his  army  to  the  north  side  of  the 
Aufidus   and  by  forming  a  second  camp  there,  some  miles 
nearer  to  the  Carthaginians.     By  this  step  he  hoped  at  once 
to  protect  his  own  foraging  parties  and  to  annoy  those  of 
the  enemy.i    Eager  for  the  conflict.  Hannibal,  two  days  after- 
wards, drew  out  his  forces  in  battle  array  on  the  south  side 
of  the  nver     The  offer  was  declined  by  the  prudent  Paullus  • 
and  Hannibal,  to  bring  matters  to  a  crisis,  sent  his  Numidians 
across  the  river  with  orders  to  cut  off  the  Eomans.  who  were 
encamped  on  its  northern  side,  from  aU  access  to  it.2    It  was 
the  middle  of  June  ;   the  country  was  parched  and  thirsty 
and  a  dry  wind,  the  Vulturnus,  which  blows  at  that  time 
of  year,  raising  clouds  of  dust,  would  make  a  scanty  supply  of 
water  an  intolerable  hardship."    Even  if  he  had  been  disposed 
to  postpone  fighting,  Varro  could  hardly  now  have  done  so. 
Ihe  delay  of  the  last  few  days  seemed  irksome  enough  to  the 
rival  armies  ;  but  what  must  it  have  seemed  to  the  citizens  at 
home  ?    News  had  reached  the  city  that  the  armies  were  facing 
^"fl°.     1"°"^  '^*'  everything  was  prepared  for  a  decisive 
conflict.    They  had  ventured  their  all,  or  neariy  their  aU,  on 
this  one  throw.    The  stake  was  laid  down,  and  the  throw  must 
be  made  but  it  was  hard  to  have  so  much  time  to  ask  them- 
selves what  if  they  should  lose  1    Omens  and  portents  seemed 
to  fill  the  air,  as  before  the  Trasimene  Lake,  and  busy-tongued 
rumour  passed  from  mouth  to  mouth,  sending  the  citizens  in 
crowds  to  the  temples  to  seek  from  the  gods  by  supplications 
what  they  could  no  longer  gain  or  lose  by  any  exertions  of 

•  Polyl.  m.  no,  8-10  ;  Livy,  zxii.  46.  =  P„lyb.  iii.  112.  3-4. 

Livy.  iiu.  46 ;  Appian,  Harm.  22. 


228 


CARTHAGE  AND  THE  CARTHAGINIANS. 


DISPOSITIONS  OP  HANNIBAL, 


22^ 


I 


their  own.     It  was  the  resource  of  the  destitute,  and  they 
knew  it,  but  it  helped  them  to  kill  the  period  of  suspense.^ 
Once  more  it  was  Varro's  turn  for  the  command,  and  as 
the  sun  rose  he  began  to  transfer  his  army  to  the  northern 
side  of  the  river,  and  after  joining  the  contingent  in  the 
smaller  camp  there,  drew  the  whole  out  in  battle  array, 
facing  the  south.2     Nearly  opposite   Cannae   the  Aufidus, 
whose  general  course  is  north-east,  takes  a  sharp  bend  to 
the  south.     Afterwards,  for  some  distance,  it  runs  east,  and 
then,  once  more,  turning  northward,  reaches  the  line  of  its 
former  course.     The   loop   or  link   thus  formed  Hannibal 
marked  out  as  the  grave  of  the  Koman  army,  the  grave  of 
fifty  thousand  men  ;  ^  and  into  it,  as  a  preparatory  step,  he 
now  threw  his  own  small  force,  while  Varro  was  crossing  the 
stream  higher  up.     His  infantry  did  not  number  half  that 
of  the  Eomans;  but  they  were  many   of   them  veterans, 
and  all  of  them  men  on  whom  he  knew  by  experience  that 
he  could  rely.     His  cavahry  were  only  slightly  superior  in 
numbers  to  the  enemy,  but  how  vastly  superior  in  every 
mihtary  quality  the  result  was  to  prove.     In  the  centre  of 
his  line  of  battle  were  the  Spaniards,  clothed  in  white  tunics 
edged  with  purple,  and  armed  with  swords  equally  suited 
for  thrusting  or  for  striking.     Next  them  were  the  Gauls, 
who,  naked  to  the  waist,  and  armed  with  long  swords,  fitted 
to  their  gigantic  stature,  but  pointless,  and  therefore  suited 
for  striking  only,  seemed  as  though  they  were  the  warriors 
of  Brennus  come  to  life  again  with  one  more  terrible  than 
many  Brennuses  to  lead   them.      This  part  of   his  force 
Hannibal  threw  forward  in  the  form  of  a  semicircle  or  a 
wedge,*  while,  on  then:  flanks  and  some  way  to  the  rear, 
he  placed  the  best  part  of  his  infantry,   the  heavy-armed 
Africans,  eager,  many  of  them,  doubtless,  to  flesh,  for  the 
first  time,  in  Koman  hearts  the  Roman  weapons  which  they 

1  Polyb.  L  112,  6-9.  "Polyb.  iii.  113,  2 ;  cf.  114,  8  ;  Livy,  xxii.  46. 

3 The  plain  of  Caniijc  is  still  called  the  plain  of  blood,  "  Campo  di  Sangue  ". 
^  Polyb.  iii.  113,  8 ;  Livy,  xxiL  46. 


bore.     Beyond  these  again,  and  forming  the  left  wing  of 
the  whole  army,  were  the  heavy  Gallic  and  African  cavalry, 
eight  thousand  strong.     On  the  right  wing  he  posted  his  light- 
armed  Numidians,  reduced  by  the  waste  of  life  attending 
such  campaigns  as  Hannibal's  to  two  thousand  men  aU  told 
but  with  spirit  and  fidelity  enough  to  their  great  leader  to  fi^ht 
on  to  their  very  last  man  and  last  horse.     Hasdrubal  led  the 
heavy  cavalry  on  the  left,  and  Maharbal  the  Numidians  on 
the  right,  while  Hannibal,  with  his  brother  Mago  near  him 
stationed  hnnself  in  the  centre  to  direct  the  general  operations 
of  the  battle.!    He  had  been  obliged  to  leave  ten  thousand 
men  on  the  other  side  of  the  river  to  guard  his  camp  against 
surpnse  and  was  able  therefore  to  put  only  thirty  thousand 
men  into  Ime  of  battle  :  thirty  thousand  against  the  Eoman 
eigh  y  thousand !    The  odds  were  heavy  indeed  against  him  in 
point  of  numbers  ;  but  it  must  be  remembered  that  his  wings 
rested  on  the  sides  of  the  loop  which  he  had  himself  selected 
and  could  not  be  outflanked  by  the  enemy.     Varro,  whether 
because  he  distrusted  his  raw  levies,  or  because  he  saw,  when 
It  was  too  late  to  remedy  it,  that  unless  he  massed  his  troops 
together  half  of  his  whole  army  would  be  outside  the  fray 
increased  the  depth  of  his  maniples  from  ten  to  sixteen 
hopmg  by  sheer  weight  to   bear  down  all  resistance  and 
drive  the  Carthaginians  into  the  river.     He  was,  in  fact 
only  penning  his  sheep  more  closely  for  the  slaughter 

After  the  usual  preliminary  skirmish  of  the  light-armed 
troops,  the  eight  thousand  heavy  cavalry  on  Hannibal's  left 
charged  the  two  thousand  four  hundred  Eoman  cavaby  op- 
posed  to  them.    These  last  were  picked  men,  belonging,  most 
of  them,  to  the  best  Roman  famUies,  men  of  equestrian  and 
senatorial  rank.     They  withstood  the  charge  bravely  for  a 
tmie,  and  grappled  horse  to  horse  and  man  to  man  with  the 
barbarians       But  they  were  overpowered  by  numbers,  and 
only  a  small  remnant  escaped  from  the  field.2    Unlike  Rupert 
at  Naseby,  Hasdrubal  held  his  eager  cavalry  weU  in  hand. 
> Polyb.  iii  114.  7.  »Polyb.  iii.  116.  1^;  Livy.  xxa  47. 


230 


CARTHAGE  AND  THE  CARTHAGINIANS. 


BATTLE  OF  CANNM, 


231 


He  forbade  them  to  pursue  those  who  were  ahready  routed, 
and  passing  behind  the  whole  Roman  line  fell  on  the  rear  of 
the  Italian  cavalry,  who  were  stationed  on  the  other  wmg, 
and  who  had  hitherto  been  held  in  check  by  the  skilful  evolu- 
tions of  the  mere  handful  of  Numidians.      These  admirable 
horsemen  had  avoided  coming  to  close  quarters,  in  which 
they  must  have  been  crushed  by  numbers,  but  had  managed 
to  keep  their  vastly  more  numerous  enemy  employed  till  Has- 
drubal  came  thundering  on  their  rear.     Attacked  now  by  the 
uninjured  Numidians  in  front  and  by  Hasdrubal's  cavahry, 
flushed  with  success,  behind,  the  Italian  cavaky  broke  and 
fled      Hasdrubal,  not  yet  sated  with  victory,  left  the  Numi- 
dians to  render  an  account  of  their  flying  foes,  and  turned  his 
attention  to  the  Roman  centre.      Here,  so  far,  matters  had 
gone  well  for  the  Romans ;  but  it  was  so  far  only.    The  semi- 
circle of  Gauls  and  Spaniards  whom  Hannibal  had  pushed 
forward  in  his  centre,  had  been  gradually  forced  back,  or 
rather  had  fallen  back  in  accordance  with  his  plan,  first  to  a 
level  with,  and  then  right  past,  the  heavy  Africans  on  their 
flanks.     The  convex  Hne  of  battle  had  thus  become  concave, 
and  it  seemed  that  the  whole  would  be  driven  headlong  into 
the  river  by  the  overwhelming  masses  of  the  Romans,  who, 
as  they  yielded,  kept  pressing  on,  or  were  themselves  pressed 
on  by  those  behind  and  at  their  flanks,  into  every  inch  of 
ground  left  vacant  for  them.^     But  just  at  the  critical  mo- 
ment Hasdrubal  fell  upon  their  rear,  and  the  heavy  Libyan 
infantry,  who  had  hardly  yet  taken  part  in  the  battle,  wheel- 
ing inward  at  the  same  time  from  right  and  left,  attacked 
them  on  both  flanks.*-^     Denser  and  denser  grew  the  mass  of 
terrified  Romans,  pressed  on  aU  four  sides  at  once.     Huddled 
together  without  room  to  draw,  much  less  to  wield,  their 
swords,  they  stood  or  struggled  in  helpless  imbecility,  seeing 
their  comrades  on  the  ch-cumference  of  the  fatal  circle  cut 
down,  one  after  the  other,  and  doomed  to  wait  in  patience 

iPolyb.  iii.  115.  5-12  ;  Livy,  xxii.  47. 
2  Polyb.  ill  116 ;  Livy,  xxii.  48. 


till  their  own  turn  should  come.  The  question  was  no  longer 
whether,  but  simply  when,  the  stroke  would  fall  on  each. 
Few  Romans  indeed  within  that  fatal  ring  were  destined  to 
escape.  As  at  the  Trasimene,  it  was  a  simple  butchery ;  but 
it  was  a  butchery  which  required  treble  the  number  of  victims. 
The  Romans  were  never  cowards,  but  those  who  stood  near 
the  centre  of  that  seething  mass  must  needs  have  died,  like 
cowards,  many  times  before  their  death.  "  The  thicker  the 
hay,"  said  Alaric  long  afterwards,  in  an  outburst  of  brutality, 
"  the  easier  it  is  mown."  But  not  even  Alaric's  imagination 
could  have  pictured  such  a  harvest  of  death  as  this  of  Cannse, 
and  even  the  muscles  of  his  brawny  Visigoths  would  have 
oeen  wearied  out  before  they  had  slain,  as  the  Carthaginians 
did  on  this  fatal  day,  a  number  of  the  enemy  which,  man  for 
man,  vastly  exceeded  their  own. 

For  eight  hours  the  work  of  destruction  went  on,  and  at  the 
end  not  less  than  fifty  thousand  men  lay  dead  upon  theground.^ 
^milius  Paullus,  the  Illyrian  hero,  who,  though  wounded  by 
a  sling  eariy  in  the  day,  had  clung  to  his  horse,  heartening  on 
his  men,  till  he  dropped  exhausted  from  his  saddle ;  the  pro- 
consul Servilius ;  the  late  high-spirited  Master  of  the  Horse 
Minucius ;  both  quasstors,  twenty-one  military  tribunes,  sixty 
senators,  and  an  unknown  number  of  knights,  were  among  the 
plain.  Nearly  twenty  thousand  Roman  prisoners  were  taken, 
whether  on  the  field  itself,  in  the  pursuit,  or  in  the  two  camps 
which  were  among  the  prizes  of  Hannibal's  gigantic  victory.2 
Of  the  rest,  Varro,  with  a  few  horsemen  only,  had  the  good 
or  the  ill  fortune  to  escape  to  Venusia ;  and  it  was  with  diffi- 
culty that,  after  some  days,  he  managed  to  rally  a  few  thou- 
sand stragglers  or  malingerers  at  Canusium— all  that  now 
remained  of  the  Roman  army.3  Amidst  all  this  slaughter, 
the  conqueror  had  lost  only  five  thousand  five  hundred  of  his 
infantry,  and  but  two  hundred  of  those  matchless  cavah*y  to 

iPolybius,  iii.  117,  4,  puts  the  number  of  slain  at  70,000;  livy,  xxii.  49 
at  48,000 ;  Appian,  Hann.  25,  at  50,000. 

2  Polyb.  iii.  116;    Livy.  xxii.  19.  3  Polyb.  iiL  117,  2;  Livy,  xxu.  50. 


232 


CARTHAGE  AND  THE  CAkTHAGINIANS. 


MEASUkES  OF  THE  SENATE. 


233 


( 


I'  I 


t  t 


'  I 


whom  the  victory  was  mainly  due.^  *'  Send  me  on  with  the 
cavaky,"  said  Maharbal  to  Hannibal,  in  the  exultation  of  the 
moment,  "  do  thou  follow  behind,  and,  in  five  days,  thou  shalt 
sup  in  the  Capitol."  ^  He  might  well  think  so  at  the  time,  for 
the  worst  fears  of  the  Komans,  the  highest  hopes  of  Hannibal, 
had  been  more  than  reahsed ;  the  double  stake  had  been  played 
and  had  been  lost, — lost,  it  would  seem  then, — irretrievably. 
So  many  knights  lay  dead  that,  as  the  story  goes,  Mago,  when 
sent,  some  time  afterwards,  by  Hannibal  to  Carthage  with 
*iidings  of  his  victory,  emptied  on  the  floor  of  the  Senate-house 
three  bushels  of  golden  rings  taken  from  equestrian  fingers.^ 
It  was  a  trophy  of  victory  which  the  Carthaginian  aristocracy, 
who,  as  has  been  already  pointed  out,-*  commemorated  the 
number  of  their  campaigns  by  that  of  their  rings,  and  who 
had,  many  of  them,  joined  the  opposition  to  the  noble  Barcine 
gens,  could  not  fail  to  appreciate. 

The  news,  which  was  necessarily  slow  in  reaching  Carthage, 
reached  Home  apace.  It  was,  as  the  saying  is,  "  in  the  air  " 
even  before  the  first  courier  with  his  disastrous  tidings  ap- 
peared at  the  Appian  gate,  and  rumour,  as  was  natural,  went 
even  beyond  the  truth.  It  was  believed  that  both  consuls 
were  dead,  and  that  no  portion  of  the  army  had  survived. 
Livy,  the  most  graphic  of  historians  or  of  romancers,  fairly 
shrinks  from  the  attempt  to  picture  the  scene  of  horror  which 
followed.5  Each  flying  messenger,  as  he  reached  the  walls, 
fancied  himself,  or  was  fancied  by  the  Eomans,  to  be  but  the 
forerunner  of  the  dread  Hannibal  himself.  He  knew  not, 
indeed,  as  he  drew  near  the  city,  whether  the  Numidian  cav- 
alry were  not,  even  then,  before  him,  as  their  own  messengers. 
A  panic-stricken  multitude,  thinking  that  all  save  their  Uves 
was  lost,  made  for  the  gates,  and,  for  a  moment,  it  seemed 

1  Polyb.  iii.  117,  6.  2  Livy.  xxH.  61. 

3  livy,  xxiii.  12;   cf.  Juv.  Sat.  x.  164:— 

Caniiarum  viudex  et  tanti  sanguinis  ultor 
Annulus  .  .  . 

*See  above,  p.  38.  »Livy,  xxii.  54. 


likely  that  Hannibal  when  he  came  would  find  Eome  indeed, 
but  no  Eoman  citizens  within  her. 

Any  other  state  must  have  succumbed  to  such  a  blow  •  1 
but  now,  as  after  the  Trasimene,  it  was  the  Senate,  or  what 
remamed  of  it,  who  saved  the  city  from  being  abandoned  by 
her  own  chUdren.     They  alone  preserved  their  presence  of 
mmd ;  and  it  was  the  old  ex-dictator,  Fabius,  who  was  once 
more,  the  soul  of  their  deliberations.     By  his  advice  the 
gates  were  closed  to  prevent  the  exodus  of  the  inhabitants. 
The  citizens  should  not  be  saved,  so  he  wiUed  it,  unless  the 
city  was  saved  with  them.     Messengers  were  sent  along  the 
southern  mihtary  roads  to  see,  as  Livy  pathetically  expresses 
It,  ''if  the  gods,  touched  by  one  pang  of  pity,  had  left  aught 
remaining  to  the  Eoman  name,"  and  to  bring  the  first  tidings 
of  the  expected  advance  of  Hannibal.2    It  was  difficult  for 
the  Senate  to  dehberate  at  aU ;  for  the  cries  of  thousands  of 
women  outside  the  Senate-house,  who  were  bewaihng  their 
absent  husbands,  or  fathers,  or  sons,  as  though  they  were  aU 
dead,  drowned  the  voices  of  those  who  spoke.     Orders  were 
issued  that  the  women,  if  wail  they  must,  should  wail  within 
their  own  houses,  and  henceforward  silence,  mournful  in- 
deed, but  dignified,  was  observed  in  the  public  streets.     All 
assemblies  of  the  people  were  prohibited.     M.  Junius  Pera 
was  named  Dictator,  the  city  legions  were  called  out ;  the 
whole  male  population— some  fourteen  thousand  slaves  and 
cnmmals,  and  boys  still  clothed  in  the  garb  of  childhood 
among  them— were  armed,  and  the  angry  gods  were  pro- 
pitiated, as  best  they  might,  by  the  punishment  of  guilty 
Vestals,  and  by  the  burying  alive  of  Greek  and  Gallic  men 
and  women  in  the  Eoman  Forum.^ 

After  a  few  days  more  hopeful  news  came.  A  despatch 
arrived  from  Varro  himself,  saying  that  he  had  escaped  from 
the  carnage,  and  was  doing  his  best  to  reorganise  and  to 
raUy  the  ten  thousand  demoralised  fugitives  who  had,  at  last, 

>  Livy.  loc.  cU.  2  Livy,  xxii.  55. 

•Livy,  xxii  56.  57  ;  xxiii.  14  ;  Appian,  Hann,  27. 


234 


CARTHAGE  AND  THE  CARTHAGINIANS. 


I 


l^f 


found  their  way  to  Canusium.  More  important  still,  Han- 
nibal was  not  on  his  way  to  Rome,  but  was  still  encamped 
on  the  field  of  CannaB.  The  Romans  breathed  more  freely ; 
but  from  other  parts  of  the  Roman  world  tidings  of  fresh 
danger,  fresh  disaster,  or  fresh  shame  came  pouring  in. 
One  Carthaginian  fleet  was  threatening  LilybaBum,  another 
Syracuse.  The  force  sent  northwards  to  watch  the  Gauls 
had  fallen  into  an  ambuscade  and  had  been  cut  off  to  a  man.^ 
Worse  still,  a  body  of  Roman  nobles  who  had  escaped  from 
Cannae,  thinking  that  all  was  lost  save  their  honour,  had 
determined,  regardless  even  of  their  honour,  to  fly  beyond 
the  seas,  and  would  have  carried  their  purpose  out  had  not 
the  young  Scipio  rushed  in  amongst  them,  sword  in  hand, 
and  sworn  that  he  would  slay  any  one  who  would  not  bind 
himself  never  to  desert  his  country.^ 

And  why  did  not  Hannibal  march  at  once  on  the  panic- 
stricken  city  ?  Roman  historians  and  Roman  generals  could 
not  refrain  from  expressing  their  thankfulness  and  their 
surprise  at  his  dilatoriness  or  his  blindness.^  In  Juvenal's 
time  Roman  schoolboys  declaimed  upon  it  in  their  weekly 
themes.'*  Maharbal,  the  master  of  the  Numidian  cavalry — 
if,  indeed,  the  story  be  true,  and  not  what  the  Romans 
imagined  ought  to  have  been  true — exclaimed,  in  an  outburst 
of  vexation  at  the  chance  which  was  thrown  away,  that  the 
gods  had  taught  Hannibal  how  to  win,  but  not  how  to  use, 
a  victory ;  ^  and  the  greatest  master  of  modern  warfare, 
Napoleon  himself,  has  joined  in  the  general  chorus  of  con- 
demnation. But  perhaps  the  best  and  the  all-but-sufficing 
answer  to  those  who  say  that  Hannibal  ought  to  have  ad- 
vanced on  Rome,  is  the  simple  fact  that  Hannibal  himself, 
the  foremost  general  of  all  time,  and  statesman  as  well  as 


^  Polyb.  iii.  118,  6.     Livy  (xxiii.  24)  places  it  later. 
2  Livy,  xxii.  53  ;  Val.  Max.  v.  6,  7. 

"  T'lutarch,  Fabiua  Maximus,  17 ;  Val.  Maximus,  ix«  5,  8 ;  Floras,  it  6, 
19-20. 

*  Juvenal,  SaU  vii.  161-163  ;  cf.  x.  166-167.  »  Uvy,  xxii.  61. 


WHY  DID  NOT  HANNIBAL  ADVANCE? 


235 


general,  did  not  attempt  it.     Moreover,  all  the  arguments 
which,  we  have  seen,  held  good  after  Trasimene  against  such 
an  advance,  held  equally  good  now.     There  were  still  the 
stone  walls  of  the  city.     There  was  still  the  population  of 
Latium  and  of  the  surrounding  country,  as  yet  untouched  by 
the  war,  hostile  to  him  to  a  man ;  still— after  the  first  few 
^days  of  panic,  of  which  Hannibal,  laden  with  booty  and  with 
half  Italy  between  him  and  Rome,  could  hardly  have  taken 
advantage— the  unbroken  resolution  of  the  citizens  them- 
selves.    Hannibal  never  liked  sieges,  and  was  seldom  suc- 
cessful in  those  he  undertook  ;  he  forbore  at  this  moment  to 
besiege  even  Canusium  with  its  feeble  and  panic-stricken 
defenders.     Finally,  his  long-cherished  hope  of  the  defection 
of  the  Italian  allies  seemed  now  at  length  to  be  not  only 
within  his  sight,  but,  if  only  he  was  patient  or  prudent, 
ab-eady  almost  within  his  grasp.     The  battle  of  Cannse  had 
been  too  much  for  the  resolution  of  Apulia ;  Samnium  had 
already  in  part  joined  him;    Lucania  and  Bruttium  rose 
in  revolt.     The  Greek  cities  in  the  south  were  prepared  to 
hail  him  as  their  dehverer ;  Campania,  it  was  whispered,  was 
wavering  in  the  balance,  and  ready  at  the  sight  of  the  con- 
queror  to  go  over  to  Carthage.^     Thus  deprived  of  her  allies, 
Rome,  he  hoped,  would  fall  almost  by  her  own  weight. 

Never  did  the  self-control  and  the  true  nobility  of  soul  of 
Hannibal,  never  did  the  unbending  resolution  of  the  Ro- 
man Senate,  display  itself  more  conspicuously  than  at  this 
moment.  Never  in  the  very  moment  of  victory  did  Hanni- 
bal lose  his  head.  The  good  of  his  country  was  even  now 
nearer  to  his  heart— and  doubtless  it  was  the  only  thing  that 
was  nearer  to  his  heart— than  his  hatred  to  Rome.  Think- 
ing that  it  might  be  advantageous  to  Carthage  to  conclude 
peace,  and  that  she  might  now  do  so  almost  on  her  own 
terms,  he  called  the  Roman  prisoners  together — almost  the 
only  occasion  in  his  life  on  which  he  brought  himself  to 

>  Polyb.  ill  118;  Livy,  xxil  61 ;  xxui.  1,  ete.    Cf.  Appian    Hann.  31  and 
33-35. 


ill 


236 


CARTHAOE  AND  THE  CARTHAGINIANS, 


UNBROKEN  SUCCESS  OF  HANNIBAL. 


I'i 


237 


speak  a  friendly  word  to  any  Koman — and  told  them  that  he 
did  not  wish  that  the  strife  which  he  was  waging  should  be 
internecine ;  he  was  willing  to  take  a  ransom  for  them,  and 
some  of  their  number  might  go  on  their  parole  to  Kome 
to  negotiate  the  matter.  Even  in  the  first  flush  of  his 
victory,  he  bade  Carthalo  offer  terms  of  peace,  if  he  saw 
that  the  Roman  wishes  turned  in  that  direction.  But  the 
Romans  also  rose  to  the  emergency.  Fifty  years  before,  as 
has  been  already  related,  they  had  told  the  victorious  Epirot 
that  Rome  never  negotiated  with  an  enemy  so  long  as  he  was 
on  Itahan  soil;  and  the  answer  which  they  had  given  to 
Pyrrhus  then  in  words,  they  gave  now  to  a  general  greater 
than  Pyrrhus,  and  crowned  with  a  far  more  overwhelming 
victory,  by  their  deeds.  They  spoke  no  word  and  thought  no 
thought  of  peace.  Their  want  of  troops  was  urgent,  but  they 
refused,  as  the  story  goes,  to  buy  with  money  men  who  had 
disgraced  themselves  by  surrender ;  ^  and  when  Varro  neared 
the  city,  obnoxious  though  he  was  to  the  aristocracy  on  ac- 
count of  his  low  birth  and  his  career,  and  branded  with  the 
defeat  of  Cannae,  not  one  word  of  reproach  was  uttered  against 
him.  His  efforts  only,  not  his  failures  or  mistakes,  were  re- 
membered, and  the  citizens  went  forth  in  a  body  to  meet  him, 
and  thanked  him,  in  words  that  are  ever  memorable,  for  not 
having  despaired  of  the  repubUc.^  The  Roman  historians  have 
a  right,  here  at  least,  to  congratulate  themselves  that  they 
were  not  as  were  the  Carthaginians.  The  defeated  Roman 
general  received  a  vote  of  thanks  for  his  unsuccessful  efforts ; 
a  defeated  Carthaginian  would  have  been  nailed  to  a  cross. 

After  the  battle  of  Cannae  the  character  of  the  war  is  changed, 
and  it  loses  something  of  the  intensity  of  the  interest  attached 
to  it.  Hitherto  the  tide  of  invasion  has  run,  as  Dr.  Arnold  has 
pointed  out  in  an  eloquent  passage,^  in  one  single  current,  and 
that  current  so  magnificent  and  so  resistless  that  it  rivets  the 

1  Polyb.  vi.  58,  2.  13 ;  livy,  xxi.  60,  61 ;  Appian,  Uann.  28. 

'Livy,  xxii.  61,  ad  fin. 

s  See  Arnold,  Rom.  Hist.  vol.  iii.  ch.  xliv.  ad  init 


attention  of  even  the  most  careless  spectators.    There  has  been 
no  reverse,  hardly  even  a  check,  from  the  moment  when  Han- 
nibal left  his  winter  quarters  at  New  Carthage,  tiU  he  stood 
victorious  on  the  field  of  Cannae.    The  most  vivid  of  historians 
can  do  little  by  description  to  make  Hannibal's  achievements 
stand  out  m  more  startling  relief  than  they  do  already  by  their 
bare  recital.   The  dullest  annalist,  if  only  he  record  them  truly, 
cannot  make  them  seem  commonplace.     The  eye  can  hardly 
wander  as  it  sees  the  great  drama  develop  itself  step  by  step 
and  sweep  irresistibly  on  towards  what  seems  its  legitimate 
and  necessary  conclusion.   The  obstacles  interposed  by  Nature 
herself— rivers  and  marshes  and  mountain  chains— seemed 
interposed  only  to  stimulate  the  energies  and  to  heighten  the 
glory  of  him  who  could  surmount  them  all.     Each  difficulty 
overcome  is  an  earnest  to  Hannibal  of  his  power  to  grapple 
with  the  next,  and  is  used  by  him  as  a  stepping-stone  towards 
It.     That  they  had  crossed  the  Pyrenees,  he  told  his  soldiers 
when  they  were  hesitating  on  the  Rhone,  was  a  proof  that  they 
could  pass  the  Alps.    When  they  had  reached  the  summit  of 
the  Alps,  he  told  them  they  had  already  seized  the  citadel  of 
Italy,  and  had  only  to  walk  down  and  take  possession  of  the 
city.     Four  times  over,  he  had  now  measured  his  sword  with 
the  future  conquerors  of  the  worid,  and  each  time  he  had  been 
victorious,  and  that  too  in  an  ever-ascending  series  of  successes. 
At  the  Ticinus  he  first  met  the  Roman  cavalry,  and  it  was  their 
hasty  retreat  from  the  field  of  battle  which  alone  saved  them 
from  a  rout.     At  the  Trebia,  however  the  consul  might  try 
to  disguise  it,  it  was  no  retreat  at  all,  it  was  a  total  rout. 
At  the  Trasimene,  it  was  neither  defeat  nor  rout,  it  was 
the  extermination  of  an  army.     At  Cannse  it  was  the  ex- 
termination, not  of  one  but  of  two  armies,  and  each  of  them 
twice  its  usual  size.     This  was  the  pinnacle  of  Hannibal's 
success,  and  a  pinnacle  indeed  it  was. 

Almost  as  wonderful  as  Hannibal's  victories  over  Nature 
or  his  enemies,  were  his  victories  over  his  own  followers 
Under  the  speU  of  his  genius,  the  discordant  members  of 


238 


CARTHAGE  AND  THE  CARTHAGINIANS. 


a  motley  Carthaginian  army — disaffected  Libyans  and  Nu- 
midians,  barbarous  and  lethargic  Spaniards,  fierce  and  fickle 
Gauls — were  welded  into  a  homogeneous  whole,  which  com- 
bined the  utmost  play  of  individual  prowess  with  all  the  pre- 
cision of  a  machine.  No  whisper  of  disaffection  or  of  mutiny 
was  ever  heard  in  Hannibal's  camp.^  Italians  deserted  by 
thousands  to  Hannibal;  but  no  Hannibalian  veteran,  even 
when  his  star  was  on  its  wane,  ever  deserted  to  Rome.  Politic 
as  he  was  brave,  and  generous  as  he  was  far-sighted,  Hannibal 
could  arouse  alike  the  love  and  the  fear,  the  calm  confidence 
and  the  passionate  enthusiasm,  of  all  the  various  races  who 
served  under  his  standard.  The  best  general,  a  high  authority 
has  said,  is  he  who  makes  the  fewest  mistakes ;  but  what  single 
mistake  can  the  keenest  critic  point  out  which  marred  the  pro- 
gress or  chequered  the  success  of  these  three  first  extraordinary 
years  ?  They  are  years,  moreover,  any  one  of  which  might 
have  made  or  marred  the  reputation  of  any  lesser  general. 
Unfortunately  we  know  Hannibal  only  through  his  enemies. 
They  have  done  their  best  to  malign  his  character ;  they  have 
called  him  cruel,  and,  happily,  almost  every  specific  charge  of 
cruelty  supplies  us,  even  with  our  imperfect  knowledge,  with 
the  materials  for  its  own  refutation.'-^    They  talked  of  "  Punic 


*  Polyhius,  Xxiv.  9,  5.  'Avyifiat  iwTOKaCStita  ini  luivat  ip  roU  tnaiipoi^,  mai 
vAeto-Toiv  oAAo^wAois  itat  erepoyAMrroic  aySpdvi  xP^^<MA<>'Of  ""P^*  omjAirta^eVaf  ical 
wapaSo^ovs  «Airi6as,  i/v  witvh^  ovt*  circ^ovAcvdi)  to  wapavav,  ovr  cy«carcA(t^0i|  iurb 
tS»v  wvTftaTtvoyiivnv. 

2 The  judgment  of  Polybius  himself  on  Hannibal,  ix.  22-26;  xi.  19,  etc., 
is  on  the  whole  both  just  and  appreciative.  He  tells  us  explicitly  (ix.  24)  that 
an  officer  of  his  called  Hannibal  Monomachus  was  the  author  of  many  of  the 
acts  of  cruelty  which  were  attributed  to  his  chief.  Livy  (xxviii.  12,  etc.)  does 
full  justice  to  the  ability  of  Hannibal,  but  not  to  his  character  ;  Silius  Italicus, 
Pun.  i.  56  seq.^  exactly  expresses  the  ordinary  Roman  view  in  the  following 
lines : — 

Ingenio  motus  avidus,  fideique  sinister 
Is  fuit :  exsuperans  astu,  sed  devius  sequi : 
Armato  nullus  divflm  pudor :  improba  virtus, 
Et  pacis  despectus  honos,  penitusque  medullia 
Sanguinis  humani  flagrat  sitis. 
This  is  only  the  echo  of  the  end  of  livy,  xxi  4 :  "  Has  tantas  viri  virtutes  in- 


CHARACTER  OF  HANNIBAL. 


239 


til  faith  "  till  they  came  themselves  to  believe  in  its  existence, 
or  to  think  that  the  name  proved  itself.     But  what  people  or 
what  town,  it  may  well  be  asked,  which  Hannibal  had  ever 
promised  to  support,  did  he  voluntarily  abandon,  or  of  what 
smgle  act  of  treachery  can  it  be  proved  that  he  was  guilty  ? 
They  made  as  light  as  they  could  even  of  his  achievements,  by 
attributing  to  Phoenician  cunning,  or  to  the  blind  forces  of 
Nature,  the  severity  of  defeats  which  no  patriotic  Eoman 
could  beheve  were  due  to  his  individual  genius  alone ;  for 
It  was  an  individual  genius  such  as  they  had  never  seen 
or  imagined.     A  storm  of  sleet  at  Trebia,  the  mist  at  the 
Trasimene,  the  wind  and  clouds  of  dusti  or  the  treachery 
of  some  deserters  at   Cannae— such   were  the  transparent 
fictions  by  which  the  Eomans  attempted  to  disguise  from 
others,  and,  perhaps,  even  from  themselves,  that  they  had 
found  their  master.      We  know  Hannibal,  let  us  repeat  it 
once  more,  only  from  his  enemies ;    but  in  what  character 
even  as  painted  by  his  best  friends,  can  we  discern  such  vivid 
and  such  unmistakable  marks  of  greatness  ?    The  outline  is 
commanding,  imperial,  heroic ;    and  there  is  no  detaU  with 
which  our  materials  enable  us  to  fiU  it  in  at  aU,  which  is  not 
in  perfect  harmony  with  the  whole. 

After  CannaB  the  tide  of  invasion  ceases  to  flow  onward 
in  one  irresistible  sweep.  It  is  broken  up  into  a  number 
of  smaller  currents,  which,  though  they  are,  doubtless,  each 
planned  by  the  ruling  mind,  and  conducted  by  the  master 
hand,  are  often  in  the  nature  of  by-play  rather  than  have 
any  direct  bearing  on  the  main  issues  of  the  war.  They 
are,  moreover,  always  difficult  and  often  impossible  to  follow 
The  Eomans,  taught  by  the  experience  which  they  had 
bought  so  bitterly  on  four  battle-fields,  decline  any  longer 
to  trust  themselves  within  the  reach  of  Hannibal's  arm, 

gentia  yitia  lequabant;  inhumana  crudelitas,  perfidia  plusquam  Punica.  nihil 
ver,   nihil  sancti.  nullus  DeOm  metus.  nullum  jusjurandum.  nulla  religio  " 

^    Livy.  XXI  56  ;  xxii.  4  and  43 ;  Appian.  JIann.  20  and  22 ;  Florus,  ii.  6.'  13- 
lu ;  Zonaras,  ix.  1.  .  ,        ,  *vp- 


I 


240 


CARTHAGE  AND  THE  CARTHAGINIANS. 


or  to  stake  their  safety  on  any  single  blow ;  while  Hanni- 
bal, lacking  the  reinforcements  which  he  had  a  right  to 
expect,  and  which  it  is  impossible  to  believe  that  the  Car- 
thaginian government,  had  they  been  animated  by  a  tithe 
of  the  spirit  of  their  general,  could  not  have  despatched 
to  him  before  this,  has  to  adapt  the  plan  of  his  campaign 
to  his  altered  circumstances  and  his  ever-straitening  means. 
The  Numidian  cavalry  as  they  die  off  have  to  be  replaced 
by  Gauls,  and  the  Libyan  and  Spanish  v^eterans  by  Samnites 
or  Lucanians,  who  had  long  since  bowed  their  necks  to  the 
Roman  yoke.     Isolated  sieges,  embassies  to  distant  poten- 
tates, pressing  messages  to  Carthage,  rapid  marches  and 
counter-marches,   ambuscades   and   surprises,    the    sudden 
swoop  on   Rome,  and   the  doom  of  Carthage,  recognised 
by  Hannibal  in  the  ghastly  head  of  his  brother  Hasdrubal, 
thrown  with  true  Roman  brutality  into  his  camp— these  still 
lend  Hfe  and  variety  and  a  deadly  interest  to  the  struggle 
such  as  we  find  in  few  other  wars  ;  but  we  feel  all  the  time 
that  the  war  is  not  what  it  was.      It  is  not  that  Hannibal's 
eye  has  grown  dim,  or  his  natural  force  abated.      His  right 
hand  never  lost  its  cunning.     Invincible  as  ever  in  the  field, 
we  shall  see  Hannibal,  for  years  to  come,  marching  wher- 
ever he  likes,  no  Roman  general — and  there  were  sometimes 
half  a  dozen  of  them  round  him — daring  to  say  him  nay. 
Following  the  example  of  Fabius,  they  dogged  his  footsteps, 
or  hung  upon  the  hills  above  him,  while  he  encamped  fear- 
lessly in  the  plain  below;    but  when  he  turned  his  face 
towards  one  and  the  other,  they  scattered  before  him  in  all 
directions  as  the  jackals  before  a  lion.     Yet  we  feel  through- 
out, what  Hannibal  must  soon  have  come  to  feel  himself, 
that  fate  had  at  length  declared  against  him.      It  is  a  noble 
but  a  hopeless  struggle,  and  we  are  fain  to  turn  away  from 
the  spectacle  of  so  heroic  a  soul  struggling  against  what  it 
knows  to  be  inevitable.     It  is  indeed  a  psychological  puzzle 
how  any  one  man — even  though  he  were  the  greatest  product 
of  the  Phoenician  race — can  have  combined  such  opposite,  nay, 


0ENW3  OP  HANNIBAL, 

orZinghisioS^^^^^^^^^ 

him  in  one  imDetuou«TnT     '    u  f  ''^'"^  everything  before 

from  SaguntZL  Can^^^^^  irihl  th  "7  T ^^  ^^  ^^^^-«*^ 
and  then,  for  its  twekeTemainin  ^"''  ^""'^  "^  '^'  ^^^' 

struggle  by  a  warfa"  wh  JZ  ?  ^  "^.'  T"*^^^  *^^ 
ing  against  honP  an^  7  u         '       ^  '^^''''  defensive,  hop- 

It  would  be  well  wortK  ft       u^f     ,       ever-increasing  foe. 
tmce.  if  it  werTposrw!^     f.      "^^  °^  '^'  ""'"'^^^  ^'-^ent  to 

in  patience  as  in  in.petZtTtln.^Z'L^''^  """''  ^"^ 
warfare,  which  if  onlv  th.  t>    P>^oionged  for  thirteen  years  a 

bal.  or  ihe  C^baSlXT^nllut^l^:^^^^^ 

way  or  the  other  havp  h«<.„  1     '  °°^  °"'  *»"».  must,  in  one 

Bui  we  cannot  d;  so  f^.^  T""^^'  *°  "  '^"'^  ^l'""^'  -'  """e. 
goes  the  ch^nlfwhik  L«  ^  '''^  T  '*""'  '^'  ^^'  ^''^^^■ 
the  continuous'LSnt  orthr  T''  ^T'"^"'  ^«  ''^  ^^ 
have  enabled  ^1^^^!:^-^^'-'-^ 

of  the  Scipios,  obtained  jS^istSr  f';,""''^  "'•''« 
heard  in  conversation  theTfl^/wendra/d  ""'^ 
respects,  treated  lilcA  nnn  r.f  *u  ^  f  gends,  and  was,  m  aU 

separated  him  from  them  L.LT  v!u  ^  '™®  "^^""^ 
is.  doubtless,  verv  nearlv 'th«  f  !t  ""^^'^^"^  ^  get  at  what 
But,  henceforIZ  Tl^  ""  °^  *^*  ^^^^^^  *»«  records. 

checlSrtt  Irl  falsZr  ""'  ^^^^^'^^-^  -eans  of 
Bomans     TwoT  tht« !       f  "J,   ^^''ggerations  of  the 
iwo  or  three  considerable  fragments  indeed  of 

i6 


I 


142 


CARTHAGE  AND  THE  CARTHAGINIANS. 


MEAGRE  MATERIALS  FOR  A  HISTORY, 


H3 


I 


the  lost  books  of  Polybius  have  been  preserved  to  us  ;  but 
they  are  fra-ments  only,  and  dealing  as  they  do  chiefly 
with  the  exploits  of  the  Scipios,  the  favourite  heroes  of  the 
author  they  unfortunately  leave  almost  untouched  what  we 
should'  most  wish  to  know,  the  history  of  the  eleven  cam- 
paigns  which  yet  remained  to  Hannibal  in  Italy. 

Another  Greek  historian,  indeed,  there  was,  a  man  named 
Silenus,  who  might  have  given  us  an  independent,  or,  at 
all  events,  a  Carthaginian  version  of  the  events  of  the  war, 
drawn  from  direct  personal  observation.     Silenus,  we  are 
told  by  C.  Nepos,  accompanied  Hannibal  in  his  campaigns, 
shared  his  tent,  and  seems  to  have   been  specially  com- 
missioned by  him  to  write  a  history  of  his  expedition.^     He 
must  have   been  able  to  converse  with   Hannibal  in  his 
native  language,  for  the  versatile  Phoenician,  we  know  from 
the  same  source,  was  not  ignorant  of  Greek.2    But,  un- 
fortunately, of  the  writings  of  Silenus,  if  any  such  ever  ex- 
isted, not  a  paragraph,  not  a  sentence,  not  a  word,  has  come 
down  to  us  direct.     Did  ever  any  historian,  we  are  tempted 
to  ask,  have  so  magnificent  a  chance,  enjoy  such  near  access 
to  the  man  who  was  making  history,  and  making  it  on  so 
gigantic  a  scale,  and  yet  produce  absolutely  nothing  which 
could  survive  him  ?      The  "  table-talk  "  of  Napoleon  at  St 
Helena  will  always  retain  its  deep  human  interest  even  though 
the  idol  itself  may  have  been  long  discrowned,  and  the  whole 
Napoleonic  legend  dissipated,  as  it  has  already,  to  a  great  ex- 
tent, been  by  Lanfrey  and  others  in  the  clear  light  of  authentic 
documents.    It  is  melancholy  to  think  how  much  greater  m- 

iCorn.  Nepos.  Hannibal,  xiil  3;  Cicero.  De  Div.  i.  24  gives  us,  on  his 
authority,  the  famous  «« Somnium  Haunibalis."  and  says  of  him  "is  autein 
diligentis^ime  res  Hannibalis  pcrsecutus  est".    Livy  («vi.  49)  quotes  him  once 

as  "the  Greek  Silenus".  -^  t    1      *    u„„« 

2Sosilus.  a  Lacedemonian,  is  said  by  Corn.  Nepos  (loc.  cU.Uho  to  have 

accompanied  HanniUl  and  to  have  given  him  Ics-sons  in  Greek     Of  his  Nvritm^ 

Polybius  had  not  formed  a  high  opinion  ;  his  history  was  "  full  of  gossip  such 

as  would  delight  a  barber"  ;   oh  yap  l<rTopi««  iAXa  Kovpea^?  ital  tra^5„MOV  AaAta« 

.>.ye  «o«vac  rife.  .V-  -1  «-aM-  (PoL  iii-  20.  5).     On  Hanmbars  knowledge 
of  Greek,  cf.  Cic.  De  Oratore,  il  IQu 


terest  would  have  attached  to  the  table-talk  of  Hannibal,  the 
table-talk  of  the  man  whose  noble  image  no  friend  has  been 
able  adequately  to  paint  and  no  foe  to  mar.  But  the  same 
fate  which  has  deprived  us  of  aU  adequate  knowledge,— of 
knowledge,  that  is,  drawn  from  internal  or,  at  aU  events'  not 
unfriendly  sources,  of  Carthage  herself ,— has,  with  cruel  con- 
sistency, also  deprived  us  of  what  might,  perchance,  have 
thrown  a  blaze  of  light  on  the  inner  character  and  aims  of  the 
greatest  of  her  citizens,  and  have  shown  us  not  merely  what 
Hannibal  did,  but  what  he  was. 

Although,  therefore,  we  have  dwelt  at  length  upon  the 
first  three  years  of  the  war  wherein  victories  and  defeats 
are  on  so  gigantic  a  scale,  and  where  each  step  can  be 
traced  with  accuracy,  or  has  a  direct  bearing  on  the  main 
result,  it  seems  consistent  alike  with  the  scope  and  object 
of  this  book,  and  with  our  own  views  of  what  is  desirable 
or  even  possible,  to  pass  more  lightly  over  its  remaining 
thirteen   years,   endeavouring   mainly   to   bring  into   relief 
those  incidents  which  appeal  to  the  imagination,  which  are 
characteristic  of  the  rival  nations  or  of  their  leaders,  and 
which  are  of  universal  or  of  lasting  significance.     The  cam- 
paigns themselves  it  is  impossible  to  follow  accurately  in  a 
part  of  the  war  where  it  must  be  admitted  that,  in  spite  of 
the  seven   graphic  books  of  Livy  devoted  to  it,   and  the 
supplementary  fragments  of  several  other  ancient  writers, 
the  materials  for  a  trustworthy  history  are,  on  the  whole,' 
80  meagre  and  so  one-sided. 


244 


CARTHAGE  AND  THE  CARTHAGINIANS. 


CHAPTER  XIV. 


BEVOLT  OF  CAPUA.      SIEGE   OF  8TRA0U8B. 


(B.O.  216-212.) 

Capua  revolts — Its  previous  history  and  importance— Marcellus — Hannibal 
winters  at  Capua— Supposed  demoralisation  of  his  troops — Latin  colonies 
still  true  to  Rome — Great  exertions  of  Rome — Hannibal  negotiates  with 
Syracuse,  Sardinia,  and  Macedon— His  position  at  Tifata— Revolt  of 
Bruttians — Conquest  of  Greek  cities — History  and  importance  of  Crotcu — 
Temple  of  Juno  l.jacinia— Fabius  and  Marcellus  consuls — The  tide  turns 
against  Hannibal— He  gains  possession  of  Tarentum — Its  position  and  im- 
portance—The citadel  holds  out— The  war  in  Sicily— Importance  of 
Syracuse — Its  siege  and  capture — Its  fate. 

The  victory  of  CannsB  led  almost  immediately  to  the  revolt 
of  Capua,  a  city  second  only  to  Bome  in  wealth  and  power, 
and  able  to  put  into  the  field,  when  disposed  to  do  so,  a 
force  of  thirty  thousand  infantry  and  four  thousand  cavalry.  * 
Originally  an  Etruscan  city,  Capua  had,  at  an  early  period, 
passed  into  the  hands  of  her  warlike  neighbours,  the 
Samnites ;  and  these,  in  their  turn,  becoming  demoralised 
by  the  idle  plenty  of  the  '*  greatest  and  richest  city  in  the 
whole  of  Italy,"  ^  were  glad  (e.g.  340)  to  put  themselves 
under  the  protection  of  Kome.  Borne  proved  to  be  an  easy 
mistress,  for  while  she  appropriated  to  herself  the  rich 
Falernian  plain,  she  gave  Capua  a  full  equivalent  in  the 
shape  of  the  Boman  franchise,  and  allowed  a  Campanian 
magistrate  with  the  native  title  of  Meddix  Tuticus^  to  ad- 
minister justice  to  its  citizens.  Any  other  Italian  city  out- 
side the  magic  circle  of  the  thirty-five  tribes  would  have  been 
glad  enough  to  change  places  with  Capua  ;  but  a  position  of 


>  liyy,  xziii.  5. 


«Ibid.  viiSl. 


REVOLT  OF  CAPUA, 


245 


poitical  inferiority  is  often  most  resented  when  it  is  least 
felt,  and  Capua,  which  wanted,  as  she  believed,  but  one 
step  more  to  put  her  on  terms  of  equality  with  Borne,  and 
but  two  to  make  her  its  superior,  had  long  been  waiting  for  a 
favourable  opportunity  to  assert  her  claims.  And  now  the  un- 
broken  success  of  Hannibal,  the  favourable  terms  he  offered 
her  the  ambition  of  the  popular  party,  and  the  apparent  pros- 
tration of  Bome,  combined  to  indicate  that  the  hour  of  her  de- 
liverance had  come.  AU  the  Boman  citizens  resident  in  Capua 
were  collected  into  the  public  baths  and  were  there  suffocated 
and  the  second  city  in  Italy  passed  over  to  Carthage 

It  was  a  terrible  blow  to  Bome,  for  it  seemed  to  put  the 
finishing  touch  to  the  victories  of  Hannibal.     Valuable  in 
Itself,  It  was  much  more  valuable  in  what  it  seemed  to  por- 
tend,  for  it  was  the  first  breach  in  the  walls  of  the  Boman 
confederacy  properly  so  called,  and  Hannibal  might  weU 
imagine  that  the  breach  once  made  would  be  likely  to  widen 
of  Itself  with  httle  exertion  on  his  part.    Already  indeed  Atella 
and  Calatia,  two  small  towns  in  the  neighbourhood,  had  gone 
over  to  Carthage,!  and  it  might  well  seem  that  the  rest  would 
foUow     But,  unfortunately  for  Hannibal,  the  revolt  of  Capua 
was  shorn  of  half  its  value  by  the  stipulation  made  by  the 
ease-loving  inhabitants  and  granted  by  the  eager  Carthaginian 
general,  that  no  Capuan  citizen  should  be  required  to  serve  in 
his  army.2    It  was  an  arrangement  which  cost  him  dear ;  but 
cost  him  what  it  might,  it  was  ever  afterwards  religiously  ob- 
served by  him.     He  had  ahready  tried  to  capture  Naples  by 
surpnse,  but,  failing  in  the  attempt,  he  had  not  cared,  deficient 
as  he  was  in  military  engines  and  other  appliances  for  a 
blockade,  to  besiege  it  in  form.     Nor  was  he  more  successful 
at  Nola  which  was  prevented  from  revolting  by  the  energy 
and  skill  of  M  Claudius  MarceUus,  the  ablest  general  whom 
the  agony  of  the  last  three  years  had  brought  to  the  front  • 
perhaps  as  able  as  any  whom  the  Second  Punic  War  pro' 
duced  for  Bome  at  all.3  ^ 


*  Livy,  xxii.  61. 


«Ibid.  xxiil  7. 


•Ibid.  xxii.  land  14. 


246 


CARTHAGE  AND  THE  CARTHAGINIANS. 


I 


As  consul,  six  years  before,  Marcellus  had  slain  with  his 
own  hand  the  huge  Gallic  chieftain  Viridomarus,  and  had, 
for  the  third  and  last  time  in  Roman  history,  dedicated  the 
sjwlia  opima  in  the  temple  of  Jupiter  Feretrius.^     When, 
after  the  battle  of  Cannae,  Varro  was  recalled  to  Rome,  it 
was  he  who  in  the  hour  of  her  extreme  distress  had  taken 
the  command  of  the  ten  thousand  Roman  survivors  at  Canu- 
sium.2    He  it  was  who  with  them,  discredited  as  they  were 
in  the  eyes  of  the  Senate,  had  boldly  followed  Hannibal  into 
Campania,  and  had  succeeded  in  repelling  him  from  before 
Nola.3    It  was  no  slight  honour;  for  as  Livy,  with  proud 
humility,  and,  perhaps,  pardonable  exaggeration,  remarks,  it 
was  in  those  dark  days  more  difficult  to  avoid  being  conquered 
by  Hannibal  than  it  was  afterwards  to  conquer  him.*     Like 
Fabius,  Marcellus  knew  how  to  avoid  defeat,  but  he  knew 
better  than  Fabius  how  and  when  to  strike  a  vigorous  blow. 
If  Fabius  deserved  to  be  called  the  shield  of  Rome,  Marcellus 
might  with  equal  right  be  called  its  sword.*    He  has  doubt- 
less been  overpraised  by  Roman  writers,  who  drew  their  notions 
of  him  from  the  panegyric  passed  on  him  by  his  son^ — a  very 
doubtful  authority  for  an  historian— and  Cicero,  in  particular, 
with  the  especial  object  of  contrasting  him  with  Verres,  has 
attributed  to  him  those  quaUties  of  mercy,  generosity,  and 
refinement  in  which,  Uke  most  of  his  contemporaries,  he 
was  conspicuously  wanting^    He  was  a  rough  soldier,  un- 
cultured as  Marius,  and  hardly  less  cruel;  but  during  the 
next  eight  eventful  years  Rome  could  hardly  have  done  with- 
out him.     The  dread  of  Hannibal  had,  at  length,  taught  the 
city  to  know  a  good  general,  and  to  keep  him  when  she  had 
found  him,  and  she  showed  her  appreciation  of  Marcellus  by 
breaking  through  for  ever  the  insane  tradition  which  brought 
a  military  command  to  an  end  on  a  predetermined  day.    For 

>Livy,  Epitome,  xx. ;  Plutarch,  Mareettua,  6-8. 

2  Livy,  xxii.  57  ;  Plutarch,  Marcellus.  9.  »Livy.  xxiu.  14-16. 

*  Livy,  xxiii.  16  ad  fin.  *  See  Plutarch,  Fabiu3  and  Marcellus,  passim. 

«  Livy,  xxvii.  27  ad  fin.  ^  Cicero.  In  Verrem,  ii.  lib.  4,  52-55,  58,  etc 


HANNIBAL  WINTERS  AT  CAPUA. 


247 


the  next  eight  years,  his  is  the  name  in  the  Roman  annals 
which  we  hear  most  often,  and  that  on  all  the  most  critical 
occasions.  He  served,  in  fact,  as  consul  and  proconsul  in 
alternate  years  in  almost  continuous  succession ;  and  when, 
at  last,  he  fell  in  an  ambuscade,  his  body  was  treated  with 
marked  honour  by  the  great  Hannibal  himself. 

Foiled  at  Nola,  Hannibal  turned  his  attention  to  Casi- 
linum,  a  town  situated  on  the  Vulturnus,  and  then  con- 
taining a  mixed  garrison  of  Praenestines  and  Perusians,  who 
had  taken  shelter  within  its  walls  when  they  heard  of  the 
disaster  of  Cannae.^  Leaving  a  sufficient  force  to  blockade 
the  place,  he  went,  with  the  remainder,  into  winter  quarters 
at  Capua,  a  few  miles  to  the  south.  It  has  been  remarked 
by  many  writers,  modern  as  well  as  ancient,  that  Capua 
proved  a  Cannae  to  Hannibal. 2  Given  over  to  luxury  and 
to  Greek  vices,  it  was  certainly  not  the  place  best  suited 
for  the  winter  retirement  of  an  overstrained  army;  and, 
doubtless,  the  troops,  who  had  ere  now  wintered  among  the 
snow  of  the  Apennines  or  in  the  open  plains  of  Apulia, 
must  have  luxuriated  in  the  easetul  quarters  which  Hannibal's 
Bword  had  opened  for  them.  It  is  true  also,  as  has  already 
been  pointed  out,  that  this  year  was  a  turning-point  in  the 
war;  but  that  it  was  so  is  due  to  other  causes  than  the 
luxury  of  Capua.  i?Tor  would  it  seem  to  be  true  that  the 
Carthaginians  were  in  any  way  demoralised  by  their  winter's 
comfort.  They  were  irresistible  as  ever  in  the  field.  The 
real  difference  was  that  the  Roman  generals  had  learned  in 
the  school  of  adversity  not  to  trust  themselves  within  the 
reach  of  Hannibal's  army,  and,  from  this  time  to  the  end  of 
the  war  in  Italy,  they  acted  on  the  Fabian  maxim,  and  never 
gave  him  an  opportunity  of  fighting  a  pitched  battle,  or,  what 
was  the  same  thing,  of  giving  them  a  crushing  defeat. 

Early  in  the  spring,  Casilinum  surrendered  to  Hannibal. 
But  the  circumstances  of  its  surrender,  when  closely  scanned, 

^  Livy,  xxiii.  17. 

«  Kg.  Florns.  ii.  6,  21 ;  cf.  Livy,  xxiii.  18 ;  Zonaras,  ix.  a 


i! 

1 1 


^48 


CARTHAGE  AND  THE  CARTHAGINIANS, 


p. 


must  have  seemed  more  suggestive  of  hope  as  to  the  ultimate 
result  of  the  war  to  the  conquered  Bomans  than  to  the  con- 
quering Carthaginians.    For  the  resistance  it  had  offered  gave 
an  unmistakable  proof  that  the  resolution  and  fidelity  of  a 
large  part  of  the  Boman  confederation  had  not  been  shaken 
even  by  CannaB.     Its  garrison,  drawn  at  hap-hazard  from 
distant  towns,  had  supported  life  on  such  scanty  supplies  of 
com  or  nuts  as  could  be  sent  floating  down  the  river  by  night, 
in  the  hope  that,  while  they  escaped  the  keen  eye  of  Hannibal, 
they  might  not  escape  those  who  were  rendered  keener  still 
by  the  pinch  of  hunger ;  nor  was  it  till  after  mice  and  herbs, 
and  even  the  leather  thongs  of  their  shields,  had  been  con- 
sumed, that  the  garrison  surrendered,  stipulating,  even  then, 
for  their  liberty  on  payment  of  a  sum  of  money.     The  terms 
of  capitulation  were,  as  Livy  himself  admits,  loyally  observed 
by  the  "perfidious"  Hannibal,  though  he  also  frankly  tells 
us  that  some  of  his  predecessors,  in  an  access  of  patriotic 
hate,  had  affirmed  that  the  survivors  of  the  siege  were  mas- 
sacred by  the  Numidians  as  they  returned  to  their  homes.  ^ 
Such  fidelity  on  the  part  of  this  motley  garrison  must  have 
raised  doubts  in  the  mind  of  even  the  victor  of  Cannae  and 
the  master  of  Capua,  whether  he  had  not  undertaken  a  hope- 
less task.     He  might  cut  off  one  of  the  Hydra's  heads,  but 
two  seemed  to  spring  up  in  its  place.     Might  there  not  be 
many  Casilinums  in  other  parts  of  Italy?    Even  in  those 
country  districts,  the  fidelity  of  whose  inhabitants  appeared  to 
have  been  shaken  by  the  victory  of  Cannae,  the  towns  were 
still  staunch  to  Rome.     There  were  still,  for  instance,  Bene- 
ventum  in  Samnium ;  Nola,  Naples,  and  Cumae  in  Campania; 
Luceria,  Brundusium  and  Venusia  in  Apulia;  Tarentum  in 
lapygia ;  Bhegium  and  Consentia,  Petelia  and  Croton,  among 
the  Bruttii ;  and  each  of  these,  it  might  be  presumed  by  the 
example  set  by  Casilinum,  would  have  the  strength  and  the 
spirit  to  stand  a  desperate  siege.     Indeed,  no  single  Latin 
colony,  throughout  the  whole  of  Italy,  had,  as  yet,  opened 

}  Uvy,  xxiii.  19, 


LATIN  COLONIES  TRUE  TO  ROME. 


249 


her  gates  to  Hannibal ;  still  less,  any  town  which  enjoyed 
the  full  Boman  citizenship. 

The  active  operations,  therefore,  of  the  year  B.C.  215  did 
not  open  quite  so  gloomily  for  Bome  as  might  have  been 
anticipated.     The  consuls  were  the  old  dictator  Fabius  and 
Tib.  Sempronius  Gracchus.     Incredible  exertions  were  made 
by  Bome   to   bear  the   strain   which   was   put  upon   her. 
Double  taxes  were  imposed  and  paid,  and  freewill  contribu- 
tions were  offered  by  the  citizens,  which  it  was  understood 
were  not  to  be  repaid  till  the  treasury  was  full;   in  other 
words  not  till  the  war  was  over.     The  year,  therefore,  which 
followed  the  butchery  of  eight  legions  at  Cannae  saw  four- 
teen new  ones  raised  to  take  their  place,  six  of  them  in  other 
parts  of  the  Boman  world,  and  the  remaining  eight  in  Italy 
itself.      On  his  side,  Hannibal  can  hardly  have  mustered 
more  than  forty  thousand  men,  even  if  we  include  his  recent 
levies  in  Samnium.     It  must  be  remembered  that  till  to- 
wards the  close  of  b.c.  216,  after  fighting  four  pitched  battles, 
and  marching  and  counter-marching  through  the  whole  of 
Italy,  Hannibal  had  received  no  single  soldier  and  drawn 
not  a  single  penny  from  the  home  government  of  Carthage.^ 
Never  before  or  after  was  war  so  made  to  support  itself,  and 
never,  even  in  the  hands  of  the  author  of  that  sinister  maxim, 
was  it  waged  with  such  astonishing  results. 

But  if  Hannibal's  victories  had  not  yet  done  for  him  all 
that  he  had  hoped  in  Italy  itself,  might  it  not  be  possible  to 
gain  his  object  by  taking  a  wider  sweep  ?  If  Italy  could  not 
be  armed  against  Bome,  might  not  the  surrounding  countries, 
whose  existence  was  already  threatened,  be  armed  against 
Italy  and  Bome  alike?  Circumstances,  at  the  moment,  seemed 
to  smile  on  the  project ;  for  Hiero,  the  ancient  and  faithful 
ally  of  Bome,  was  just  dead,  and  Hieronymus,  his  grandson 
and  successor,  straightway  joined  the  Carthaginians.2  Sar- 
dinia too  was  planning  revolt  from  the  city  which  had  stolen 
her  with  such  infamous  bad  faith  from  Carthaginian  rule ; « 


\m 


»Uvy,  xxiil  13. 


•Ibid.  xxiv.    4. 


'Ibid,  xxiii.  32  and  34. 


ii| 


It 


250 


CARTHAGE  AND  THE  CARTHAGINIANS, 


and,  about  the  same  time,  ambassadors  arrived  in  Hanni- 
bal's camp  from  Philip,  king  of  Macedon,  offering  to  conclude 
with  him  an  alliance,  offensive  or  defensive.^  But  the  bright 
vision  rose  before  Hannibal's  eyes  only  to  vanish  away.  The 
revolt  of  Sardinia  was  stamped  out  before  it  came  to  a  head.^ 
Hieronymus  was  weak  and  foolish,  and  setting  himself  to 
imitate  the  able  Dionysius  who  had  once  ruled  Syracuse,  showed 
that  he  was  able  to  imitate  him  only  in  his  arrogance  and 
his  vices,  and  was  soon  despatched  by  the  well-deserved  dagger 
of  the  assassin.2  Finally,  the  Macedonian  ambassadors,  when 
returning  with  the  treaty  which  had  just  been  concluded 
between  Hannibal  and  Philip,  fell,  as  ill-luck  would  have  it, 
into  the  hands  of  the  Bomans,  and  so  gave  them  a  timely 
warning  to  prepare  for  what,  otherwise,  might  have  burst 
upon  them  hke  a  thunder-clap.* 

Amidst  such  hopes  and  such  disappointments  the  year 
passed  away.  Throughout  its  course  Hannibal  had  retained 
Tifata,  a  mountain  ridge  which  rises  abruptly  from  the  plain 
about  a  mile  from  Capua,  as  his  head-quarters.  No  better 
place  could  have  been  chosen.  Here  he  could  wait  in  safety 
the  results,  if  any,  of  the  alliances  he  was  planning  in  Italy 
and  outside  of  it ;  here  receive  the  long-expected  reinforce- 
ments from  Carthage  if  ever  they  should  come.  Here  he 
could  protect  Capua,  his  latest  and  his  most  important  ac- 
quisition ;  here,  with  his  one  small  army,  he  could  keep  three 
separate  armies,  headed  by  no  meaner  generals  than  Fabius, 
Gracchus,  and  Marcellus,  at  bay,  and  dealing  his  blows  upon 
them  in  rapid  succession,  could  threaten  now  Cumse,  now 
Naples,  and  now  Nola ;  till,  at  last,  the  approach  of  winter 
warned  him  to  transfer  his  troops  to  his  former  quarters  at 
Arpi  in  Apulia.* 

Meanwhile  Hanno,  Hannibal's  able  lieutenant  in  the  south 
of  Italy,  had  not  been  idle.    He  had  been  sent  thither  after 


*  Polyb.  vii.  9 ;  Livy,  xxiii.  33. 
3  Polyb.  vii.  2-7 ;  Livy,  xxiv.  5-7. 
»Ibid.  xxiii.  36.  37.  39,  43-46. 


8  Livy.  xxiii.  40,  41. 
*Livy,  xxiii.  38. 


{ 


HANNIBAL  CONQUERS  GREEK  CITIES, 


251 


if 


the  victory  of  CannaB  to  raise  the  standard  of  revolt  among 
the  Bruttians,  a  semi-barbarous  people,  who,  not  being 
wholly  independent,  nor  yet  quite  subdued,  but  hard  pressed 
alike  by  the  Romans  from  the  north,  and  by  the  Greek 
cities  which  had  so  long  been  planted  round  their  coasts, 
maintained  a  sullen  struggle  for  existence  in  the  forest  fast- 
nesses of  their  home,  the  land's-end  of  Italy.  They  joined 
the  deliverer  to  a  man ;  but  it  was  still  doubtful  whether  the 
Greek  colonies  in  their  midst  would  follow  their  example. 
The  Greeks  of  the  south  of  Italy,  if  they  hated  the  Eomans 
much,  hated  the  Bruttians  more,  and  were  not  disposed  to 
make  common  cause  with  the  man  who  had  proclaimed 
himself  the  champion  of  Bruttian  independence.^  Petilia,  a 
Hellenised,  if  not  a  Hellenic  city,  was  first  attacked  (b.c. 
216).  For  months  it  made  a  desperate  resistance,  and  it  was 
not  till  its  garrison  had  suffered  the  last  extremity  of  famine 
that  it  submitted  to  the  besieging  army.  Consentia  fell 
after  a  less  prolonged  struggle.  But  Ehegium  baffled  an 
attack  of  Hanno,  as  afterwards,  throughout  the  war,  it  baffled 
the  attacks  of  Hannibal  himself.^  The  fortress  which  com- 
manded the  Straits  of  Messana,  which  had  witnessed  the 
outbreak  of  hostilities  between  Rome  and  Carthage,  and  had 
so  long  confronted  the  Carthaginians  when  they  threatened 
it  from  the  side  of  Sicily,  was  now,  in  the  strange  vicissitudes 
of  the  struggle,  attacked  by  those  same  Carthaginians  from 
the  side  of  Italy,  the  Italy  which  they  had  oveiTun  from  end 
to  end,  and  which  now  seemed  likely  to  form  the  basis  of  yet 
further  conquests.  It  was  a  strange  reverse  of  fortune,  and 
the  difference  between  the  two  is  the  measure,  if  indeed  any- 
thing material  can  be  the  measure,  of  the  genius  of  Hannibal. 
With  the  failure  of  Hanno's  attempt  on  Ehegium,  the  resist- 
ance of  the  Greek  cities  of  Southern  Italy  seems  to  have  come 
to  an  end.  Locri  (b.c.  215)  dismissed  its  Eoman  garrison  at 
the  first  attack,  and  concluded  an  alliance  offensive  and  defen- 

1  Livy,  xxiv.  1 ;  cf.  Plutarch,  TimoUon,  xvi  and  xix, 
«Livy,  xxiii.  30.  and  xxiv.  1. 


t  n 


ilh 


252 


CARTHAGE  AND  THE  CARTHAGINIANS. 


CROTON  AND  ITS  NEIGHBOURHOOD, 


253 


if 


sive  with  Carthage,  and  the  politic  Hannibal,  who  always 
knew  what  to  claim  for  himself  and  what  to  leave  to  his 
allies,  asked  only  for  the  free  use  of  the  city,  while  he  left  its 
port  to  the  control  of  its  seafaring  and  commercial  population. 
The  important  city  of  Croton  followed  the  example  of  Locri, 
and  Hannibal  now  found  himself  possessed  of  steadfast  allies,' 
and  of  a  safe  base  of  operations  in  that  part  of  Italy  which 
lay  nearest  to  Carthage.^ 

But  Croton  is  so  interesting  a  place  in  itself,  and  is  so  in- 
timately  connected  with  the  subsequent  career  and  character 
of  Hannibal,  that  it  may  be  well  here  to  give  a  brief  account 
of  Its  history  and  surroundings.    Croton  was  one  of  the  earli- 
est Achaean  colonies  in  Italy.    At  quite  an  early  period  in  its 
history  it  ha^  covered  an  area  of  twelve  miles  in  circum- 
ference ;  a  fact  to  which  its  waUs,  which  were  standing  in 
these  the  days  of  its  decay,  still  bore  witness.    The  pastoral 
beauty  of  its  neighbourhood  had  been  celebrated  in  an  idyU 
of  Theocntus,  and  the  great  names  of  Milo  its  athlete,  of  De- 
mocedes  and  Alcmaeon  its  physicians,  and  of  Pythagoras  its 
philosopher,  had  spread  its  reputation  throughout  the  Hel- 
^nic  world  and,  far  beyond  it,  even  to  the  court  of  Persia  2 
Fmally    m  the  year  b.c.  510,  it  had  given  a  conspicuous 
proof  ahke  of  its  power  and  of  its  genuine  Hellenic  hatred 
for  Its  nearest  relatives,  by  defeating  in  the  field  and  after- 
wards razing  to  the  ground  the  splendid  city  of  Sybaris      But 
the  mcursions  of  Dionysius,  of  Agathocles,  and  of  Pyrrhus 
ha^,  m  later  times,  shorn  it  of  much  of  its  prosperity.     The 
buildings  of  the  city  now  covered  scarcely  half  the  space  con- 
tamed  within  its  waUs.    The  river  ^sarus,  which  had  once 
flowed  through  the  market-place,  now  flowed  only  throu-h  a 
sohtude,  and  what  still  remained  of  the  city  had  gradually 
crept  away  from  the  citadel  around  which,  in  earher  times, 
It  would  have  clustered  for  protection. 

Six  miles  from  the  city  was  a  temple  dedicated  to  Juno 
Lacinia,  and  revered  by  Greeks  and  Romans  and  Italian 


'Livy,  xxiy.  1. 


•Herod,  iii  129  and  137, 


aborigines  alike.    Standing  on  a  bold  cliff.i  it  served  as  a 
andmark  to  vessels  from  afar;   for,  catching  sight  of  it  as 
they  rounded  the  lapygian  promontory,  they  would  venture 
keeping  it  in  view,  to  steer  right  across  the  mouth  of  the  deep 
Tarentine  gulf.    To  the  landward  was  an  extensive  forest 
encosing  broad  glades  and  rich  pasture  lands,  where  the 
flocks  and  herds  belonging  to  the  temple  could  graze  un- 
shepherded.  and  whence  they  would  return  at  night,  of  their 
own  accord  to  their  proper  homesteads,  safe,  under  the  pro- 
tection of  the  goddess,  alike  from  robbers  and  from  noisome 
beasts.    The  temple  was  as  famous  for  its  wealth  as  for  its 
sanctity.    Its  waUs  were  adorned  with  the  paintings  of 
Zeuxis.2  and  with  the  rich  ofiferings  of  the  neighbouring 
peoples.    From  the  produce  of  its  innumerable  flocks  and 
herds  a  column  of  solid  gold  had  been  erected  in  the  temple 
an  ofl-ering  the  value  of  which  Crcesus  himself,  with  aU  the 
careless  profusion  of  his  gifts  to  the  Delphian  god,  can 
hardly  have  surpassed.    The  sanctity  of  the  spot  was  attested 
by  a  standing  miracle,  for  under  the  portico  of  the  temple 
exposed,  as  it  would  seem,  to  the  full  force  of  the  sea  breezes' 
stood  an  altar,  the  ashes  on  which— so  the  devout  worship- 
pers believed— could  be  disturbed  by  no  wind  that  blew  = 

Of  this  famous  place-city  and  citadel,  sanctuary  and 
forest,  with  aU  its  wealth  and  all  its  historical  and  religious 
associations— Hannibal  now  found  himself  the  master  It 
was  here  that  he  established  his  principal  magazines  •  here 
were  his  head-quarters  during  the  last  three  years  of  the 
war  in  Italy ;  here  he  erected  those  brazen  tablets  on  which 
to  record  those  splendid  exploits  which  he  might  well  have 
deemed  would  be  more  imperishable  than  any  brass ;  and  it 
was  from  here  that  he  set  sail,  at  last,  for  Carthage,  stained 
if  we  may  beUeve  the  Roman  story,  with  a  crime  which  as 
we  shaU  show  hereafter,  is  wholly  inconsistent  with  whatever 
else  we  know  about  him,  and  which,  when  taken  in  connec- 

I  Lnotn,  Phars.  11  484.  n  Cic.  De.  'inv.  U.  1. 

•  Livy,  xxiv.  8. 


254 


CARTHAGE  AND  THE  CARTHAGINIANS. 


I II  ^ 


tion  with  his  known  reverence  for  the  shrine  wherein  the 
deed  is  said  to  have  been  done,  happily  itself  furnishes  the 
best  materials  for  its  own  refutation. 

The  elections  for  the  year  b.c.  214 — after  the  consul  Fabius 
had  given  a  solemn  warning  to  the  electors  to  let  military 
considerations  alone  influence  them  at  such  a  time  of  need — 
ended,  as  was  to  be  expected,  and  as  Fabius  had  himself  in- 
tended, in  the  re-election  of  the  Mentor  himself,  Marcellus  being 
chosen  as  his  colleague.^  Seldom  in  Roman  history  had  two 
such  men  held  office  at  the  same  time,  and  the  memories  of 
the  older  citizens  had  to  travel  back  to  the  days  of  Decius  Mus, 
or  even  of  Papirius  Cursor,  till  they  found  or  thought  they 
found  a  parallel  to  it.  In  this  year,  indeed,  and  for  some  years 
to  come,  Eome  was  likely  enough  to  need  her  shield  as  well 
as  her  sword.  The  fourteen  legions  which  had  been  thought 
sufficient  in  the  previous  year,  were  raised  now  to  the  still  more 
astonishing  number  of  eighteen ;  and  the  wealthier  citizens 
contributed  from  their  private  means  the  sums  which  were 
necessary  to  raise  the  payment  of  the  sailors  of  the  fleet. ^ 

Capua  had  already  begun  to  tremble  for  her  safety  ;  but  she 
was  reassured  when  the  movement  of  Hannibal  showed  that 
it  was  his  intention  not  only  to  keep  what  he  had  already 
won  in  Campania,  but,  if  possible,  to  win  the  whole.  In 
vain,  however,  did  he  attempt  to  surprise  or  bring  over 
CumaB,  Naples,  and  PuteoU,  seaport  towns  which  would  have 
done  good  service  by  opening  direct  communication  with 
Carthage.  Hanno,  moreover,  on  coming  to  co-operate  with 
him,  with  the  numerous  Lucanian  and  Bruttian  levies  which 
he  had  raised,  was  intercepted  by  Gracchus  in  the  heart  of 
Samnium.  Gracchus  promised  freedom,  in  the  event  of 
victory,  to  the  armed  slaves  {volones)  of  whom  his  force  con- 
sisted ;  and  in  the  battle  which  ensued,  conscious  that  they 
were  carrying  their  liberty  as  well  as  their  hves  in  their 
hands,  they  cut  to  pieces  Hanno's  army,  and  received  their 
reward.     The  word  of  a  Gracchus,  in  this  as  in  other  epochs 


1  Livy,  xxiv.  8,  9 ;  Zonaras,  ix.  4. 


•  Uvy,  xxiv.  11. 


I     1 


THE  TIDE  TURN:i  ^GAINST  HANNIBAL, 


255 


of  Roman  history,  was  his  bond,  and  a  bond  which  was  a 
first-rate  security.^  These  reverses  brought  Hannibal's  plans 
of  Campanian  conquest  to  an  abrupt  conclusion,  and  when 
he  received  a  friendly  message  from  Tarentum,  a  place  more 
important  to  him,  just  then,  even  than  the  Campanian  towns, 
from  its  proximity  to  Macedon,  he  paid  it  a  flying  visit.^  But 
here,  too,  the  Romans  had  anticipated  him,  and  Fabius,  taking 
advantage  of  his  absence,  besieged  and  recaptured  Casilinum. 
The  Carthaginian  garrison  stipulated  for  their  lives  as  the 
Italian  garrison  had  stipulated  before  them ;  but  as  they  were 
filing  out  of  the  gate,  Marcellus,  in  direct  violation  of  the  terms 
of  their  surrender,  fell  upon  and  killed  a  large  number  of 
them.  The  bad  faith  in  this  instance,  at  least,  was  not  on 
the  side  of  the  Carthaginians ;  and  we  can  well  understand 
how  the  story  of  the  treachery  of  Hannibal  on  the  first  sur- 
render of  Casilinum  was  invented  now  as  a  set-off  to  that  of 
Marcellus.^  Anyhow,  when  Hannibal  went  into  his  next  winter 
quarters  at  Salapia  in  Apulia,  the  tide  of  unbroken  victory  had 
begun  to  ebb.*  He  was  already  waging  a  warfare  which  was 
mainly  defensive,  and  it  might  have  seemed  to  any  one  who 
had  not  felt  the  terrors  of  his  spring,  that,  if  only  the  three 
armies  which  lay  watching  him  during  the  winter  had  ven- 
tured to  beard  the  lion  which  lay  crouching  in  his  den,  they 
would  have  had  a  chance  of  bringing  the  Second  Punic  War 
to  a  conclusion  then. 

During  the  next  two  years  the  interest  of  the  war  is  for  the 
first  time  in  some  measure  diverted  from  Hannibal.  The 
great  Carthaginian,  though  he  had  not  yet  spoken  aloud  the 
word  **  Impossible,"  must  have  occasionally  whispered  it  to 
himself.  He  was  still  without  adequate  reinforcements  from 
home;  for  the  considerable  armament,  which  the  news  of 
Hannibal's  triumphant  progress  through  Italy  had,  at  last, 
shamed  the  Carthaginians  into  raising  for  him,  had,  when  they 
were  on  the  point  of  embarkation,  been  diverted  to  Sardinia 


i 


1  Livy,  xxiv.  12-16. 


2  Ibid.  xxiv.  20. 
*  Ibid.  xxiv.  20. 


8  Ibid.  xxiv.  19. 


256 


CARTHAGE  AND  THE  CARTHAGINIANS. 


and  Spain.i  In  this  last  country  the  star  of  Carthage  was  not 
just  then,  in  the  ascendant,  and  Hannibal,  who  had  received 
only  a  paltry  force  of  some  forty  elephants  and  some  four 
thousand  Numidian  cavah^  from  his  countrymen  at  home, 
was  compelled,  partly  from  necessity,  and  partly,  it  would 
seem,  from  lassitude,  to  spend  the  greater  part  of  the  summer 
ofB.c.  213  in  the  neighbourhood  of  Tarentum,  without  attempt- 
ing  any  active  operations.s  With  admirable  pohcy,  he  had, 
even  in  the  moment  of  disappointment  in  the  preceding  year] 
abstained  from  ravaging  the  Tarentine  lands  while  he  harried 
those  of  the  surrounding  towns,  and  now  he  reaped  his  re- 
ward.3  In  the  course  of  the  winter  he  was  half  ofifered,  and 
he  half  forced  for  himself,  an  entrance  into  the  city,  though 
he  was  unable  to  eject  the  recently  arrived  Eoman  garrison 
from  the  citadel 

But  here,  once  more,  we  must  turn  aside,  as  in  the  case  of 
Capua  and  Croton,  to  give  some  account  of  a  place  which  so 
often  raised  and  so  often  disappointed  Hannibal's  highest 
hopes,  which  invited  him  to  come  and  take  possession  of  her 
and  then  closed  her  gates  in  his  face,  which  kept  him  so  long 
inactive  in  her  neighbourhood  that  the  Eomans  began  to 
think  that  he  must  be  anxious  to  win  the  love  of  an  Apulian 
maiden  rather  than  occupy  an  Apulian  town*— a  new  Hercules 
enslaved  by  a  new  Omphale— and  which,  when  at  last  she  fell 
into  his  hands,  under  circumstances  that  bring  out  his  con- 
summate genius  for  stratagem,  proved  to  be  a  city  without  a 
citadel ;  for  the  citadel  held  a  Eoman  garrison,  which,  after 
baffling,  for  three  years,  all  the  efiforts  of  Hannibal  and  ham- 
pering all  his  movements,  finally  succeeded  in  delivering  the 
city  once  more  into  the  hands  of  the  Romans.  Tarentum  thus, 
during  a  long  period,  stands  in  a  close  personal  relation  to 
Hannibal ;  and  any  one  who  would  picture  the  Carthaginian 
general  rightly  to  himself  during  these  eventful  years,  will 

»  Livy.  xxiil  13  and  32.  a  Ibid.  xxv.  1.  i  Ibid.  xxiv.  2a 

*  Cf.  Livy,  xxvi.  ;  Appian,  llann.  43 ;  Pliny,  Hist.  Nat.  Hi  le. 


t 


HANNIBAL  AND  TARENTUM. 


257 


do  well  to  learn  at  least  the  general  features  of  a  place  which 
exercised  so  critical  an  influence  on  his  actions. 

Tarentum  was  of  Spartan  origin,  and  though  its  inhabi- 
tants hardly  showed  themselves  by  their  deeds  in  war  to  be 
genuine  sons  of  Sparta,  yet  there  is  abundant  proof  that  they 
were  not,  as  it  pleased  the  Roman  writers  to  represent  them, 
merely  effeminate  Greeks,  given  up  to  luxury  and  amuse- 
ment.    A  people  who  could  haughtily  order  the  Romans  and 
the  Samnites  to  desist  from  their  mutual  hostilities  on  pain 
of  instant  war,i  and  could  conclude  a  treaty  with  Rome  which 
forbade  any  Roman  ships  of  war  to  show  themselves  in  Taren- 
tine waters— the  whole  extent,  that  is,  of  the  great  Tarentine 
Gulf —cannot  have  been  destitute  either  of  energy  or  courage. 
The  original  town  was  built,  as  was  Syracuse,  on  a  penin- 
sula or  island,  which  ran  from  east  to  west,  across  the  inner 
portion  of  the  gulf,  and  left,  on  its  western  extremity  only, 
a  narrow  entrance  to  the  splendid  land-locked  harbour,  six- 
teen miles  in  circumference,  which  lay  behind  it.     Like  Syra- 
cuse, too,  Tarentum  soon  spread  from  the  peninsula  to  the 
mainland,  and  drew  from  the  adjoining  territory  a  rich  abund- 
ance of  all  the  necessaries  and  luxuries  of  hfe.     Its  olives 
vied,  as  Horace  tells  us,  with  the  olives  of  Venafrum ;  its  honey 
with  the  honey  of  Hymettus ;  its  wine  was  hardly  jealous  even 
of  the  Falernian.2    From  its  pastures  came  a  well-known  breed 
of  horses,  and  sheep  the  very  best  in  Italy,  with  fleeces  so  fine 
that  they  were  protected  from  injury  by  skins  thrown  over 
their  backs. ^    Its  waters   teemed  with   the  murex,  which 
yielded  a  purple  dye  second  only  to  the  Phoenician. 

A  strong  Roman  garrison  had  been  thrown  into  a  place 
whose  ample  harbour,  as  the  Romans  well  knew,  if  it  once 
fell  into  Hannibal's  hands,  might  soon  receive  the  navy  of 
Philip  of  Macedon.  It  was  just  in  time  to  save  the  town  ; 
but  when  Hannibal  came  in  force  and  encamped  at  a  distance 
of  three  days'  journey,  two  Greek  youths  belonging  to  the 

>  Livy,  ix.  14.  2  Horace.  Ode,  ii.  5. 

»  Hor.  loc.  cU.:  "  pellitia  ovibus  ". 

17 


I 


*fl 


258  CARTHAGE  AND  THE  CARTHAGINIANS. 


HANNIBAL  AND  SICILY. 


259 


Carthaginian  party  within  it,  went  to  visit  him    and  passing 
to  and  fro  under  pretext  of  hunting,  arranged  with  him  all  the 
steps  by  which  it  was  to  be  put  into  his  hands.     Not  a  detail  01 
the  plot  laid  by  the  Phoenician  general  miscarried.    The  Orreek 
youths  returned  one  night  with  a  huge  wild  boar  to  the  postern 
by  which  they  were  wont  to  pass,  and  while  the  gate-keeper  was 
appraising  their  booty,  they  cut  him  down,  and  opened  the  gate 
to  Hannibal  and  his  Numidians,  who  had  crept  up  ^observed 
outside     The  Eoman  commandant  on  his  part  qmte  fulfilled 
HannibaVs  expectations,  for,  after  a  prolonged  revel,  he  had 
gone  drunk  to  bed.     The  conspirators,  blowing  a  bugle-caU  on 
some  Boman  trumpets  which  they  had  procured,  advanced  to- 
wards the  market-place,  and  the  Boman  soldiers,  who  staggered 
out  half  awake  by  twos  and  threes  into  the  streets  in  obedience 
to  the  summons,  were  cut  down  at  once.     Before  mormng  the 
city  was  in  Hannibal's  power,  and  a  kindly  proclamation  to  the 
citizens,  granting  them  almost  as  ruinously  favourable  terms 
as  he  had  granted  to  the  Capuans,  showed  them  that  he  had 
come  not  as  their  enemy  but  as  their  friend  and  their  dehverer.^ 
The  citadel,  built  on  some  rising  ground,  at  the  western 
end  of  the  neck  of  land,  stiU  held  out  with  its  Boman  garri- 
son and  commanded  the  narrow  passage  by  which  alone  the 
Tarentine  navy,  penned  within  the  harbour,  could  hope  to  es- 
cape    But  Hannibal,  familiar  from  early  youth  with  nautical 
affairs  and  fertile  as  ever  in  expedients,  managed  to  convey 
the  ships  overland  through  the  streets  which  ran  across  the 
isthmus  from  sea  to  sea,  and  launched  them  safely  in  the 
open  eulf.    The  Boman  garrison,  though  threatened  by  both 
land  and  sea,  stiU  resisted  aU  his  assaults.^    The  city  in  fact 
only  as  yet  half  belonged  to  him,  but  that  half  carried  with  it 
important  consequences  ;  for  other  and  lesser  Greek  towns  m 
the  south-Metapontum,  Heraclea,  and  Thurii-foUowed  the 
example  of  this,  the  greatest  of  them  aU  ;  and  Hannibal,  com- 

1  Polyb.  xiii.  26-85 ;  Livy.  xxv.  8-10 ;  Appian.  Hann.  88. 
a  Polyb.  viu.  36;  Livy,  xxv.  11  ;  Appian.  Hann.  34. 


polled  to  relax  his  grasp  upon  Campania,  made  up  for  its  loss  by 
appropriating  to  himself  a  large  part  of  Magna  Graecia.^ 

Meanwhile  the  war,  which  seemed  for  the  moment  to  have 
spent  its  force  in  Italy,  had  broken  out  (b.c.  215)  with  fresh 
fury  in  Sicily.  Marcellus,  the  best  general  whom  the  Bo- 
mans  possessed,  was  despatched  to  quell  the  revolt.  The 
whole  island,  with  few  exceptions,  had  declared  for  Carthage  ; 
and  the  active  emissaries  of  Hannibal,  the  desperation  of  the 
soldiers  who  had  deserted  from  Borne,  and  the  cruelties  of  the 
Bomans  in  the  first  towns  which  they  occupied  or  recaptured, 
most  notably  in  Megara  and  Enna,  cut  off  all  hopes  of  a  re- 
conciliation. 2  The  Carthaginian  government  too,  from  some 
unexplained  reason,  now  awoke  from  its  sleep,  and  sent 
Himilco  with  considerable  reinforcements  to  Sicily.^  Had 
they  only  sent  half  the  force  to  Italy  in  B.C.  216  that  they 
sent  in  b.c.  214  to  Sicily,  the  war  might  have  had  a  different 
course.  They  were  willing  and  able,  it  seemed,  to  send  re- 
inforcements at  a  time  and  to  a  place  where  they  were  not 
much  needed ;  they  would  not  send  them  at  the  time  and 
to  the  place  where  they  would  have  been  all-important. 

After  massacring  the  inhabitants  of  several  towns,  Marcel- 
lus laid  siege  to  Syracuse  ;  but  all  his  efforts  were  frustrated 
by  the  science  and  by  the  engines  of  the  famous  mathema- 
tician Archimedes,  and  after  eight  months  of  chequered  war- 
fare, he  was  obliged  to  convert  the  siege  into  a  blockade.* 

Syracuse  was  the  greatest  Greek  city  in  Sicily,  possibly  the 
greatest  of  all  Greek  cities.  It  contained  within  its  walls  four 
distinct  towns — the  island  of  Ortygia,  the  oldest  and  the  strong- 
est part  of  the  city  ;  Achradina,  or  the  city  proper,  crowded 
with  magnificent  buildings  ;  and  the  two  suburbs  of  Tycha  and 
Neapolis.  The  whole  had  been  recently  surrounded  by  a  wall 
eighteen  miles  in  circumference,  which,  in  part,  abutted  on  the 
sea,  but  was,  in  part,  carried  over  rugged  hills,  or  low-lying 

>  Livy,  XXV.  15 ;  Appian,  Hann.  35. 

2  Livy,  xiiv.  21,  30,  35,  38-39.  s  ibid.  xxiv.  35. 

*  Polyb.  viii.  5-8  ;  Livy,  xxiv.  34  ;  Zonaras.  ix.  4. 


H 


a6o 


CARTHAGE  AND  THE  CARTHAGINIANS. 


SIEGE  AND  CAPTURE  OF  SYRACUSE. 


261 


I 


marshes,  defensible  in  themselves,  and  now  rendered  doubly 
strong  by  art.     The  city  possessed  two  harbours,  in  the  larger 
of  which  the  Carthaginian  fleet,  under  Bomilcar,  was  riding  at 
anchor,  while  a  Carthaginian  army,under  Himilco,  hovered  near 
the  walls,  or  made  flying  expeditions  to  other  parts  of  Sicily, 
thus  distracting  the  attention  of  the  besiegers.     The  blockade, 
therefore,  was  never  effective  or  complete,  and  it  is  not  to  be 
wondered  at  that  it  was  nearly  three  years  before  the  city  feU. 
It  was  indeed  treachery   from    within  rather  than  force 
from  without  which  ultimately  enabled  Marcellus,  in  the  year 
B.C.  212,  to  gain  possession  of  the  heights  of  Epipolae  to  the 
rear  of  the  city,  and,  making  these  his  basis,  to  conquer  in 
succession  its  different  portions.^     The  two   suburbs  feU 
first,  and  the  plunder  which  they  yielded  whetted  the  appe- 
tites of  the  soldiery  for  the  still  richer  stores  which  lay  be- 
hind the  walls  of  Achradina  and  Ortygia.     It  was  now  too 
late  for  Bomilcar  or  Himilco  to  save  the  city.     Bomilcar 
sailed  away  without  striking  a  blow,  and  the  army  of  Himilco, 
which  lay  encamped  on  the  low  grounds  of  the  Anapus,  fell 
victims  to  the  fever  which  had  so  often  before  saved  Syra- 
cuse from  a  besieging  force.2    By  a  curious  caprice  of  for- 
tune, the  best  defence  of  the  city  was  now  turned  agamst 
its  defenders,  while  it  left  its  assailants  on  the  higher  ground 
unscathed.     The  Koman  deserters  and  the  mercenaries  had 
long  estabUshed  a  reign  of  terror  within  the  city.     Having 
nothing  to  hope,  and  little  therefore  to  fear,  they  were  bent 
on  holding  the  place  to  the  bitter  end.     But  when  Marcellus 
had  been  admitted  by  some  of  his  partisans  into  the  island 
of  Ortygia,  Achradina  could  no  longer  offer  resistance.     The 
deserters  and  the  mercenaries,  the  only  portion  of  the  in- 
habitants who  deserved  punishment,  managed  to  escape  by 
night,  and  the  remainder  threw  themselves  on  the  mercy 
of  MarceUus.    They  might  weU  expect  to  receive  it,  for  they 
had  been  involved  in  hostilities  which  were  not  of  their  own 
seeking,  and  it  would  be  hard  if  the  short-lived  folly  of  Hie- 


i  Livy,  XXV.  23,  24. 


« Ibid.  XXV.  26,  27. 


ronyraus  should  be  held  by  Marcellus  to  have  effaced  the  re- 
collection of  the  fifty  years'  fidelity  of  Hiero  his  grandfather. 
But  it  seldom  suited  the  Romans  to  remember  past  services  or 
extenuating  circumstances  when  they  had  anything  to  gain  by 
forgetting  them.  Marcellus,  as  Livy  tells  us,  had  burst  into 
tears  when  he  first  stood  on  Epipolae  and  saw  Syracuse,  as  he 
fancied,  in  his  power  beneath  him.  But  these  were  not  tears 
of  compassion,  or,  if  they  were,  they  were  not  forthcoming  now, 
when  they  were  most  needed.  The  city  was  given  over  to 
plunder,  and  the  death  of  the  venerable  Archimedes  while  intent 
upon  a  problem,  a  man  whom— just  as  Alexander  bade  his 
troops  spare  the  house  of  Pindar  in  the  sack  of  Thebes— even 
the  rough  Marcellus  had  wished  to  save,  gave  proof  that 
plunder  was  not  the  only  object  of  the  infuriated  soldiery.^ 

So  fell  Syracuse,  the   virgin  city,  which  had  seen  two 
Athenian  armaments  perish  beneath  its  walls ;  which  had, 
for  centuries,  saved  Sicily  from  becoming  altogether,  what 
its  greater  part  then  was,  a  Carthaginian  appanage ;  which 
had,  once  and  again,  when  its  turn  came,  under  Dionysius  or 
Timoleon,  almost  driven  those  same  Carthaginians  from  the 
island ;  and  once,  under  Agathocles,  had  threatened  the  exist- 
ence of  Carthage  herself.     It  fell  to  rise  no  more,  at  least  to 
its  former  opulence.     Its  temples  were  left  standing,  because 
they  would  not  pay  for  moving ;  and  they  belonged  to  the 
conqueror  as  much  where  they  were  as  if  they  had  been 
transferred  to  Rome;  but  the  choicest  works  of  art — vases 
and  columns,  paintings  and  statues — were  swept  off  to  adorn 
the  imperial  city.2    It  must  have  been  an  additional  drop  in 
the  cup  of  bitterness  which  the  Syracusans  had  to  drain, 
that  these  works  of  art  were  carried  off  by  men  who  could 
not  appreciate  them  at  their  proper  value.     Sixty  years  later, 
the  surpassing  excellence  of  Hellenic  art  and  literature  had 
begun  to  make  a  deep  impression  on  the  more  cultivated 
classes  at  Rome;   but  if,  even  then,  a  victorious  general 

1  Livy.  XXV.  31 ;  Floras,  ii.  6,  33,  34  ;  Zonaras,  ix.  5. 

^Polyb.  ii.  10.  3-13 ;  Livy,  xxv.  40 ;  Cicero.  Verres,  u.  2,  3 ;  ii.  4.  54,  etc. 


I' 


262 


CARTHAGE  AND  THE  CARTHAGINIANS. 


WAR  IN  SPAIN. 


263 


ti 


could  stipulate,  that  any  of  the  works  of  art  taken  by  him 
from  Corinth  should,  if  broken  on  the  passage  to  Rome,  be 
replaced  by  others  of  equal  worth,  we  can  hardly  believe 
that  it  was  their  intrinsic  excellence  which  recommended  the 
treasures  of  Syracuse  to  the  attention  of  the  rude  and  uncul- 
tured Marcellus.  Anyhow  Marcellus  set  an  example  only 
too  fatally  followed  by  the  conquerors  who  succeeded  him. 
It  was  a  practice  new  in  Roman  warfare  then,  and  to  be 
condemned  at  all  times  and  under  all  circumstances :  a 
practice  cruel  and  destructive  to  the  states  despoiled,  and 
useless  for  all  moral  or  high  artistic  purposes  to  the  despoiler. 
It  is  equally  reprehensible  whether  it  be  the  plunder  of  half 
Europe  by  the  representative  of  one  of  its  most  enlightened 
nations,  the  arch  robber  of  modern  times,  Napoleon ;  or  the 
sack  of  a  Chinese  palace  by  those  whom  the  Chinese  had  a 
right,  in  this  instance  at  least,  to  style  barbarians.  If  good 
men  and  great  nations  have  hitherto  often  followed  the 
example  of  Cicero  in  drawing  a  broad  contrast  between  the 
extortions  of  a  Verres  and  the  high-handed  plunder  of  a 
Marcellus,  a  Warren  Hastings,  or  a  Napoleon,  it  is  because 
they  have  not  yet  reached  the  moral  standard  which  con- 
demns the  public  robber ;  they  look  askance  only  at  a  thief. 


I 


CHAPTER  XV. 

SIEGE   OP   CAPUA   AND    HANNIBAL'S   MARCH   ON   ROME. 

(212-208  B.C.) 

Importance  of  war  in  Spain— Successes  and  death  of  the  two  Scipios— Renewed 
activity  of  Hannibal— Siege  of  Capua— Hannibal  attempts  to  relieve  it— His 
march  on  Rome— Fate  of  Capua— "  Ovation  "  of  Marcellus— the  Numidian 
cavalry  at  Salapia— Continued  superiority  of  Hannibal  in  the  field — Death 
of  Marcellus— Influence  of  family  traditions  at  Rome— Patriotism  of  Romans 
— Latin  colonies  show  symptoms  of  exhaustion. 

We  have  hitherto  concentrated  our  attention  as  much  as  pos- 
sible on  the  main  current  of  the  war  in  Italy ;  but  it  must  not 
be  forgotten  that  throughout  these  first  six  years  which  we 
have  described  in  detail,  a  side  conflict  was  raging  in  Spain, 
the  result  of  which  might  go  far  to  decide  that  in  Italy.  To 
the  importance  of  the  Spanish  contest  the  Romans  and  the 
Carthaginians  were  equally  alive.  It  was  from  Spain,  if  from 
any  country,  that  Hannibal  must  draw  his  reinforcements ; 
and  it  was  in  Spain,  if  anywhere,  that  those  reinforcements 
must  be  intercepted  and  cut  down.  The  Romans  saw  that  if 
a  second  army  crossed  the  Alps  and  swooped  down  upon  the 
north  of  Italy,  while  Hannibal  was,  at  his  pleasure,  over- 
nmning  the  south,  the  city  would  be  taken  between  two  fires, 
and  could  not  long  resist.  To  Hannibal,  on  the  other  hand, 
Spain  was  the  new  world  which  the  genius  of  his  family  had 
called  into  existence.  The  names  of  his  father,  Hamilcar,  and 
of  his  brother-in-law,  the  elder  Hasdrubal,  were  still  names  of 
power  among  the  Spanish  tribes  whom  they  had  conquered 
or  conciliated,  and  the  younger  Hasdrubal,  a  worthy  member 
of  the  same  family,  had  been  left  in  Spain  by  Hannibal  when 


M 


264 


CARTHAGE  AND  THE  CARTHAGINIANS. 


SUCCESSES  OF  THE  SCIPIOS  IN  SPAIN. 


265 


he  started  on  his  great  expedition,  to  preserve  the  family 
traditions  there,  and  to  raise  fresh  levies  for  the  Italian  war. 
P.  Scipio,  as  we  have  seen,  instead  of  returning  in  the 
autumn  of  b.c.  218  with  all  speed  and  with  all  his  forces  from 
Massilia  to  Italy,  where  he  might  possibly  have  met  and 
crushed  the  worn-out  troops  of  Hannibal  as  they  descended 
from  the  Alps,  had  sent  the  bulk  of  his  army  straight  to  their 
Spanish  destination,  while  he  himself  returned  to  Italy  with 
only  a  few  followers.     To  have  altogether  set  aside  the  orders 
of  the  Senate  would  have  been  a  step  quite  alien  to  the  charac- 
ter of  an  ordinary  Koman  general,  and  could  only  have  been 
justified  by  the  most  complete  success.     But,  failing  this, 
there  is  no  doubt  that  Cn.  Scipio  took  the  next  best  course  in 
hastening  off  to  Spain ;  1  and  the  Eoman  Senate  showed  fore- 
thought which  was  quite  out  of  the  common  with  them,  in 
determining,  whatever  the  danger  nearer  home,  to  carry  on 
this  distant  war  with  vigour.     After  his  defeats  at  the  Ticinus 
and  the  Trebia,  and  while  the  memories  of  the  Trasimene 
Lake  were  still  fresh  in  the  Roman  minds,  Pubhus  was  sent 
off  to  Spain  with  a  naval  and  miUtary  force,  which  a  less 
courageous  and  self-reliant  people  would  have  been  unwilling 
to  spare.     There  he  joined  CnsBus,  and,  henceforward,  the 
two  brothers  carried  on  the  war  in  common,  bringing  over 
Spanish  tribes  as  much  by  their  address  as  by  their  arms, 
and  winning,  if  the  accounts  they  sent  home  were  true,  an 
almost  unbroken  series  of  successes.     After  making  sure  of 
the  country  to  the  north  of  the  Ebro,  the  Scipios  crossed  that 
boundary  river,  sent  to  their  homes  the  Spanish  hostages 
which,  having  been  deposited  by  Hannibal  in  Saguntum,  fell 
by  the  caprice  of  a  Saguntine  citizen  into  then-  hands,2  and 
in  the  autumn  of  the  year  b.c.  216— the  year,  it  should  be 
remembered,  of  the  battle  of  CannaB— defeated  Hasdrubal  in 
a  pitched  battle  near  a  town  called  Ibera,  when  he  was  on 
the  eve  of  starting  for  Italy  with  the  large  army  which  he  had 
recently  raised  in  Spain  or  had  received  from  Carthage.    Has- 


» Polyb.  iil  494 ;  Livy.  xxi.  60,  61. 


Livy,  xxii.  22 ;  xxiu.  26-28. 


drubal's  Spanish  recruits,  Livy  somewhat  naively  remarks, 
preferred  to  be  defeated  in  Spain  and  so  to  remain  at  home, 
rather  than  to  go  as  conquerors  to  Italy. ^  The  remark  is  just, 
probably  more  just  than  even  Livy  imagined  it  to  be,  for  had 
they  gone  to  Italy  at  all  this  year,  they  would,  as  even  the 
most  patriotic  of  the  Eoman  annalists  admit,  not  only  have 
gone,  but  have  returned  as  conquerors.  Rightly  viewed, 
therefore,  the  battle  of  Ibera,  though  the  place  at  which  it 
was  fought  is  quite  unknown,  was  one  of  the  most  decisive  in 
the  whole  of  the  war,  for  it  prevented  the  despatch  of  rein- 
forcements to  Hannibal  in  the  year  when  they  would  have 
made  him  wholly  irresistible. 

The  two  brothers  made  the  most  of  their  success.  They 
enrolled  Celtiberian  mercenaries — the  first  instance  of  such 
a  practice  on  a  large  scale  in  Roman  history;  they  won 
victories  which,  if  they  were  not  half  what  their  despatches 2 
represented  them  to  be,  were  yet  signal  victories  ;  they  formed 
an  alliance  with  Syphax,  a  Numidian  prince,  and  seemed,  in 
B.C.  212,  to  be  on  the  point  of  ejecting  the  Carthaginians  from 
Spain,  when,  in  the  mid  career  of  their  success,  they  inad- 
vertently separated  from  each  other  ;  they  were  attacked  by 
Hasdrubal  and  by  Mago,  who  had  been  recently  sent  thither 
from  Carthage,  in  detail ;  their  armies  were  defeated  and  dis- 
persed, and  themselves  slain. ^  It  seemed  for  the  moment  as 
if  the  Romans  would  be  driven  from  Spain  in  the  very  year 
in  which  they  had  confidently  counted  on  driving  out  the 
Carthaginians.  But  the  death  of  the  elder  Scipios,  as  we 
shall  see,  opened  a  free  field  for  a  younger  and  still  abler 
member  of  the  family,  and  one  whose  high  destiny  it  was 
to  accomplish  in  Spain  what  his  father  and  uncle  had  been 
compelled  to  leave  unfinished. 

While  these  events  were  taking  place  in  Spain,  the  flame 

1  Livy,  xxiii.  29. 

«  Livy,  xxiu.  48,  49  ;  xxiv.  41,  42  ;  48,  49  ;  xxv.  32.  Cicero,  Farad,  vii.  2, 
calls  the  two  brothers,  *'  duo  propugnacula  belli  qui  Carthaginiensium  adven- 
tum  corporibus  suis  intercludendum  putaveruut ". 

»  Livy,  xxv.  32-36 ;  Florus.  i.  6-36. 


266 


CARTHAGE  AND  THE  CARTHAGINIANS, 


SIEGE  OF  CAPUA, 


267 


r 


of  war  had  burst  out  afresh  in  Italy.  Early,  it  would  seem, 
in  the  winter  of  b.c  212,  Tarentum,  as  described  already, 
had  fallen  into  Hannibal's  hands,  and  in  the  campaign  thus 
begun  the  hero  seemed  to  awake,  like  a  giant  refreshed,  from 
his  year-long  repose.  He  was  needed  each  moment  at  Taren- 
tum, where  the  citadel  still  held  out ;  he  was  needed  yet  more 
at  Capua,  round  which  the  Boman  armies,  like  vultures  scent- 
ing their  prey  afar,  seemed  to  be  gathering  for  the  last  time. 
The  home  government  of  Carthage  itself  needed  his  control- 
ling mind,  the  war  in  Sicily  needed  it,  the  war  in  Spain,  and 
the  war  in  Greece.  His  spirit  and  his  influence,  if  not  his 
bodily  presence,  were  needed  everywhere,  and  everywhere, 
once  again,  they  seemed  to  be.^  Six  Boman  armies  were  in 
the  field  against  him.  By  a  searching  inquisition  every  free- 
born  citizen — many  of  them  below  the  age  of  seventeen — 
had  been  swept  into  the  ranks,^  which  were  intended  not,  in- 
deed, to  face  him,  for  that  they  never  dared  to  do,  but  to  harass 
his  movements  ;  yet  he  managed,  in  spite  of  them  all,  to  push 
the  siege  of  the  Tarentine  citadel  on  the  one  hand,  and,  on  the 
other,  to  show  himself  for  a  moment,  when  required,  on  the 
hills  above  Capua,  where  his  mere  appearance  caused  the  two 
consular  armies  which  were  threatening  it  to  vanish  away 
before  him.  One  Boman  army  of  irregulars  he  annihilated 
in  Lucania ;  another  of  regular  troops,  under  the  prsBtor  Cn. 
Fulvius,  he  annihilated  in  Apulia ;  while  a  third,  consisting 
of  the  slaves  liberated  by  Gracchus,  as  soon  as  their  liberator 
had  fallen  in  an  ambuscade,  dispersed  in  all  directions,  think- 
ing that  they  had  done  enough  for  their  step-mother  Italy.* 

But  amidst  all  these  brilliant  achievements  and  these  ro- 
mantic shiftings  of  the  war,  the  one  point  of  fixed  and  cen- 
tral interest  was  the  city  of  Capua.  That  guilty  city  *  had 
long  felt  that  her  turn  must  soon  come ;  she  had  gone  now 
unpunished  for  nearly  four  years,  and  the  safety  and  the 

1  Polyb.  ix.  22, 1-6  ;  larj,  xxvi.  5.  '  livy.  xxv.  6. 

'  Livy,  XXV.  19-22,  ''  clades  snper  alia  aliam  ". 

*  Florus,  ii.  6-42,  ' '  sedes  et  doinus  et  patria  altera  Uaunibalia  ". 


honour  of  the  Boman  state  alike  demanded  that  the  day  of 
reckoning  should  be  no  longer  postponed.  The  mere  pres- 
ence of  two  large  armies  in  her  neighbourhood  during  so 
considerable  a  part  of  these  four  years  had  caused  a  scarcity 
within  her  walls,  before  even  a  sod  was  turned  of  the  Boman 
lines  of  circumvallation.  An  efifort  of  Hanno  to  throw  pro- 
visions on  a  large  scale  into  the  place  was  frustrated  by  the 
negligence  and  the  apathy  of  the  citizens  themselves.^  The 
convoy  fell  into  the  hands  of  the  Bomans,  and  had  Hanni- 
bal's faith  been  what  his  enemies  said  it  was,  he  might  have 
been  tempted,  in  his  vexation,  to  abandon  the  city  to  her  fate. 
She  had  done  him  little  active  service  since  her  revolt ;  in  fact, 
she  had  stipulated  that  she  should  not  be  called  upon  to  do  so  ; 
on  the  other  hand,  the  duty  of  protecting  her  had  often  seri- 
ously hampered  his  movements.  The  other  cities  of  Campania 
had  declined  to  follow  her  lead  in  going  over  to  the  Cartha- 
ginians ;  while  the  lead  of  Tarentum,  on  the  contrary,  was  now 
being  followed  rapidly  by  the  other  Greek  cities  in  the  south. 

But  Hannibal  swallowed  his  resentment,  and  appearing  at 
Capua  while  his  enemies  thought  he  was  in  lapygia,  put  the 
two  armies  which  were  threatening  it  to  flight,  and,  as  it 
would  seem,  revictualled  it  for  the  coming  blockade.^  It  was 
not  till  he  had  gone  far  to  the  south  again,  and  was  scatter- 
ing the  smaller  Boman  armies  there  in  the  manner  which 
has  just  been  described,  that  they  ventured  to  close  in  once 
more  round  the  place,  and  began  the  siege  in  earnest.  News 
of  ever  fresh  disaster  reached  Bome  from  the  track  of  Hanni- 
bal's flying  squadrons,  and  the  Senate  could  only  console 
itself  by  the  reflection  that  the  consular  armies  of  Fulvius 
and  Appius,  which  had  fled  before  Hannibal's  advance,  were 
as  yet  intact,  and  were  free  during  his  absence,  at  all  events, 
to  prosecute  the  object  which  they  had  most  at  heart  ^ — the 
punishment  of  the  guilty  Capua. 

Caius  Nero,  the  praetor,  was  ordered  to  co-operate  with 

»  Livy,  XXV.  13,  14.  « ibid.  xxw.  19. 

^  Ibid.  XXV.  22,  "  ubi  sumina  rerura  esset ". 


^^ 


268 


CARTHAGE  AND  THE  CARTHAGINIANS. 


HANNIBAL'S  MARCH  ON  ROME. 


269 


the  consuls,  Q.  Fulvius  Flaccus  and  App.  Claudius  Pulcher, 
and  the  three  armies  in  their  several  camps,  each  with  a  large 
magazine  established  in  a  town  to  its  rear,  settled  down  be- 
fore the  devoted  city.  A  double  line  of  circumvallation  was 
soon  completed,  the  one  to  guard  the  besiegers  from  the  sor- 
ties of  the  besieged,  the  other  to  repel  the  expected  attack 
of  Hannibal  from  without  (b.c.  211).  The  days  of  Capua 
were  clearly  numbered  unless  help  came  from  him.  An  ad- 
venturous Numidian  from  the  garrison  made  his  way  unob- 
served through  the  double  lines  of  the  Eomans  and  informed 
Hannibal  of  the  danger  of  the  city.  Taking  a  select  band  of 
horsemen  and  light-armed  troops,  the  Phoenician  hero  started 
from  Tarentum,  and  before  the  enemy  dreamed  of  his  ap- 
proach he  appeared  on  Mount  Tifata.  According  to  the  plan 
which  had  been  pre-arranged,  a  simultaneous  attack  was  made 
on  the  Koman  lines  by  the  beleaguered  garrison  and  by  Han- 
nibal. Some  of  the  elephants,  whose  bulky  frames  had  been 
with  difificulty  forced  to  keep  pace  with  his  cross-country 
march,  were  killed  in  the  attack.  Hannibal  threw  their  bodies 
into  the  ditch  and  a  few  of  his  troops  crossing  over  the  bridge 
thus  formed  found  themselves  within  the  Eoman  hnes.  But 
it  was  only  for  a  moment.  They  were  outnumbered  and  driven 
back,  and  Hannibal  gave  up  all  hope  of  thus  raising  the  siege. ^ 
One  plan  alone  remained.  He  might  advance  on  the  capi- 
tal ;  and  the  terror  of  the  citizens  when  the  danger  which  had 
so  often  approached  them,  and  had  so  often  been  withdrawn, 
had  at  last  really  come,  might  drive  them  to  recall  for  the 
defence  of  Kome  the  armies  which  were  besieging  Capua. 
Once  more  a  Numidian  messenger  made  his  way  through  the 
Roman  lines  round  Capua,  and  bade  the  citizens  hold  out 
bravely,  for  Hannibal's  departure  did  not  mean  that  he  had 
deserted  them.  It  rather  meant  that  he  was  making  one  more 
efifort  for  their  dehverance,  and  then  he  was  ofif  for  Rome.* 
The  news  of  what  was  coming  reached  the  city  long  before 

»  Polyb.  ix.  3-4  ;  Livy.  xxv.  20  ;  xxvl  5,  6  j  Appian,  Hann.  88. 
2  Polyb.  ix.  6  ;  Livy,  xxvi.  7. 


Hannibal  reached  it  himself,  perhaps  before  he  wished  to 
reach  it.  A  few  days*  delay  would,  he  knew  well,  only  in- 
crease the  panic  of  the  citizens.  Slowly  he  advanced  along 
the  Latin  road,  passing  each  day  some  Latin  fortress,  and 
devastating  the  country  right  up  to  its  walls  beneath  the 
eyes  of  its  afifrighted  garrison.  Before  him  fled  a  panic- 
stricken  throng — women  and  children,  and  aged  men — leav- 
ing their  homes,  like  animals  when  the  prairie  is  on  fire,  a 
prey  to  the  destroyer.  On  he  went,  through  Latium,  through 
the  only  district  of  Italy  which  had  not  yet  felt  his  dreaded 
presence,  no  one  daring  to  say  him  nay,  till  he  pitched  his 
camp  upon  the  Anio,  only  three  miles  from  Rome,  and  the 
flaming  villages  announced  in  language  which  could  not  be 
mistaken  that  he  was  really  there.^  He  was  there  in  fulfil- 
ment of  his  life-long  vow  ;  the  hater  face  to  face,  at  last,  with 
the  object  of  his  deadly  hate.  He  was  there,  the  destroyer 
of  every  Roman  army  which  had  ventured  to  meet  him,  to 
destroy  the  city  which  had  sent  them  forth.  So  thought  at 
least  the  flying  rustics  and  the  mass  of  the  Roman  citizens. 
But  so  did  not  think  the  calm  and  clear-sighted  Hannibal  him- 
self ;  nor  yet,  after  the  first  days  of  panic  had  passed  by,  so 
thought  the  Roman  Senate.  The  imagination,  indeed,  of  the 
citizens  pictured  to  themselves  the  total  destruction  of  their 
armies  at  Capua.  The  air  was  filled  with  cries  of  women  who 
ran  wildly  about  the  streets,  or  flocked  to  the  temples  of  the 
gods,  and  throwing  themselves  on  their  knees,  raised  their 
suppliant  hands  to  heaven,  or  swept  the  altars  with  their 
long  dishevelled  hair.* 

But  the  Roman  Senate,  as  after  Trasimene  and  after  Cannae, 
was  once  more  worthy  of  itself.  When  the  terrible  news  of 
Hannibal's  first  approach  came,  they  had  been  disposed  to 
recall  the  whole  of  their  armies  to  the  defence  of  the  capital ; 
a  measure  of  precaution  which  would  have  fulfilled  Hannibal's 
highest  hopes  and  saved  the  beleaguered  Capua.     But  fresh 

»  Livy,  xxvi.  8.  9,  10  ;  Appian,  Hann.  38  ;  Floras,  ii.  6,  44. 
'Polyb.  ix.  6,  3 ;  Appian,  Hann.  39. 


270 


CARTHAGE  AND  THE  CARTHAGINIANS, 


SIEGE  OF  CAPUA, 


271 


confidence  came.  They  recalled  only  Q.  Fulvius,  who, 
marching  by  inner  lines,  amidst  a  popiilation  who  bade  him 
God-speed,  managed,  as  it  would  seem,  to  reach  Rome  by 
the  Appian,  just  before  Hannibal  reached  the  Anio  by  the 
Latin  Way.^  Two  legions  which  had  lately  been  got  together 
in  the  country  around  Rome,  when  they  were  joined  by  the 
army  which  had  just  arrived,  gave  the  city  a  respectable 
garrison,  and  Hannibal  made  no  attack — he  probably  never 
intended  to  make  one — on  the  city  itself.  Unmolested  by 
the  Romans  and  almost  within  their  view,  he  ravaged  the 
whole  country  round,  destroying  the  gardens  and  the  villages, 
and  carrying  off  into  his  camp  with  stern  delight,  the  crops 
and  the  cattle  and  the  booty  of  every  kind  on  which  he  could 
lay  his  hand.^  Then  with  a  body  of  two  thousand  horsemen 
he  rode  right  up  to  the  CoUine  gate,  and  passed  leisurely 
along  the  walls  to  the  Temple  of  Hercules,  gazing  wistfully 
at  the  cruel  stones  which  alone  stood  between  him  and  his 
hopes,  and  alone  saved  the  inhabitants,  Romans  though  they 
were,  from  his  avenging  sword.^  The  fates  were  against  him, 
but  he  must  have  felt  that  he  had  nobly  kept  his  vow.* 

Little  wonder  is  it,  when  the  facts  themselves  are  so 
dramatic,  and  when  the  chief  character  is  so  heroic,  that  the 
imagination  of  those  who  recorded  the  scene  ran  riot  in  the 
process  and  filled  in  the  details  with  what  they  thought  ought 
to  have  happened.  They  pointed,  for  instance,  their  eulogies 
on  the  faith  of  the  Romans  in  their  own  future,  by  telHng  us 
how  they  put  up  to  auction  the  ground  on  which  Hannibal's 
camp  was  pitched,  and  how  it  was  bought  at  its  full  value ; 
while  Hannibal,  by  way  of  reprisals,  offered  for  sale  to  his 
troops  the  silversmiths*  shops  in  the  Roman  Forum,  and 
flung  his  spear  over  the  walls  in  token  of  his  contempt  and 
hate.^    But  Hannibal  was  great  enough  to  know  when  he 

iLivy,  xxvi.  8-9.  «Polyb.  ix.  6,  8,  9 ;  and  cf.  Pliny.  Hist.  Nat.  xv.  18. 

»Livy,  xxvi.  10.  *See  Arnold,  Rom.  Hist.  chap.  iii.  p.  242-246. 

6Livy.  xxvi.  11 ;  PUny.  Hist.  Nat.  xxxiv.  15;  Floras,  it.  7,  47-48;  cf.  Val. 
Max.  iii.  7,  "  Capenam  portam  armis  Hannibale  pulsante". 


had  delivered  his  blow,  and  he  wasted  no  time  in  lamenting 
that  it  had  failed.  Accordingly,  he  marched  off  northward 
into  the  Sabine  country,  which  he  had  only  skirted  in  his 
first  campaign,  and  then  sweeping  round  to  the  south  he 
turned  fiercely  upon  the  Romans  who  were  making  believe 
to  follow  him,  and  after  taking  one  distant  look  at  the  un- 
troken  and  impenetrable  girdle  of  men,  and  earth,  and  iron, 
which  girt  Capua  in,  he  left  her  to  her  inevitable  fate.^ 

Inevitable  indeed  it  was ;  for  the  Romans  knew  no  pity, 
and  the  citizens  themselves  must  have  felt  that  the  murder 
of  all  the  Romans  residing  in  the  city  at  the  time  of  their 
revolt  would  have  steeled  even  those  who  were  naturally  piti- 
ful against  them.     The  senators,  abandoned  to  despair,  shut 
themselves  within  their  own  houses,  and  left  the  responsi- 
bilities of  the  defence  to  the  Numidian  leaders.     At  last,  when 
the  surrender  of  the  city  was  only  a  question  of  hours,  they 
met  at  the  house  of  one  Vibius  Virrius,  the  author  of  the 
revolt,  and  after  holding  high  festival  on  such  fare  as  the 
besieged  city  could  supply,  and  could  lend  them  courage  for 
what  they  were  about  to  do,  they  passed  round  the  poisoned 
cup,  and,  to  the  number  of  twenty-seven,  balked  their  Roman 
conquerors  of  their  long-expected  revenge.^    Of  the  remaining 
senators,  when,  next  day,  the  gates  were  opened,  twenty-five 
were  sent  by  the  orders  of  the  consuls  to  Gales,  and  twenty- 
eight  to  Teanum ;  but  close  behind  them  foUowed  the  victor 
Fulvius,  and  by  his  command  they  were  scourged  and  be- 
headed,' one  by  one,  before  his  eyes.     When  the  bloody  work 
was  only  half  finished  a  despatch  from  the  Senate  arrived 
bidding  him  reserve  for  their  decision  the  question  of  the 
punishment ;  but  the  butcher  thrust  it  into  his  bosom,  and 
it  was  not  tiU  the  last  head  had  faUen  that  he  read  the  letter 
which  might  have  postponed,  but  would  hardly  have  averted, 
their  fate.^    Three  hundred  noble  Campanian  youths  were 

JPolyb.  ix.  7  ;  Livy.  xxvi.  11.  ^Livy,  xxvi.  14 ;  Zonaras.  ix.  «. 

'  Livy,  xxvi.  15. 


27a 


CARTHAGE  AND  THE  CARTHAGINIANS, 


FATE  OF  CAPUA. 


273 


thrown  into  prison  to  perish,  many  of  them,  later,  on  a 
false  charge. 

It  only  now  remained  to  decide  the  fate  of  the  bulk  of  the 
Capuan  citizens  and  of  the  city  itself.     The  decree  passed  by 
the  Senate  is  eminently  characteristic  of  it,  characteristic  at 
once  of  its  severity,  of  its  rigid  notions  of  equity,  and  of  its 
wise  precautions  for  the  future.     All  the  citizens  who  had 
held  ofl&ce  w^ere  to  be  reduced  to  beggary,  the  more  guilty  of 
them  being  carried  to  Eome,  and  there  sold  as  slaves.     The 
private  citizens  were  to  be  transported  in  batches  to  various 
parts  of  Latium  and  Etruria,  to  be  determined  by  the  exact 
amount  of  their  guilt.     The  least  guilty  among  them — the 
absolutely  innocent,  less  severe  judges   might  have  been 
tempted  to  call  them — those  who  had  not  been  present  in 
Capua  at  the  time  of  the  revolt,  were  only  to  be  removed 
across  the  Vulturnus,  though  even  these  were  forbidden  to 
settle  within  fifteen  miles  of  the  sea.     Those  whose  guilt  was 
more  heinous,  but  who  had  repented  before  the  arrival  of 
Hannibal,  were  to  be  transported  beyond  the  Liris,  while  the 
most  guilty  were   condemned  to  put   the   Tiber   between 
themselves  and  their  former  home,  care  being  taken  that  they 
should  have  neither  house  nor  land  on  the  river  on  which 
stood  the  city  whose  cause  they  had  betrayed.     It  should  be 
observed,  that  all  alike  were  to  live  in  those  parts  of  Italy 
where  the  Latin  colonies  lay  thickest  together.     They  seem 
in  fact,  like  ticket-of-leave  men,  to  have  been  put  under  their 
surveillance  ;  they  were  to  be  among  them  but  not  of  them ; 
for  it  was  specially  provided  that  no  one  of  them  should  ever 
obtain  the  rights  of  Latins,  still  less  of  Roman  citizens.     Of 
all  the  vast  multitudes  who  had  inhabited  the  city,  two  citizens, 
and  two  only,  were  found  deserving  of  reward.     Both  of  them 
were  women:  the  one  had  sacrificed,  in  secret,  throughout 
the  siege,  for  the  success  of  the  Romans — though  how  she 
was  able  to  prove  her  merit  we  are  not  told ;  the  other  had 
supplied  food,  in  secret,  to  the  Roman  prisoners  of  war. 
These  two  women  were  allowed  to  retain  their  property  and 


their  freedom,  and  it  was  intimated  that  if  they  liked  to  come 
to  Rome  and  lay  their  case  before  the  Senate,  they  might  hear 
of  something  further  to  their  advantage  there.^ 

The  city  itself  was  spared,  a  signal  instance,  remarks  Livy 
—is  he  speaking  in  irony  or  in  earnest? — of  Roman  clemency. 
But  it  was  no  longer  to  have  citizens,  or  any  form  of  civic 
life.  Without  magistrates,  and  without  a  senate,  it  was  to 
receive,  year  by  year,  a  prefect  from  Rome,  who  should  deal 
out  Roman  justice  to  such  waifs  and  strays  of  population  as 
might  be  drawn  thither  by  the  incomparable  beauty  of  the 
situation  or  by  the  fertility  of  the  soil.  It  was  a  warning 
also,  Livy  remarks— and  here  he  is  on  safer  ground— to  any 
other  city  which  had  revolted,  or  might  yet  be  disposed  to 
revolt,  of  the*  amount  of  protection  she  might  expect  hence- 
forward from  Hannibal,  and  of  the  vengeance  which  would 
surely  fall  upon  her  from  Rome.^ 

Hardly  less  characteristic  of  the  spirit  which  animated 
the  Roman  Senate  than  their  treatment  of  Capua  is  the 
way  in  which  they  dealt  with  their  own  victorious  generals. 
Neither  to  Fulvius  the  conqueror  of  Capua,  nor  to  Marcellus 
the  conqueror  of  Syracuse,  would  they  grant  the  honour  which 
each  expected,  and  each  had  deserved,  of  a  triumph.  Ful- 
vius, they  argued,  had  only  reconquered  what  had  belonged 
to  Rome  before ;  Marcellus  had  only  half  done  his  work,  for 
the  war  was  still  raging  in  Sicily;  and  Mutines,  an  able  Liby- 
phoenician,  who  had  been  trained  by  Hannibal  himself,  was 
still  laying  it  waste  from  end  to  end.  Fulvius  accordingly 
received  no  reward  at  all  for  his  services,  and  Marcellus  was 
obliged  to  content  himself  with  the  lesser  honour  of  an 
"ovation,"  entering  Rome  on  foot  instead  of  riding  in  a 
triumphal  car.  But  what  the  procession  lacked  in  dignity, 
it  made  up  by  the  extraordinary  variety  and  number  of  the 
trophies  of  victory  which  accompanied  it.  There  was  a  pic- 
ture or  a  model  of  the  ill-fated  city  of  Syracuse  itseL';  there 
were   the   famous  military  engines,  the  catapults,  and  the 


1  livy,  xxvi.  33-34. 


18 


2  Ibid.  xxvi.  12. 


274 


CARTHAGE  AND  THE  CARTHAGINIANS, 


HANNIBAVS  SUPERIORITY  IN  THE  FIELD.         275 


r.A  fV,A  iron  hands-the  invention  of  the  cunning 

wlr,^  of  Rome-   there  were  the  traitors,  Sosis  and  Mer^ous. 
EolirtUe  of  tWrtr^hery  byw^KSS 

as  the  Romans  had  not  seen  ^^  *J«  ^^    ,^ t!^;:: 

Sit  none  but  f  Greek  city  and  that  a  JuyoMhe 
highest  culture  and  refinement,  could  ^ave  nghtfuUy  caUed 
her  own.  In  fine,  it  was  a  great  show  but  to  those  who 
had  eves  to  see,  it  was  but  a  sorry  sight. 
'InTaL  did  'Hannibal  endeavour  by  some  '.rd Jant  ^t  oke 
to  counteract  the  fatal  impression  which  *«  J"^"  ^*  3' 
Zl  Syracuse  must  produce  on  his  Italian  aUies.    An  attempt 

rs^r^e^umW^^^  rrrwrrredt 

uTho^  that  PhUip  of  Macedon  would  ever  be  able  to  join 
Ust  bope  that  ^-^  P  gannibal's  worthiest  antagomst. 

h^  i^rJItely^eSfS'  from  Sicily  flushed  with  victory 
^A  eZr  so  L  Romans  thought,  at  last  to  measure  his 
tforfS  Ws  ancient  foe.^  News  soon  followed  h.m  tti^ 
aXm  the  chief  remaining  Carthaginian  B^f  "gl'ol^^ 
fh? £d,  had  faUen,  that  its  example  had  been  foUo-d^ 
some  sixty  other  towns,  and  that  once  agam-and  *«  time  it 
waTfo^ir-SicUy  was  dear  of  the  Carthagmians.'  Twenty- 

*  Ibid.  XXVI.  21,  29. 


one  legions  were  now  put  into  the  field  by  Rome ;  for  as  Hanni- 
bal's forces  dwindled,  so  did  the  Romans'  seem  to  increase,  and, 
at  the  outset  of  the  campaign,  Salapia  in  Apulia  was  betrayed 
by  the  Roman  party  within  it  into  Roman  hands.  But  worse 
even  than  this  ;  Salapia  contained  a  garrison  of  five  hundred 
Numidians,  those  splendid  soldiers  who,  like  the  fabled  Cen- 
taurs of  old,  or  like  the  Turkomans  of  the  present  day,  could 
manage  their  horses  as  though  they  formed  part  of  them- 
selves, and,  on  occasion  doing  what  neither  Centaur  nor 
Turkoman  is  ever  reported  to  have  done,  would  each  take 
two  horses  into  battle,  and  keeping  them  well  in  hand,  when 
one  of  them  was  wearied  out,  would  leap  hke  an  acrobat  from 
its  back  to  that  of  the  other,  even  in  the  very  heat  of  the 
conflict.  1  These  peerless  horsemen  were  now  taken  by  sur- 
prise ;  their  horses,  as  ill  luck  would  have  it,  were  stabled 
outside  the  town,  while  they  themselves  were  penned  within 
it.  They  sprang  to  arms— such  arms  as  they  could  find — 
and  trying  to  force  their  way  out  on  foot  in  a  charge  which 
was  more  impossible  and  desperate  even  than  the  light 
cavalry  charge  at  Balaclava,  were  cut  down  by  the  Romans 
and  the  Salapians,  and,  of  the  whole  five  hundred,  only  fifty 
came  alive  into  their  enemies'  hands.  From  this  time  forward 
Hannibal  lost  that  superiority  in  cavahy  which  had  hitherto 
stood  him  in  such  good  stead;  and  we  hear  Uttle  more  of  the 
operations  on  any  large  scale  of  his  ubiquitous  and  irresistible 
Numidian  horse.^ 

Everything,  now,  seemed  to  betoken  that  the  end  was 
near ;  but  those  who  thought  so  reckoned  prematurely.  In 
the  year  which  followed  the  fall  of  Capua,  the  year  b.c.  210, 
Hannibal  surprised  and  slew  the  Praetor,  Cn.  Fulvius,  before 
Herdonea.  Herdonea  itself,  which  was  meditating  revolt, 
he  burned  to  the  ground  after  transferring  its  inhabitants  to 
Metapontum  and  Thurii,  two  of  the  few  towns  which  were 
still  faithful  to  him.^    In  B.C.  209,  when  Samnium  and  Lu- 

1  Livy,  xxiii.  29 ;  cf.  above,  p.  39-40. 

a  Uvy,  xxvi.  38.  s  ibid.,  xxvu.  1. 


J76  CARTHAGE  AND  THE  CARTHAGINIANS. 


FAMILY  TRADITIONS  AT  ROME. 


V7 


cania  had  already  submitted  to  the  Romans,  and  while  one 
consul,  Fulvius,  was  threatening  Metapontum.  and  the  other 
consul,  Fabius,  was  pressing  the  siege  of  Tarentum  m  h.s 
rear  he  fought  two  briUiant  actions  m  Apulia,  which  drove 
his  third  anUgonist,  the  sword  of  Rome  himself,  to  take 
refuge  in  Venusia,  and  to  adopt  the  more  cautious  tactics  of 

In  B  c '  208  and  207  his  superiority  in  the  field  was  as  in- 
contestable as  ever.     Tarentum,  indeed,  which  it  had  cost 
him  so  much  to  win  and  so  much  to  keep,  had  been  be- 
trayed by  the  commander  of  its  garrison  into  the  hands  of 
the  Komans,  and  suffered  the  fate,  or  worse  even  than  the 
fate,  of  Syracuse  and  Capua.    All  the  Bruttians  found  within 
it  were  put  to  death;  thirty  thousand  of  its  Greek  inhabitants 
were  sold  as  slaves,  and  all  the  works  of  art  it  contained 
except  its  "  angry  gods,"  were  carried  off  to  Eome.     Yet 
Hannibal  encamped  beneath  its  walls  as  though  the  place 
stiU  belonged  to  him,  and  in  vain  offered  battle  to  its  new 
possessors.^     When  he  moved  northwards  into  Apuha  and 
found  himself  with  his  ever-diminishing  force  face  to  face 
with  two  consular  armies  there,  he  yet  ventured  to  detach  a 
flying  squadron,  which  cut  to  pieces  a  Eoman  legion  on  a  spot 
some  fifty  miles  to  his  rear;  and  he  held  his  own  in  the  open 
field,  waiting  patiently,  tiU  the  moment  should  come  for  strik- 
ing a  blow.^  ,  .  ,    ,       i.      1 
At  last  the  moment  came,  and  the  blow  which  he  struck 
was  a  heavy  one.     The  consuls,  Crispinus  and  MarceUus,  as 
fate  would  have  it,  had  left  their  camps,  each  with  a  smaU 
band  of  foUowers,  and  had  ridden  in  company  to  the  top  of  a 
wooded  hill  which  lay  between  their  two  armies.   They  were 
observed  by  the  Numidian  cavaby,  ready  as  ever  for  a  sur- 
prise or  a  deed  of  daring.    There  was  a  sudden  charge,  and 
Crispinus,  wounded  to  the  death,  staggered  back  to  his  camp, 

1  Llvy.  xxvii.  12-U ;  cf.  20.  21. 

2  livy,  xxvu.  15. 16  ;  Appian,  Hann.  49 ;  Plutarch,  tainus,  22. 

3  Ldvy.  xxviL  26. 


while  the  body  of  the  other  consul,  the  bravest  of  the  brave, 
was  found  by  Hannibal  himself  where  it  had  fallen.     The 
Phoenician  gazed  on  it  for  a  while  in  silence,  and  then  remark- 
ing, "  There  lies  a  good  soldier  but  a  bad  general,"  ordered  it 
to  be  honourably  burned  and  the  ashes  to  be  sent  to  his  son.^ 
But  dangers  greater  even  than  the  loss  of  MarceUus  were 
now  threatening  the  Romans.     It  is  one  special  glory  of 
Kome  that  at  no  period  of  her  history  could  it  be  said  that 
her  safety  depended  upon  the  existence  of  any  single  citizen. 
The  abilities  or  the  character  of  an  individual,  however  com- 
manding, are  a  bad  security  at  the  best  for  the  life  of  a 
state  ;  and  at  Rome  had  such  a  military  or  political  genius 
been  wanted,  he  would  not,  with  the  one  exception  of  the 
age  which  produced  Julius  Caesar,  have  been  forthcoming. 
But  we  have  already  had  occasion  to  remark,  that  if  Rome 
produced  only  one  man  who  rose  to  the  very  front  rank  in 
any  department  of  human  greatness,  the  number  of  those 
who  came  in  the  rank  next  below  it  was  exceptionally  large. 
The  national  ideals  of  Rome,  if  not  the  noblest  ideals  con- 
ceivable, were  yet,  in  many  respects,  truly  noble,  and,  what 
is  more,  they  were  attainable  and  not  infrequently  attained. 
If  one  man  fell,  whom,  at   the  moment  of   his  death,  it 
seemed  that  Rome  could  ill  spare — just  when  the  execution 
of  some  darling  project,  an  extension  of  the  franchise,  a 
reform  of  a  crying  abuse,  or  the  conquest  of  some  imme- 
morial enemy  seemed  to  be  within  his  grasp — others  were 
always  ready  to  step  into  his  vacant  place.    Not  infrequently 
it  was  his  own  son,  or  grandson,  who  filled  the  gap ;  for 
nowhere  in  ancient  history,  nor  indeed  in  any  history  unless, 
possibly,  it  be  in  that  of  England,  do  we  find  so  command- 
ing a  place  occupied  by  the  conception  of  hereditary  duties 
and  traditions.     In  democratic  Greece  and  in  aristocratic 
Carthage  there  was  very  little  of  such  influence.     The  great- 
ness of  the  Barcine  family  with  their  traditionary  policy 

1  Polyb.  X.  32 ;  Livy,  xxvil  26-28 ;  Appian,  Hann.  vii.  50 ;  Plutarch,  Mar- 
ceUus, 28-^;  Zonaras,  ix.  9. 


278  CARTHAGE  AND  THE  CARTHAGINIANS. 


carried  on  at  Carthage  through  three  generations,  is  some- 
thincf  altogether  exceptional,  and  admits  of  special  explana- 
tion!'  But  at  Kome  we  habituaUy  find  the  same  objects. 
poUtical  and  social,  taken  up  and  carried  on  from  age  to  age 
by  members  of  the  same  noble  or  the  same  plebeian  famdy. 
Every  one  knew  beforehand  the  hereditary  disposition,  and 
therefore  the  general  line,  which,  on  any  particular  question, 
would  be  taken  by  a  member  of  the  Valerian  or  the  Hora- 
tian,  the  Cornelian  or  the  Claudian  Gens.     When,  through 
a  period  of  many  generations  together,  was  there  a  Claudius 
who  was  not  arrogant ;  a  Gracchus  whose  word  was  not  his 
bond ;  a  Decius  who  would  not  devote  himself  in  battle  for 
the  state  ?    When  was  there  a  Scipio  who  did  not  temper 
Roman  simplicity  by  Greek  culture ;  a  Cato  who  was  not 
**  a  foe  alike  to  villainy  and  refinement "  ;    a  Brutus  who 
would  not  have  struck  down  a  tyrant?    There  was  little 
fear  then  that  any  great  principle  of  policy  would  die  out  at 
Rome  for  lack  of  representatives.     At  Rome  the  family  al- 
ways came  before  the  individual,  and,  what  is  more  impor- 
tant to  note  here,  when  once  the  feud  between  patrician 
and  plebeian  had  been  fought  out,  the  state  always  before 

the  family. 

It  was  thus  upon  the  patriotism  and  the  exertions  of  the 
whole  body  of  the  citizens,  and  not  upon  any  part  or  parts 
of  them,  that  the  state  throughout  the  periods  of  the  Punic 
wars  could  safely  count.     The  wise  extension  of  the  fran- 
chise, whether  in  whole  or  in  part,  in  fruition  or  in  prospect, 
first  to  the  Latin  colonies  and  then  to  the  other  cognate 
tribes  of  Italy,  formed,  as  it  were,  a  wall  of  adamant  round 
the  Roman  Confederation,  against  which  all  the  waves  of  the 
Phoenician  invasion  had  hitherto  dashed  in  vain.     Was  the 
treasury  exhausted,  or  was   some  special  tax  required  to 
meet  a  pressing  emergency  ?    Again  and  again  in  the  course 
of  the  Punic  wars  the  need  was  met  by  private  and  volun- 
tary contribution.     Most  notably,  in  a  memorable  scene  de- 
scribed by  Livy,  in  the  year  B.C.  210,  the  Senate,  acting  on 


SYMPTOMS  OF  EXHAUSTION. 


279 


the  principle  that  nobility  imposes  obligation  to  an  extent 
to  which  few  aristocracies  have  ever  followed  them,  set  the 
example  of  devoting  the  whole  of  their  moveable  property 
beyond  what  was  necessary  to  support  life,  to  the  service  of 
the  state,  and  their  example  was  imitated,  and  imitated 
enthusiastically,  by  all  orders  and  degrees  in  the  common- 
wealth.i 

But  in  the  year  b.o.  209  symptoms  of  exhaustion,  if  not  of 
disafifection,  had  begim  to  show  themselves  even  within  the 
bounds  of  the  confederation,  amongst  the  Latin  colonies  them- 
selves. Twelve  of  the  thirty  colonies,  and  those  some  of  the 
oldest  and  the  most  important,  in  the  most  widely  scattered 
parts  of  Italy,  declared  that  the  Romans  must  look  for  no 
more  men  and  money  from  them,  for  they  had  neither  men 
nor  money  to  give.  The  news  fell  like  a  thunderbolt  upon 
the  consuls  who  were  the  first  to  hear  it,  and  the  Roman 
Senate  knew  that  if  the  example  spread  all  was  lost ;  but 
they  were  prudent  enough,  or  generous  enough,  to  require 
no  forced  service.  Accordingly,  throwing  themselves  on  the 
fidelity  and  devotion  of  the  remaining  eighteen,  they  pre- 
pared to  face  their  redoubtable  antagonist  with  such  help 
as  they  alone  could  give  her. 2 


*  Livy,  xxvl  35,  86. 


«Ibid.  xxvii.  9,  10. 


I  . 


280 


CARTHAGE  AND  THE  CARTHAGINIANS, 


CHAPTER  XVI. 

BATTLE   OP   THE   METAURUS. 

(207  B.C.) 

The  approach  of  Hasdrubal  from  Spain— His  messengers  fail  to  find  Hannibal 
—Importance  of  the  crisis— Brilliant  march  of  Nero— Retreat  of  Hasdrubal 
—Description  of  the  Metaurus— Battle  of  the  Metaums— Triumph  and 
brutality  of  Nero. 

It  seemed  to  augur  ill  for  Rome  that  the  stress  of  the  war 
had  at  length  begun  to  tell  on  the  spirit  and  the  fidelity  of 
the  Latin  colonies  themselves.    But,  more  ominous  still, 
news  reached  the  city  in  B.C.  208  that  after  the  vicissitudes 
of  the  ten  years*  struggle  in  Spain,  Hasdrubal  had  at  length 
eluded  Scipio,  had  entered  Gaul  by  the  passes  of  the  Wes- 
tern Pyrenees,  near  to  the  Atlantic,  while  the  Romans  were 
looking  out  for  him  on  the  borders  of  the  Mediterranean, 
had  struck  boldly  out  into  the  heart  of  the  country,  was 
raising  fresh  levies  there,  and  early  in  the  following  summer 
might  be  expected  in  Italy.^    Rome  had  been  in  no  such 
peril  since  the  morrow  of  the   battle  of  Cannse ;  for  the 
approach  of  Hasdrubal  indicated   that  the   great   Spanish 
struggle,  to  support  which  Rome  had  sent  out  some  of  her 
best  troops  and  generals,  even  when  Hannibal  was  threaten- 
ing her  existence,  had  at  last  been  played  out,  and  had 
ended  in    favour  of  Carthage.      It   seemed,   indeed,   that 
Carthage  by  conquering  in  Spain  had  assured  her  victory 
in  Italy  also.     For  the  last  ten  years  one  son  of  Hamilcar 
had  been  overrunning  Italy  from  end  to  end,  and  had  more 

1  Polyb.  X.  38,  39 ;  Livy,  xxvu.  36  ;  Appian,  Hisp.  28. 


APPROACH  OF  HASDRUBAL  FROM  SPAIN, 


281 


than  once  brought  Rome  to  the  brink  of  destruction ;  and 
now  with  her  resources  diminished,  her  population  halved, 
and  her  allies  wavering,  she  had  to  face  the  onset  of  a 
second  son  of  the  same  dreaded  chieftain,  who  would  sweep 
down  with  new  swarms  of  Africans,  Gauls,  and  Spaniards 
from  the  north,  while  his  brother,  for  the  last  time,  moved 
up  with  his  veterans  for  her  destruction  from  his  retreat  in 
Bruttium  in  the  south.  A  bitter  comment  this  on  the 
brilliant  victory  which  Scipio  was  reported  to  have  just  won, 
at  Baecula  in  Spain !  ^  For  Hasdrubal,  his  defeated  ad- 
versary, was  not  penned,  as  he  should  have  been,  within 
the  walls  of  Gades,  but  was  collecting  allies  at  his  leisure 
in  the  heart  of  Gaul.  A  few  precious  months  of  winter  re- 
mained to  prepare  for  the  double  danger  which  the  spring 
would  bring.  C.  Claudius  Nero,  a  man  who  had  done  fair 
service  before  Capua  and  in  Spain,  was  one  of  the  consuls 
selected  for  the  year  of  peril.2  His  plebeian  colleague,  M. 
Livius,  was  one  of  the  few  Romans  then  living  who  had 
enjoyed  a  triumph  ;  but  his  temper  had  been  soured  by  an 
unjust  charge  of  peculation,  and  he  was  personally  hostile 
to  Nero.  However  in  the  face  of  public  danger  he  was 
brought  to  forget  his  grievances  and  to  act  in  concert  with 
his  colleague  for  the  public  good.^  Livius,  so  the  Senate 
arranged,  was  to  await  the  approach  of  Hasdrubal  near  the 
frontiers  of  Hither  Gaul,  while  Nero  was  to  impede,  as  best 
he  could,  the  movements  of  Hannibal  in  the  south.  Seventy 
thousand  Romans  and  as  many  allies  were  put  into  the  field 
for  this,  the  supreme  effort,  as  it  seemed,  of  the  republic* 

As  soon  as  the  weather  permitted,  Hasdrubal  started  from 
Auvergne.  Everything  was  in  his  favour.  The  mountaineers 
were  friendly,  the  mountain  passes  were  free  from  snow,  his 
army  gathered  strength  and  bulk  as  it  advanced,  and  was  in 
a  more  effective  condition  when  it  entered  the  plains  of  Italy 

1  Polyb.  X.  39  ;  Livy,  xxvii.  18.    See  below,  p.  296. 

2  Livy,  xxvi.  17  ;  Appian.  Hisp.  17.  »  Livy,  xxvii.  34,  35. 
*  Ibid,  xxvii.  36  and  38. 


s8a 


CARTHAGE  AND  THE  CARTHAGINIANS, 


than  when  it  had  crossed  the  Pyrenees.  What  a  contrast  to 
his  brother's  advance  ten  years  before  1  Less  prudent  than  his 
brother,  however,  Hasdnibal  sat  down  to  besiege  Placentia 
when  he  had  better  have  been  pressing  on  towards  his  destina- 
tion.i  When  at  last  he  moved  forward,  the  Roman  army  re- 
treated before  him  till  it  reached  the  small  town  of  Sena  Gal- 
lica  (Sinigagha),  a  Roman  colony  fourteen  miles  to  the  south 
of  the  Metaurus.  From  this  place,  which  has  given  to  the 
decisive  battle  that  was  so  soon  to  follow  one  of  the  names  by 
which  it  is  known  in  history ,2  Hasdrubal  sent  off  four  Gallic 
horsemen  and  two  Numidians  on  whom  he  knew  he  could  rely 
for  so  deUcate  and  difficult  an  enterprise.  They  were  ordered 
to  find  Hannibal  wherever  he  might  be ;  to  apprise  him  of  Has- 
drubal's  arrival,  and  to  beg  him  to  come  with  such  forces  as  he 
could  muster  to  Namia  in  Umbria,  a  place  only  thirty  miles 
from  Rome,  that  the  two  brothers  might  then  advance  at  once 
together  by  the  Flaminian  road  on  the  city. 

Here  then  was  the  very  crisis  of  the  war.  Everything 
turned  or  seemed  to  turn  on  the  fidelity  and  the  address,  the 
courage  and  the  luck  of  these  six  horsemen.  For  a  time, 
fortune  helped  those  who  were  so  ready  to  help  themselves. 
They  traversed  half  the  length  of  Italy  amidst  half  a  dozen 
Roman  armies  undiscovered  and  unmolested,  and  at  length 
neared  the  spot  in  Apulia  where  Hannibal  ought  to  be.  But 
Hannibal  was  not  there,  and  following  his  footsteps  once 
more  southward,  they  fell  into  the  hands  of  some  Roman 
foragers,  and  their  despatches  were  interpreted  and  read, 
not  by  the  Carthaginian  but  by  the  Roman  general.^  It  is 
not  difficult  to  imagine  the  terrible  suspense,  the  sudden 
reUef,  and  then  the  renewed  anxiety  with  which  the  Roman 
consul  must  have  listened  to  the  plans  of  his  redoubtable 
antagonist ;  must  have  felt  how,  but  for  a  happy  accident, 
those  plans  must  have  succeeded,  and  how,  with  the  help 
of  just  such  another  accident,  they  might  succeed  even  now. 

^  Livy,  xxvii.  39.  'Cic.  Brutus.  18,  "  Senense  prwlium'*. 

»  Livy,  xxvii.  43  ;  Appian,  Hann.  52, 


MARCH  OF  NERO, 


283 


Since  the  beginning  of  the  campaign  Hannibal  had  been 
rapidly  shifting  his  quarters  backwards  and  forwards  between 
Bruttium  and  Apulia  amidst  a  network  of  Roman  fortresses 
and  armies,  always  followed  and  never  opposed  by  his  vastly 
more  numerous  foe.  The  victories  attributed  by  Livy  and 
others  to  Nero  during  this  period  are  purely  fictitious,  and 
are  explicitly  contradicted  by  Poly  bins  himself.^  Hannibal, 
as  fate  would  have  it,  must  have  gone  southwards  just  before 
his  brother's  messengers  were  despatched  to  find  him.  Had 
it  been  otherwise,  they  must  have  reached  him  in  safety ;  and 
in  that  case  we  can  hardly  doubt  that  the  brilliant  march 
northward  would  have  been  not  Nero's,  but  Hannibal's,  and 
that  the  Metaurus  would  have  seen  the  collapse  of  the  for- 
tunes not  of  Carthage,  but  of  Rome. 

Nero  formed  a  bold  resolution — one  almost  without  pre- 
cedent at  this  period  of  Roman  history — to  desert  the  pro- 
vince and  even  a  portion  of  the  troops  confided  to  his  keeping 
by  the  Senate  ;  with  the  remainder  to  march  rapidly  north- 
ward, a  distance  of  two  hundred  miles,  to  join  Livius,  to 
crush  Hasdrubal  by  a  combined  assault,  and  then  to  return 
again  before  Hannibal  should  have  discovered  his  absence. 
It  was  a  bold  step,  but  hardly  bolder  than  the  extremity  of 
the  danger  required ;  above  all  it  was  justified  by  the  event. 
Nero  took  care  not  to  inform  the  Senate  of  what  he  proposed 
to  do  till  he  was  already  doing  it,  thus  putting  it  in  their 
power  to  co-operate  with  his  later  movements,  but  not  giving 
them  the  chance  of  impeding  the  decisive  blow.  He  had 
already  sent  messengers  to  the  friendly  cities  near  his  line  of 
march  bidding  them  help,  as  best  they  could,  the  progress 
of  their  deliverers.  The  six  thousand  infantry  and  the  one 
thousand  cavalry  selected  for  the  enterprise  started,  like  the 
ten  thousand  Greeks  before  them,  in  total  ignorance  of  their 
destination.  They  believed  that  they  were  about  to  surprise 
some  petty  Carthaginian  garrison  near  at  home  in  Lucania ; 
and  their  enthusiasm   when    the    momentous   secret  was 

iPolyb.  X.  33, 1.  2,  and  xv.  11.  7-12 ;  Livy.  xxvii.  42. 


284 


CARTHAGE  AND  THE  CARTHAGINIANS. 


BATTLE  OF  THE  METAURUS. 


285 


communicated  to  them,  was  only  equalled  by  that  of  the 
Italian  provincials  who  thronged  the  roadside  with  provisions, 
vehicles,  and  beasts  of  burden,  and  accompanied  the  army 
with  their  blessings  and  their  prayers.  The  soldiers  declined 
everything  that  was  not  necessary  for  their  immediate 
support;  and  pausing,  we  are  told,  neither  to  eat  nor  to 
drink,  hardly  even  to  sleep,  in  a  few  days  they  neared  the 
army  of  the  other  consul^ 

Nero  entered  the  camp  of  Livius  at  night  and  distributed 
his  wearied  troops  among  the  tents  which  were  already  oc- 
cupied, so  as  to  avoid  exciting  the  suspicions  of  Hasdrubal 
till  he  should  meet  them  in  the  field.  But,  next  morning, 
the  quick  ear  of  the  Carthaginian  noticed  that  the  trumpet 
sounded  twice  instead  of  once  within  the  enemies'  camp,  and 
when  the  Romans  offered  battle  his  quick  eye  rested  with 
suspicion  on  the  travel-stained  troops,  and  the  draggled 
horses  of  a  portion  of  the  army.  Concluding  that  the  other 
consul  had  arrived  and  that  his  brother's  army  must  have 
been  dispersed  or  annihilated,  he  remained  within  his  camp 
throughout  that  day,  and  at  nightfall  began  to  retreat  towards 
the  friendly  Gaul.  He  reached  the  Metaurus,  fourteen  miles 
distant,  in  safety,  but  here  his  guides  played  him  false  and 
instead  of  crossing  at  once  by  the  ford  he  wandered  hither 
and  thither  on  the  nearer  side,  vainly  searching  for  it 
in  the  darkness.^ 

The  Metaurus  is  a  torrent-like  stream  forty  miles  long, 
which,  rising  in  the  Eastern  Apennines,  makes  its  way 
through  a  comparatively  level  country  to  the  Adriatic. 
Subject  like  other  mountain  torrents  to  extraordinary  alter- 
nations in  the  volume  of  its  waters,  it  has  hollowed  out 
for  itself  in  the  rich  alluvial  soil  a  wide  and  deep  depression 
which  is  not  visible  from  the  surrounding  plain  till  the 
traveller  finds  himself  close  upon  it.  This  depression 
resembles,  on  a  small  scale,  that  which  the  Bagradas  has 
scooped  out  for  itself  through  the  Carthaginian  domain  in 


^Livy,  xxvii.  45. 


a  Ibid,  xxvil  46,  47. 


Africa,  or  again,  the  remarkable  valley  (el  Ghor)  through 
which  the  Jordan  makes  its  way  from  the  Lebanon  to  the 
Dead  Sea.  Like  the  Jordan,  too,  the  Metaurus  winds 
about  from  side  to  side  of  the  hollow  it  has  made,  enclosing 
in  its  meanderings  many  almost  circular  plots  of  ground. 
Among  the  "links"  thus  formed,  and  above  and  below 
the  cHff-like  banks,  then,  probably,  crowned  with  wood,  which 
enclose  the  whole,  the  ill-fated  Hasdrubal  must  have  wan- 
dered during  the  dark  hours  of  the  early  morning,  searching 
for  the  ford  which  his  guides  had  promised  to  show  him, 
but  showed  him  not.  The  farther  he  ascended  the  course  of 
the  stream  the  steeper  and  more  impracticable  did  its  banks 
become,  and,  at  last,  he  determined  to  wait  on  some  rising 
ground  for  the  morning  light.^ 

But  the  morning  light  brought  the  Romans,  and  Has- 
drubal was  now  obliged  to  draw  up  his  army  where  it  was, 
with  a  rapid  and  dangerous  river  in  his  rear.  The  Spanish 
veterans,  his  main  strength,  he  placed  on  the  right,  intend- 
ing to  lead  them  in  person  against  Livius.  The  Ligurians, 
with  the  elephants  in  their  front,  formed  the  centre,  while 
the  Gauls,  untrustworthy  as  ever — except  when  led  by  Han- 
nibal—were drawn  up  on  a  hill  to  the  left,  which  by  the 
mere  advantage  of  position  they  could  hardly  fail  to  hold 
against  Nero.  The  Spaniards,  under  Hasdrubal's  own  eye, 
fought  nobly  and  with  every  prospect  of  success,  till  Nero, 
unable  to  dislodge  the  Gauls,  left  them  to  themselves,  and 
by  a  brilliant  manoeuvre,  passing  behind  the  whole  length 
of  the  Roman  army,  fell  at  once  on  the  Spanish  flank  and 
rear.  Thus  surrounded,  they  were  cut  to  pieces  where  they 
stood,  and  Hasdrubal,  after  doing  all  that  a  general  could 
do  to  save  the  fortunes  of  the  day,  rushed  into  the  midst 
of  the  enemies'  cavalry,  and  died  as  became  the  son  of  Ha- 
milcar  and  the  brother  of  Hannibal. 2    The  greater  part  of 

» livy,  xxvii  47.  See  Dr.  Arnold's  description  of  the  river,  drawn  from 
personal  observation  {Raman  History,  iii.  p.  371-373). 

«  Polyb.  xi.  1,  2  ;  Livy,  xxviL  48,  49  ;  Floras,  ii.  6,  49-52. 


286 


CARTHAGE  AND  THE  CARTHAGINIANS. 


the  elephants,  when  they  became  unmanageable,  were  killed 
by  their  own  drivers,  who  were  furnished  with  weapons  for 
the  purpose,  and  who  knew  how  and  where  to  strike  the 
fatal  blow.  The  Gauls  were  slaughtered  as  they  lay  on  the 
ground,  heavy  with  wine  or  wearied  out  by  their  night's 

march. 

The  victory  of  Kome  was  not  bloodless,  but  it  was  com- 
plete.   Hasdrubal's  army,  whatever  its  size,  was  annihilated, 
and  some  of  the  Roman  annalists,  regardless  alike  of  truth 
and  probabiUty,  strove  to  make  out  that  the  slaughter  of 
the  Metaurus  equalled  that  of  Cannae.^     From  the  agonies 
of  suspense  the  Romans  passed  at  once  into  the  exuberant 
enthusiasm  of  victory.     They  had  been  rudely  awakened  to 
the  consciousness  that  there  were  two  Hannibals  in  Italy. 
They  forgot  now  that  there  was  still  one  ;  that  the  Hannibal 
was  still  in  Italy,  still  unconquered,  and,  as  far  as  they 
knew,  unconquerable.    A  well-deserved  triumph  was  granted 
to  the  victorious  generals.    It  was  the  first  which  the  Sacred 
Way  had  seen  ever  since  Hannibal  had  entered  Italy,  for  it 
was  the  first  time,  by  the  confession  of  the  Romans  them- 
selves, that  victory  had  smiled  on  their  arms.*     The  consuls 
triumphed  in  common — Livius  borne  in  the  triumphal  car, 
Nero  riding  beside  him  on  horseback.     To  Livius  indeed 
were  due  the  chief  external  marks  of  honour,  since  it  was  on 
the  day  of  his  command  that  the  battle  had  been  fought, 
and  it  was  his  army  which  had  returned  to  Rome  flushed 
with  victory  ;  but  it  was  Nero  who  was  the  true  hero  of  the 
day.     To  him  was  due  aUke  the  strategy  of  the  northward 
march — a  march  perhaps  only  equalled  in  history  by  the  ad- 
vance of  Marlborough  from  Belgium  to  the  Danube  in  the 
campaign  of  Blenheim — and  the  brilliant  stroke  which  de- 
cided the  battle.     To  Nero,  however,  also  belongs  the  act 


BA'I 


V^H 


iV 


.tri 


* 


•  / 


Sy 


Ri^* 


I  Carfhuginiant        'ttKonii 
I  Roman  a  HOAtoo 


yo; 


:Sfi^ 


1  Livy,  he.  cU. ;  Appian.  Hann.  63.  Polybius  (xi.  8)  is  perhaps  himself 
outside  the  truth  when  he  makes  the  number  of  slain  on  the  Carthaginian  side 
to  have  been  ten  thousand. 

2  Cf.  Hot.  Ode,  iv.  4,  41 :  "  ({xA  primus  alm&  risit  adorea  ". 


.1 


286 


CARTHAGE  AND  THE  CARTHAGINIANS. 


the  elephants,  when  they  became  unmanageable,  were  killed 
by  their  own  drivers,  who  were  furnished  with  weapons  for 
the  purpose,  and  who  knew  how  and  where  to  strike  the 
fatal  blow.  The  Gauls  were  slaughtered  as  they  lay  on  the 
ground,  heavy  with  wine  or  wearied  out  by  their  night's 

march. 

The  victory  of  Rome  was  not  bloodless,  but  it  was  com- 
plete.   Hasdrubal's  army,  whatever  its  size,  was  annihilated, 
and  some  of  the  Roman  annalists,  regardless  alike  of  truth 
and  probability,  strove  to  make  out  that  the  slaughter  of 
the  Metaurus  equalled  that  of  Cannae.i     From  the  agonies 
of  suspense  the  Romans  passed  at  once  into  the  exuberant 
enthusiasm  of  victory.     They  had  been  rudely  awakened  to 
the  consciousness  that  there  were  two  Hannibals  in  Italy. 
They  forgot  now  that  there  was  still  one  ;  that  the  Hannibal 
was  still  in  Italy,  still  unconquered,  and,  as  far  as  they 
knew,  unconquerable.    A  well-deserved  triumph  was  granted 
to  the  victorious  generals.    It  was  the  first  which  the  Sacred 
Way  had  seen  ever  since  Hannibal  had  entered  Italy,  for  it 
was  the  first  time,  by  the  confession  of  the  Romans  them- 
selves, that  victory  had  smiled  on  their  arms.*-^     The  consuls 
triumphed  in  common — Livius  borne  in  the  triumphal  car, 
Nero  riding  beside  him  on  horseback.     To  Livius  indeed 
were  due  the  chief  external  marks  of  honour,  since  it  was  on 
the  day  of  his  command  that  the  battle  had  been  fought, 
and  it  was  his  army  which  had  returned  to  Rome  flushed 
with  victory  ;  but  it  was  Nero  who  was  the  true  hero  of  the 
day.     To  him  was  due  alike  the  strategy  of  the  northward 
march — a  march  perhaps  only  equalled  in  history  by  the  ad- 
vance of  Marlborough  from  Belgium  to  the  Danube  in  the 
campaign  of  Blenheim— and  the  brilliant  stroke  which  de- 
cided the  battle.     To  Nero,  however,  also  belongs  the  act 


/   BATTLE 

CANN^ 

N        B.C.2I6. 


I  Curthiiaiitinnt        .Vifvut 
\  Romans  i%O.Uiio 


1  Livy.  he.  cit. ;  Appian.  Hann.  53.  Polybius  (xi.  3)  is  perhaps  himself 
outside  the  truth  when  he  makes  the  number  of  slain  on  the  Carthaginian  side 
to  have  been  ten  thousand. 

2  Cf.  Hor.  Ode,  iv.  4.  41  :  "  ({m  primus  alma  risit  adorea  ". 


BRUTALITY  OF  NERO, 


2&9 


of  revolting  barbarism  which  wound  up  his  achievements 
and  must  for  ever  detract  from  his  fair  fame.  Eeturning 
to  his  army  in  Apuha  as  quickly  as  he  had  left  it,  he  carried 
with  him  the  head  of  Hasdrubal,  which  he  had  caused  tc 
be  severed  from  his  body,  and,  with  true  Roman  brutahty, 
ordered  this  ghastly  trophy  of  victory  to  be  flung  into  the 
camp  of  Hannibal,  who,  it  is  said,  was  still  ignorant  that  the 
general  opposed  to  him  had  ever  left  his  quarters.  Hannibal, 
who  had  so  often  treated  with  marked  respect  the  bodies 
of  Roman  generals  who  had  fallen  in  battle,  recognised  the 
features  of  the  brother  whom  he  had  so  long  and  eagerly 
expected,  and  in  them  sadly  saw  the  doom  of  Carthage.^ 

i  Uvy,  xxvii.  61 ;  Florus.  ii.  ti.  53 ;  Zonaras.  ix.  9. 


»9 


2iO 


CARTHAGE  ASD  THE  CARTHAGIMANS. 


SCIPIO'S  EARLY  HISTORY. 


291 


* 


CriAPTER  XVII. 

r.   CORNELIUS   SCIPIO. 

(210-206  B.C.) 

c  •  •    i„  <?n«in    His  earlv  history-His  characU'.r  and  influence-Ma.U-  i.ro 
'Ts^-Ser "e:  cX-Carthaginians  finally  driven  out  o.  Sp.uu. 

It  is  necessary  now  that  ne  have  reached  this,  the  decisive, 
point  of  the  war,  to  direct  our  attention  once  more  to  hpain  , 
for  it  was  on  the  Metaunis  that  Spain  as  well  as  Italy  was 
lost  to  the  Carthaginians,  and  it  was  in  Spain  at  this  very 
time,  that,  moving  in  an  atmosphere  of  mingled  war  and  love, 
amidst  romantic  expeditions  and  hair-breadth  escapes,  fortu- 
nate in  what  he  did,  and  perhaps  more  fortunate  m  what 
he  failed  to  do,  surrounded  by  devoted  friends,  like  LaBlms. 
or  by  court  annalists,  who  saw  all  his  doings  through    he 
bright  halo  which   he  or  they  diffused  around  them,   the 
young  general  was  being  nursed  by  Fortune  into  fame,  who 
was  soon  to  drive  the  Carthaginians  from  Spain,  then,  with- 
out striking  a  blow,  was  to  compel  Hannibal  to  withdraw 
from  Italy,  was  next  to  crush  that  greatest  of  all  heroes  in 
Africa,  and,  finally,  to  bring  to  a  conclusion  there  the  long 
aaony  of  the  Second  Punic  War. 
°P.  Cornelius  Scipio  is  one  of  the  central  figures  of  Roman 
history.     His  presence  and  his  bearing  exercised  a  strange 
fascination  over  aU  who  came  within  its  influence  and  his 
name,  with  the  romances  that  began  to  cluster  round  it  even 
in  his  hfetime,  was  a  yet  more  living  power  with  posterity^ 
It  turned  the  head  of  even  the  sober-minded  Polybms,  and 
has  given  an  air  of  unreality  and  of  poetry  to  such  fragments 


of  his  history  of  this  portion  of  the  war  as  have  unfor- 
tunately,  alone  come  down  to  us.  Let  us  pause  for  a  while 
on  the  antecedents  and  the  surroundings,  the  virtues  and 
the  fallings,  of  so  important  and  conspicuous  a  personage 

Scipio  was  the  son  of  that  Publius  who.  by  an  unlooked- 
for  reverse  of  fortune,  had  just  been  defeated  and  killed  on 
the  field  of  his  numerous  victories  and  in  the  full  tide  of  his 
success.     But  Fortune,  so  capricious  towards  the  father  was 
unswerving  in  her  devotion  to  the  son.     He  was  then 'only 
twenty.four  years  of  age ;  1  but,  young  as  he  was,  he  was 
already  known  to  fame  by  his  conduct  on  three  critical  oc- 
casions.    As  a  mere  stripling  of  seventeen,  he  had  saved  or 
It  was  believed  that  he  had  saved,  his  father's  life  at  the  battle 
of  Ticmus  at  the  risk  of  his  own  ;  2  after  Cannae,  it  was  his 
resolute  bearing  which  had  shamed  or  frightened  the  recreant 
nobles  of  Rome  from  deserting  the  fast-sinking  ship  of  the 
State  ;  3  at  the  age  of  twenty-three  he  had  been  candidate  for 
the  Curule  .Edileship,  and  when  the  magistrate  objected  that 
he  was  not  yet  of  legal  age,  he  replied  that,  if  aU  the  Quirites 
wished  to  make  him  sBdile,  he  was  old  enough.-*    It  was  a 
characteristic  reply,  a  sample  of  that  contempt  for  the  forms 
of  law,  and  that  mingled  respect  and  contempt  for  popular 
opinion,  which  marked  his  conduct  on  several  occasions  of 
his  life,  and  goes  some  way  to  explain  alike  what  he  did  and 
what  he  failed  to  do ;  and  now.  when  his  father  and  uncle 
had  fallen  m  Spain,  and  the  comitia  were  being  held  for  the 
election  of  some  one  to  fill  their  place,  and.  as  the  story  goes, 
people  were  looking  anxiously  one  upon  the  other  to  see  who 
would  offer  himself  for  a  task  wherein  two  Scipios  had  failed 
It  was  the  young  Publius  himself  who,  with  mingled  modesty 

'  ^'T'  f  "SI'*  wJ.  ^^^-  ^^^^'  '"•  ^'  ^-  ^°^y^»"«  (^-  «'  10)  makes  him  twenty 
seven  ;  but  that  this  is  a  mere  slip  is  evident  from  his  statement  only  there 
chapters  before  (x.  3.  4)  that  he  was  seventeen  at  the  time  of  the  battle  of  the 
J  iciinis,  B.C.  218. 

-  Polyb.  X.  3,  3  5  ;  Livy.  xxi.  46.  -^  lAyy,  xxiu  53. 

*  Livy,  XXV.  2  ;  Appian,  Jlisp.  18. 


1 


2g2 


CARTHAGE  AND  THE  CARTHAGINIASS. 


SCIPIO'S  CHARACTER  AND  INFLUENCE. 


293 


and  seU-reliance,  came  forward,  and  was  straightway  chosen 
proconsul  amidst  the  acclamations  of  aU  present. 

A  second  secret  of  Scipio's  influence  was  the  popular  behef 
in  part,  at  least,  shared  by  himself,  that  he  was  the  spec.al 
favourite  of  the  gods  and  inspired  by  them  m  all  he  did.  Stones 
were  in  the  air  of  his  divine  descent,  and  even  oi^is  mn^n- 
lous  birth,  which  he  had  too  much  prudence  either  to  affirm 
or  to  contradict.^    Why  should  the  favourite  of  the  gods  re- 
fuse  to  avail  himself  of  any  help  they  offered  h™?    I^i  t^io 
existence  of  the  gods  and  in  their  spec.al  help  to  him  Sc.p.o 
doubtless  implicftly  believed  ;  but  the  ostentatious  secrecy  of 
bis  visits  to  the  Capitol  before  undertaking  any  work  of  im- 
portance, must  have  been  suggested  by  the  credulity  of  the 
Situd;  rather  than  his  own.     At  all  events,  h-  -te-iew^ 
with  Jupiter  there  never  ended  in  any  other  way  than  a  care. 
Tul  consLation  of  the  circumstances  of  the  case  -  the  prnracy 
of  his  own  study  would  have  been  likely  to  suggest.    He  was 
not.  therefore,  as  has  sometimes  been  said.  "  a  ^^l^^^' 
siast  •'  nor  was  his.  as  Dr.  Mommsen  caUs  it.  a     genuinely 
rpke«c  nature  ••      on  the  other  hand   he  was  no  mere 
vulvar  impostor.^-    He  had  enough  of  enthusiasm  h.mseU  to 
evoke  it  towards  himself  in  others  ;  not  enough  to  allow  him- 
self,  under  any  circumstances,  to  be  hurried  away  ^J^- 

One  of  the  greatest  of  Roman  heroes.  Scipio  was  himseU 
only  three  parts  a  Roman.  He  was  fond  of  literary  men. 
and  was  himself  not  destitute  of  Greek  culture ;  a  weak- 
ness  which  certainly  could  not  be  charged  against  any 
J  nuine  Roman  of  the  old  school.  By  turns  the  hero  and 
the  enemy  of  the  populace,  he  knew  how  to  wm  yet  how  to 
despise,  how  to  use  yet  sometimes  how  to  abuse,  popular 
favour.  In  Spain,  with  the  air  and  the  surroundings  of  a  king, 
he  had  enough  Roman  feeling  to  reject  the  regal  gewgaws 

>  Livv  xxvi  18 ;  Anpian,  Hisp.  toe.  cU. ;  Zonara-s,  ix.  7. 

=  Ct  Polyhlus,  X.  2,'5  and  U.  5  ;  laxy.  xxvi.  19  ;  Appian.  Ihsp.  19  a™i  2«. 

:'See  Moniiiisen,  ii.  159-160. 
*  livy,  xxix.  19. 


and  the  regal  title  which  the  Spaniards  pressed  upon  him  ;  ^ 
at  Rome,  after  his  victory  at  Zama,  he  showed  that  he  still 
retained  enough  of  the  genuine  republican  spirit  to  refuse  the 
invidious  honours — the  dictatorship  for  life  and  the  statue  in 
the  Capitol — which  the  citizens,  in  the  ecstasy  of  their  joy, 
would  fain  have  given  him.2     But  he  had  not  that  inborn  re- 
verence for  law  and  for  authority  which  had  made  the  Romans 
what  they  were,  and  which  would  have  bidden  him  cheer- 
fully remain  in  Italy,  even  when  he  knew  he  had  it  in  him 
to  finish  the  war  in  Africa,  rather  than  resist  the  powers 
that  be. 3     A  Roman  of  the  old  type  would  have  submitted 
to  an  accusation  or  to  a  punishment  which  he  knew  to  be 
unjust  rather  than  involve  himself  in  the  semblance  of  il- 
legality ;  but  Scipio,  when  his  brother  Lucius  was  called  to 
give  an  account  of  the  moneys  which  he  liad  received  from 
King  Antiochus,  and  was  about  to  present  to  the  Senate 
the  document  which  would  have  cleared  or  condemned  him, 
proudly  snatched  it  from  his  hands  and  tore  it  to  pieces  before 
their  eyes.*     So  again,  in  his  last  appearance  in  pubhc  life, 
when  it  was  his  own  turn  to  have  his  conduct  called  in 
question,  he  reminded  his  accusers,  by  a  happy  stroke  of 
audacity  which  was  akin  to  genius,  that  this  was  the  day  on 
which  he  had  defeated  Hannibal  at  Zama,  and  called  upon 
them  to  follow  him  to  the  temple  of  the  Capitoline  Jupiter 
that  they  might  there  return  thanks  to  the  gods  who  had 
given  them  the  victory,  and  pray  that  the  Roman  state 
might  have  other  citizens  like  himself.^    The  appeal  was  ir- 
resistible, and  the  Romans  once  more  showed  that  they  could 
not  judge  a  Manlius  in  sight  of  the  Capitol.    These  incidents 
have  a  grandeur  peculiarly  their  own ;    but  it  is  hardly  a 
Roman  grandeur. 

As  a  young  man  Scipio  was  fond  of  romantic  situations, 
and  fortune  showered  them  upon  him.     The  charms  of  his 

»  Polyb.  X.  40  ;  Livy,  xxvii.  19.        2  Livy.  xxxvUi.  56  ;  Val.  Max.  iv.  1,  6, 
»  Livy,  xxviii.  40.  *  Livy,  xxxviii.  55  ;  VaL  Max.  iii.  7,  1. 

*Livy,  xxxviii.  51. 


294 


CARTHAGE  AND  THE  CARTHAGINIANS, 


personal  presence,  and  the  moral  and  the  material  victories 
which  they  won,  his  adventurous  interviews  with  Spanish 
or  Berber  princes,  or  with  hostile  generals,  his  chivalrous 
treatment  of  captive  maidens  and  their  bridegrooms  or  their 
suitors,  fill  a  large  part  in  the  histories  which  remain  to 
us  of  his  Spanish  and  his  African  campaigns.^  Much  of 
the  setting  of  these  stories  may  be  imaginary  ;  but  the  stories 
themselves  doubtless  rest  on  a  substratum  of  fact,  and  they 
reveal  to  us,  however  dimly,  a  union  of  gallantry  and  gener- 
osity, of  prudence  and  of  passion,  of  sensibility  to  the  charms 
of  beauty,  and  yet  of  resistance  to  their  power,  which  enable 
us  to  feel  something  of  the  fascination  which  made  Scipio 
the  idol  of  his  soldiers,  of  the  natives  of  Spain  and  Africa, 
and  of  the  great  body,  and  those  the  more  generous,  of  his 
fellow-citizens. 

Above  all,  if  Scipio  had  not  all  the  most  characteristic 
Roman  virtues,  he  was  free  from  the  worst  Roman  vices. 
He  was  not  cruel,  not  faithless,  not  indifferent  to  human 
life ;  as  times  went,  he  was  not  self-seeking.  He  could  ap- 
preciate virtue  in  an  enemy.  He  could  be  generous  to  a 
fallen  foe.  He  could  observe  the  terms  of  a  capitulation. 
He  could  suppress  a  mutiny  without  promiscuous  massacre, 
and  could  sometimes  take  a  town  without  slaughtering  the 
inhabitants  in  cold  blood.  He  could  even  enter  into  the 
peculiarities  and  characteristics  of  nations  other  than  his 
own,  and,  unlike  his  younger  namesake,  could  shrink  from 
obliterating  a  seat  of  ancient  civilisation  and  commerce  at 
one  fell  blow.  In  fine,  if  he  was  not  a  worthy  antagonist  to 
Hannibal,  he  was  the  least  unworthy  that  Rome,  the  nurse 
of  heroes,  could  in  this  sixteen  years'  war  produce ;  and  if 
he  was  the  favourite  of  Fortune,  it  must  be  admitted  that 
that  capricious  goddess  has  seldom  conferred  her  favours  on 
one  who  did  so  much  to  deserve  them. 

Scipio  crossed  to  Spain  with  eleven  thousand  men  towards 

»See  Polyb.  bk.  x.  xi.  xiv.  xv.  passim;  Livy,  xxvi.  49,  .'iO  ;  xxvil  17-19; 
xxviii.  17,  18 ;  xxx.  13  15,  etc.  ;  Appiaa,  Ilisj).  29-30.  37,  etc. 


SCIPIO  TAKES  NEW  CARTHAGE. 


295 


the  close  of  the  year  b.c.  210,^  and  early  in  the  spring  of  the 
following  year  he  struck  a  blow  which  showed  that  a  general 
of  a  new  stamp  had  appeared  upon  the  scene.  Finding  that 
the  three  Carthaginian  generals,  Hasdrubal  and  Mago,  sons 
of  Hamilcar,  and  Hasdrubal,  son  of  Gisco,  were  passing  the 
winter  in  widely  different  parts  of  Spain  each  more  distant 
from  New  Carthage  than  he  was  himself,  and  hearing  also 
that  the  garrison  had  been  reduced  to  one  thousand  men  all 
told,  he  determined  to  make  a  rapid  descent  upon  that  city, 
the  head-quarters  of  the  Carthaginian  government  and  the 
key  to  their  position  in  Spain. 2 

New  Carthage  was  a  noble  city  situated  on  a  land-locked 
harbour,  the  only  good  harbour  on  the  south-east  coast  of 
Spain.  It  was  surrounded  on  all  sides  by  water,  save  where 
an  isthmus  only  two  hundred  and  fifty  yards  wide  connected 
it  with  the  mainland.  Its  fortifications,  strong  everywhere, 
were  doubly  strong  here ;  but  there  was  one  weak  spot  which 
fortune  or  the  gods  were  preparing  to  reveal  to  their  favourite. 
The  object  of  the  enterprise  was  entrusted  to  Laelius,  Scipio's 
life-long  friend,  alone ;  and  it  was  arranged  that  he  should 
enter  the  harbour  with  the  fleet  just  when  Scipio  with  his 
land  force  appeared  before  its  walls.  Not  a  whisper  of  what 
was  coming  reached  the  city  till  it  was  already  come ;  and 
not  a  misadventure  or  a  hitch  occurred  from  the  moment 
when  the  adventurous  Scipio  left  Tarraco  to  the  time  when 
New  Carthage  was  in  his  power. 

The  assault  indeed  of  the  Romans  on  the  fortifications  of 
the  isthmus  was  repelled  ;  but  Scipio  intended  it  to  be  so, 
for  it  was  not  the  real  point  of  his  attack.  Taking  advan- 
tage of  the  ebb  tide  which  left  the  waters  of  the  lagoon  on 
the  western  side  so  low  that  they  could  easily  be  forded — a 
fact  known  to  few  but  himself — and,  by  a  happy  inspiration, 
bidding  his  soldiers  follow  him  boldly  where  Neptune  him- 
self pointed  out  the  way,  Scipio  led  a  select  body  of  his  troops 
to  the  attack,  through  waters  which  besiegers  and  besieged 


*  Livy,  xxvi.  19. 


2  Polyb.  X.  7  :  Livy,  xxvi  20  and  42. 


2gb 


CARTHAGE  AND  THE  CARTHAGINIANS, 


might  well  have  thought  would  submerge  them  all.  The 
walls  here  proved,  as  Scipio  had  expected,  to  be  accessible, 
and  they  were  quite  undefended.  The  attention  of  the  gar- 
rison had  been  called  elsewhere,  and,  with  the  help  of  scaling 
ladders  and  the  god  of  the  sea,  the  small  band  soon  found 
themselves  masters  of  New  Carthage.  New  Carthage — with 
its  mines  of  gold  and  silver,  its  arsenal  and  its  dockyards,  its 
merchant  vessels  and  its  stores  of  corn,  its  stands  of  arms 
and  its  engines  of  war,  its  skilled  workmen  and  its  hostages 
drawn  by  the  suspicious  Carthaginians  from  all  the  Spanish 
tribes— all  belonged  to  Rome.  The  work  of  slaughter  over 
— and  terrible  work  it  was — Scipio  addressed  himself  to  the 
distribution  of  the  booty.  If  the  stories  that  have  come 
down  to  us  may  be  trusted,  the  survivors  of  the  massacre 
had  reason  to  admire  the  skill  with  which  their  conqueror 
managed  to  turn  foes  into  friends,  and  so,  as  it  were,  to  arm 
Carthage  against  herself.  Under  promise  of  their  freedom, 
the  Punic  shipwrights  cheerfully  transferred  their  services  to 
Rome.  Captive  princesses,  who  might  have  been  given  up 
to  the  Roman  soldiery,  or  reserved  by  the  young  general  for 
himself,  were  restored  to  their  parents  or  their  betrothed 
lovers ;  and  the  hostages,  those  standing  monuments  of  Car- 
thaginian mistrust,  were  dismissed  to  their  homes  and  con- 
verted into  so  many  pledges  of  Roman  moderation  and  good 
will.i 

It  seemed  once  more  as  if  the  Spanish  war  was  over ;  and 
Lselius  was  despatched  to  Rome  to  report  to  the  Senate, 
perhaps  to  magnify  the  achievements  of  his  friend.  We  are 
surprised  indeed,  after  so  brilliant  a  beginning,  to  find  that 
the  young  general,  instead  of  pressing  on  at  once  to  Gades, 
fell  back  on  Tarraco  whence  he  had  started,  and  that  Hasdru- 
bal,  after  he  had  been  conquered  by  him  in  a  decisive  battle 
at  BsBcula,  was  yet  able,  as  has  been  already  related,  to  give 
him  the  slip  and  to  go  ofif  with  a  considerable  force  to  Italy, 
thus,  to  all  appearance,  accomplishing  the  object  of  the  long 

«  Polyb.  X.  8-16  ;  Ldvy.  xxvi.  43-50 ;  Appian,  JJisj).  19-23. 


Spanish  struggle.^  It  was  not  till  Hasdrubal  had  spent  the 
winter  months  in  Gaul,  had  invaded  Italv,  and  had  fallen  on 
the  Metaurus,  that  Scipio  ventured  to  advance  into  Baetica, 
and  then,  step  by  step,  after  a  decisive  victory  at  Elinga  or 
Silpia,  drove  the  Carthaginians  into  Gades,  "their  first  and 
their  last  possession  "  in  Spain.2  Nor  was  it  till  the  year 
B.C.  205  that  Mago,  the  youngest  of  the  brood  of  Hamilcar, 
passed  over  into  the  Balearic  Islands,  leaving  to  Rome,  or 
rather  to  two  centuries  of  half -suppressed  revolts  against  her 
cruel  and  treacherous  rule,  the  empire  which  his  family  had 
founded  and  built  up,  and  of  which  they  had  so  long  post- 
poned the  falL^ 


»  Polyb.  X,  89 ;  Livy,  xxvl  51 ;  xxvii.  18,  20,  36. 

2  Polyb.  xi.  20-24  ;  Livy.  xxviii.  2.  12-16.  The  whole  history  of  the  Roman 
tampaigns  in  Spain  is  involved  in  obscurity,  partly  the  result  of  our  ignorance 
and  the  Roman  ignorance  of  ancient  Spanish  geography,  but  much  more  of  the 
gross  exaggerations  of  the  Roman  writers,  especially  where  the  family  of  the 
Scipios  is  concerned.  These  falsifications  reach  their  acme  perhaps  in  the 
account  of  the  two  battles,  or  (it  may  be)  in  the  double  account  of  the  one 
battle  of  Baecula.  In  the  first.  Hasdrubal  is  said  to  have  been  defeated  with  a 
loss  of  twenty  thousand  men,  and  yet  he  went  oflf  unmolested  from  the  field,  and 
traversed  the  whole  of  Central  Spain  on  his  way  to  Italy,  unpursued  by  his  con- 
queror !  (Livy,  xxvii.  19).  In  the  second,  Hasdrubal,  son  of  Gisco,  is  said  to  have 
been  defeated  at  the  head  of  an  army  of  seventy-four  thousand  men  ;  but  the  place 
at  which  this  portentous  and  (probably)  imaginary  battle  took  place  is  quite  un- 
known, and  receives  four  different  names— Baecula,  and  Silpia  in  Livy  (xxviii. 
12-13).  Elinga  in  Polybius  (xi.  20),  and  Karmon  in  Appian  (Hisj).  25-27). 

»  Livy,  xxviii  36,  37 ;  Appian,  I/isp.  37. 


lit 


298 


CARTHAGE  AND  THE  CARTHAGINIANS, 


CHAPTER  XVIII. 

THE    WAR   IN   AFRICA.        BATTLE   OP    ZAMA. 

(206-202  B.C.) 

Scipio  returns  to  Rome  and  is  elected  Consul— Receives  leave  to  invade  Africa- 
Goes  to  Sicily— His  doings  and  difficulties  there-Sails  lor  Africa— Massi- 
nissa  and  Syphax— Roman  ignorance  of  Carthage— The  fall  of  Carthage, 
how  far  a  matter  of  regret— Siege  of  Utica— Scipio's  command  prolonged— 
He  bums  the  Carthaginian  camps-Sophonisba— The  Carthaginian  peace 
party— Sons  of  Hamilcar  recalled  to  Africa— Mago  obeys  the  summons- 
Hannibal  obeys  it— The  Bruttian  territory— The  "Camp  of  Hannibal"— 
The  Lacinian  column— Joy  in  Italy— First  operations  of  Haimibal  in  Africa 
—Battle  of  Zaraa -Dignity  of  HannilMil— Terms  of  peace  -Results  of  the 
war— Alternative  policies  open  to  Rome. 

On  his  return  to  Rome,  towards  the  close  of  the  year  b.c. 
206,  Scipio  enumerated  to  the  Senate,  which  had  been  as- 
sembled for  that  purpose  in  the  Temple  of  Bellona  outside 
the  walls,  the  long  roll  of  the  actions  which  he  had  fought, 
the  towns  which  he  had  taken,  and  the  cities  which  he  had 
subdued.  Not  a  Carthaginian,  he  proudly  told  them,  was  left 
ahve  in  Spain.  He  expected  to  receive  a  triumph;  and,  truly, 
in  view  of  his  successes,  if  not  of  his  intrinsic  merits,  he  de- 
served it  as  few  Roman  generals  had  done  before  him.  But 
the  Senate,  half  envious  and  half  distrustful  of  the  young 
general,  determined  to  abide  by  precedent  where,  as  in  this 
case,  precedent  fell  in  with  their  own  inclinations,  and  re- 
fused an  honour  which  had  never  yet  been  granted  except 
to  a  regularly  commissioned  officer  of  the  state.  Scipio,  who 
had  conquered  as  a  mere  proconsul,  could  console  himself 
only  with  the  conquests  he  had  yet  in  view,  when  it  might 
be  that  there  would  be  no  such  artificial  obstacle  to  tba 


SCIPIO  CHOSEN  CONSUL, 


299 


reward  which  they  merited.  He  had  not  long  to  wait ;  for  at 
the  Comitia,  to  which  the  people  flocked  as  much  to  see  as 
to  vote  for  the  conqueror  of  Spain,  he  was  unanimously 
chosen  consul— though  he  had  not  yet  filled  the  office  of 
praetor,  and  was  still  only  thirty  years  of  age — and  with  the 
purpose  clearly  understood,  even  if  it  was  not  expressed  in 
words,  that  he  should  transfer  the  war  to  Africa.  ^ 

But  the  fathers  of  the  city  were  full  of  misgivings.  They 
remembered  Regulus ;  they  reflected  that  Hannibal  was  still 
in  Italy,  that  there  might  be  life  in  the  old  lion  yet,  and  that, 
even  in  his  death-grapple,  he  might,  like  the  blind  and  captive 
Samson,  slay  and  scatter  his  foes  once  more  as  he  had  done 
scores  of  times  in  the  heyday  of  his  strength.  The  old  Fabius, 
true  to  his  policy  to  the  end,  advised  Scipio  to  reckon  with 
Hannibal  and  his  few  soldiers  in  Italy  rather  than  attempt 
to  draw  him  ofif  to  Africa,  where  he  would  have  the  whole 
power  of  Carthage  at  his  back.  But  Scipio  showed  clearly 
enough  that,  if  the  Senate  refused  the  leave  he  sought,  he 
would  seek  it  from  the  people ;  and  if  he  failed  to  get  it  from 
them,  he  would  still  take  it  for  himself.  The  Senate,  there- 
fore, were  glad  to  save  their  dignity  and  to  shift  a  portion  of 
their  responsibility  from  their  own  shoulders,  by  assigning  the 
province  of  Sicily  to  the  newly  elected  consul,  at  the  same 
time  giving  him  permission  to  cross  thence  into  Africa,  "  if 
he  should  judge  it  to  be  advantageous  to  the  State  ".  They 
declined,  however,  to  vote  him  a  sufficient  army,  and  would 
hardly  even  allow  him  to  accept  the  services  of  those  who 
came  to  him  as  volunteers.  The  army  assigned  to  him  con- 
sisted of  but  two  legions,  and  those  the  two  which  had 
survived  the  defeat  at  Cannae,  and  which  had  been  kept  on 
duty  in  Sicily,  as  in  a  kind  of  penal  settlement,  ever  since. 
But  the  warlike  nations  of  Italy  supplied  him  with  seven 
thousand  trusty  volunteers  ;  and  the  Etruscans,  those  ancient 
mariners  of  the  Italian  waters,  eagerly  furnished  him  with 
the  rough  materials  for  a  fleet.     Once  more  the  fairy  tale  of 

'  I»ul>b.  xi.  3a,  7-8;  Livy,  xxviii.  38;  Appian,  Jlisp.  38. 


300 


CARTHAGE  AND  THE  CARTHAGINIANS. 


the  First  Punic  War  is  repeated  in  honour  of  the  favourite  of 
the  gods,  and  a  growing  wood  was  transformed  in  forty-five 
days  into  a  fleet  of  ten  quadriremes  and  twenty  quin- 
queremes.i 

With  this  meagre  provision  for  what  he  was  meditating, 
Scipio  landed  in  his  province.  There  he  furnished  three 
hundred  of  his  army  with  horses  which  he  had  taken  from 
the  Sicilians ;  a  delicate  operation,  but  so  adroitly  managed, 
that  we  are  asked  to  believe  that  the  despoiled  provincials, 
instead  of  resenting  it  as  an  injury,  thanked  him  as  for  a 
benefit.  Discharged  veterans  of  the  army  of  Marcellus  came 
and  enrolled  themselves  amongst  his  followers,  and  supplies 
of  provisions  came  flowing  in  from  all  the  corn-growing  lands 
of  Sicily.  The  ships  which  he  knew  to  be  seaworthy  he 
sent  under  the  command  of  Laelius  to  devastate  the  African 
coast ;  those  which  were  newly  built  he  laid  up  for  the  winter 
in  dry  docks  at  Panormus,  that  their  unseasoned  timbers 
might  warp  or  leak  in  a  place  where  a  warp  or  leak  would 
not  be  fatal  to  them.  He  then  went  into  winter  quarters  in 
the  pleasant  town — too  pleasant  his  critics  at  Rome  deemed 
it — of  Sjrracuse.  But  the  inactivity  which  was  thus  forced  or 
seemed  to  be  forced  upon  him  in  his  own  province  he  turned 
to  good  account  by  the  blow  he  managed  to  strike  in  the  pro- 
vince of  his  colleague.  He  threw  a  small  force  across  the 
Straits  of  Messana,  and  by  an  arrangement  with  a  party  within 
the  town,  he  got  possession  of  Locri,  an  important  place  near 
the  southernmost  point  of  Italy.  Hannibal  thus  found  him- 
self deprived  of  his  base  of  operations  in  Bruttium.  But  the 
gain  was  a  doubtful  one  for  the  reputation  aUke  of  Scipio  and 
of  Rome.  For  the  capture  of  the  town  was  followed  by  a 
series  of  terrible  atrocities  which  Scipio,  if  he  did  not  actually 
authorise,  took  no  measures  either  to  prevent  or  adequately 
to  punish,  and  which  reflected  seriously  on  the  State  in  whoso 
service  the  worst  offenders  were.* 

1  Idvy,  xxviii.  40-45. 

*Livy,  xxix.  1,  6-10;  Appiaii,  Ilann.  55  ;  Zonturas.  ix.  11. 


SCIPIO  SAILS  FOR  AFRICA, 


301 


The  complaints  of  the  unhappy  Locrians  fell  like  a  spark 
upon  the  smouldering  dislike  and  discontent  with  which  a 
large  party  in  the  Senate  regarded  Scipio,  and  the  question 
of  his  recall  and  punishment  was  openly  debated.  He  was 
giving  himself  up— so  the  Senate,  with  old  Fabius  for  their 
spokesman,  indignantly  exclaimed— to  his  own  enjoyment  at 
Syracuse,  clothed  in  Greek  garments,  frequenting  the  Greek 
wrestling  school,  and — a  worse  offence  still — studying  Greek 
literature,  instead  of  enforcing  ordinary  discipline  among  his 
troops,  or  of  carrying  the  war,  as  he  had  threatened  or 
promised,  into  Africa.^  But  some  at  least  of  these  accusations 
proved  to  be  ill-founded,  and,  early  in  B.C.  204,  the  armament 
which  Scipio  had  collected  in  face  of  the  lukewarmness  or 
the  opposition  of  the  Senate  sailed,  amidst  all  the  pomp  and 
circumstance  of  war,  from  LilybaBum,  that  ancient  stronghold 
of  the  Phoenician  race. 

Accounts  differ  as  to  the  size  of  the  armament.  Some  of 
our  authorities — they  can  perhaps  in  this  instance  hardly  be 
called  authorities  at  all — place  the  number  of  men  on  board 
as  low  as  twelve  thousand,  while  others  make  it  as  high  as 
thirty-six  thousand.  But  if  we  take  the  higher,  and  perhaps 
the  more  likely  estimate,  we  still  cannot  fail  to  observe  how 
vastly  inferior  in  numbers  this  expedition  was  to  those  which 
were  again  and  again  despatched  against  Carthage,  or  her 
maritime  dependencies,  in  the  course  of  the  First  Punic  War. 
Even  if  the  Senate  had  taken  up  the  project  warmly,  as  a 
more  far-sighted  body  would  probably  have  done,  the  waste 
of  life  and  property  occasioned  by  Hannibal's  fourteen  years' 
war  in  Italy  must  have  made  any  armament  which  they 
were  able  to  raise  look  small  in  comparison  with  that  of 
Regulus ;  and  we  are  surprised  to  find  that  the  Carthaginians, 
who  still  claimed,  in  a  measure,  the  empire  of  the  seas,  who 
knew  what  an  invasion  of  Africa  meant,  and  who  had  long 
seen  that  it  was  coming,  yet  offered  no  opposition  by  their 
fleet  to  Scipio's  approach. 

J  Livy,  xxix.  16-20. 


302  CARTHAGE  AND  THE  CARTHAGINIANS, 

The  small  force  which  was  for  ever  to  deprive  Carthage  of 
her  proudest  title,  and  to  make  her  a  mere  dependency  of 
Rome,  landed  on  the  third  day,  without  seeing  a  vestige  of 
the  foe,  near  the  "  Fair  Promontory  "  ;  and  Scipio,  according 
to  his  wont,  drew  a  not  ill-grounded  omen  of  success  from 
the  name  of  the  spot  to  which  the  gods,  or  his  own  carefully 
considered  plans,  had  guided  him.i  Fortune,  however,  did 
not  smile  on  his  first  attempt.  Already,  in  Spain,  he  had 
prepared  the  way  for  his  invasion  of  Africa  by  opening  friendly 
communications  with  the  two  Numidian  chieftains  from 
whom,  in  such  a  contingency,  he  might  have  most  to  hope 
or  fear.  These  two  chieftains  were  Massinissa,  head  of  the 
Massylians,  a  tribe  which  dwelt  immediately  to  the  westward 
of  the  domain  of  Carthage,  and  Syphax,  who  ruled  the 
Massaesylians,  a  much  more  important  tribe,  occupying  the 
region  of  the  modern  Algeria.  Before  we  enter  on  those  final 
operations  of  the  war  in  which  they  play  so  important  a  part, 
it  is  necessary  to  give  a  brief  account  of  the  antecedents  of 
each  of  these  barbarian  princes. 

Massinissa  had,  during  many  years,  fought  against  the 
Romans  in  the  Spanish  war,  and  had  done  good  service  to 
Carthage ;  but,  even  there,  seeing  which  way  fortune  was  turn- 
ing, he  had,  with  the  astute  fickleness  of  a  barbarian,  come  to  a 
secret  understanding  with  Scipio. ^  Syphax  was  also  bound 
by  treaty  to  Carthage.  But  it  was  a  treaty  which  the  Cartha- 
ginians well  knew  that  he  would  break  as  soon  as  he  should 
deem  it  to  his  advantage  to  do  so;  and  Scipio  flattered 
himself  that  by  a  romantic  visit  which,  amidst  great  dangers, 
he  had  paid  to  his  court  in  the  midst  of  the  Spanish  war,  he 
had  secured  alike  the  support  of  the  Berber  chieftain  and  the 
admiration  of  Hasdrubal,  his  Carthaginian  antagonist.  It 
was  by  a  strange  coincidence  indeed  that  the  rival  generals, 
unknown  to  each  other,  had  abandoned  their  respective  armies 
in  Spain,  and  crossing  over  into  Africa,  had  met,  with  an- 


i  Livy,  xxix.  25-27. 

!*  Livy,  XXV.  34 ;  xxvii.  19 ;  xxviii.  13,  16,  35  ;  Appian,  Pun.  10. 


MASSINISSA  AND  SYPHAX. 


303 


tagonistic  objects,  but  in  no  unfriendly  intercourse,  at  the 
court  of  an  African  prince.  Fascinated  by  Scipio's  address 
and  bearing,  Syphax  readily  promised  the  alliance  which 
he  asked.  But  the  surpassing  beauty  of  Sophonisba,  the 
daughter  of  Hasdrubal,  his  other  guest,  made  a  more  per- 
manent impression  on  the  amorous  barbarian ;  and  on  the 
promise  of  a  marriage  with  her,  Syphax  was  induced  to 
throw  up  his  newly  formed  friendship  with  Rome,  and  to 
renew  his  old  one  with  Carthage.^  He  forthwith  drove  his 
nephew  Massinissa  out  of  his  hereditary  kingdom  ;  and  when 
that  chieftain,  after  innumerable  adventures  and  escapes,  now 
presented  himself  in  Scipio's  camp,  near  the  Fair  Promontory, 
it  was  only  as  an  outlaw  at  the  head  of  a  few  horsemen, 
whose  aid  might  cost  the  Romans  more  than  it  was  worth.2 
This  was  a  keen  disappointment  to  Scipio,  and,  so  far,  seemed 
to  augur  ill  for  his  African  campaign. 

It  might  have  been  expected  that  in  this,  the  last  period 
of  the  war,  waged  as  it  was  almost  under  the  walls  of 
Carthage,  some  clear  rays  of  light  would  have  been  thrown 
on  the  internal  state  of  the  city  itself.  But  in  this,  as  in 
other  parts  of  the  long  struggle,  we  look  in  vain  for  such  a 
clear  and  truthful  narrative  of  events  as  would  have  enabled 
us  to  picture  to  ourselves  the  wonderful  city  from  which 
Hannibal,  one  of  the  greatest  wonders  of  all  times,  came. 
Here,  if  anywhere,  and  now,  if  anywhere,  we  might  have 
expected  that  the  Romans  would  have  taken  the  pains  to 
explain  to  themselves,  if  not  to  others,  the  condition  and 
the  constitution,  the  fears  and  the  hopes,  the  strength  and 
the  weakness  of  that  great  city  which  had  so  long  contended 
with  them  on  equal  or  even  superior  terms.  What  a  price- 
less boon,  for  instance,  would  Scipio  himself,  with  that  taste 
for  literature  with  which  the  unlettered  Roman  senators 
twitted  him,  and  with  his  power  of  understanding,  or  at 
least  of  influencing,  nations  less  civilised  than  his  own,  have 

«  Livy,  xxviii.  17,  18;  Appiun,  //is/,.  30;  Z«>iiaia.s,  ix.  10.  11. 
«Livy,  xxix.  29,  33;  Apiiijui,  Pun.  11-13. 


304 


CARTHAGE  AND  THE  CARTHAGINIANS, 


conferred  on  all  future  times,  had  he  cared  to  tell  us  ex- 
actly what  he  saw,  and  what  he  inferred,  about  his  great 
antagonists !     The  facts  of  these  last  few  years  we  cannot 
think  would  have  been  less  instructive,  less  thrilling,  or  less 
strange,  than  those  fictions  in  which  the  Scipionic  circle 
appear  habitually  to   have   indulged.     The  glory  of  Rome 
would  not  have  been  lessened,  it  might  even  have  been 
increased,  had  she  given  her  adversaries,  now  at  any  rate, 
that  credit  which  was  their  due.     We  might  then  have  been 
able  to  judge,  on  better  grounds  than  those  on  which  most 
historians  have  passed  so  ready  and  so  easy  a  judgment,  as 
to  what  elements  of  civihsation  and  of  progress,  along  with 
those  other  elements  of  weakness  which  are  admitted  on  all 
hands,  Carthage  might  have  transported  into  Europe,  had 
the  result  of  the  war  been  different.     We  should  then  have 
had   more  data  for  determining  the  question  as  to  what 
would  have  been  the  gain  and  what  the  loss  to  the  world  at 
large  had  the  Mediterranean  continued,  what  Nature  seems 
to  have  intended  it  to  be,  the  highway  of  independent  na- 
tions, each,  perhaps,  endeavouring,  but,  happily,  each  failing, 
to  conquer  its  neighbours  ;  instead  of  becoming  a  Roman  lake, 
connecting  nations  whose  separate  existence  had  been  stamped 
out  of  them,  and  all  of  them  controlled,  assimilated,  civilised 
— ^if  we  like  to  call  it  so — by  the  all-levelling  power  of  Rome. 
The  services  rendered  to  civilisation  by  Rome  are  clear 
enough  ;  but  it  is  not  so  clear  what  services  might  hereafter 
have  been   rendered   to  it  by  a  free   Athens   and   a  free 
Corinth,  by  the  inexhaustible  energy  of  the  Greek  colonies 
in  Sicily,  by  a  possibly  resuscitated  Tyre  or  by  the  new-born 
Alexandria ;  last,  not  least,  by  a  Carthage  freed,  as  Hannibal 
was  able  for  a  short  time  at  least  to  free  it,  from  its  narrow 
oligarchy,  and  by  a  Rome  which  would  have  been  content 
with  her  natural  boundaries,  content,  that  is,  to  assimilate, 
and  to  weld  into  one,  the  various  tribes  which  were  most 
of  them  cognate  to  herself,  from  the  Straits  of  Messana  to 
the  Alps.     He  is  certainly  a  bold  historian  who,  with  these 


FASCINATION  OF  HANNIBAL. 


305 


--so  large  a  part  of  the  conditions  of  the  problem-not 
before  him,  will  pronounce  dogmatically  that  it  was  in  all 
respects  well  for  the  world  that  Rome'was  able  utterly  to 
de  troy  her  ancient  rival.  The  phrase  «'  it  would  have 
nl  Ai^  ^f  °f  rous  phrase  to  use  in  the  study  of  history. 
Lwl      '^  ^"^"^^  ""'^^  ''  altogether;    but   it   must 

ft  r^'l,     'Tr^"'f  ^°  ^^**  ^^^"^^^  ^^^^d«  we  can  use 
it  at  all,  and  how  infinite  are  the  possibilities  of  which  no 
account  is  taken^    If  it  be  presumptuous  to  say,  as  Frederick 
the  Great  did,  that  God  is  always  on  the  side  of  the  big 
bat tahons  It  is  hardly  less  presumptuous  to  say  dogmatically 
that  m  this  or  that  instance  He  was  on  the  side  of  the 
weaker  ones^    It  surely  savours  of  presumption  to  main- 
tain,  as  one  historian,i  never  to  be  mentioned  without  high 
honour,  has,  throughout  this  portion  of  his  noble  history 
maintained,  that  Providence  must  surely  have  been  plotting 
against  Carthage,  and  watching  over  Rome,  because  when 
Hannibal  advanced  on  the  city,  two  legions  which  had  been 
raised  for  the  Spanish  war  happened  to  be  still  lingering 
there,   and  could    be  utilised  for  her  defence ;    or  again" 
because    the  great  Carthaginian  happened  to  have  turned 
southwards  to  Bruttium  instead  of  northwards  to  Apulia  at 
the  moment   when   the  messengers  of  his  long-looked-for 
brother  were  despatched  to  find  him.    We  know  all  too  little 
of  the  nation  which  produced  Hamilcar  Barca  and  Hannibal 
to  say  what  that  nation  might  have  done  in  happier  times 
under  the  guidance  of  such  commanding  geniuses.      The 

from  first  to  last  only  by  Hannibal's  enemies,  who  neither 
understoc^,  nor  cared  to  understand,  what  made  him,  and 
what  made  his  city,  great.  Yet  it  is  the  old  story.  It  is 
the  man  who  paints  the  prostrate  lion ;  but  it  is  the  lion 
and  not  the  man-it  is  Hannibal,  and  not  his  conquerors' 
who  in  spite  of  the  painter's  intention,  rivets  all  eyes  and 
stands  forth  alone  from  the  canvas,  alike  in  his  military 

'  Dr.  Arnold,  vol.  iii.  p.  244,  etc. 
20 


3o6  CARTHACfE  AND  THE  CARTHAGINIANS, 


genius  and  in  his  patriotism,  in  his  hundred  victories  and  in 
his  one  defeat,  without  a  parallel  in  history. 

The  Carthaginians  were  not  more  ready  to  meet  Scipio 
by  land  than  they  had  been  by  sea.     They  were  without  a 
sufficient  army,  and  Hasdrubal,  the  son  of  Gisco,  their  best 
available  general,  was,  just  then,  at  a  distance.^     For  nearly 
fifty  years,  Africa  had  been  free  from  invasion ;  and  the 
soldiers  of  Scipio  found  the  same  unwalled  towns  and  vil- 
lages and  the  same  fruitful  and  well-watered  estates  which 
had  sated  the  greed  of  the  followers  of  Agathocles  and  Kegu- 
lus  before  them.     From  this  rich  and  prosperous  country  a 
motley  and  a  panic-stricken  multitude  flocked  towards  Car- 
thage,  driving  their  flocks  and  herds  before  them  ;  and  the 
gates  of  the  capital  were  shut  and  the  walls  manned,  as 
though  for  an  immediate  attack.     Pressing  messages  for  aid 
were  sent  to  Hasdrubal  and  Syphax  ;  and  the  sense  of  relief 
was  great  when  Scipio,  instead  of  advancing  on  the  capital, 
showed  that  he  intended  first  to  secure  Utica. 

Frequent   skirmishes   with    the   Numidian   cavalry   took 

place  in  which  Massinissa,  avaihng  himself  to  the  utmost 

of  his  knowledge  of  the  Numidian  tactics,  did  good  service 

to  the  Romans.2    The  ships  which  Scipio  had  sent  back  to 

SicUy  returned  laden  with  provisions  and  with  his  siege 

train :  but  for  forty  days  the  oldest  Phoenician  colony  m 

Africa  resisted,   with  true   Phoenician   endurance,   aU    his 

assaults.     Two  large  armies  under  Hasdrubal  and  Syphax 

advanced  to  its   relief,   and,  on   the  approach  of  winter, 

Scipio  was  obliged,  without  having  won  any  decisive  success, 

to  abandon  the  blockade,  and  to  transfer  his  camp  to  an 

adjoining  tongue  of  land  (Ghella),  then  washed  by  the  sea. 

but  now  far  inland,  which  was  known  for  centuries  after- 

wards  as  the  Castra  CorneUa.^ 

1  Livy.  xxix.  28 ;  Appian.  Pun.  9. 

'^  Polyb.  xiv.  1.2;  Livy,  xxix.  28,  34.  35  ;  App.an   Pun.  16.  25 
^ObLt    I)e  Betlo  CHvUi,  ii.  24,    "Ipse  cum  e^iuitatu  autecedit  ad  casira 
exploranda  Corneliaiia "  ;    Appiau,  Bell.  Civ.  ii.   44.  i  i«c,i-.o,  x^P-.^     ^^ 


SCIPIO  BURNS  THE  CARTHAGINIAN  CAMPS.        307 


So  ended  the  year  b.c.  204.  Neither  the  hopes  nor  the 
fears  which  Scipio's  invasion  of  Africa  had  called  forth  had 
as  yet  been  fulfilled;  and  so  far  did  the  war  still  seem 
from  its  termination,  that  the  Italians  were  not  yet  able  to 
look  upon  themselves  as  secure  from  invasion.  They  even 
thought  it  prudent  to  build  ships  for  the  special  purpose  of 
protecting  their  coasts  from  possible  attacks  on  the  part  of 
the  Carthaginian  navy.^  Twenty  legions  were  put  into  the 
field  for  the  year  b.c.  203,  and  the  command  of  Scipio  was 
prolonged,  not,  as  on  previous  occasions,  for  a  fixed  period, 
but  till  such  time  as  the  war  should  be  brought  to  a  con- 
clusion.2  From  the  military  point  of  view  this  was  a  step  in 
the  right  direction.  It  had  already  been  tried  in  Spain  in 
the  persons  of  two  members  of  the  same  illustrious  family ; 
but  it  was  also  the  first  step  towards  the  establishment  of 
the  military  dictatorship  which  was  destined,  after  a  long 
agony  of  civil  wars,  to  overthrow  the  liberties  of  Borne. 

Fortune  or  fraud  soon  gave  Scipio  the  chance  of  dealing  a 
decisive  blow.  In  sight  of  his  winter  quarters  was  the  camp 
of  the  Carthaginians,  under  Hasdrubal,  son  of  Gisco,  and, 
at  some  distance  farther,  lay  that  of  the  Numidians  under 
Syphax.  The  Carthaginian  huts  were  built  of  dry  wood 
which  had  been  collected  from  the  fields,  while  those  of  the 
Numidians,  as  their  custom  was,  were  made  of  wattled 
reeds  thatched  with  straw.  Such  materials  suggested  to 
Scipio  the  way  in  which  they  might  best  be  destroyed. 
Opening,  or  pretending  to  open,  negotiations  for  peace,  he 
sent  messengers  backwards  and  forwards  with  orders  to  note 
the  shape  and  the  arrangements,  the  exits  and  the  entrances 
of  the  hostile  camps.  This  information  obtained,  he  sud- 
denly broke  off  the  negotiations,  and  then,  with  an  easy  con- 
science as  it  would  seem,  set  out  on  his  night  errand.  The 
wily  Numidian  chief  was  told  off  to  the  task  which  seemed 

Liicaii,  Phars.  iv.  589-590  aud  656-660 ;  Pliny,  Hist.   Nat.  v.  3 ;  Pompouius 
M.  la,  i.  7. 

»  Uvy,  XXX.  2.  a  Ibid.  xxx.  1. 


3o8 


CARTHAGE  AND  THE  CARTHAGINIANS. 


appropriate  to  him,  and  which  he  had,  perhaps,  been  the 
first  to  suggest,  the  burning  of  the  Numidian  camp.  The 
flames  spread  with  the  rapidity  of  lightning,  and  when  the 
Carthaginians  hastened  to  the  help  of  their  allies,  their  own 
camp  was  set  on  fire  by  Scipio  behind  them.  The  panic 
was  sudden  and  universal,  and  what  the  flames  spared,  the 
swords  of  the  Romans,  who  had  been  stationed  at  all  the 
outlets,  cut  down.  Forty  thousand  Africans  fell  the  victims 
of  this  not  very  glorious  exploit.^  It  was  with  difficulty  that 
the  two  generals,  Hasdrubal  and  Syphax,  escaped,  the  one 
to  Carthage,  to  keep  alive  the  spirit  of  the  "  Barcine  faction  " 
against  the  faint-hearted  counsels  of  the  peace  party,  which 
now,  perhaps  with  reason,  might  make  themselves  heard ; 
the  other,  to  rally  the  survivors  of  the  slaughter,  and  to 
collect  new  forces  for  the  defence  of  the  capital.*^ 

Another  victory  of  Scipio  followed  in  the  so-called  "  Great 
Plains,"  3  and  on  the  exiled  Massinissa  was  imposed  the 
congenial  task  of  following  up  his  rival  Syphax,  who  had  de- 
prived him  of  his  hereditary  kingdom.  Massinissa's  pursuit 
was  as  rapid  as  it  was  successful.  The  Massaesylians  were 
defeated,  and  Syphax  himself,  together  with  his  beautiful 
wife  Sophonisba,  and  his  capital,  Cirta  (the  Modern  Con- 
stantine),  which  had  been  built  in  the  most  romantic  and 
impregnable  of  situations,  fell  into  the  conqueror's  hands.* 
In  times  long  gone  by,  so  the  story  went,  Massinissa's  heart 
had  been  touched  by  the  charms  of  the  Carthaginian  maiden. 
Fortune  had  then  thrown  her  into  the  hands  of  his  rival, 
but  now  his  own  turn  was  come.  He  married  her  on  the 
spot,  and  when  Scipio,  aUve  to  the  complications  which 
might  follow  from  such  a  marriage,  and  perhaps  jealous  of 
his  own  superior  rights,  bade  him  dismiss  a  wife  who  might 
compromise  his  fidelity  to  the  Romans,  he  sent  her  a  cup  of 

iPolybius,   strangely  enough,  calls  it  (xiv.  5,  lb)  "Uie  most  glorious  aud 
extraordinary  of  Scipio's  many  glorious  exploits"  I 

•sPolyb.  xiv.  1-5;  Livy,  xxx.  5-7;  Appian,  Pun.  19-23. 

•  Folyb.  xiv.  8 ;  Uvy,  xxx.  8.  *  l^ivy.  xxx.  11.  12. 


SOPHONISBA, 


309 


poison,  "  the  only  present  which  the  bridegroom  could  offer 
to  his  bride.  Let  her  see  to  it  that  she  did  nothing  un- 
worthy of  the  daughter  of  a  Carthaginian  general  and  the 
wife  of  two  Numidian  kings."  Sophonisba  drank  off  the 
poison,  only  remarking  that  her  death  would  have  been 
more  opportune  had  it  not  followed  so  immediately  upon 
her  marriage.  Massinissa,  so  the  chroniclers  rounded  off  the 
tragic  story,  was  gently  rebuked  by  his  Roman  Mentor  for 
having  atoned  for  one  rash  act  by  another ;  but  he  was  con 
soled  for  the  loss  of  his  bride  by  the  royal  title,  and  by  the 
Roman  garments  which  Scipio  solemnly  bestowed  upon  him.^ 

It  was  an  honour  never  before  granted  by  the  proud  re- 
public to  one  who  was  not  a  Roman  citizen ;  but  Massinissa 
lived  long  enough  abundantly  to  justify  his  privileges. 
What  Hiero  had  been  to  the  Romans  throughout  the  First 
Punic  War  and  during  the  early  years  of  the  Second,  that 
Massinissa  was  to  them  during  its  closing  years,  throughout 
the  long  agony  of  the  peace  which  followed  it,  and  in  the 
short  and  sharp  struggle  of  the  Third.  When  the  "  War  of 
Hannibal "  was  over,  Massinissa  was  planted,  as  we  shall 
hereafter  see,  by  the  Romans  as  a  thorn  in  the  side  of  the 
city  with  which  they  professed  to  have  made  peace.  He 
was  encouraged  to  make  aggressions  on  her  mutilated  terri- 
tory, and  then  to  complain  to  the  Romans  if  she  ventured 
to  defend  herself.  Carthage  was  the  lamb  in  the  fable. 
Whatever  excesses  she  might  allege,  or  whatever  the  provo- 
cation or  the  injury  she  might  receive,  she  knew  that  the 
case  was  prejudged  against  her  by  the  wolf,  and  that  she 
must  meet  the  lamb's  fate. 

The  fall  of  Syphax  was  a  great  blow  to  Carthage.  Her 
most  powerful  friend  was  gone,  and  his  place  was  taken  by 
her  deadliest  foe.  Indeed  the  whole  power  of  Numidia 
was  now  arrayed  against  her.  In  spite  of  a  naval  success 
obtained  by  the  Carthaginians  over  Scipio's  fleet,  and  the 


1  I.lvy.  xxix.  33;  xxx.  li  1;'  ;  Appian,  Pun.  27,  28;  Zonaras,  ix.  13. 


310 


CARTHAGE  AND  THE  CARTHAGINIANS, 


consequent  raising  of  the  siege  of  Utica,^  the  peace  party 
now  came  to  the  front  at  Carthage.  The  able  Hasdrubal, 
the  son  of  Gisco,  they  condemned  to  death  in  his  absence,  a 
sentence  passed,  ostensibly,  no  doubt,  as  a  pimishment  for 
his  recent  failure,  but  really,  as  seems  probable,  for  his  pre- 
vious energy ;  ^  and  they  then  opened  negotiations  for  peace 
with  Scipio.3  The  terms  offered  by  him  were  lenient ;  more 
lenient,  as  has  been  already  pointed  out,  than  those  offered 
by  Regulus  fifty  years  before.  He  knew  that  there  was  a 
strong  party  opposed  to  him  at  Rome,  and  he  knew  also 
that  an  army  which  had  failed  to  reduce  Utica,  would  not 
be  likely  to  capture  Carthage  by  a  sudden  assault. 

Ambassadors  were  sent  to  Rome  to  get  the  terms  to  which 
both  parties  had  agreed  in  Africa  confirmed  by  the  Roman 
Senate ;  and  if  Livy  may  be  beheved — and  he  is  to  a  certain 
extent  borne  out  by  what  we  know  of  the  state  of  parties  at 
Carthage — those  who  were  now  in  power  had  the  baseness 
as  well  as  the  folly  to  try  to  throw  the  blame  of  the  war  on 
Hannibal.  "He  had  crossed  the  Alps,  nay  the  Ebro  itself, 
against  the  express  wishes  of  the  Carthaginian  government. 
So  far  as  they  were  concerned,  the  treaty  made  at  the  end  of 
the  First  Punic  War  was  still  in  force.  Might  it  please  the 
Romans  to  renew  its  terms  ?  "  This  was  too  gross  to  be  lis- 
tened to  even  by  the  Romans.*  What  of  truth  there  was  in 
it,  that  Hannibal  had  been  the  nerve  and  soul  of  the  war, 
and  that  he  had  not  been  properly  supported  by  the  home 
government,  was  true  enough ;  but  it  did  not  become  that 
government  to  make  a  boast  of  it.  What  was  untrue  in  it, 
that  Hannibal  had  engaged  in  the  war  on  his  own  responsi- 
bility and  for  private  purposes  of  his  own,  was  not  only  con- 
tradicted by  the  whole  course  of  the  war,  but  by  what  the 
Romans  themselves,  in  all  the  bitterness  of  their  hatred, 
could  not  help  admitting  about  their  great  antagonist.  Any- 
how, the  proposals  were  summarily  rejected,  the  ambassadors 


» Livy,  XXX.  10  ;  Appiaii,  Pun.  30. 
3  Livy,  XXX.  16. 


^Appian,  Pun.  24. 
« Ibid.  XXX.  22. 


RECALL  AND  DEATH  OF  MAGO. 


3" 


were  dismissed  without  an  answer,  and  Scipio  was  instructed 
to  press  the  war  to  its  natural  conclusion.^ 

But  for  Carthage  there  remained  one  resource  as  yet 
untried.  The  sons  of  Hamilcar  might  be  recalled  to  help 
in  the  hour  of  her  extremity  the  state  which  had  done  so 
little  to  help  them,  and  which  now,  by  the  mouths  of  one 
party  within  it,  professed  to  be  ashamed  of  having  done  even 
that  little.  And  whether  it  was  the  work  of  the  peace  party, 
in  the  hope  that  peace  might  thereby  be  made  more  possible, 
or  of  the  war  party,  who  hoped  that  Hannibal,  the  genius  of 
war,  might  yet  strike  a  blow  which  would  reverse  its  fortunes, 
the  order  was  sent  to  the  two  sons  of  Hamilcar  to  return  to 
Africa  (b.c.  205).2 

Driven  out  of  Spain  by  Scipio,  Mago,  as  we  have  seen, 
had  crossed  to  the  Balearic  Islands,  and  passing  thence  from 
the  splendid  harbour  which  still  bears  his  name.  Port  Mahon, 
into  Northern  Italy,  had  taken  Genoa,  and,  during  the  last 
two  years,  had  been  labouring  to  organise  among  the  un- 
subdued and  ever-savage  Ligurians  an  active  coalition  against 
Rome.'  But  it  was  too  late.  In  the  territory  of  the  Insubrian 
Gauls  he  at  last  measured  his  sword  with  the  Romans. 
The  battle  was  well  contested,  but  it  was  decisive;  and 
Mago,  who  had  received  a  dangerous  wound  in  his  thigh, 
staggered  back  by  night,  as  best  he  could,  through  that 
rugged  country,  to  the  sea-coast.  Here  he  found  the  message 
of  recall  awaiting  him.  He  set  sail  at  once,  as  became  a 
true  son  of  Hamilcar ;  but  worn  out  with  anxiety  of  mind 
and  with  agony  of  body,  he  died,  perhaps  happily  for  him- 
self, before  he  hove  in  sight  of  the  African  shore.* 

A  different,  but  hardly  a  less  tragic  fate  awaited  his  elder 
and  more  famous  brother.  For  four  years  past,  ever  since 
the  battle  of  Metaurus  had  shown  him  that  ultimate  success 
was  not  to  be  looked  for,  Hannibal  had  been  compelled  to 
act  simply  on  the  defensive.     With  his  sadly  thinned  army 

» Livy,  XXX.  24 ;  Appian,  Pun.  31.        a  Livy,  xxx.  19  ;  Appian.  Hann.  58. 
3  Livy,  xxviii.  46.  *Ibid.  xxx.  18,  19. 


312 


CARTHAGE  AND  THE  CARTHAGINIANS. 


of  veterans,  and  his  Campanian  and  Bruttian  recruits,  ha 
had  withdrawn  into  the  neck  of  land  to  the  south  of  Italy 
which  seemed  as  if  it  had  been  made  for  his  purpose.  If  it 
prepared  the  way  for  his  future  retreat  to  Africa,  it  was 
Italy  still ;  and  it  still  for  four  years  enabled  him  to  keep  his 
vow,  and  to  make  Rome  uneasy.  He  had  withdrawn  to  the 
"  Land's  End,"  but  he  lay  there  with  his  face  to  the  foe, 
gathering  up  his  strength,  and  ever  ready  to  spring  upon 
any  one  who  should  venture  to  molest  him. 

We  have  said  that  the  territory  of  the  Bruttii  seemed 
formed  by  nature  to  encourage  the  resistance  and  to  postpone 
the  fate  of  a  people  hard  driven  by  their  enemies,  and 
struggling  against  overwhelming  odds.  Never  more  than 
fifty  miles  wide,  and  generally  very  much  less,  it  is  traversed 
throughout  its  length  by  the  main  chain  of  the  Apennines ; 
and  these,  where  the  peninsula  widens  out,  send  down  to- 
wards the  Ionian  sea  two  vast  and  broken  mountain  tracts 
which  cover  its  entire  extent.  One  of  them  is  called  Sila, 
famous  in  all  ages  for  its  timber  and  its  cattle ;  ^  the  other  is 
now  known  as  Aspromonte,  and,  in  very  recent  times,  has 
been  rendered  famous  by  the  tragical  mishap  which  put  an 
end  to  the  military  career  of  a  patriot  hero  as  disinterested 
and  single-hearted  as  Hannibal  himself.  Each  of  these  moun- 
tain tracts  is  clothed  with  impenetrable  forests,  and  each  forms 
a  fastness,  or  rather  a  series  of  fastnesses,  in  itself.  The  in- 
habitants of  this  region  had  been  the  first  to  throw  in  their 
lot  with  Hannibal,  and  having,  therefore,  nothing  to  hope  from 
Roman  mercy,  they  still  clung  to  his  declining  fortunes  with 
the  resolution  of  despair.^  Such  were  the  people  and  such  the 
country  which  witnessed  and  sustained  the  last  four  years  of 
Hannibal's  struggle. 

At  one  point,  about  half-way  down  the  Bruttian  peninsula, 

the  mountains  sink,  and  the  peninsula  itself  contracts,  till 

it  measures  only  sixteen  miles  across.     It  was  on  this  spot 

that,  two  centuries  before,  Dionysius  of  Syracuse  had  pro- 

>  Virgil,  Mn.  xii.  715,  "  iugentis  SilsB  ".  «  Appiaii.  Ilann.  61. 


HANNIBAL  STANDS  AT  BAY. 


313 


posed  to  build  a  wall  from  sea  to  sea.i  It  was  across  this 
isthmus,  a  century  and  a  half  later,  that  the  Roman  consul 
Crassus  carried  a  double  line  of  entrenchments  in  the  vain 
hope  of  confining  the  -  roving  "  Spartacus  and  his  gladiators 
to  the  region  which  lay  to  the  south  of  it ;  2  and  it  was  here 
that  Hannibal  stood  at  bay  for  the  last  time  against  the 
enemies  who  were  pressing  on  him  from  above,  as  they  had 
often  done  before,  and  who  now,  owing  to  the  fall  of  Locri, 
were  able  to  threaten  him  from  below  as  well.  It  was  this 
spot,  too,  which  was  pointed  out  for  centuries  afterwards-^ 
and  well  it  might  be  pointed  out— as  the  ''  Camp  of  Han- 
nibal ".2 

The  Roman  vultures  gathered  indeed  round  the  dying 
lion ;  but  each,  as  though  Hannibal  were  in  the  heyday 
of  his  strength,  hesitated  to  trust  himself  within  the  reach 
of  his  arm.  Invincible  as  ever  in  the  field— for  Polybius 
tells  us  expressly  that  he  was  "  never  beaten  in  a  battle  so 
long  as  he  remained  in  Italy  "*— Hannibal  had  been  con- 
demned to  see  province  after  province,  and  fortress  after 
fortress— Consentia  and  Metapontum,  Locri  and  Pandosia— 
torn  from  him,  till,  at  last,  there  was  nothing  left  in  Italy 
but  the  narrowest  part  of  the  Bruttian  peninsula,  and  the 
one  fortress  of  Croton  which  he  could  call  his  own. 5  Yet 
all  this  time,  when  he  must  have  been  in  sore  want  of  pro- 
visions, when  reinforcements  from  Carthage  were  no  longer 
to  be  thought  of,  when  it   became  more  and  more  clear 

i  Strabo,  vi.  261.  a  Plutarch.  Crassus.  x.  10-11. 

'Pliny.  Nai.  Hist  iii.  10.  15.  "Castra  Ilannibalis". 

clTll«\Jl    ''    ''I  7;."'    !"'    '^•'^^-- r-Vo-J-.    Cf.    Plutarch. 
H^'k!^^'  '•'  '"^'^  ^'"'  "'  ^^^^  "according  to  Polybins  and  his  part^ 

Hannibal  was  never  once  beaten  by  Marcellus,  but  continued  invincible  till  he 
w^  conquered  by   Scipio".     Corn.    Nepos.    Han.,  i.    2.   says   the  same 

Quotiescunque  populus  Romanus  cum  eo  congressus  est  in  Italia  semp^; 
discessit  supenor  Hannibal".     And  again,  v.  4 :     ' '  Quamdin  in  ItaliHu^t 

c^stra  posuit         What  a  crowd  of  victories  circumstantially  related  by  Liry 
vanish  into  thin  air  before  those  definite  statements  »  ^      ^ 

^Uyy,  XXX.  12;  Appian,  Hann.  57. 


314 


CARTHAGE  AND  THE  CARTHAGINIANS, 


that  no  help  could  be  expected  from  Philip  of  Macedon,  or 
from  his  own  heroic  brother  Mago;  when  he  had  already 
seen  the  result  of  the  war  registered  in  the  ghastly  head 
of  his  other  brother  Hasdrubal,  there  had  been  no  thought 
of  surrender  and  no  whisper  of  mutiny  in  his  camp.^  With- 
out hope  but  without  fear,  he  had  held  on  there  in  his 
solitary  strength ;  and  now  when  the  order  came  to  leave 
the  land  of  his  fifteen  years'  struggle  and  of  his  astonishmg 
victories,  like  his  father  and  like  his  brother,  he  mastered 
his  feelings  and  obeyed. 

Well  knowing  that  the  calumnies  of  the  Romans,  which 
had  assailed  him  through  his  life  and  in  the  mid  career 
of  his  successes,  would  not  fail  to  follow  him  amidst  his 
reverses  and  in  the  tomb,  Hannibal  took  care  to  leave  behind 
him,  on  some  brazen  tablets,  in  the  temple  of  Juno  on  the 
Lacinian   promontory,  an  inscription  in  Punic  and  Greek 
which  recorded  the  history  of  his  campaign.2    This  inscription 
was  seen  by  Polybius,   and  it  is  doubtless  to  its  faithful 
record  that  we  owe  some  of  the  minuter  details  which  his 
history  reveals  to  us.^    Nor  can  we  believe  that  the  hero,  who 
was  so  anxious  thus  to  perpetuate  his  fair  fame,  was  at  the 
very  same  time  so  careless  of  it,  and  so  unlike  what  we  know 
him  to  have  been  at  other  periods  of  his  career  as,  even  in 
this  supreme  bitterness  of  his  soul,  to  have  put  to  death— as 
the  annalists  tell  us  that  he  did— the  Italian  soldiers  who 
refused  to  accompany  him  to  Africa,  in  the  very  sanctuary 
which  was  to  preserve  the  memory  of  his  exploits.*     Some 
years  before,  in  a  moment  of  thoughtlessness  or  of  distress, 
Hannibal  had  determined  to  appropriate  the  golden  column 
which  adorned  this  very  shrine,  and  had  even  bored  a  hole 
through  it  to  convince  himself  of  its  real  value.     But  the 

1  Cf.  Polyb.  xxiv.  9,  6  ;  Livy.  xxviii.  12. 

2 The  promontory  is  still  callea.  from  the  ruins  of  a  temple  upon  it,  Capo 
della  Colonna.  Cf.  Livy,  xxiv.  3:  Virg.  vCn.  iii.  352.-"attollit  se  Diva 
Lacinia  contra".    Lucan.  u.  434.    See  above,  p.  252-260. 

3  Polyb.  iil  33. 18 ;  Livy.  xxviii.  46. 

*Livy,  XXX.  20 ;  Diodorus  Sic.  xxvii.  Fr.  6.  ;  Appian,  Hann.  58,  59. 


IN 


CHARGE  AGAINST  HANNIBAL  UNTRUE. 


315 


» 


outraged  goddess,  we  are  told,  appeared  to  him,  as  he  lay 
asleep,  and  warned  him  that,  if  he  carried  his  purpose  out, 
he  should  lose  the  one  eye  which  remained  to  him.  On 
a  former  occasion,  Hannibal  had  shown  his  reverence  for 
the  gods  of  Italy  by  making  a  pilgrimage  to  Avernus,  the 
sulphurous  lake  across  which  no  bird  could  fly  and  live,  and 
by  sacrificing  there  to  the  gods  of  the  lower  world,  with 
which  it  was  supposed  to  hold  direct  communication.  But 
combining,  as  he  often  did,  practical  objects  with  religious, 
he  had  endeavoured,  under  the  guise  of  a  pilgrimage,  to 
steal  a  march  upon  Tarentum.^  On  the  present  occasion 
he  showed  again  that  he  was  as  astute  as  he  was  pious ; 
for,  profiting  by  the  warning  of  the  goddess,  he  not  only 
left  her  column  in  its  place,  but  caused  the  figure  of  a  small 
heifer  to  be  moulded  out  of  the  golden  filings  which  he  had 
bored  from  it,  and  devoutly  placed  it  on  its  top.  This  story 
rests  on  the  authority  of  Caelius,  who  took  it  from  Silenus, 
the  constant  companion  of  Hannibal.^  We  can  hardly, 
therefore,  doubt  its  truth,  and  its  interest  and  value  in 
connection  with  the  horrible  charge  brought  against  Hanni- 
bal by  his  enemies  on  this  occasion,  will  be  at  once  apparent. 
For  what  act,  we  may  well  ask,  would  have  seemed  more 
certain  than  this  cruel  desecration  of  a  sanctuary  which  was 
regarded  with  common  reverence  by  all  the  inhabitants  of 
Southern  Italy,  at  once  to  draw  down  upon  his  own  head  the 
divine  vengeance  which  he  had  so  narrowly  escaped  before, 
and  to  insure  the  immediate  destruction  by  the  outraged 
natives,  as  soon  as  he  should  have  left  Italy,  of  the  tablets 
which  he  had  taken  such  pains  to  engrave  ?  The  charge, 
indeed,  bears  its  own  refutation  on  the  face  of  it,  and  may 
safely  be  put  down  to  the  impudent  fictions  of  Valerius  of 
Antium,  whom  Livy  so  much  mistrusted  and  so  often  copied.^ 

1  Livy,  xxiv.  12-13.  2  Cicero,  De  Div.  i.  24. 

•'•'AUeo  nullus  mentiendi  modus,"  Livy  says  of  him  in  one  place  (xxvL 
49) ;  cf.  iii.  5 ;  xxxvi.  38,  where  there  are  similar  uncomplimentary  remarks. 
Yet  to  no  other  source  than  to  Valerius  and  his  like  can  we.  in  the  face  of  the 


3i6 


CARTHAGE  AND  THE  CARTHAGINIANS, 


When  the  Boman  Senate  heard  of  their  deliverance  they 
once  more  breathed  freely.  A  five  days'  festival  was  pro- 
claimed, and  a  crown  of  grass  was  voted  to  old  Fabius,  as 
though  it  was  the  Delayer,  and  not  the  remissness  of  the 
Carthaginian  government,  and  the  heroic  perseverance  of 
the  whole  body  of  the  Koman  state,  which  had  freed  Italy 
from  the  invader.  To  Fabius  indeed,  if  to  any  single  Roman, 
might  justly  be  given  such  a  meed  of  honour.  His  ancestors, 
as  Livy  remarks,  had  gained  greater  and  more  numerous 
victories  than  he.  Indeed,  it  occurs  to  us  to  remark  that 
throughout  the  war  he  had  not  gained  a  single  victory ;  but 
the  one  fact  that  he  had  been  long  pitted  against  Hannibal, 
and  had  not  been  defeated  by  him  in  a  pitched  battle,  might 
fairly  be  set  against  them  all.  He  died  towards  the  close  of 
the  year  by  a  death  which  was  opportune  enough,  for  he 
had  lived  to  see  the  deliverance  for  which  he  had  so  long 
watched  and  waited.^ 

*'  Leaving  the  country  of  his  enemies  with  more  regret," 
says  Livy,'-  **  than  many  an  exile  has  left  his  own,"  Hanni- 
bal struck  across  for  Africa,  and  avoiding  with  characteristic 
horror  the  bad  omen  suggested  by  the  ruined  sepulchre 
which  was  near  the  spot  where  he  first  made  the  land,  he 
coasted  along  till  he  reached  the  Smaller  Leptis,  a  place  far 
to  the  south-east  of  Carthage.^  Here  he  landed,  and  the 
news  of  his  arrival  at  once  brought  back  the  war  party  in 
the  capital  to  power.  Some  Roman  transports  which  had  been 
driven  ashore  in  a  storm  were  seized  by  the  excited  populace, 
and  hostilities  broke  out  amidst  homilies  on  the  part  of  the 
Romans  against  Carthaginian  ill-faith,  which,  owing  to  the 
circumstances  under  which  they  have  come  down  to  us,  we 
can  neither  refute  nor  believe.*    The  Romans  knew  well 


statement  of  Polybius,  the  first  of  all  authorities,  quoted  above  (p.  313),  refer 
the  reports  we  find  in  Livy  of  the  repeated  victories  gained  by  Fabius.  by 
Marcellus,  and  Nero,  etc.,  etc.,  oyer  Hannibal, 

1  Livy,  XXX.  26.  Mbid.  xxx.  20.  »  Ibid.  xxx.  25. 

*  Livy,  xxx.  24,  25;  Appian,  Pun.  34,  35. 


BATTLE  OF  ZAMA. 


317 


'if 


that  the  scourge  which  had  been  withdrawn  from  themselves 
in  Italy  would  fall  with  redoubled  vigour  on  their  countrymen 
in  Africa,  and  it  is  all  the  more  to  be  wondered  at  that  they 
did  not  think  it  worth  while  to  leave  to  posterity  a  trustworthy 
account  of  the  steps  which  led  up  to  the  final  catastrophe. 

Hannibal  passed  the  winter  at  Adrumetum,^  the  modern 
Susa,  a  town  nearer  to  Carthage  than  Leptis,  but  still  con- 
siderably to  the  south-east  of  it,  and  then,  instead  of  advanc- 
ing on  the  capital — which  he  must  have  yearned  to  visit, 
for  he  had  not  seen  it  since  he  was  nine  years  old — he  struck 
across  the  southern  part  of  the  Carthaginian  dominions  into 
Numidia.  There  he  won  some  successes  over  Massinissa, 
he  formed  an  alliance  with  some  Numidian  chiefs,  and  there, 
finally,  he  met  or  was  overtaken  by  Scipio,  who  had  moved 
forward  from  his  head-quarters  at  Tunis,  plundering  and 
enslaving  as  he  went. 

After  an  abortive  negotiation  for  peace,^  in  the  year  b.c. 
202,  and  probably  in  the  month  of  October,  but  on  a  day  and 
at  a  place  which,  strange  to  say,  are  unknown,  the  two  great 
generals  met  for  the  first  and  last  time  in  the  battle  which 
was  to  decide  for  centuries  the  fate  of  the  civilised  world. ^ 
The  battle  of  Zama,  like  many  other  battles  in  history — 
those,  for  instance,  of  Arbela,  Hastings,  and  Blenheim — was 
fought  at  some  distance  from  the  place  whose  name  has 
been  united  with  it.  The  battle-field  lay,  probably,  much  to 
the  west  of  Zama,  near  the  Upper  Bagradas,  and  not  far  from 
a  town  called  by  Livy  Naraggara.*  Hannibal  drew  up  his 
army  in  three  lines.  In  the  first  were  his  Ligurian,  Gallic, 
and  Moorish  mercenaries  and  the  slingers  from  the  Balearic 
Isles.  In  the  second  stood  the  native  Carthaginians  and 
their  African  subjects,  with  some  troops  which  had  recently 
arrived  from  Macedon.  In  the  third  line  were  drawn  up 
the  tried  soldiers  of  Hannibal's  own  army,  on  whom,  if  on 


'  Tolyb.  XV.  5;  Zouaras,  ix.  131,  4. 
'■'  Polyb.  xiv.  U-8  ;  Livy,  xxx.  29  31. 


3  Cf.  Folyb.  XV.  9^  5. 


■*  Livy,  xxx.  29, 


3i8 


CARTHAGE  AND  THE  CARTHAGINIANS. 


n 


IT,      • 


no  others,  he  could  rely.  These  last  consisted  chiefly  of 
Bruttians.  The  sixteen  years'  war  had  done  its  work  with 
the  veterans  who  had  crossed  the  Alps,  and  who  had  fought 
at  Trasimene  and  at  Cannse.  But  the  Itahans,  who  had 
known  Hannibal  only  in  the  days  of  his  comparative  adver- 
sity, seem  to  have  been  as  devoted  to  him  as  if  they  had  had 
a  share  in  winning  all  his  laurels.  The  cavalry,  as  usual, 
were  placed  upon  the  wings,  and,  in  front  of  the  whole, 
marched  a  magnificent  array  of  eighty  elephants.^ 

Scipio,  as  every  Eoman  general  did,  drew  up  his  army  in 
the  three  lines  of  hastati^  principeSj  and  triarii.  But,  ob- 
serving the  number  of  the  enemy's  elephants — by  a  happy 
thought  which  alone  would  distinguish  him  from  the  ma- 
jority of  Eoman  generals,  who  would  have  preferred  to  be 
conquered  by  rule  rather  than  try  to  conquer  without  it — he 
placed  the  maniples  of  the  second  and  third  lines  immedi- 
ately behind  those  of  the  first.  Thus,  instead  of  covering 
his  ground  chequer-wise,  he  left  broad  lanes  through  the 
whole  depth  of  his  army,  of  which  the  sagacious  elephants, 
when  they  found  themselves  goaded  by  the  Boman  lances, 
would  be  likely  to  avail  themselves  for  their  escape.* 

The  plan  succeeded ;  and  the  whole  array  of  elephants, 
frightened  by  the  blare  of  the  trumpets,  made  the  best  of 
their  way  through  these  open  lanes,  some  to  the  flanks  of 
their  own,  and  others  to  the  rear  of  the  Roman  army,  with- 
out trampUng  the  legionaries  to  death  or  even  breaking  their 
line  of  battle.  Those  which  escaped  to  the  flanks  of  the 
army  threw  into  confusion  their  own  cavalry,  who  were 
already  outnumbered  by  the  Numidians  opposed  to  them. 
Hannibal  thus  found  on  this  fatal  day  that  his  two  most 
formidable  weapons — his  elephants  and  his  cavalry — had 
been  turned  against  himself.  LasUus  and  Massinissa  soon 
drove  the  disordered  Carthaginian  horsemen  from  the  field ; 
but   the  conflict   in  the  centre  was  much  more  stubborn. 

*  Polyb.  XV.  11  ;  Livy,  xxx.  33, 
«  Polyb.  xiv.  9,  6,  7  ;  Livy,  xxx.  33. 


TERMS  OF  PEACE. 


319 


When  Hannibal's  first  line  gave  way,  the  second  tried  by 
blows  to  drive  them  back  to  the  battle.  There  had  not  been 
time  for  Hannibal  to  throw  over  these  raw  mercenaries  that 
commanding  spell,  which,  during  his  long  campaigns  in  Italy, 
and  under  circumstances  which  looked  even  more  desperate 
than  these,  had  made  desertion  or  mutiny,  or  half-heartedness 
among  their  Gallic  or  Ligurian  countrymen,  alike  impossible. 
8ome  of  them,  to  the  number  of  eleven  hundred,  now  went 
over  to  the  enemy ;  but  the  veterans  did  their  duty  well,  and 
withstood  the  combined  attack  of  Scipio's  second  and  third 
lines.  They  stood  and  fought  without  flinching  till  Laehus  and 
Massinissa,  returning  from  the  pursuit  of  the  cavalry,  closed  in 
upon  their  flanks  and  rear,  and  then,  like  Napoleon's  Old  Guard 
at  Waterloo,  still  without  flinching,  they  fought  and  fell.^ 

Twenty  thousand  of  the  Carthaginian  army  had  fallen  in 
the  battle.  Twenty  thousand  more  had  been  taken  pri- 
soners, and  Hannibal  himself  escaped,  with  a  few  survivors 
only,  to  Adrumetum.  He  fled,  not  because  he  wished  to 
prolong  the  campaign,  for  he  had  the  magnanimity  to  confess 
that  he  was  conquered  not  only  in  the  battle  but  in  the  war ;  2 
still  less  because  he  cared  for  any  personal  reason  to  save 
his  own  life,  but  because  he  felt  that  the  terror  of  his  name 
and  the  undefined  possibilities,  which,  as  in  the  case  of  his 
father  at  the  close  of  the  First  Punic  War,  the  Romans  still 
attached  to  it,  might  enable  him  to  procure  better  terms  for 
his  unfortunate  countrymen.  Never  did  a  general  return  to 
his  native  country,  after  a  long  absence,  under  a  fate  more 
cruel.  The  hero  of  a  hundred  victories  saw  his  native  city 
for  the  first  time  after  his  one  defeat,  but  that  one  a  defeat 
so  crushing  that  it  could  not  but,  for  the  moment,  obliterate 
the  memory  of  all  that  had  preceded  it.  But  with  true 
dignity  and  self-respect  he  set  himself  to  accept  the  inevit- 
able, and  to  make  what  he  could  of  it.  Scipio  prepared  as 
though  he  would  besiege  the  city,  but  his  heart  also  inclined 

>  Polyb.  XV.  12-14  ;  Livy,  xxx.  33-35  ;  Appiau,  Hann.  41-47 ;  Zouaras,  ix.  14. 
*  Polyb.  XV.  15.  3  ;  Livy.  xxx.  35. 


I 


320 


CARTHAGE  AND  THE  CARTHAGINIANS. 


i\ 


i 


to  peace.  He  knew  that  the  consul  was  aheady  on  his  way 
who  might  rob  him  of  much  of  his  well-earned  glory,  and 
with  that  prudence  or  that  moderation  which  was  habitual 
to  him,  he  forbore  to  push  his  victory  to  the  bitter  end.* 

The  terms  which  he  offered  were  severe  enough,  and  had 
the  Carthaginians  only  realised  what  they  involved,  they 
would  surely  have  asked  to  be  allowed  to  meet  their  fate  at 
once.  They  were  to  retain  indeed  their  own  laws  and  their 
home  domain  in  Africa  ;  but  they  were  to  give  up  all  the 
deserters  and  prisoners  of  war,  all  their  elephants,  and  all 
their  ships  of  the  line  but  ten.  They  were  to  wage  war, 
neither  in  Africa  nor  outside  of  it,  without  the  sanction  of 
the  Boman  Senate.  They  were  to  recognise  Massinissa  as 
the  king  of  Numidia,  and,  with  it,  the  prescriptive  right 
which  he  would  enjoy  of  plundering  and  annoying  them  at 
his  pleasure,  while  they  looked  on  with  their  hands  tied,  not 
daring  to  make  reprisals.  Finally,  they  were  to  give  up  all 
claim  to  the  rich  islands  of  the  Mediterranean  and  to  the 
Spanish  kingdom,  the  creation  of  the  Barcides,  of  which  the 
fortune  of  war  had  already  robbed  them  ;  and  thus,  shorn  of 
the  sources  of  their  wealth,  they  were  to  pay  within  seven 
years  a  war  contribution  equal  to  fifty  millions  sterling  I 
Henceforward,  in  fact,  they  would  exist  on  sufferance  only, 
and  that  the  sufferance  of  the  Bomans.  Do  we  seem  to  be 
reading  ancient  or  modern — very  modern — history?  Still 
the  terms  of  peace,  heavy  though  they  were,  were  as  light 
under  the  circumstances  as  they  could  expect ;  and  Hanni- 
bal dragged  down  with  his  own  hands  from  the  rostra  an 
ill-judging  orator  who  was  recommending  a  continuance  of 
the  struggle.  The  people  gave  vent  to  their  indignation  at 
this  infringement  of  their  liberty  of  speech,  but  Hannibal 
pertinently  replied,  that  they  must  forgive  him  if,  after  a 
thirty-six  years'  service  in  the  camp,  he  had  forgotten  the 
manners  of  the  Forum. - 

The  terms  which  had  been  agreed  upon  by  Scipio  and  the 

» Polyk.  XV.  17  ;  Livy,  xxx.  36. 

«  Polyb.  XV.  18.  19 ;  Uvy,  xxx.  37 ;  Appiaii,  run.  M-65. 


BURNING  OF  CARTHAGINIAN  FLEET. 


321 


Carthaginian  government  were  referred  to  the  Boman  Senate 
for  their  approval ;  and  ambassadors  were  sent  from  Carthage 
with  Hasdrubal,  surnamed  the  Kid,  the  leader  of  the  peace 
party,  and  the  bitter  opponent  of  the  Barcine  family,  as  their 
spokesman,  to  plead  the  cause  of  the  conquered.  The  Bomans 
accepted  the  conditions,  for  they  felt  that,  this  time,  the  Car- 
thaginians  were  in  earnest,  and  they  felt  also  that  Hannibal 
was  stiU  at  large,  and  it  might  not  be  weU,  even  then,  to  drive 
nim  to  despair. 

The  conclusion  of  the  peace  was  celebrated  at  Carthage  by 

'  u  r'.f  ''^^*'  *^^  ""^'^  °^^^^  ^^'^^  *^«  ^^iti^ens  could  have 
beheld,  except  the  destruction  of  the  city  itself-the  destruc- 
tion  of  their  fleet.     Five  hundred  vessels,  the  pride  and  glory 
of  the  Phoenician  race,  the  symbol  and  the  seal  of  the  com- 
merce,  the  colonisation,  and  the  conquests  of  this  most  im- 
penal  of  Phoenician  cities,  were  towed  out  of  the  harbour  and 
were  dehberately  burned  in  the  sight  of  the  citizens.*     In  the 
days  of  the  greatest  prosperity  of  Carthage  if  any  signal  re- 
verse  happened  to  her-if,  for  instance,  a  storm  at  sea  de- 
stroyed  a  portion  of  her  navy,  and  so  touched  her  in  that  on 
which  she  most  prided  herself,  the  command  of  the  seas-the 
whole  state  would  go  into  mourning,  and  the  huge  waUs  of  the 
city  would  themselves  be  draped  in  black.2    It  is  a  strange 
and  touching  custom,  and  the  mention  of  it  here  may,  perhaps 
better  enable  us  to  picture  to  ourselves  the  feelings  of  the  dis' 
crowned  queen  of  the  seas.     Scipio  now  set  sail  for  Italy,  and 
andmg  at  Lilybasum  made  his  way  leisurely  towards  Borne 
through  the  cities  and  the  provinces  which  he  had  freed  from 
the  invader  and  which  fondly  hailed  him  as  their  deliverers 
He  had  delivered  them,  but  from  what,  and  to  what  end  ? 
He  had  dehvered  them  from    the  immediate  scourge  of 
foreign  war ;  but  it  remained  to  be  seen  how  far  they  would 
be  gainers  thereby.     It  remained  to  be  seen,  now  that  their 
great  rival  m  the  western  Mediterranean  was  put  out  of  the 
way,  whether  Borne  would  visit  the  Greek  and  the  Sicilian 


'  Livy,  xxx.  43. 


*Diod.  Sic.  xix.  106. 
21 


^Livy,  xxx.  45, 


322 


CARTHAGE  AND  THE  CARTHAGINIANS. 


I 


:    'I 

ii 


the  Apulian  and  the  Campanian   towns,  which  had  been 
guilty  of  coquetting  with  the  invader,  with   that  condign 
vengeance  which  she  had  ahready  wreaked  on  the  unhappy 
Capua  and  Tarentum  ;  whether  she  would  hand  them  over 
to  the  more  Ungering  oppression  of  Roman  magistrates  and 
tax-gatherers ;  or  whether,  throwing  off  the  narrow  mum- 
oipal  conceptions  in  which  she  had  grown  up,  she  would  rise 
to  the  imperial  dignity  which  circumstances  had  forced  upon 
her.     In  other  words,  it  remained  to  be  seen  whether  Rome 
would  govern  the  states  which  were  already,  or  were  here- 
after  to  be,  enrolled  in  her  vast  Empire,  in  thek  own  in- 
terests, encouraging,  as  far  as  was  consistent  with  her  own 
safety,  their  national  Ufe,  developing  their  resources,  giving 
them  a  Hberty  which  was  not  a  licence,  and  a  security  which 
was  not  a  solitude.     If  Rome  rose  to  this,  her  true  dignity, 
we  can  hardly  regret,  in  the  interests  of  humanity,  that 
Hannibal's  enterprise  ended  as  it  did.     But  if  her  conduct 
was  the  reverse,  or  nearly  the  reverse,  of  all  this,  we  may  at 
least  be  allowed  to  question,  as  we  have  already  hinted, 
what  most  historians  have  laid  down  as  an  axiom  too  self- 
evident  to  be  worth  discussing,  whether  it  was  for  the  good 
of  the  human  race  that  Rome  should  not  only  out-top  but 
should  utterly  extirpate  her  ancient  rival.     We  may  beheve, 
on  the  whole,  in  the  survival  of  the  fittest,  and  that  arms 
generally  come  to  him  who  can  best  handle  them ;  but  it 
is  open  to  us  to  regret  that  even  the  less  fit  were  not  aUowed 
to  survive  as  well.     There  was  surely  room  on  the  shores  of 
the  Mediterranean  and  on  the  Ocean  beyond  for  the  Phoe- 
nician as  well  as  the  Roman  civiHsation  ;  and  the  worst  ex- 
cesses of  the  Romans,  the  perfidy  and  the  biutality  of  their 
wars  in   Spain,  their   grinding   and   oppressive   system   of 
taxation,  the  destruction  of  Corinth,  the  eye  of  Greece,  their 
civil  wars  themselves,  might  have  been  mitigated  or  post- 
poned, if  they  could  not  have  been  altogether  prevented,  by  the 
salutary  knowledge  that  they  had  powerful  rivals  on  the  other 
side  of  the  Mediterranean  who  would  not  allow  them  to  be 
judge  and  jury,  counsel,  criminal,  and  executioner  all  in  one. 


DETERIORATION  OF  ROMANS, 


323 


n^ 


CHAPTER  XIX. 

CARTHAGE  AT  THE    MERCY   OP   ROME. 

(201-150  B.C.) 

Deterioration  of  Roman  character — Condition  of  Italy — Condition  of  Rome — 
Condition  of  Roman  Provinces— Story  of  Lucius  Flamininus— Story  of 
S^rgius  Galba — Rapid  conquest  of  the  East— State  of  Eastern  world — 
Summary  of  Roman  conquests  in  the  East— Reforms  introduced  by 
Hannibal  at  Carthage— Romans  demand  his  surrender — Self-abnegation 
of  Hannibal— Comparison  between  Hannibal  and  Napoleon— Hannibal's 
exile  and  wanderings— His  schemes,  his  suflferings,  and  his  death— Roman 
fear  and  hatred  of  him— Credibility  of  the  anecdotes  about  him — Humour 
of  Hannibal — Anecdotes  of  him  while  at  court  of  Antiochus  and  during 
his  wandering  life— He  founds  Artaxata  and  Prusa— History  and  im- 
portance of  Prusa— Hannibal's  personal  characteristics— Death  of  Scipio — 
Treatment  of  Carthage  by  Romans  and  Massinissa — "  Delenda  est 
Carthago  " 

The  fifty  years  which  passed  between  the  end  of  the  Second 
and  the  outbreak  of  the  Third  Punic  War  were  years  in 
which  Rome  advanced  with  extraordinarily  rapid  strides 
towards  the  empire  of  the  world  ;  but  they  witnessed  also 
the  incipient  decay  of  all  that  was  best  in  the  Roman  char- 
acter. Already,  in  the  Second  Punic  War,  we  have  seen 
indications  that  the  Golden  Age  of  Rome  was  passing  away. 
Whatever  the  heroic  qualities  which  the  long  struggle  called 
forth,  we  feel  that  the  stern  simplicity,  the  simple  faith, 
the  submission  to  law  which  formed  the  groundwork  of  the 
Roman  character,  and  had  marked,  at  all  events,  the  deal- 
ings of  Romans  with  each  other,  are  not  what  they  have 
been  ;  and  now,  when  the  strain  of  the  war  is  over,  and  the 
victorious  city  has  to  meet  new  problems  and  to  face  new 


324 


CARTHAGE  AND  THE  CARTHAGINIANS. 


dangers,  we  find  that,  except  in  the  one  point  of  her  material 
strength,  and  her  appliances  for  further  conquest,  she  is  un- 
equal to  the  emergency. 

An  emergency  indeed  it  was !     Three  hundred  thousand 
Italians  had  fallen  in  the  field  ;  three  hundred  towns  had 
been  destroyed  ;  to  the  North,  the  Gauls  and  the  Ligurians 
were  still  unsubdued  ;  in  Central  Italy,  the  Campanians,  the 
Apulians,  and  the  Samnites,  who  had  long  dallied  with  Han- 
nibal, were  awaiting  their  future  in  ill-concealed  anxiety; 
while  in  the  extreme  South,  the  Bruttians,  who  had  clung 
to  him  to  the  last,  abandoned  themselves  to  their  fate  in 
dull  despair.     The  Italian  yeomen,  who  had  never  wavered 
in  their  attachment  to  Kome,  torn  from  their  homes  for 
years,  and  demoralised  by  the  camp,  were  unable  or  un- 
willing to  settle  down  into  the  quiet  routine  of  agricultural 
life.     They  went  as  settlers  to  those  disaffected  towns  which 
Rome,  according  to  her  practice,  selected  as  new  military 
colonies,  or  were  content  to  swell  the  city  rabble,  which 
now  began  to  rise  into  importance,  and  was  kept  in  good 
humour  by  largesses   of  corn,  or  by  cruel  and  degrading 
public  spectacles.     Their  farms  passed  into  the  hands  of 
capitalists,  and  were  cultivated  by  foreign  slaves  whom  the 
frequent  wars  with  the  half-subdued  provinces  brought  in 
shoals  to  Rome.     "  Sardinians  for  sale,"  was  the  sorry  jest 
which  rose  to  people's  lips  when  they  saw  a  batch  of  these 
wretched  creatures  landed   at  Ostia,  or  exposed  for  what 
little  they  would  fetch  in  the  Roman  Forum.     "  The  more 
slaves,  the  more  enemies,"  was  the  grim  proverb  which 
forced  itself  on  their  minds  in  all  its  stem  reaUty,  when  they 
awoke  to  the  danger,  which  it  was  then  too  late  either  to 
prevent  or  to  cure.     The  rich  arable  lands  of  Italy  fell  back, 
as  might  be  expected  under  such  keeping,  into  pasture  ;  and 
half-naked  slaves  tended  herds  of  cattle  where  Roman  con- 
suls or  dictators  had  been  content  to  plough  and  dig  before 
them.     When  the  slaves  asked  their  masters  for  clothes  to 
cover  them,  they  were  met  by  the  suggestion,  half  question 


CONDITION  OF  ROMAN  PROVINCES. 


325 


and  half  answer,  whether  the  travellers  who  passed  through 
their  solitudes  were  wont  to  pass  naked  ? 

In  Rome  itself  the  old  aristocracy,  which,  it  must  be 
admitted,  with  all  its  faults,  had  been,  on  the  whole,  an 
aristocracy  of  merit,  had  given  place  to  a  new  nobility  of 
wealth,  who  were  as  exclusive,  and  certainly  were  not  more 
far-sighted  or  more  public-spirited,  than  theu:  predecessors. 
Rule  was  no  longer  looked  upon  as  its  own  reward.     It  was 
valued  for  what  it  brought,  and  high   office  lost  half  its 
dignity  when  it  was  won  by  a  reckless  display  of  wealth,  or 
was  used  as  a  means  of  acquiring  more.     Religion  was  no 
longer  the  simple  and  childlike  faith  of  the  eariy  common- 
wealth, but  tended   to  become  an  affair  of  titles   and  of 
priests,  of  auguries  and  of  ceremonies— of  ceremonies  which 
became  more  stringent  and  more  vexatious  exactly  in  pro- 
portion as  they  were  felt  to  be  less  real. 

Beyond  the  confines  of  Italy  Proper,  Rome  was  mistress 
indeed  of  the  four  provinces  which  she  had  torn  from  Car- 
thage in  her  fifty  years'  war,  of  Hither  and  Further  Spain, 
of  Sicily  and  Sardinia  ;  but  of  these,  Sicily  alone  was  un- 
likely to  give  her  further  trouble  ;  and  that,  not  because  she 
was  well-affected,  but  simply  because  she  was  exhausted. 
Sardinia  supplied  Rome  with  the  living  chattels  which  were 
to  be  so  perilous  a  property ;  while  Spain  entailed  upon  her 
a  yet  more  disastrous  heritage  of  petty  wars— wars  inces- 
santly ended  and  incessantly  renewed  ;  wars  waged  on  the 
part  of  the  Romans  with  a  baseness  and  a  cruelty  such  as 
have  characterised  few  wars  before  or  since.     The  wholesale 
murder  of  a  tribe  which  had  submitted,  or  the  assassination 
of  a  formidable  but  honourable  foe,  were  the  weapons  with 
which  the  Roman  generals  managed  to  retain  their  hold  over 
their  Spanish  provinces.    What  kind  of  redress  the  subject  or 
half-subject  populations  might  expect  to  get,  if  appeal  were 
made  from  the  Roman  generals  to  the  Roman  government, 
will  be  sufficiently  apparent  if  we  relate  two  incidents.     They 
are  well  known,  but  are  too  characteristic  to  be  omitted  here. 


1 


326 


CARTHAGE  AND  THE  CARTHAGINIANS. 


L.  Flamininus,  brother  to  the  conqueror  of  Macedon,  and 
consul  in  the  year  b.c.  192,  happened  to  leave  Rome  for  the 
province  of  Cisalpine  Gaul  just  before  the  gladiatorial  games 
came  on.     In  his  retinue  was  a  beautiful  boy  to  whom  he 
was  attached.     The  boy,  old  before  he  was  young  in  cruelty 
and  in  profligacy,  complained  of  the  pleasure  which  he  had 
lost.     A  Boian  chief  who  had  taken  refuge  in  the  Roman 
camp  happening  just  then  to  come  in,  the  consul  stabbed 
him  with  his  own  hands  that  his  favourite  might  feast  his 
eyes  on  his  dying  agonies.     The  foul  deed  passed  unnoticed 
and   uncensured   at  the  time ;    but  M.   Porcius   Cato,   the 
most  honest,  and  in  many  ways  the  most  original  of  Roman 
statesmen,  had  the  courage  as  censor,  eight   years  after- 
wards,  to  strike  the  name  of  the  murderer  from  off  the  roll 
of  the  Senate.     The  senators  could  not  reinstate  him  by 
force ;  but  they  showed  their  appreciation  of  the  character 
of  their  brother  senator  by  inviting  him  to  retain  his  sena- 
torial seat  in  the  theatre.^ 

The  other  incident  we  will  take  from  the  wars  in  Spain, 
which  are  fertile  enough  in  them.     The  Lusitanian  War 
had  just  been  terminated  by  the  submission  of  the  insurgents. 
The  Praetor,   Sergius   Galba,  invited  them,  in  the  kindest 
language,  to  meet  him  in  three  several  divisions  that  he 
might  redress  their  grievances  and  assign  them  new  lands. 
They  came  unsuspectingly,  when  Galba  at  once  fell  upon 
and  massacred  them,  together  with  their  wives  and  children, 
in  cold  blood.     The  few  survivors  were  sold  into  slavery. 
On  his  return  to  Rome,  the  same  honest  Cato,  now  in  his 
extreme  old  age,  who,  forty-five  years  before,  had  himself 
crushed  a  Spanish  rising  with  no  over- scrupulous  hand,^ 
attempted  to   bring  the   miscreant  to  justice ;   but  Galba 
produced  his  weeping  wife  and  children  in  court,  and  was 
acquitted  by  the  compassionate  judges.^    Happily  for  justice, 

1  Livy,  xxxix.  42  ;  Cicero,  De  Senec.  12  ;  IMutarch,  Cato.  17. 

«See  Livy,  xxxiv.  passim;  Appian.  Hisp.  41. 

a  Livy,  KpU.  xlix. ;  Appian.  Ilisp,  69-60;  Cicero,  Ih-utus,  23. 


ROMAN  CONQUESTS  IN  THE  EAST,  327 

however,  one  shepherd  warrior  had  escaped  the  treacherous 
massacre,  and  he  lived  to  take  ample  but  honourable  ven- 
geance for  his  country's  wrongs.  Viriathus  defeated  consul 
after  consul  in  the  open  field,  till  at  length  the  Romans 
bribed  his  friends,  and  got  rid  of  him  by  assassination. 

We  turn  with  a  sense  of  relief  from  this  picture  of  the 
internal  corruption  of  Rome,  and  from  the  duplicity  and  sava- 
gery of  her  dealings  with  the  brave  nations  of  the  West,  to 
the  story  of  her  brilliant  conquests  in  the  more  effeminate 
East.  We  can  but  glance  at  them ;  for,  though  they  fall 
within  the  period  of  which  this  work  treats,  they  have  little 
direct  bearing  on  the  great  drama  which  is  its  special  subject, 
and  which  is  now  hastening  on  to  its  melancholy  catastrophe. 

The  Eastern  world  was  still  strewn  with  the  fragments, 
each  a  colossus  in  itself,  into  which  the  gigantic  empire  of 
Alexander  the  Great  had  been  broken  up,  as  soon  as  the  master 
hand  was  withdrawn.  Like  a  meteor,  Alexander  had  shot 
down  upon  the  East  and  had  passed  from  province  to  province, 
laying  low  immemorial  empires  and  taking  virgin  fortresses, 
yet  everywhere  building  where  he  had  thrown  down,  selecting 
sites  for  new  cities  which  have  stood  the  test  of  twenty- 
centuries,  and  planting,  even  in  the  remotest  East,  the  seeds 
of  Greek  culture  and  civilisation  which  twenty  centuries  of 
barbarism  have  not  been  able  altogether  to  obliterate.  But 
like  a  meteor  also,  the  political  fabric  founded  by  him  had 
vanished.  Among  these  fragments  of  his  empire,  each  an 
empire  in  itself,  and  each  at  war  with  almost  all  the  others, 
Rome  was  now  to  play  her  easy  part ;  and  it  was  the  ancestral 
kingdom  of  the  conqueror  of  the  East  himself  which  was  to 
be  the  first  to  feel  the  weight  of  the  new  power  which  had 
arisen  in  the  West. 

It  was  not  Rome  but  Macedon  which  had  been,  m  the  first 
instance,  the  aggressor.  It  may  be  indeed  that  Philip,  King 
of  Macedon,  saw  clearly  that  when  Carthage  should  have  been 
disposed  of,  his  own  turn  would  come,  and  that  it  would  be 
wise  to  choose  his  own  time  for  the  "  struggle  for  life  "  which 


II 


328 


CARTHAGE  AND  THE  CARTHAGINIANS. 


he  knew  could  not  be  altogether  averted.  Anyhow,  he  had 
formed  an  alliance  offensive  and  defensive  with  Hannibal  after 
Cannae,^  and  the  Eomans,  already  overmatched  as  they  were, 
had  expected  day  by  day  to  hear  of  his  landing  in  Italy.  Had 
he  done  so  about  the  time  when  Tarentum  fell  into  Hanni- 
bal's hands,  Eome  could  hardly  have  weathered  the  storm. 
But  Philip's  bark  was  worse  than  his  bite.  With  miserable 
procrastination  he  neglected  to  send  aid  to  the  Cartha- 
ginians when  it  might  have  turned  the  scale,  and  then 
with  a  zeal  which  was  equally  ill-timed,  he  had  sent  four 
thousand  men  to  fight  by  their  side  at  Zama,  when  all  hope 
was  gone.'^  Thus,  for  fourteen  years  past,  if  there  had  not 
been  continuous  war,  still  less  had  there  been  peace  between 
the  neighbouring  nations.  When  the  Second  Punic  War 
was  over,  the  bulk  of  the  citizens  fondly  hoped  that  they 
would  be,  for  a  time  at  least,  at  peace  with  all  the  world ;  and 
only  when  the  Senate  pointed  out  to  them  that  if  they  did 
not  go  against  Philip,  Philip  would  come  against  them,  and 
that  those  who  were  just  freed  from  Hannibal  might  live  to 
see  a  second  Hannibal  in  Italy,  were  the  reluctant  people  in- 
duced again  to  take  up  arms.  Philip  indeed  was  already 
planning  alliances,  or  making  conquests  which  would  one  day 
render  him  really  formidable;  and  thus  Rome,  triumphant 
in  the  West,  found  herself,  in  some  sense  in  spite  of  herself,' 
involved  in  that  career  of  Eastern  conquest  and  aggression 
which  was  not  to  be  stopped,  hardly  even  to  receive  a  check, 
till  the  Mediterranean  should  become  a  Roman  lake,  and  the 
power  of  Rome  should  be  felt  on  the  Nile  as  on  the  Tagus, 
on  the  Euphrates  as  on  the  Danube. 

It  does  not  fall  within  the  scope  of  this  work  to  trace  in 
detail  the  steps  by  which  Rome  acquired  this  universal 
supremacy :  to  show  how  Philip,  who  had  scornfully  remarked 
that  the  Roman  general  "  thought  he  might  do  anything  with 
Macedon  because  he  was  a  Roman,  and  that,  if  war  was  what 

1  Livy.  xxiii.  33.  sibid.  xxx.  26.  33,  42. 

^  See  Mommsen,  iL  p.  229  and  passim. 


\ 


y 


SKETCH  OF  ROMAN  CONQUESTS. 


329 


he  wanted,  war  he  should  have,"  found,  in  a  few  short  years, 
when  the  Macedonian  phalanx  first  measured  its  strength 
with  the  Roman  legion  in  the  open  field  at  CynoscephalaB, 
that  the  Roman  general  was  not  far  wrong,  and,  being  thus 
driven  to  sue  for  peace,  was  able,  out  of  all  his  conquests  or 
dependencies,  to  retain  only  his  hereditary  kingdom;  how 
the  Greeks,  delivered  from  the  Macedonians,  received  at  the 
hands  of  the  Romans  their  nominal  liberty,  and  greeted  with 
short-sighted  acclamations  the  Philhellenic  Flamininus,  who 
was  in  fact  giving  them  only  a  change  of  masters ;  how  "  the 
fetters  of  Greece,"  ^  first  adjusted  by  Philip,  were  now  riveted 
on  that  unhappy  country  by  a  firmer  hand,  and  how  its  petty 
cities  and  blustering  confederations,  the  degenerate  represen- 
tatives of  those  states  to  whom  the  world  owes  Hellenic  art 
and  culture,  after  being  allowed  for  a  brief  space  to  air  their 
importance  and  their  imbecility,  settled  down  peaceably  under 
the  Roman  protectorate,  and  avenged  themselves  by  corrupt- 
ing by  their  manners,  or  subduing  by  their  arts,  those  whom 
they  could  not  meet  in  arms;  how  Antiochus  the  Seleucid, 
the  successor,  as  he  fondly  thought,  of  the  king  of  kings  who 
rejoiced  in  the  self-assumed  name  of  the  Great,  was  driven 
by  the  Romans  first  out  of  Greece  and  then  out  of  Asia  Minor, 
eighty  thousand  of  his  Asiatic  troops  flying  like  chaff  before 
the  onset  of  less  than  half  that  number  of  Roman  legionaries 
at  Magnesia;  how  the  Asia  Minor  which  he  had  overrun 
gradually  passed  under  the  control  of  Rome,  while  the  puppet 
monarchs  of  its  various  portions — Eumenes  of  Pergamus, 
Ariarathes  of  Cappadocia,  and  Prusias  of  Bithynia — whom 
she  kindly  allowed  to  retain  for  a  season  the  phantom  of 
independent  sovereignty,  humbly  registered  her  decrees, 
and  even  the  hordes  of  Gallic  invaders  learned  to  stop  their 
ravages,  or  at  least  to  keep  at  a  respectful  distance  from  her 
all-powerful  arm ;  how  the  grand  schemes  of  a  greater  than 
Antiochus  the  "Great,"  now  a  friendless  exile  at  his  court, 

^So  Philip  called  the  three  fortresses  of  Corinth,  Chalcis,  and  Demetriaa. 
See  Livy,  xxxii.  37. 


330 


CARTHAGE  AND  THE  CARTHAGINIANS, 


ll' 


were  crushed,  not  so  much  by  the  wisdom  or  courage  as  by 
the  good  fortune  of  Rome,  which  found  her  best  ally  in  the 
jealousy  and  the  incapacity  of  the  empty-headed  monarch 
who  flattered  himself  that  he  was  Hannibal's  protector; 
how  the  Egyptian  Ptolemy  himself  became  the  ward  of 
Rome,  and  the  chief  naval  power  of  the  Eastern  Mediter- 
ranean was  saved  from  the  ambitious  schemes  of  Macedon 
and  Syria  only  by  the  upstart  naval  power  of  Rome  in  the 
West ;  how,  lastly,  by  the  defeat  of  Perseus  at  Pydna,  and 
the  taking  of  Corinth  by  Mummius,  Macedon  and  Greece  dis- 
appeared for  ever  as  independent  powers  from  history,  and 
became  part  and  parcel  of  the  Roman  Empire.  All  these 
events,  and  many  more,  are  crowded  into  the  fifty  years  of 
existence  which  it  still  suited  Rome  by  a  cruel  kindness  to 
allow  to  her  Carthaginian  rival.  But  they  belong  to  the 
general  current  of  Roman  history,  rather  than  to  that  special 
episode  of  which  this  book  treats. 

The  year  b.c.  146,  which  witnessed  the  fall  of  Corinth, 
witnessed  also,  by  a  strange  coincidence,  the  destruction  of 
Carthage ;  and  to  the  chain  of  events  which  led  directly  up 
to  that  catastrophe  we  now  turn. 

Beaten  in  the  war  by  his  cruel  destiny,  Hannibal  made 
the  best  of  his  altered  circumstances.  He  had  lived  many 
lives  in  what  he  had  achieved  and  suffered ;  but  he  was  still 
comparatively  a  young  man,  and  he  set  himself,  as  though  he 
had  been  bom  to  be  a  statesman,  to  reform  those  abuses  in 
the  state  which  had  done  so  much  to  mar  his  patriotic  aims. 
His  apology  for  his  ignorance  of  the  manners  of  the  Forum 
was  hardly  needed.  He  triumphantly  refuted  the  accusations 
which  the  peace  party  were  impudent  enough,  or  base  enough, 
to  bring  against  him,  that  he  had  spared  Rome,  and  had 
appropriated  to  his  own  use  the  public  money  1  ^  Whether 
by  the  help  of  his  veterans,  or  by  the  voice  of  the  citizens,  he 
was  appointed  Shofete,  or  chief  magistrate ;  ^  and  he  used  his 

iZonaras,  ix.  14. 

2Livy,  xxjiiii.  46;  Corn.  Nepos,  Hannib.  vii.  7,  4,  "hie,  ut  rediit,  praetor 
factus  est"  ;  Justin,  xxzi.  2,  6,  "  prineipem  reruni  ac  tuui  teinporis  consulem". 


REFORMS  OF  HANNIBAL, 


331 


power  to  overthrow  the  narrow  and  selfish  oligarchy  whose 
strength  lay  in  the  council  of  "  the  hundred  judges".  Hence- 
forward this  council  was  to  be  filled  up,  not,  as  heretofore, 
by  co-optation,  but,  in  part  at  least,  by  free  annual  election.^ 
Lastly,  Hannibal  reformed  the  financial  system,  made  those 
who  had  thriven  on  the  plunder  of  the  treasury  disgorge  their 
ill-gotten  gains,  and  applied  the  proceeds  to  the  payment  of 
the  war  indemnity.  So  admirable  were  his  measures,  that, 
at  the  end  of  thirteen  years,  his  successors  were  able  to  offer 
to  pay  up  the  whole  of  the  instalments  of  the  forty  millions 
due  to  Rome,  and  that  without  imposing  any  additional  taxes 
on  the  subjects  of  Carthage. ^ 

These  reforms  stirred  up  a  nest  of  hornets  round  the  ears 
of  their  great  author,  and  his  new  enemies  joined  his  old  ones 
in  denouncing  his  projects  to  the  Romans.  Rome,  indeed, 
hardly  needed  such  an  invitation  ;  she  had  made  peace  with 
Carthage,  but  not  with  Hannibal.  If  she  no  longer  feared 
the  city,  she  feared  one  of  its  simple  citizens  ;  and  in  spite 
of  the  protest  of  Scipio  Africanus,  Hannibal's  noble-minded 
foe,  an  embassy  was  sent  to  demand  the  surrender  of  the  man 
whose  bare  existence  disturbed  her  equanimity. ^  From  the 
crowning  disgrace  of  complying  with  this  demand  Hannibal 
saved  his  fellow-citizens  by  going  into  voluntary  exile. 

Let  us  here,  once  more,  turn  aside  to  dwell  upon  that 
moral  quality  in  Hannibal  which  can  hardly  fail,  here  as  else- 
where, to  strike  us  most  forcibly — his  entire  self-abnegation. 
We  have  had  occasion,  once  and  again,  in  the  course  of  this 
history,  to  compare  Hannibal  with  his  best  modern  counter- 
part on  the  score  of  military  greatness — with  Napoleon.  But 
the  fundamental  contrast  on  which  we  would  now  insist,  and 
which  makes  the  two  men  stand,  on  the  score  of  morality,  as 
wide  as  the  poles  apart,  will  perhaps  come  out  more  clearly  if 

1  Livy,  xxxiii.  46,  "  Ut  in  singulos  annos  judices  legereiitur  ". 

»Livy,  xxiii.  46,  47  ;  Corn.  Nepos,  vii.  7,  5. 

3  Livy,  xxxiii.  47  ;  Val.  Max.  iv.  1,  6 ;  Zonaras,  ix.  18. 


33a 


CARTHAGE  AND  THE  CARTHAGINIANS. 


Il 


we  first  point  out  some  of  the  more  striking  parallels  in  their 
careers  and  characters. 

Each  is,  beyond  question,  the  foremost  military  genius  of 
his  age  and  nation.  More  than  this,  the  one  is,  beyond 
question,  the  foremost  military  genius  of  the  ancient,  the 
other  of  the  modem  world.  Each  was  the  mainspring,  the 
soul,  the  vis  viva  of  the  long  struggle  in  which  he  was  en- 
gaged. Each  found  himself  pitted  against  the  united 
strength  and  resolution  of  a  great  nation  which,  though  it 
could  produce  no  single  general  who  was  either  like  or 
second  to  him,  yet,  by  the  toughness  of  its  fibre  and  its 
inherent  moral  qualities,  at  last  came  off  victorious.  Each 
met  his  most  formidable  opponent  for  the  first  and  last 
time  in  the  great  battle  which  was  to  end  the  war ;  and 
each,  fighting  under  special  disadvantages,  was  beaten  by 
the  general  who  was  confessedly  his  inferior.  What  Scipio 
and  Zama  were  to  Hannibal,  that  Wellington  and  Waterloo 
were  to  Napoleon.  Each  won  his  first  mUitary  laurels  on 
a  large  scale  in  the  plains  of  Northern  Italy— Hannibal 
on  the  Ticinus  and  the  Trebia,  Napoleon  on  the  Adda  and 
the  Mincio.  Each  won  a  victory  over  Nature  as  surprising 
as  any  of  his  victories  over  his  foes :  Hannibal  by  conquer- 
ing the  Little  St.  Bernard,  Napoleon— not  probably  without 
a  feeling  of  conscious  and  successful  emulation — by  con- 
quering the  Great.  Each,  in  virtue  of  the  most  diverse  and 
contradictory  qualities,  was  capable  of  exercising  enormous 
influence  over  men,  and  of  arousing  the  passionate  enthu- 
siasm alike  of  the  raw  recruits  and  of  the  weather-beaten 
veterans  who  served  under  his  standard.  Each  was  a  states- 
man as  well  as  general.  If  Napoleon  was  able  to  *'  methodise 
anarchy  "  and  to  produce  the  Code  Napoleon,  Hannibal  could, 
even  in  the  hour  of  his  defeat,  in  a  year  or  two  of  office  with 
very  limited  powers,  reform  the  most  inveterate  abuses  of 
the  constitution  and  revivify  the  whole  Carthaginian  state. 

But  here  the  parallel  ends,  and  the  fundamental  moral 
contrast  is  all   the  more  striking  because  of  the  previous 


HANNIBAL  COMPARED  WITH  NAPOLEON. 


333 


parallel.  The  one  inspiring  motive  of  Hannibal  throughout 
his  career — carried  often  to  what  we  might  be  disposed  to 
think  a  Quixotic  excess — was  unswerving  devotion  to  his 
country.  The  one  inspiring  motive  of  Napoleon,  that  to  which 
he  ruthlessly  sacrificed  his  generals,  his  soldiers,  his  wife, 
his  honour,  and  the  lasting  prosperity  of  his  country,  was 
unswerving  devotion  to— himself.  To  show  this  as  clearly 
as  possible,  let  us  imagine  each  of  these  great  generals 
to  have  been  placed,  at  a  critical  moment  of  his  career, 
in  the  position  of  the  other,  and  ask  how  he  would  have 
been  likely  to  act.  Imagine  Hannibal,  for  instance,  in  the 
disastrous  retreat  from  Moscow,  and  imagine  him,  if  such 
a  thing  be  possible,  leaving  the  remnant  of  his  "  grand 
army,**  the  victors  of  the  Borodino,  and  the  vanquished  of 
the  Beresina,  under  the  command  of  some  Carthaginian 
Murat,  to  the  tender  mercies  of  the  Cossacks  and  a  Kussian 
winter,  while  he  himself  made  his  way  in  comfort  to  his 
capital,  and  there,  while  his  veterans  were  still  perishing 
among  the  snows  and  ice-bound  rivers  of  the  North — 
called  upon  his  feverish  and  infatuated  subjects  to  make 
new  sacrifices  to  the  Moloch  of  his  ambition.  Now  transfer, 
on  the  other  hand.  Napoleon  to  the  place  of  Hannibal  in 
Italy.  Imagine  him  to  have  fought  campaign  after  cam- 
paign without  receiving  any  adequate  reinforcements  from 
home,  and  to  have  now  given  up  all  hope  of  receiving  any 
in  the  future,  since  the  governing  classes  at  Carthage, 
while  he  was  engaged  in  a  life  and  death  struggle  for  them, 
were  engrossed  or  distracted  by  petty  jealousies  and  party 
squabbles.  What  would  he  have  done  ?  Leaving  behind  him 
one  of  his  subordinates,  Hanno,  or  Mutines,  or  Maherbal — 
as  he  did,  in  fact,  leave  behind  Kleber  in  Egypt — to  sustain 
for  the  time  a  defensive  war  in  Italy,  he  would  have  flung 
himself  on  board  a  vessel  with  a  few  trusted  followers, 
would  have  landed  at  some  African  Frejus — at  Leptis  or 
at  Hadrumetum — and,  amidst  the  enthusiasm  of  the  popu- 
lace for  the  hero  of  a  hundred  victories,  would  have  sud- 


w 


334 


CARTHAGE  AND  THE  CARTHAGINIANS. 


denly  appeared  in  the  capital.  Hasdrubal,  recalled  at  the 
same  time  from  Spain  with  an  army  devoted  to  the  interests 
of  his  family,  would  have  made  him  master  of  the  situation ; 
the  incapable  Carthaginian  "  Directory  "  would  have  van- 
ished before  him,  and  by  a  coup  d'etat,  which  under  the 
circumstances  would  hardly  have  been  a  coup  d*itat  at  all, 
he  would  have  firmly  estabhshed,  for  purposes  of  his  own, 
his  throne  and  his  dynasty. 

We  may,  perhaps,  doubt  whether  it  would  not  have  been 
well  for  his  country  if  Hannibal,  with  his  singleness  of  pur- 
pose, had  brought  himself  to  take  similar  strong  measures. 
What  might  not  the  resources  of  Carthage,  if  placed  at  the 
absolute  disposal  of  Hannibal,  a  man  as  great  in  the  council 
as  in  the  field,  have  even  then  accomplished  ?  What  a  din 
of  preparation  would  have  resounded  in  the  disused  docks  and 
the  half-empty  arsenals,  and  that  too  at  a  time  when  it  was 
not  yet  too  late  for  preparations  or  for  energy  to  be  of  any 
permanent  avail !  What  new  energy  would  have  been  in- 
fused into  all  the  operations  of  the  war  !  What  new  levies 
would  have  been  raised  in  Africa  and  in  Spain,  in  Gaul  and 
in  Italy  itself,  and  what  a  "  grand  army,"  composed  of 
nations  as  numerous  as  those  which  crossed  the  Niemen,  to 
their  own  destruction,  in  1812,  would  Hannibal  have  ulti- 
mately advanced  on  Kome !  But  Hannibal  was  too  scru- 
pulous and  too  self-sacrificing  for  this,  or  for  anything  like 
it.  If  he  had  no  "  eighteenth  Brumaire  "  of  his  own,  it  was 
not  because  he  had  no  temptation  or  no  chance  for  it.  It 
was  not  in  him  to  be  guilty  of  a  coup  d*^tat  in  any  shape. 
He  was  in  Italy  to  fight,  not  for  himself  or  for  his  dynasty, 
but  for  his  country ;  and  in  Italy  he  was  determined  to  stay 
till  that  country  recalled  him  to  her  own  defence.  Then,  and 
not  till  then,  he  left  it,  and  when,  after  his  inevitable  defeat,  he 
became  Shofete,  or  chief  magistrate,  at  Carthage,  he  again 
used  the  power  committed  to  him  not  for  his  own  but  his 
country's  good.  To  the  abuses  that  had  grown  up  in  the 
Carthaginian  constitution  he  gave  no  quarter ;  but  instead  of 


HANNIBAL  AND  CANTIOHUS. 


335 


profiting  by  their  abolition,  and  by  the  devotion  of  his  army, 
to  establish  a  dynasty  of  his  own,  he  descended  quietly  into 
a  private  station,  and,  rather  than  raise  his  arm  against  his 
country,  he  was  content  to  suffer  at  the  hands  of  those  whom 
he  had  deprived  of  much  of  their  power  to  injure  it,  and  who 
now,  to  their  eternal  shame,  leagued  themselves  even  with  his 
Roman  foes  against  him.  Surely  there  are  few  scenes  in  his- 
tory more  sad  or  more  sublime  than  this.^ 

Able  now  for  the  first  time  in  his  Ufe  to  go  wherever  his 
inclination  prompted  him— for  his  country,  which  he  had 
served  from  youth  with  a  singleness  of  purpose  which  knew 
no  divided  allegiance,  had,  as  far  as  she  could  do  so,  just  for- 
bidden him  to  render  her  any  further  service— Hannibal,  the 
greatest  of  Phoenicians,  first  visited  Tyre,  the  cradle  of  the 
Phoenician  race,  and  passed  thence  to  Ephesus,  whither,  as 
chance  would  have  it,  Antiochus  had  gone  before  him,2  that 
he  might  prepare  for  war  with  Rome.  He  was  received  with 
the  highest  honours ;  and,  striking  while  the  iron  was  hot, 
he  asked  the  great  king  to  place  at  his  disposal  a  small  fleet 
and  army.  If  this  boon  were  granted  him,  he  undertook  to 
sail  to  Carthage;  to  renew  the  struggle  with  Rome  in  Africa; 
thence,  once  more,  to  cross  to  Italy,  and  there  meeting 
Antiochus  himself— who  was  to  advance  overland  and  draw 
fresh  contingents  as  he  advanced  from  Macedon  and  Greece 
to  bear  down  with  him  on  their  common  enemy.^ 

It  was  a  magnificent  scheme,  and  one  which  did  not  seem 
altogether  impossible  of  realisation,  for,  just  then,  a  general 
rising  in  Spain  gave  the  Romans  enough  to  do  in  the  West 
alone.  But  it  was  proposed  to  deaf  ears.  In  vain  did 
Hannibal  reveal,  perhaps  for  the  first  time  in  his  life,  the 
secret  which  had  been  the  mainspring  of  his  achievements, 

iSee  two  articles  on  the  first  edition  of  this  work  in  the  Biblujtheque 
Universelh  et  Rome  Suisse  for  November  and  December,  1878,  p.  474,  486, 
49*2. 

2  Livy,  xxxiii.  49. 

3  Livy,  xxxiv.  60;  Justin,  iii.  31 ;  Appian,  Syr.  7. 


•I 


ttoi 


336  CARTHAGE  AND  THE  CARTHAGINIANS. 


I 

i 


the  stoiy  of  his  early  vow.i     The  courtiers  were  jealous  of 
the  lonely  exile,  and  the  great  king  himself,  inflated  with  his 
own  importance,  had  no  mind  to  be  told  by  a  suppliant  and 
a  refugee  what  his  interests  or  his  duty  called  for  or  if  he 
was  told,  to  do  it.2     Against  his  own  urgent  entreaties 
Hanmbal  was  carried  into  Greece,  in  the  wake  of  the  Syrian 
army,  there  to  be  asked  for  fresh  advice,  which  Antiochus 
took  care  agam  ostentatiously  to  reject.'    When  his  warn- 
ings  turned  out  true,  he  was  carried  back  into  Asia,  and 
Antiochus  having,  as  it  would  seem,  nothing  for  the  greatest 
soldier  of  his  age  to  do  by  land,  sent  him  off  by  sea  to  escort 
some  ships  from  Phoenicia.     The  small  armament  was  met 
as  might  have  been  expected,  by  the  large  Ehodian  navy.' 
and  was  overpowered  in  an  engagement  which  took  place  off 
bide.    Hannibal  himself  fought  well  and  escaped  to  Ephesus 
just  in   time  to  see  the  huge  force  which,  as  Antiochus 
imagined,  was  to  sweep  the  Romans  out  of  Asia «    This 
force  was  itself  annihilated  at  Magnesia,  and  the  conquerors 
demanded,  as  one  of  the  conditions  of  peace,  that  Hannibal 
should  be  surrendered  to  them.' 

Once  more,  Hannibal  anticipated  the  demand.  He  fled 
to  Crete  and  thence  returning  to  Asia,  wandered  about  from 
land  to  land  till,  at  last,  he  found  refuge  with  Prusias,  the 
petty  kmg  of  Bithynia.  There  he  lived  for  some  years ;  but 
even  there  the  Eoman  fear,  or  hatred,  pursued  him.  The 
pitiful  embassy  which  was  to  demand  his  extradition  was 
beaded,  it  is  sad  to  say,  by  no  less  a  person  than  Flamininus 
the  conqueror  of  Macedon  and  the  so-called  liberator  of 
Greece.  And  at  last,  at  the  age  of  sixty-three,  and  at  a 
place  called  Libyssa,  a  small  town  in  Bithynia  on  the  road 
between  Chalcedon  and  Nic*a,  the  Phoenician  hero,  weary 

les-wsT"  "^  " '  ^^'  ""■  " '  "^  ^'^  "'"""^'  2-   (S«« »''»".  P- 

'  Livy.  «iv  42 ;  Zonaras.  i,.  18.  ,  ^       „„;  ,., 

*  L.vy  ,.xxv„.  8.  23,  24  ;  Corn.  Nep.  Hanniial.  8,  4 

•Polyb.  „..  14,  7;  xxii.  26,  11;  Livy  xxxviii.  38;  Justin,  xxxii.  4  8 


DEATH  OF  HANNIBAL. 


337 


of  his  life,  disappointed  his  implacable  enemies  in  the  only 
way  that  was  now  left  to  him,  by  taking  the  poison  which 
he  used  to  carry  about  with  him  concealed  in  a  ring  1  The 
oracle  which  had  foretold  that  "  Libvssian  soil  should  one 
day  give  shelter  to  Hannibal "  2  was  thus  fulfilled,  not  by  his 
return  in  his  old  age  to  his  native  country,  but  by  his  death 
B.O.  183  in  this  remote  comer  of  the  Sea  of  Marmora,  and 
for  centuries  afterwards,  a  huge  mound  of  earth  was  shown 
to  travellers  which  was  called  "  the  tomb  of  Hanmbal ".» 

So  died  the  last  and  the  greatest  of  Hamilcar's  sons ;  and 
It  may  be  doubted— or  may  we  not  rather  say,  after  such 
study  as  we  have  been  able  to  give  to  their  lives  and  actions 
that  It  hardly  admits  of  doubt  ?— whether  the  whole  of  history 
can  furnish  another  example  of  a  father  and  a  son,  each  cast 
m  so  truly  heroic  a  mould,  each  so  worthy  of  the  other  and 
each  proving  so  brilliantly,  in  his  own  person,  through  a  life- 
long struggle  with  fate,  that  success  is  in  no  way  necessary 
to  greatness. 

Many  anecdotes  have  come  down  to  us,  respecting  the 
last  few  years  of  Hannibal's  life-the  years,  that  is,  of  his 
exile  and  humiliation.  Few  of  these,  perhaps,  are  thoroughly 
authenticated  or  rise  to  the  dignity  of  the  man,  as,  even  in  our 
imperfect  hghts,  we  have  seen  him;  but  we  are  fain,  before 
withdrawing  our  eyes  altogether  from  his  commanding  figure 
to  take  a  glance  at  anything  which  may  probably,  or  even 
possibly,  shadow  forth  the  truth  respecting  him. 

The  anecdotes  told  of  Hannibal's  last  years  faU  naturaUy 
into  three  classes.  There  are  those  which  are  transparent 
hctions-the  product  of  Eoman  vanity  or  malice,  or  of  the 
mere  love  of  the  absurd ;  such,  for  instance,  as  that  whicli 
teUs  us  of  the  personal  interview  of  Hannibal  and  his  con- 

\  ^7-  " 'i^  *V  ^"^  Nep.  Hannibal,  x.  2 ;  Justin,  xxxii.  4,  8. 

Jtu™7nm«S"*''  "  "^    "'""  '*  I^by-*  oPPidum  ubi  nunc  Hannibali, 

22 


338 


CARTHAGE  AND  THE  CARTHAGINIANS. 


I 


queror  at  the  court  of  Antiochus,  and  the  delicate  yet  ful- 
some compliment  said  to  have  been  paid  by  him  to  the  general- 
ship  of  Scipio  at  the  expense  of  his  own.i    Qnce  only  had  the 
two  great  generals  seen  each  other  before.     It  was  on  the 
fatal  field  of  Naraggara,  just  before  they  met  for  the  first  and 
last  time  in  arms.    They  had  held  there,  if  we  may  trust  the 
speeches  put  into  their  mouths  by  Livy,  earnest  and  not  un- 
friendly conference,  and,  in  spite  of  some  mutual  recrimina- 
tion and  widely  conflicting  views,  had  parted,  with  much  of 
mutual  admiration,  to  decide  the  issue  on  the  field  of  battle.' 
They  now  met,  once  more,  at  the  court  of  Antiochus— Scipio 
at  the  head  of  an  embassy  from  Rome,  Hannibal  as  an  exile, 
half-protecting,  and  half-protected  by,  the  great  king.     They 
entered  into  conversation,  and  Scipio,  as  the  story  goes,  asked 
Hannibal  whom  he  thought  to  be  the  greatest  general  that 
bad  ever  lived?      "Alexander  the  Great,"  was  Hannibal's 
reply.      "Who  was  the  second?"      "  Pyrrhus,"  answered 
Hannibal.    "  Who  was  the  third  ?  "    "  Myself,"  rejoined  the 
modest  Carthaginian.      "What  would  you  have  said  then  if 
you  had  conquered  me?  "  asked  Scipio  half  pleased  and  half 
surprised,  half  self-confident  and  half  self-depreciatory.     "  I 
should  then  have  placed  myself,"  rejoined  Hannibal,  "  above 
Alexander,  above  Pynrhus,  and  above  all  other  generals." 
It  is  the  story  of  Croesus  and  Solon,  but  without  its  beauty, 
without  its  truthfulness,  and  without  its  moral.     It  tickled 
Roman  vanity,  and,  therefore,  needed  no  critical  investiga- 
tion.   From  such  stories  as  these,  characteristic  though  they 
are,  we  turn  away  with  impatience  and  disgust. 

There  are  other  anecdotes  which  can  hardly  have  been 
invented,  and  which,  it  is  probable  enough,  are  strictly  true; 
while  others  again— and  these  the  most  numerous  class- 
hover  on  that  borderland  between  fact  and  fiction  on  which 
it  is  the  privilege  or  the  fate  of  great  men,  when  once  they 
have  been  removed  from  the  scene  of  their  labours,  simply 
because  they  have  been  so  great,  to  move.     The  substratum 


HUMOUR  OF  HANNIBAL. 


339 


1  livy,  XXXV.  19 ;  Appian,  Sj/r.  x.  10. 


a  Uvy,  XXX.  30.  32. 


of  such  stories  is  doubtless  true,  and  the  accessories  have 
gathered  round  them  by  a  process  of  accretion  which,  in 
an  illiterate  age,  and  perhaps  in  some  ages  which  are  not 
illiterate,  is  as  strictly  natural  as  are  the  various  feelings 
which  contact  with  a  commanding  character  calls  forth  in 
differently  constituted  minds.  They  are  the  fundamental  feel- 
ings of  human  nature :  envy,  jealousy,  or  fear,  deepening  into 
a  passionate  and  unreasoning  hatred ;  admiration  kindling 
into  enthusiasm,  and  enthusiasm,  again,  rising  at  times  into 
something  which  is  even  akin  to  worship. 

Plutarch  ^  tells  us  incidentally  of  a  humorous  remark  made 
by  Hannibal  just  before  the  battle  of  Cannae,  which,  being 
caught  up  by  the  bystanders,  spread  rapidly  from  mouth  to 
mouth,  till  the  whole  army,  with  its  babel  of  races  and  of 
languages,  pealed  with  one  hearty  and  continuous  laugh. 
Hannibal  had  ridden  with  a  few  attendants  to  a  rising  bit 
of  ground  that  he  might  view  the  enemy  who  were  now 
drawn  up  in  order  of  battle.  One  of  his  followers  named 
Gisco,  a  Carthaginian  noble,  remarked  that  the  number  of 
the  enemy  was  very  astonishing.  "There  is  something," 
replied  Hannibal  gravely,  "  which  is  still  more  astonishing." 
"  What  is  that  ?  "  asked  Gisco  with  equal  gravity,  but  doubt- 
less with  intensified  anxiety.  "  Why,  that  in  aU  that  host," 
rejoined  Hannibal,  "  there  is  not  a  single  man  whose  name 
is  Gisco."  The  joke  does  not  read  to  us  like  a  very  good 
one ;  perhaps,  we  could  hardly  expect  that  it  would,  when  we 
know  so  little  of  the  decorous  personage  at  whose  expense 
the  laugh  was  raised,  and  when  the  story  has  been  divested 
of  those  accompaniments  of  time  and  place,  of  gesture  and 
manner,  above  all  of  that  divinum  aliquid,  that  indescribable 
something  which  is  the  very  essence  of  humour,  and  which  is 
the  sufficient  justification  even  for  that  "inextinguishable 
laughter"  of  the  immortal  gods  at  a  very  ordinary  occur- 
rence which  so  scandalised  the  religious  instincts  of  Plato. 
Anyhow  the  incident  was  not  without  its  material  value ;  for 

1  Plutarch,  Fabius,  16. 


340 


CARTHAGE  AND  THE  CARTHAGINIANS, 


ANECDOTES  OF  HANNIBAL. 


341 


i,i 


\i  < 


! 


Hannibars  men,  feeling  that  their  general  would  not  have 
uttered  a  jest  at  such  a  time  unless  he  was  in  good  heart  as 
to  the  result,  went  into  battle  with  redoubled  confidence. 

No  other  illustration  has  been  preserved  to  us,  during  the 
period  of  his  long  struggle  in  Italy,  of  that  gift  of  humour, 
that  genuine  undercun-ent  of  the  soul,  of  which,  in  spite  of 
the  silence  of  our  historians,  we  cannot  believe  that  any  one 
so  great  as  Hannibal  could  have  been  wholly  destitute. 
But  one  or  two  of  the  later  anecdotes  of  which  we  speak  do 
give  us  some  idea  of  his  humour  on  its  drier  or  more  serious 
side,  the  only  side  to  which  he  would  be  likely  to  give  free 
play  in  his  sadly  altered  circumstances.^ 

During  his  residence  at  Ephesus  Hannibal  was  invited  by 
his  hosts  to  listen  to  a  discourse  of  Phormio,  the  philoso- 
pher. Phormio  discoursed  for  several  hours  on  military 
affairs  in  general,  and  on  the  duty  of  a  commander-in-chief 
in  particular.  His  audience  was  enthusiastic,  and  turning 
to  Hannibal,  who  had  been  listening  patiently  throughout, 
asked  him  triumphantly  what  he  thought  of  their  philoso- 
pher. "  I  have  seen  many  dotards  in  my  time,"  said  Han- 
nibal, "  but  verily  this  is  the  greatest  dotard  of  them  all.**  * 

On  another  occasion,  when  Hannibal  returned,  as  we 
have  seen,  to  Ephesus  from  his  unsuccessful  sea  battle,  he 
found  assembled  there  an  enormous  army,  with  the  most 
magnificent  and  diversified  equipments,  which  Antiochus 
had  gathered  together  from  every  corner  of  his  dominions, 
confident  that  it  would  sweep  the  Romans  out  of  Asia.^ 
The  great  king,  his  heart  swelling  with  pride,  turned  to  the 
Carthaginian  exile,  who  had  dissuaded  him  from  the  attempt, 
and  asked  him  whether  he  did  not  think  these  were  enough 
for  the  Romans.  "  Yes,"  answered  Hannibal  grimly,  fore- 
seeing the  result,  "  enough  for  the  Romans,  however  greedy 
they  may  be." 

Other  anecdotes  illustrate  the  thousand  shifts  and  devices 


of  which  Hannibal  was  a  master,  and  to  which  his  enemies, 
in  the  endeavour  to  salve  their  wounded  pride,  were  fain  to 
attribute  so  large  a  portion  of  his  successes.  Fraud  is  the 
force  of  weak  natures :  and  it  was  not  often  in  the  mid 
career  of  his  conquests  that  the  mighty  Carthaginian  needed 
to  have  recourse  to  any  other  weapon  than  his  own  consum- 
mate military  skill.  But  when,  as  now,  force  was  no  longer 
to  be  thought  of,  it  is  little  wonder  if  the  homeless  fugitive 
availed  himself  to  the  full  of  the  other  weapons  which 
Nature  had  so  prodigally  placed  within  his  hands.  The 
Roman  commissioners  who  had  been  sent  to  Carthage  to 
demand  his  extradition,  he  put  off  their  guard  by  the  uncon- 
cerned manner  in  which  he  walked  about  the  city  in  their 
society,  and  then,  like  Samson  or  the  Circassian  Shamil, 
escaped  from  them  just  when  they  thought  he  was  within 
their  grasp. ^  The  Tyrian  shipmasters  of  the  island  of  Cer- 
cina,  who  he  feared  might  be  planning  to  carry  him  back  to 
Carthage,  and  hand  him  over  to  the  Romans,  he  invited  to 
partake  of  his  hospitality.  The  banquet  was  spread  beneath 
an  awning  made  of  the  mainsails  of  their  own  ships  which 
he  had  craftily  borrowed  from  them  for  the  purpose,  and 
when  his  guests  were  carousing  he  slipped  out,  and  was 
well  ofif  in  his  flight  to  Syria  before  any  one  of  them  could 
rig  his  ship  and  follow  him.^  The  Cretans,  whose  cupidity 
was  aroused  by  his  wealth,  he  deceived  by  a  simple  stratagem. 
He  filled  some  earthen  jars  with  lead,  and  covering  them 
over  with  gold  and  silver,  deposited  them  as  a  sacred  trust 
in  the  Temple  of  Diana,  while  his  real  wealth  he  conveyed 
away  concealed  in  some  hollow  brazen  images,  which  he 
carried  with  him  as  works  of  art  of  little  value. ^  By  a  sim- 
ilar stratagem  he  managed  to  discover,  just  before  a  naval 
battle,  what  his  enemies  in  vain  attempted  to  hide  from  him, 
the  vessel  which  carried  Eumenes,  the  puppet  king  of  Perga- 
mus.     Unable  to  vent  his  hatred  on  the  Romans  themselves. 


1  See  the  account  of  Hannibal's  grim  laughter,  Livy,  xxx.  45. 

aCic.  Orat.  ii.  18.  sPolyb.  xxxi.  3,  4  ;  Livy,  xxxvii.  39,  40. 


1  Livy,  xxxiii.  47.  ^  Ibid,  xxxiii.  48. 

'  Com.  Nepos.  Hannibal^  9  ;  Justin,  xxxii.  4,  4. 


342 


CARTHAGE  AND  THE  CARTHAGINIANS. 


he  poured  out,  in  the  engagement  which  ensued,  all  its  vials 
on  Rome's  craven  and  obsequious  ally.  *'  Fight " — so  might 
have  run  the  watchword  which  passed  along  from  ship  to  ship 
— "  fight  neither  with  small  nor  great,  but  only  with  the  King 
of  Pergamus."  i  These  anecdotes  may  be  taken  for  what  they 
are  worth ;  but  it  seems  undesirable  to  omit  them  altogether. 

Indignant  at  the  treatment  he  received  from  Antiochus, 
Hannibal  on  one  occasion  took  refuge  with  Artaxias,  one  of 
his  revolted  satraps,  in  a  remote  comer  of  Armenia ;  and  it 
is  to  the  constructive  genius  of  the  exiled  Carthaginian  that 
Artaxata  itself,  the  ancient  capital  of  Armenia,  situated  on 
the  "  resentful "  2  river  Araxes,  and  in  full  view  of  the  majes- 
tic cone  of  Mount  Ararat,  the  boundary,  then  as  now,  of  vast 
and  immemorial  empires,  and  laden,  then  as  ever,  with  the 
memories  of  a  primaeval  world,  is  said  by  Strabo  and  Plu- 
tarch to  owe  its  origin.3  It  is  interesting  to  see  Hannibal 
here,  if  here  only,  taking  his  place  as  the  supposed  founder 
of  mighty  cities,  among  the  great  wall- builders  and  wonder- 
workers of  Eastern  history  and  legend :  Nimrod  and  Nebu- 
chadnezzar, Sesostris  and  Semiramis,  Hercules  and  Samson, 
Zal  and  Rustum,  Solomon  and  '*  the  two-horned  Iskander  ". 

But  there  is  a  place  more  famous  even  than  Artaxata,  which 
is  said  to  have  been  founded  by  the  great  Carthaginian  while 
he  dwelt  under  the  protection  of  the  miserable  Prusias,  King 
of  Bithynia.  Prusa,  the  modern  Brusa,  situated  in  a  rich 
and  well- watered  plain  near  the  Sea  of  Marmora,  and  sur- 
rounded by  a  framework  of  mountains,  behind  and  above 
which  towers  the  snowy  head  of  the  Mysian  Olympus,  is  said 
by  Pliny  to  have  been  the  creation  of  Hannibal*  It  is  a 
place  of  extraordinary  beauty,  and  by  its  history  from  the 
moment  of  its  foundation  to  the  present  day,  it  has  more 
than  justified  the  choice  of  its  founder.     Here  the  kings  of 

^Corn.  Nepos,  Hannibal,  11,  1-4. 

2  Virg.  jEn.  viii.  728 :  •'pontem  iudigiiatus  Araxes". 

3 Strabo,  xi.  p.  528;  Plutarch.  LucuUus.  31. 

<  Pliny,  Nai.  Hist.  v.  43  :  "  Prusa  ab  Hannibale  sub  Olympo  condita". 


HANNIBAL  A  FOUNDER  OF  CITIES, 


343 


Bithynia  held  their  petty  court  till  it  pleased  the  all-absorbing 
Romans  to  swallow  up  their  kingdom  and  make  it  a  part  of 
one  of  their  smaller  provinces.  Here,  a  hundred  years  after 
Christ,  the  younger  Phny,  the  governor  of  the  province,  made 
roads  and  drained  marshes,  and  constructed  baths  and  aque- 
ducts, temples,  theatres,  and  bridges,  those  great  works  which 
are  the  best  justification — if  indeed  anything  can  be  a  justifi- 
cation—of  a  universal  empire,  and  were  certainly  not  unworthy 
either  of  the  great  Emperor  Trajan  whom  he  served,  or  of 
the  natural  beauties  and  capacities  of  the  place.^  Here,  half 
suspiciously  and  half  sympathetically,  he  watched  the  rapid 
spread  of  an  obscure  sect  of  religionists,  who  were  destined 
in  a  couple  of  centuries  to  overthrow  paganism  and  to  make 
Christianity  the  established  religion  of  the  whole  Roman  Em- 
pire. And  it  is  in  his  letters  written  from  this  place  that  we 
get  the  most  valuable,  because  the  most  simple  and  unsuspi- 
cious external  testimony,  to  the  purity  of  the  lives  and  the 
simplicity  of  the  doctrines  of  the  early  Christians.^  It  was 
here,  again,  that  Othman — the  founder  of  the  Ottoman  great- 
ness, the  dreamer  of  that  dream  which  has  taken  seven  cen- 
turies to  fulfil,  and  which  the  eighth  has  not  yet  quite  undone ; 
the  owner  of  that  sword  which  is  still  solemnly  girt  on  each  suc- 
cessive Sultan  as  he  mounts  the  throne — fixed  the  seat  of  his 
rising  empire,  and  it  was  in  one  of  its  mosques  that  he  ordered 
his  body  to  be  buried.  Brusa  has  been  exposed,  since  then, 
to  six  centuries  of  fires  and  earthquakes,  and  to  the  neglect 
or  fitful  misrule  of  Othman's  successors,  but  even  now  in  its 
woefully  dilapidated  state  it  is  famed  for  its  silkworms  and 
its  silk,  its  hot  springs,  its  three  hundred  and  sixty-five 
mosques,  and  the  indestructible  beauty  of  its  situation.  It 
is  the  true  Asiatic  capital  of  the  Porte,  and  towards  it,  as 
towards  a  harbour  of  refuge,  each  Sultan  in  these  latter  days 
looks  with  wistful  and,  perhaps,  not  wholly  unwilling  eyes, 
when,  hard  pressed  by  his  immemorial  enemies,  or  the  atten- 

1  Pliny,  Ldteri,  x.  34,  46,  48,  60.  58,  69,  75,  99, 
«Ibid.  X.  97. 


344 


CARTHAGE  AND  THE  CARTHAGINIANS. 


tions  and  the  jealousies  of  his  officious  friends,  he  is  told  in 
language  that  can  hardly  be  mistaken— the  language  of  boom- 
ing cannon  and  of  fiery  pamphlets,  no  less  than  by  the  irre- 
sistible march  of  events— that  Europe  is  no  permanent  home 
for  him  and  his.     Like  Alexandria,  like  St.  Petersburg,  like 
Constantinople  itself,  Brusa  is,  in  very  truth,  a  "  predestined 
capital,"!  and  Hannibal,  if  the  story  of  its  foundation— and 
there  seems  no  reason  to  doubt  it— be  true,  deserves,  in  vir- 
tue of  his  choice,  to  rank  not  only  with  the  more  legendary 
heroes  who  have  been  just  mentioned,  but  to  take  his  place 
by  the  side  of  Alexander,  of  Constantine,  and  of  Peter— men 
who,  inferior  though  they  are  to  him  in  other  respects,  have 
yet  played  a  very  large  part  in  human  history,  and'have, 
perhaps,  deserved  their  name  of  "great"  as  much  from  the 
intuition  of  genius  which  enabled  them  to  select  a  predestined 
seat  of  empire,  as  by  the  force  of  their  characters  and  by  the 
greatness  of  their  achievements. 

Other  personal  characteristics  of  Hannibal,  or  incidents 
in  his  Hfe— his  extraordinary  resemblance  in  figure,  features 
and  character  to  his  father  Hamilcar;  his  continence,  his 
simple  fare,  his  throwing  himself  on  the  ground  to  rest, 
covered  only  with  his  military  cloak,  amidst  the  outposts 
or  the  bivouacs  of  the  common  soldiers ;  his  sleep  "  so 
aery,  hght,  on  pure  digestion  bred  "  ;  his  power  of  enduring 
the  extremes  of  heat  and  cold,  of  hunger  and  fatigue ;  his 
dreams,  and  their  influence  over  him  ;  the  simplicity  of  his 
dress  as  contrasted  with  the  splendour  of  his  arms  and  of 
his  horse ;  his  skill  in  boxing  and  in  running ;  his  lessons 
in  Greek,  and  the  ease  with  which  he  was  able  to  speak 
and  to  write  it ;  his  manoeuvres  and  disguises ;  his  influ- 
ence over  men  ;  his  habit  of  pinching  the  ear  of  his  officers 
when  he  gave  them  a  command  ;  2  his  patience  and  tenacity 

iSee  in  Stanley's  Eastern  Church,  vi.  p.  207-208.  his  description  of  Con- 
stantinople. 

2  It  may  be  worth  observing  that,  in  this  practice,  as  in  others,  he  was 
inntated-either  consciously  or  unconsciously,  probably  the  former-by  tho 


PERSONAL  CHARACTERISTICS  OF  HANNIBAL.      345 


of  purpose — what  Spenser  so  well  calls  his  stubbornness, 
the  "  stubborne  Hanniball  "  ;  1  his  marriage  with  a  Spanish 
maiden,  and  his  discovery  of  Spanish  mines  ;  his  watch- 
towers  erected  along  the  coasts  of  Africa  and  Spain — these 
and  other  characteristic  facts  we  have  to  gather,  as  best  we 
may,  from  stray  hints,  scattered  up  and  down  through  Greek 
and  Koman  literature,  from  an  epithet  here,  an  anecdote 
there,  from  an  undesigned  coincidence  or  an  undesigned 
discrepancy  ;  but,  coming  to  us  though  they  do  in  so  unsatis- 
factory a  shape,  they  yet  help  us,  in  some  measure,  to  clothe 
with  flesh  and  blood  the  figure  of  the  hero  whose  general  out- 
lines seem,  perhaps,  only  more  gigantic  by  reason  of  the  mist 
through  which  we  are  compelled  to  contemplate  it.  They 
enable  us  to  feel  that  the  noble  line  of  his  African  fellow- 
countryman,  "  I  am  a  man,  and  nothing  that  is  human  do  I 
think  alien  to  me,"  may,  in  spite  of  his  almost  more  than 
human  proportions,  and  in  spite  of  the  deficiency  of  our 
materials,  be,  in  its  measure,  applied  also  to  him. 

In  the  same  year  with  Hannibal  died  his  great  rival, 
Scipio  Africanus,2  the  victim  of  a  hke  reverse  of  fortune. 
Like  Hannibal,  the  victor  of  Zama  had  tried  his  hand  at  poli- 
tics, but,  like  many  other  great  generals  who  have  followed 
his  example,  in  politics  he  does  not  seem  to  have  been  at 
home.  He  longed  for  literary  repose,  and  when  the  tide  of 
popular  favour  turned  against  him,  he  retired  into  a  kind  of 
voluntary  exile  at  Liternum.  "  Ungrateful  country,"  he  cried 
with  his  last  breath,  "  thou  shalt  not  have  even  my  ashes."  ^ 

The  great  Carthaginian  leader  was  gone,  but  something  of 
his  handiwork  still  remained  in  the  prosperity  which  his 
reforms  had  secured  for  his  native  city,  in  spite  of  the  ever- 
great  Napoleon.  I  am  informed  by  the  Dean  of  Westminster  that  the  late 
Earl  Russell  told  him  that  Napoleon  had  pinched  his  ear  when  he  visited  him 
in  the  isle  of  Elba.  There  is  sutficient  proof— as  I  have  hinted  above— that 
Napoleon  had  made  a  very  careful  study,  as  well  he  might,  of  the  genius  and 
career  of  Hannibal. 

1  Faeri/  Qjiee7ie,  v.  49.  2  j„stin,  xxxii.  4,  9 

8  Uvy,  xxxviii.  56 ;  Val.  Max.  v.  3,  2. 


346 


CARTHAGE  AND  THE  CARTHAGINIANS, 


». 


r 


increasing  depredations  of  Massinissa.     The  Second  Punic 
War  had  hardly  been  concluded,  and  the  terms  of  peace 
agreed  to,  when  that  wily  Numidian,  lord,  by  the  favour  of 
Kome,  of  the  dominions  of  Syphax  as  well  as  of  his  own,i 
began  to  justify  his  position  by  encroaching  on  the  Emporia 
to  the  south-east  of  Carthage.     This  was  the  richest  part  of 
the  Phoenician  territory  in  Africa ;  it  contained  the  oldest 
Phoenician  colonies,  and  had  belonged  to  Carthage  by  a  pre- 
scription of   at  least   three   hundred   years.      The   Cartha- 
ginians, as  by  treaty  bound,  appealed  to  Rome  for  protec- 
tion ;  and  Scipio,  the  best  judge  of  its  provisions,  as  well 
as  one  of  the  most  honourable  of  Eoman  citizens,  went  over 
to  Africa  to  decide  the  matter.     But  he  decided  nothing 
and  Massinissa  was  left  in  possession  of  his  plunder.^    This 
led  to  fresh  encroachments  on  the  other  side  of  the  Cartha- 
ginian territory  along  the  river  Bagradas,  and  these  again 
to  fresh  commissions  from   Kome,  which  always  ended  in 
the  same  way.s    At  last  the  trampled  worm  turned  on  its 
oppressor;   but  fortune   was  on   the   side  of  the  chartered 
brigandage  of  Massinissa.     Hasdrubal,  at  the  head  of  the 
patriotic  party,  was  completely  defeated,  and  Carthage  itself 
was  in  danger.   The  Carthaginians,  by  neglecting  to  ask  leave 
of  Rome  to  defend  themselves,  had  at  length  given  the  Ro- 
mans the  very  pretext  which  they  wanted  for  interfering 
actively  and  giving  them  the  death-stroke.*    Ab-eady  before 
this  a  new  commission  had  been  sent  out  with  old  Marcus 
Cato  at  its  head.     It  proved  to  be  an  evil  day  for  Carthage. 
The  Censor  had  passed  through  the  rich  districts  which  still 
remained  to  her.     He  had  been  amazed  at  the  wealth,  the 
population  and  the  resources  of  the  city  which  he  had  be- 
lieved was  crushed  ;  and  he  returned  home  with  his  narrow 
mind  thoroughly  impressed  with  the  belief  that  if  Rome  was 

»  Polyb.  XV.  18,  5  ;  Livy.  xxx.  44. 

«Polyb.  xxxii.  2 ;  Livy.  xxxiv.  62 ;  cf.  xl.  17  and  31  ;  Appian.  Pun.  67. 

»Livy.  xlii.  23-24  ;  Epit.  xlvii.  ;  Appian.  Pun,  68. 

*  Livy,  Epit.  xlviii. ;  Appian.  Pun.  70-73. 


DELENDA  EST  CARTHAGO. 


347 


to  be  saved,  Carthage  must  be  destroyed.  Cato  brought  to 
the  consideration  of  every  subject  a  mind  thoroughly  made 
up  upon  it.  No  one  ever  reasoned  him  out  of  an  opinion  he 
had  formed.  He  exhibited  in  the  Senate  some  figs  as  re- 
markable for  their  freshness  as  for  their  size,  he  told  his  ad- 
miring audience  that  they  grew  in  Carthaginian  territory  only 
three  days'  sail  from  Rome,  and  using  or  abusing  the  free- 
dom allowed  to  every  senator  of  expressing  his  opinion  on 
any  subject,  he  ended  his  speech  that  day,  and  every  speech 
which  he  delivered  in  the  Senate  afterwards,  whatever  the 
subject  under  debate,  with  the  memorable  words — Carthage 
must  be  blotted  oui^ 

» Plutarch,  Cato,  27  ;  Appian,  Pun.  69  ;  Florus,  ii.  16,  4» 


348  CARTHAGE  AND  THE  CARTHAGINIANS, 


CHAPTER  XX. 

DESTRUCTION   OP   CARTHAOB. 

(149-146  B.C.) 

Appian  and  his  history-Polybius-Characteristics  of  his  history-His  love  of 
toith-Topo^aphy  of  Carthage-Causes  of  its  obscurity- Changes  made 
by  nature-Changes  made  by  man-The  peninsula  and  the  isthmus-The 
fortifications  and  triple  waU-The  Tania-The  harbours-Resolve  of  Rome 
respecting  Carthage-Treachery  of  Romans-Scene  at  Utica-Scene  at  Car- 
thage-The  Roman  attack  fails-Repeated  failures  and  losses-Scipio  ^mili- 
anus-His  character  and  connections-He  takes  the  Megara-Siege  of  the 
city  proper-Scipio's  mole  and  the  new  ouUet-Contradictions  in  Cartha- 
gmia^  character-Scipio  attacks  the  harbour  quarter-He  takes  Nepheris- 
The  final  assault-The  three  streets-The  Byrsa-Fate  of  the  city  and  its 
inhabitants-Curse  of  Scipio-Unique  character  of  the  faU  of  Carthage-Ita 
consequences-Subsequent  cities  on  its  site-Final  destruction  by  the  Arabs. 

OuB  knowledge  of  the  Third  Punic  War  is  derived  almost 
exclusively  from  Appian,  a  mere  compiler  who  did  not  live 
till  the  time  of  the  Emperor  Hadrian,  and  whose  accuracy 
where  he  draws  upon  his  own  resources,  may  be  judged 
from  the  fact  that  he  places  Saguntum  to  the  north  of  the 
Ebro,  and  makes  Britain  only  half  a  day's  sail  from  Spain  i 
Fortunately  for  us,  however,  there  is  good  reason  to  believe 
that  his  account  of  the  faU  of  Carthage  is  drawn  directly 
from  Polybius,  who  not  only  stands  in  the  highest  rank  as 
an  historian,  but  was  himself  present  and  bore  a  part  in  the 
scenes  which  he  described.'^  Lord  Bacon  has  remarked  in 
one  of  his  aphorisms,  that  while  the  stream  of  time  has 
brought  down  floating  on  its  surface  many  works  which  are 


» Appian,  Hisp.  1  and  7. 


2  Appian,  Pun.  13ii, 


POLYBIUS  AND  HIS  HISTORY. 


349 


light  and  valueless,  those  which  were  weightier  and  worthier 
have  sunk  too  often  to  the  bottom  and  been  lost  to  us. 
Happily  the  aphorism  is  not  wholly  true,  and,  in  this  in- 
stance, the  lighter  work  of  Appian  has  been  able,  as  it  were, 
to  give  buoyancy  to  the  substance  of  the  weighty  work  of 
Polybius.  Let  us  dwell  for  a  moment  on  the  qualifications 
of  the  man  to  whom  students  of  ancient  history,  especially 
of  Carthaginian  history,  owe  so  much. 

Polybius  was  a  Greek  of  Megalopolis,  who  having  been 
carried  off  to  Italy,  in  common  with  all  the  more  enterpris- 
ing and  independent  spirits  among  his  countrymen,  by  the 
Komans,  was  invited  to  take  up  his  residence  in  the  house  of 
iEmilius  Paullus,  the  conqueror  of  Macedonia ;  and  it  is  to 
this  happy  accident  that  we  owe,  if  not  his  history  itself,  at 
all  events,  some  of  its  most  distinguishing  characteristics. 

Here  it  was  that  Polybius  learned  to  appreciate,  as  per- 
haps no  other  Greek  or  Eoman  had  hitherto  done,  the 
grandeur  alike  of  the  Greek  intellect  and  of  the  Eoman 
character,  and  was  able  to  mark  out,  in  his  own  mind  at 
least,  the  appropriate  sphere  and  limits  of  each.  Here  he 
influenced,  and,  in  turn,  he  was  influenced  by,  some  of  the 
foremost  minds  which  the  Imperial  State  had  yet  produced 
— the  young  and  virtuous  Scipio  himself,  his  father,  the  dis- 
tinguished general  -^milius  Paullus,  the  wise  and  gentle 
Laelius,  the  satirist  Lucilius,  the  African  comedian  Terence, 
and  the  Greek  philosopher  PanaBtius.  Here  he  learned  to 
rise  alike  above  the  petty  intrigues  of  the  Achaean  states  and 
the  narrow  patriotism  of  Rome  to  the  conception  of  a  Uni- 
versal Empire,  which  was  to  combine  intellectual  culture 
with  material  civilisation,  and  order  with  something  which 
was,  at  least,  akin  to  national  life.  Here,  lastly,  in  his  part 
of  historian,  he  cut  himself  adrift  from  the  dry  annals  and 
the  meagre  epitomes  which  still,  to  a  great  extent,  monopo- 
lised the  name  of  history,  and  rose  to  that  higher  conception 
which  Thucydides  alone  of  his  predecessors  had  apprehended 
— the  conception  of  history  (or,  at  all  events,  the  history  of 


'I 


350 


CARTHAGE  AND  THE  CARTHAGINIANS. 


the  Mediterranean  states)  as  a  living  whole,  in  which,  when 
the  due  distinction  had  been  drawn  between  the  ephemeral 
and  the  lasting,  the  superficial  and  the  essential,  each  sue- 
cessive  phase  of  society,  however  complicated,  may  be  shown 
by  adequate  links  of  cause  and  effect  to  be  the  resultant  of 
that  which  has  preceded  it. 

"  Truth,"  says  Polybius  himself,  in  a  weU-known  passage 
"18  the  eye  of  history;  for  as  a  living  thing  when  depriv'^ed 
of  sight  becomes  useless,  so,  if  truth  be  taken  from  history 
what  remains  is  only  an  idle  tale."  1    From  the  position  here 
taken  up  he  never  consciously  swerved.     If  he  was  unduly 
influenced  by  the  views  prevalent  in  the  Scipionic  circle,  much 
aUowance  must  be  made  for  the  haze  through  which  he  saw 
and  could  not  help  seeing,  the  exploits  of  his  patron's  family! 
But  what  history  has  gained  from  him  and  his  surroundin-a 
IS  so  gi-eat  that  we  need  not  quarrel  with  the  small  price 
which  has  been  paid  for  it.     Through  the  influence  of  the 
Scipionic  circle,  Polybius  was  able  to  get  access  to  documents 
which  otherwise  would  have  been  closed  to  him      He  was 
able  to  study  men  as  well  as  things,  and  those  the  men  who 
were  playing  the  most  decisive  part  in  the  history  of  their 
time.    It  IS  to  the  strength  of  the  friendship  which  sprang  up 
between  him  and  his  patron's  adopted  son,  the  younger  Scipio 
that  we  owe  the  one  tolerably  clear  description  we  possess  of 
Carthage  itself,  and  our  one  history  of  the  Third  Punic  War. 
He  had  only  recently  returned  to  his  native  country  after  his 
seventeen  years'  exile ;  but  when  he  heard  that  his  friend 
was  appointed  to  the  supreme  command,  he  left  it  again,  in 
order  that  he  might  witness  and  record  that  friend's  exploits. 
Here,  perhaps,  before  we  look  upon  the  last  scene  of  aU 
wiU  be  the  place  to  describe,  as  clearly  as  we  can,  the  posi- 
tion, the  fortifications,  and  the  appearance  of  the  imperial 
city.     We  noticed,  at  the  outset,  the  strange  obscurity  which 
hangs  over  the  origin,  the  rise,  and  the  internal  life  of  a  city 
whose  influence  was,  for  centuries,  so  widespread  and  so  com- 

1  Cf.  Polyb.  viii.  10,  7-9,  etc. 


C^VIITHAGK 

aurl  Its  yeij^ibonrliood. 


C.fiimttit 


/.tvu/manjt    Onien-  4  C» .  LonJou.  yfw\oi4c    BondHty i  lid* 4ata^ 


-'S. 


:*  V 


'iV 


TDU  \ 


f- 
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r  1  yi-,;     ^t;  (' 


(  ARTHACvK 

uihI  Us   Noij>iit)onrhood 


!/ 


Catacoi'tib 
liiir    ^  , 

(/7     nil-ift  Kill lUI /j: 

1.^'.  r.'.] 


^^\^^ 


% 


V', 


s~;-... 


>:>/ 

^•'S. 


.  r     ,i?,      .... 


)U\tOt.olftt  a 


/.t'luimitn.*    fiftteft  .i  i\i     /.onJiui    .\,w  ),>/•/,■    HtniiJun  \- f,iJtuf/fi . 


"I 


TOPOGRAPHY  OF  CARTHAGE. 


351 


Xeiglibonrhnod. 


manding.  The  same  obscurity  unfortunately  extends  also  to 
its  topography.  The  blind  forces  of  Nature,  and  the  ruthless 
hand  of  Man,  have  conspired  to  efface  even  its  ruins.  It 
is  not  merely  the  identification  in  detail  of  its  walls,  its 
temples,  and  its  streets,  for  these  might  have  been  expected 
to  disappear ;  but  it  is  those  more  permanent  features  of  its 
citadel  and  its  harbours,  nay,  it  is  the  position  of  the  city 
itself,  which  is,  in  some  points,  open  to  dispute.  How  this 
has  come  about  requires  explanation. 

To  the  north  of  the  city  the  tempests  of  two  thousand  years, 
and  the  alluvial  deposits  of  the  river  Bagradas,i  which  now 
enters  the  sea  several  miles  to  the  north  of  its  former  mouth, 
have  turned  much  which  in  the  palmy  days  of  Carthage  was 
open  sea  into  dry  land  or  into  land-locked  lagoons;  while,  along 
the  whole  west  and  north  front  of  the  city,  the  sea  has  re- 
venged itself  by  encroaching  on  the  land,  and  the  massive 
substructions  of  fortifications  which,  perhaps,  turned  Agath- 
ocles  aside  and  long  baffled  even  Scipio,  may  stiU  be  seen 
engulfed  beneath  the  waters  at  the  distance  of  a  furlong  or 
more  from  the  present  coast. 

Nor  has  Man  been  less  destructive  than  Nature.  On 
the  same  or  nearly  the  same  spot  have  risen  successively  a 
Phoenician,  a  Roman,  a  Vandal,  and  a  Byzantine  capital. 
Each  was  destroyed  in  whole  or  in  part  by  that  which  was 
to  take  its  place,  and  each  successive  city  found  ample 
materials  for  its  own  rise  in  the  ruins  which  it  had  itself 
occasioned.  The  Byzantine  city  was  finally  destroyed  in  a.d. 
698.  Since  that  time,  its  site  has  been  almost  uninhabited, 
and  Berbers  and  Bedouins,  Fatimite  Kalifs  and  Italian  Re- 
pubUcs,  German  Emperors  and  French  Kings,  have  all  had 
a  share  in  the  work  of  obUteration.  The  remains  of  so  many 
cities  have  formed  a  vast  quarry  out  of  which  neighbouring 

1  Silios  Italicus,  Pun.  vi.  140-144  :— 

Turbidus  arentes  lento  pede  sulcat  arenas 
Bagrada,  non  ullo  Libycis  in  finibus  amue 
Victus  limosas  extenders  latius  undas, 
Et  stagnante  vado  patulos  involvere  campos. 


352 


CARTHAGE  AND  THE  CARTHAGINIANS. 


hamlets  and  towns  have  been  built  and  rebuilt,  and,  if  we 
except  the  aqueducts  and  reservoirs,  which  tell   their  own 
tale,  even  to  the  most  cursory  observer,  of  its  former  popula- 
tion and  prosperity,  he  who  would  see  any  remains  of  the 
once  imperial  city  must  dig  deep  down  through  fathoms  of 
crumbling  masonry,  or  through  mosaic  pavement  laid  above 
mosaic  pavement,  sometimes  three  in  number,  till,  perchance, 
he  lights  upon  a  votive  tablet  covered  with  Punic  characters 
and  scored  with  rude  figures  of  a  triangle  and  an  uplifted 
hand,  or,  it  may  be,  with  the  two  horns  of  the  Moon  God- 
dess, Astarte ;  or  brings  to  view  the  basement  of  the  mighty 
temple  which  witnessed  the  bloody  ofiferinga  to  Baal-Moloch. 
Having  said  thus  much  on  the  difficulties  of  the  subject, 
we  may  proceed,   with   such   help  as  is  given  us  by  the 
fragmentary  notices  of  the  ancients,  and  by  recent  investi- 
gations upon  the  spot,  to  indicate  the  main  features  of  the 
city.    In  a  work  of  this  size,  we  can,  of  course,  only  give 
the  results  and  not  the  whole  of  the  processes  by  which  we 
have  arrived  at  them ;    still  less  can   we  indicate  all  the 
elements  of  doubt  which  may  be  used  to  support  or  over- 
throw this  or  that  theory  of  rival  antiquarians. 

The  isthmus  connecting  the  peninsula  on  which  Carthage 
was  built  with  the  mainland  was  three  miles  across,  and  the 
whole  of  the  widening  ground  to  the  east  of  it,  embracing 
a  circuit  of  about  twenty-three  miles,!  would  seem,  at  one 
time,  to  have  been  covered  by  the  city  proper,  its  suburbs, 
its  gardens,  and  its  burying-ground.  The  peninsula  ter- 
minates towards  the  north  and  east  in  two  bluff  headlands, 
now  called  Cape  Ghamart  and  Cape  Carthage.  Whether 
these  were  included  in  the  city  fortifications,  or  were  left  to 
defend  themselves  as  outlying  forts  by  their  own  inherent 
strength,  is  not  quite  clear. 

The  city  proper  was  adequately  defended  on  the  three 
sides  which  touched  the  water  by  ordinary  sea-walls ;  but 

» Polyb.  i.  73,  4-5 ;  Livy,  EpiL  E  ;  Strabo,  xvii.  3.  15 ;   Appian,  Pun.  95 
119.    (See  above,  p.  10-11.) 


THE  TRIPLE  WALLS, 


353 


on  the  side  towards  the  land,  the  side  from  which  alone  the 
mistress  of  the  seas  and  islands  could  dream  of  serious 
danger,  ran  a  triple  hne  of  fortifications,  of  which  the 
remains  have  only  very  recently  been  brought  to  light.  ^ 
The  outer  wall,  which  would  have  to  bear  the  brunt  of  an 
attack,  was  six  or  seven  feet  thick  and  forty-five  feet  high, 
and  it  was  flanked  throughout  its  length  by  towers  at  equal 
distances  of  two  hundred  feet.  Between  this  and  the  two  simi- 
lar walls  which  rose  behind  it,  and  somehow  forming  part  of 
them,  so  as  to  make  the  whole  one  compact  mass  of  masonry, 
were  casemates  capable  of  containing  three  hundred  elephants, 
with  their  vast  stores  of  food.  Above  these  rose  another  storey 
with  stabling  for  four  thousand  horses.  In  close  proximity 
there  were  barracks  for  their  riders,  as  well  as  for  twenty  thou- 
sand infantry. 2  These  magnificent  fortifications  ran  up  from 
near  the  Lake  of  Tunis  to  the  hill  on  which  the  citadel  was 
built,  and  here  were  dovetailed  into  the  wall  of  the  citadel  itself,* 
but,  it  would  seem,  were  not  continued  on  the  same  scale  to 
the  sea  to  the  north  of  it.  The  nature  of  the  ground  appears 
to  have  made  the  prolongation  of  such  elaborate  defences  un- 
necessary, and  the  only  point  which  was  really  weak  in  the 
whole  line  of  defence  was  the  bit  of  wall  at  the  south  angle 
of  the  town,  just  where  a  narrow  tongue  of  land,  called  the 
Taenia,  which  plays  an  important  part  in  the  siege,  cut  off 
the  open  gulf  from  the  lake  which  lay  within  it.  This  spot, 
l3dng  as  it  were  between  land  and  water,  was  especially  open 
to  attacks  from  both,  but  seems  never  to  have  been  suffi- 
ciently protected  against  either.* 

Besides  the  Lake  of  Tunis,  there  were  two  land-locked 
docks  or  harbours,  opening  the  one  into  the  other,  and 
both,  it  would  seem,  the  work  of  human  hands.     Hie  partus 


» Beul^,  Fouilles  d  Carthage,  iil  and  iv. 

•Appian.  Pw%.  95  ;   Strabo,  xvu.  3,  14.     Cf.  Appian,  Pun.  88;   Diod.  Sic 
xxxii.  Frag.  p.  622. 

*  Cf.  Orosios,  lii  22.  "  ex  nn&  parte  mnrus  communis  erat  urbis  et  BjTsae  ". 

*  Appian,  Pun.  95,  ad  fin. 

23 


354 


CARTHAGE  AND  THE  CARTHAGINIANS. 


alii  effodiunt}  says  Virgil,  and  in  this  instance,  at  least,  he 
speaks  historical  truth.  The  outer  harbour  was  rectangular, 
about  fourteen  hundred  feet  long  and  eleven  hundred  broad, 
and  was  appropriated  to  merchant  vessels  ;  the  inner  was  cir- 
cular like  a  drinking  cup,  whence  it  was  called  the  Cothon,  and 
was  reserved  for  ships  of  war.  It  could  not  be  approached  ex- 
cept through  the  merchant  harbour,  and  the  entrance  to  this 
last  was  only  seventy  feet  wide,  and  could  be  closed  at  any 
time  by  chains.'^  The  war  harbour  was  entirely  surrounded  by 
quays,  containing  separate  docks  for  two  hundred  and  twenty 
ships.  In  front  of  each  dock  were  two  Ionic  pillars  of  marble, 
so  that  the  whole  must  have  presented  the  appearance  of  a 
splendid  circular  colonnade.  Right  in  the  centre  of  the  har- 
bour was  an  island,  the  head-quarters  of  the  admiral.  Here 
he  could  superintend  all  the  operations  of  that  thriving  and 
industrious  population  ;  here  his  orders  were  proclaimed  by 
the  voice  of  the  trumpet,  and  from  its  most  elevated  point  he 
could  see  over  the  intervening  strip  of  land,  and  keep  himself 
informed  of  all  that  was  going  on  in  the  open  sea  beyond. 
In  time  of  war,  he  could  view  a  hostile  fleet  approaching 
and  watch  all  its  movements,  while  the  enemy  could  know 
nothing  of  what  was  being  done  inside.*  We  have  no  full 
description  of  the  merchants'  harbour  ;  but,  in  time  of  peace, 
the  spacious  Lake  of  Tunis,  which  was  much  deeper  then 
than  now,  would  afford  safe  anchorage  to  the  myriads  of 
merchant  vessels  which  no  artificial  harbour  could  contain, 
and  which  sweeping  the  whole  of  the  Western  Mediter- 
ranean, were  not  afraid  in  very  early  times  to  tempt  the 

1  VirgU,  Mii.  i.  427. 

3  In  the  times  of  the  Vandals  the  word  "  Cothon  "  is  unknown,  and  that  of 
••  Mandracium"  has  taken  its  place;  Procopius,  Bel.  Vandal.  L  19  and  20, 
shows  that  it  could  be  closed  then,  as  in  the  Carthaginian  times,  by  a  chain  : 

icai  01  Via^pxri^oviot.  ras  ai8»ipa?  dA,v(reif  tow  kitiivo^  ov  6»j  Mai'jpaxioi'  xakovviv  a^tXofktvot, 

e(<rin)Tr.  tw  crroXy  iiroLovv.    The  Lake  of  Tunis  was  then  called  the  Stagnum  : 
Proc.  loc.  cit. 

'  Appian,  Pun.  96  ;  Strabo,  xviL  8, 14,  vntxcctrrai  Bk  rg  dxpoiroXei  ol  t«  Ai^cift 

icat  6    Kwdwi',  Kijcriov  mpt^cpcf,   tvpiiry  wtptcxoficfov,   cxorrt   vtmvoUovi  iitart(u^i¥ 


OtU/r/ 


PLAN   OP  HARBOURS   AT  CARTHAGE, 


354 


CARTHAGE  AND  THE  CARTHAGINIANS. 


alii  effndiunt,^  says  Virgil,  and  in  this  instance,  at  least,  he 
speaks  historical  truth.  The  outer  harbour  was  rectangular, 
about  fourteen  hundred  feet  long  and  eleven  hundred  broad, 
and  was  appropriated  to  merchant  vessels  ;  the  inner  was  cir- 
cular like  a  drinking  cup,  whence  it  was  called  the  Cothon,  and 
was  reserved  for  ships  of  war.  It  could  not  be  approached  ex- 
cept through  the  merchant  harbour,  and  the  entrance  to  this 
last  was  only  seventy  feet  wide,  and  could  be  closed  at  any 
time  by  chains.^  The  war  harbour  was  entirely  surrounded  by 
quays,  containing  separate  docks  for  two  hundred  and  twenty 
ships.  In  front  of  each  dock  were  two  Ionic  pillars  of  marble, 
so  that  the  whole  must  have  presented  the  appearance  of  a 
splendid  circular  colonnade.  Bight  in  the  centre  of  the  har- 
bour was  an  island,  the  head-quarters  of  the  admiral.  Here 
he  could  superintend  all  the  operations  of  that  thriving  and 
industrious  population  ;  here  his  orders  were  proclaimed  by 
the  voice  of  the  trumpet,  and  from  its  most  elevated  point  he 
could  see  over  the  intervening  strip  of  land,  and  keep  himself 
informed  of  all  that  was  going  on  in  the  open  sea  beyond. 
In  time  of  war,  he  could  view  a  hostile  fleet  approaching 
and  watch  all  its  movements,  while  the  enemy  could  know 
nothing  of  what  was  being  done  inside.^  We  have  no  full 
description  of  the  merchants*  harbour  ;  but,  in  time  of  peace, 
the  spacious  Lake  of  Tunis,  which  was  much  deeper  then 
than  now,  would  afford  safe  anchorage  to  the  myriads  of 
merchant  vessels  which  no  artificial  harbour  could  contain, 
and  which  sweeping  the  whole  of  the  Western  Mediter- 
ranean, were  not  afraid  in  very  early  times  to  tempt  the 


1  Virgil,  ^n.  1.  427. 

2  111  the  times  of  the  Vandals  the  word  "  Cothon  "  is  unknown,  and  that  of 
**  Mandraeium"  has  taken  its  place;  Procopius,  lid.  Vandal,  i.  19  and  20, 
shows  that  it  could  be  closed  then,  as  in  the  Carthaginian  times,  by  a  chain  : 

KOI  oi  KapxTjSot'ioi  rdsaiSijpdfaAvo'eitToO  Aifiivo^otf  Sri  Mafipdictof  »taAoC<rir  a<f><A6fie»»ot 

eto-tTTjTtt  TcS  (TToAw  iJTotovi'.    Thc  I^akc  of  Tuuis  was  then  called  the  Stagnura  : 
Proc.  Inc.  cit 

3  Appian,  Pun.  96  ;  Strabo,  XVii.  3,  14,  vnoKtlyrai  Bi  tH  a«po»roAei  ot  rt  AtMcccf 
Koi  6  Kcitfwi',  vriiriov  ireptt^epcf,  cvpiiry  nt/mxofJitvov,  •^oi'Ti  fcwaoiVovc  «aTfp«^«i» 
kvkAu*. 


PLAN   OF   HAUBOl'RS   AT  CARTHAGE, 


i 


THE  HARBOURS  OF  CARTHAGE. 


357 


dangers  of  even  the  Ocean  beyond.  Such  was  the  general 
aspect  and  position  of  the  city  whose  last  struggle  we  have 
now  to  relate.  That  struggle  was  heroic,  desperate,  super- 
human, but  the  conclusion  was  foregone ;  and  he  who  has 
gazed  on  the  free  and  the  imperial,  may  well  be  excused 
from  dwelling  at  length  on  the  agonies  of  the  doomed  city. 

The  resolution  of  Kome  was  taken.  The  question  of 
time  was  the  only  one  that  remained,  and  the  straits  to 
which  Carthage  had  been  already  reduced  by  Massinissa 
demonstrated  to  the  few  dissentients  alike  the  guilt  of  the 
city  and  the  fitness  of  the  present  moment.  In  vain,  did 
P.  Cornelius  Scipio  Nasica,  a  man  worthy  of  his  name, 
protest  against  the  idea  that  it  was  necessary,  in  order  that 
Rome  might  be  strong,  that  her  rival  must  be  destroyed  ; 
and  point  out  what  a  useful  check  upon  the  growing  tide  of 
luxury  and  corruption  the  bare  existence  of  her  ancient  foe 
might  prove.^  In  vain,  did  the  Carthaginians  condemn  Has- 
drubal  and  Carthalo,  the  leaders  of  the  patriotic  party,  to 
death.  In  vain,  did  they  send  embassy  after  embassy  to 
Rome,  profifering  the  amplest  compensation  and  the  most  un- 
limited submission.  The  Romans  replied  that  they  wanted 
only  "  satisfaction  "  ;  and  to  the  natural  question  as  to  what 
"  satisfaction  "  meant,  they  rejoined  that  the  Carthaginians 
knew  that  best  themselves. ^  Just  then  too  the  rats  began  to 
leave  the  sinking  vessel ;  for  there  arrived  an  embassy  from 
Utica,  the  mother  city  of  Carthage  herself,  surrendering  the 
city  absolutely  to  the  Romans.  This  was  just  what  the 
Romans  wanted,  for  it  gave  them  an  unimpeded  landing, 
and  a  second  base  of  operations  in  Africa,  only  ten  miles 
from  Carthage.  An  armament  of  eighty  thousand  men  had 
already  been  raised,  and  it  was  at  once  despatched  under  the 
consuls,  Manilius  and  Censorinus,  to  Lilybaeum,  on  its  way 


'  Livy,  Epit.  xlviii.   and  xlix.  ;  Diod.  xxxiv.  Frag.  11 ;  Appian,  Pun,  69 ; 
riularch,  Cato,  27. 

«Polyb.  xxxvi.  1,  2  ;  Appian,  Pun.  74;  Florus,  iL  15,  5;  Zonaras,  ix.  26. 


358 


CARTHAGE  AND  THE  CAkTHAGlNtAN^, 


to  Africa.    War  was  thus  declared  and  begun  on  the  very 
same  day.^ 

To  a  final  embassy  which,  even  after  this,  was  sent  to 
Rome,  and  was  instructed  to  avert  the  invasion  by  any  and 
by  every  means,  the  Romans  replied,  that  the  Carthaginians 
had  now,  at  length,  done  well,  and  that  Rome  would  guar- 
antee to  Carthage  "  her  territory,  her  sacred  rites,  her  tombs, 
her  liberty,  and  her  possessions,"  if  three  hundred  hostages, 
drawn  from  the  noblest  families,  were  delivered  to  the  con- 
suls at  Lilybaeum  within  thirty  days.^  Long  before  the  thirty 
days  were  out  the  demand  was  complied  with,  by  the  ob- 
sequious zeal  of  the  Carthaginians,  who  were  then  told  that 
the  further  demands  of  the  Romans  would  be  made  known 
in  Africa.  This  secured  the  Romans  from  all  opposition  in 
crossing  or  in  landing;  and  when  the  ambassadors  again 
presented  themselves  in  Utica,  they  were  told  that  as  Car- 
thage was  henceforward  to  be  under  the  protection  of  Rome, 
they  would  need  no  other  protection  at  alL  All  arms  and 
all  engines  of  war  were  therefore  to  be  given  up.  After 
some  remonstrances  this  demand  too  was  complied  with, 
and  long  lines  of  waggons  brought  to  the  consuls  two  thou- 
sand catapults  and  two  hundred  thousand  stands  of  arms. 
Then  Censorinus  rose,  and  all  possibility  of  resistance  having, 
as  he  thought,  been  taken  away,  revealed  the  final  orders 
of  Rome — the  orders  which,  it  must  be  remembered,  had 
been  secretly  committed  to  him  and  his  brother-consul  from 
the  very  beginning — that  Carthage  was  to  be  destroyed,  but 
that  the  citizens  might  build  a  new  city  in  any  part  of  their 
territory  they  pleased,  provided  only  it  was  ten  miles  from 
the  coast.* 

*  Appian,  Pun.  75. 

*The  exact  words  have  fortunately  been  preserved  in  a  fragment  of 
Diodorus.  xxxii  Frag.  5,  and  demonstrate  beyond  a  doubt  the  *'  perfidia 
plusquam  Punica "  of  the  Romans :  Hiwaiv  avroU  ^  ovyitAi|To«  fo^ovc,  x^^p^^^i 

itpa,    rdiftovf,    cAcv^cptAf,    vwap^iv,    oWafiow     wpoariBtlaa    woXtM    r^v    KapxuSova, 
napaxpiinrovaa  Si  i^v  TavT^«  avrfptaiv.      Cf.  Polyb.  ZZXVi.  2,  4* 

»  Appian,  Pun.  76-81  ;  Florus.  u.  15.  5-S. 


i 


PERFIDIA  PLUSQUAM  PUNICA. 


359 


The  consul  was  interrupted  in  the  few  words  he  had  to 
say  by  an  outburst  of  grief  and  indignation  on  the  part  of 
the  assembled  senators  and  ambassadors.  They  beat  their 
breasts,  they  tore  their  hair  and  clothes,  they  threw  them- 
selves on  the  ground  in  their  agony.  The  Romans  were 
prepared  for  this,  and  kindly  allowed  their  grief  to  have  its 
way.  When  the  first  outburst  was  over,  and  the  am- 
bassadors found  that  all  their  appeals  to  the  treaty  and  to 
the  recent  understanding  with  Rome  were  alike  unavail- 
ing, they  begged,  in  the  extremity  of  their  distress,  that  the 
Roman  fleet  might  appear  before  the  walls  of  Carthage  at 
the  same  time  with  themselves ;  a  step  which  they  deemed 
would  make  resistance  seem  doubly  hopeless,  and  would 
save  the  lives  which,  in  the  paroxysm  of  their  fury,  the  in- 
habitants would  otherwise  be  Ukely  to  throw  away.  Many 
of  them,  even  so,  were  afraid  to  face  the  reception  which 
awaited  them  in  the  city,  and  remained  behind  in  the 
Roman  camp.  Those  who  had  the  courage  to  bear  the 
fatal  message  gave  no  answer  to  the  citizens  who  thronged 
out  to  meet  them  as  they  neared  the  city  walls  ;  but,  keep- 
ing their  eyes  on  the  ground,  made  their  way,  as  best  they 
could,  in  imminent  danger  of  their  lives,  to  the  council 
chamber.  1 

The  cry  which  burst  from  the  assembled  senators,  when 
they  learned  the  Roman  ultimatum,  was  taken  up  by  the 
multitude  outside ;  and  then  was  seen  a  sublime  outburst 
of  frenzy  and  despair,  to  which  history  affords  no  parallel. 
The  multitude  wreaked  their  fury  on  the  senators  who  had 
counselled  submission,  on  the  ambassadors  who  had  brought 
back  the  message,  on  the  gods  who  had  forsaken  them.  All 
the  Italians  found  within  the  walls  were  put  to  death  with 
torture.  There  was  a  rush  of  the  infuriated  citizens  to  the 
armoury ;  but  they  found  there  only  the  empty  stands  which 
a  few  days  before  had  been  laden  with  arms.  They  ad- 
journed to  the  harbour,  but  the  docks  were  empty ;  there 

»  Polyb.  xxxvi.  4,  5,  1-5  ;  Appian,  Pun.  81-91. 


i 


3<5o 


CARTHAGE  AND  THE  CARTHAGINIANS, 


were  only  vast  supplies  of  timber  there,  which,  but  for  their 
blind  fidelity  to  the  very  treaty  which  the  Romans  had  set 
at  nought,  might,  ere  now,  have  been  converted  into  ships 
of  war.     They  called  by  name  on  the  elephants  whose  horse- 
shoe stalls  still  stood  beneath  the  shelter  of  the  huge  triple 
wall,  and  whose  deeds  of  prowess  in  the  last  war  were  still 
remembered,  but  alas !  were  matters  of  remembrance  only. 
The  matrons  whose  sons  had  been  taken  to  serve  as  hos- 
tages rushed  about  like  furies,  upbraiding  the  magistrates 
who  had  disregarded  their  remonstrances,  and  the  gods  who 
could  look  on  unmoved  at  their  grief.    Meanwhile  the  Senate, 
or  what  remained  of  it,  declared  war  ;  the  gates  were  closed ; 
stones  were  carried  to  the  walls ;  all  the  slaves  in  the  city 
were  set  free  ;  messages  were  sent  to  the  outlawed  Has- 
drubal,  who  was  at  large  at  the  head  of  twenty  thousand 
men,  begging  him  to  forgive  and  forget,  and  to  save  the 
city,  which,  in  his  just  indignation,  he  was,  even  then,  pre- 
paring to  attack.     A   second  Hasdrubal,   the   grandson   of 
Massinissa,  was  made  commander-in-chief ;  and  while  leave 
was  being  humbly  asked,  and  refused,  to  send  once  more  to 
Bome  before  the  irrevocable  deed  was  done,  the  whole  city 
was  turned  into  one  vast  workshop.     Its  buildings — public 
and  private,  sacred  and  profane  ahke — resounded  with  the 
workman's  hammer  and  anvil.     Lead  was  stripped  oflf  from 
the  roofs  and  iron  torn  out  of  the  walls.     Men  and  women 
worked  day  and  night,  taking  neither  rest  nor  sleep ;  the 
matrons  cut  off  their  long  hair  and  twisted  it  into  ropes  for 
the  catapults ;    and    while    the   Romans   were   hesitating, 
partly  perhaps  from  pity  to  their  victims,  partly  from  the 
belief  that  a  few  days  would   demonstrate  even  to  these 
frenzied  Phoenicians  the   hopelessness  of  resistance,  arms 
were  extemporised  for  an  adequate  number  of  the  citizens, 
and  the  city  was  somehow  put  into  a  position  to  stand  a 
siege.^ 

When  at  last  the  executioners  approached  to  receive  its 

»  Appian,  Pun.  91-94  ;  Florus,  ii.  15,  9-10  ;  Zouaras,  ix.  26. 


FAILURES  AND  LOSSES  OF  ROMANS. 


361 


submission,  they  found,  to  their  surprise,  that  the   gates 
were  closed,  and   that  the  walls  were  fully  manned  and 
armed  with  all  the  engines  of  war.     There  was  nothing  for 
it  but  to  try  force.     But  force  they  tried  in  vain.     Manilius 
attacked  the  city  on  the  land  side  where  it  was  strongest, 
for  a  wall  and  ditch  ran  right  across  the  isthmus  from  sea 
to  sea ;  ^  Censorinus  from  the  side  of  the  Taenia,  between 
land  and  water,  where  it  was  weakest.     To  their  dismay, 
both   attempts  failed ;    and  each   had  to   go  through   the 
humiliating  process  of  fortifying  his  camp.     Censorinus  now 
proceeded  to  bring  up  wood  and  woodcutters  from  the  other 
side  of  the  Lake  of  Tunis,  and  filled  in  with  stones  and  soil 
that  portion  of  it  which  lay  behind  the  Taenia,  so  that  he 
might  bring  his  battering  rams  to  bear  upon  the  weakest 
part  of  the  wall.     A  portion  of  it  fell  beneath  a  gigantic  ram, 
propelled  by  six  thousand  soldiers.     But  the  damage  was 
partially  repaired  during  the  night,  and  the  besieging  engines 
themselves  were  disabled  by  a  sudden  sortie.    On  the  follow- 
ing day  the  Romans  ventured  through  the  part  of  the  breach 
which  was  still  open ;  but  they  were  glad  enough  to  make 
their  way  out  again  under  the  protection   of  the  young 
Scipio,  who  was  then  serving  in  their  army  as  a  simple 
military  tribune.^    With  the  rising  of  the  dog-star,  pestilence 
broke  out  in  the  ranks  of  the  besiegers,  and  when  Cen- 
sorinus transferred  his  ships  from  the  fetid  waters  of  the 
lake  to  the  open  sea,  they  narrowly  escaped  being  destroyed 
by  the  Carthaginian  fire  ships. 

The  year  b.o.  149  drew  towards  its  close,  and  when  Cen- 
sorinus returned  to  Rome  to  hold  the  elections  for  the  en- 
suing year,  he  had  no  progress  to  report.  Operations  were 
not  suspended  during  the  winter,  and,  once  and  again,  if  our 
authorities  are  to  be  trusted,  it  would  have  fared  ill  with  the 

1  Appian,  Pun.  97  and  117 ;  Dr.  Davis  and  others  place  the  triple  walls 
here:  and  Strabo's  tojto?  evpuxwp^?  (loc.  cit.)  certainly  agrees  better  with  this 
locality  than  with  that  near  the  Byrsa. 

«  Appian,  Pun.  97,  98;  Zonaras,  ix.  26. 


3^2 


CARTHAGE  AND  THE  CARTHAGINIANS, 


SCIPIO  MMtLIANUS, 


363 


other  consul  if  Scipio  had  not  come  to  the  rescue.^  Has- 
drubal  and  Himilco  Phameas,  who  were  in  command  of  the 
Carthaginian  army  outside  the  city,  showed  themselves  to 
be  skilful  generals ;  and  Massinissa  himself,  not  liking  to  see 
the  game  taken  out  of  his  hands,  when  he  thought  it  was  his 
own,  declined  to  supply  the  Romans  with  the  aid  for  which 
they  asked.  A  rupture  seemed  imminent,  but  the  wily  old 
Numidian  was  spared  the  humiliation  of  seeing  what  he  looked 
upon  as  his  predestined  booty  appropriated  by  the  Romans. 
It  must  have  been  a  drop  of  consolation,  the  only  drop  of  con- 
solation in  the  cup  of  misery  which  the  Carthaginians  had 
now  to  drain,  that  neither  the  honest  Roman  censor  nor  the 
grasping  Numidian  king  lived  to  see  the  deed  for  which  they 
had  so  long  worked  and  plotted.  Cato  and  Massinissa  died 
in  the  same  year,  after  the  destruction  of  Carthage  had  been 
finally  resolved  on,  but,  thanks  to  the  heroism  of  the  inhabi- 
tants, before  it  had  been  fully  carried  out.^ 

The  generals  of  the  year  148,  the  consul  Calpurnius  Piso  and 
his  legate  Mancinus,  were  not  more  successful  and  were  even 
less  energetic  than  their  predecessors.  The  siege  of  Carthage 
was  practically  raised,  and  their  term  of  office  was  frittered 
away  in  aimless  and  desultory  attacks  upon  smaller  places — 
such  as  Clypea  and  Hippo  Zary  tus — wherein  success  could  have 
done  them  little  service,  and  defeat,  which  was  the  more  com- 
mon result,  entailed  much  discouragement  and  disorganisation.' 

So  things  might  have  gone  on  for  years,  and  the  Romans, 
by  their  unprovoked  aggression,  well  deserved  that  it  should 
be  so.  But  one  man  there  was  serving  in  a  humble  capacity 
in  the  Roman  army,  whom  his  exploits  and  his  parentage, 
alike  lineal  and  adopted,  marked  out  even  then  from  his  pro- 
fessional superiors.  Even  Cato,  who  was  opposed  on  prin- 
ciple to  his  family  and  his  mode  of  life,  had  applied  to  him 
what  Homer  says  of  the  Seer  Teiresias,  amidst  the  airy 

1  Appian,  Pun.  99-101. 

«  Polyb.  xxxvii.  Frag.  3 ;  Appian,  Pun.  94, 105,  106 ;  Zonaras.  ix.  27. 

»  Appian,  Pun.  110 ;  Zonara^s,  ix.  29. 


phantoms  of  the  nether  world,  "  he  alone  is  fiesh  and  blood, 
the  rest  are  fleeting  shades  ".^ 

P.  Cornelius  Scipio  was  the  youngest  son  of  -^Emilius 
Paullus,  the  conqueror  of  Macedonia.  When  quite  a  youth 
he  had  fought  by  his  father's  side  at  Pydna,  and  he  was 
afterwards  adopted  into  a  still  more  illustrious  family,  that 
of  the  Scipios.  Like  his  grandfather  by  adoption,  the  great 
Africanus,  he  had  early  shown  a  taste  for  other  arts  than 
that  of  war ;  and  his  fondness  for  literature  was  cemented 
by  the  friendship  which  he  formed,  while  still  a  youth,  with 
the  more  distinguished  of  the  Achaean  exiles,  above  all  with 
the  historian  Poly  bins.  Not  that  he  was,  in  any  sense  of 
the  word,  as  Polybius  himself,  and  his  contemporaries  gener- 
ally, not  unnaturally,  thought  him,  a  man  of  genius.  He 
was  inferior  in  all  respects  to  his  grandfather  by  adoption, 
the  elder  Scipio.  Yet  his  friendship  with  the  best  men  of 
his  time  was  a  pure  and  noble  friendship,  and  was  worthy 
of  being  immortalised  by  the  song  of  Horace  and  by  the  De 
Amiciti^  of  Cicero.  It  was  well  for  Rome  that  to  a  man  so 
bom  and  bred,  and  so  richly  endowed  amidst  the  blunders 
and  the  incapacity  of  his  nominal  superiors,  the  eyes  of  the 
Roman  soldiers,  and  the  Roman  citizens  alike,  were  now 
instinctively  turning  for  safety.  Three  times  over,  so  it  was 
said,  during  the  absence  of  Censorinus,  by  his  address  or 
valour,  had  Scipio  saved  the  army  of  the  other  consul,  Mani- 
lius,  from  destruction.  He  had  even  induced  the  ablest  of 
the  Carthaginian  generals,  Himilco  Phameas,  to  cross  over 
to  the  Romans  with  two  thousand  five  hundred  cavalry. 2  But 
the  most  that  he  could  do  in  his  capacity  of  mere  military 
tribune  was  to  anticipate  or  undo  the  blunders  of  his  superiors ; 
and  it  seemed  more  and  more  possible  that  Carthage  might 
yet  weather  the  storm,  when,  fortunately  for  himself  and  for 
Rome,  Scipio  left  the  army  to  stand  for  the  .^dileship.  He 
was  accompanied  to  the  ship  by  the  soldiers,  who  did  not 

*  Polyb.  xxxvi.  v.  5-6 ;  Homer,  Odyssey,  x.  495. 
»  Appian,  Pun.  102-104,  107-109;  Zonaras,  ix.  27. 


364 


CARTHAGE  AND  THE  CARTHAGINIANS. 


conceal  their  hope  that  he  would  soon  return  as  their  com- 
mander-in-chief;  and  as  their  commander-in-chief  he  soon 
did  return.  Now,  as  on  one  or  two  other  occasions  in  their 
history,  notably  as  when  the  elder  Scipio  had  volunteered  to 
take  the  command  in  Spain,  the  Komans,  wedded  though  they 
were  to  constitutional  forms,  saw  that  there  was  something 
more  important  even  than  those  forms,  the  safety  of  the  state 
itself ;  and,  in  spite  of  his  age,  which  was  still  six  years  below 
the  legal  age,  and  of  his  not  having  filled  any  other  curule 
office,  the  young  Scipio  was  elected  not  to  the  ^dileship,  but 
to  the  Consulship,  with  the  implied  understanding,  as  in  the 
case  of  the  elder  Scipio,  that  his  command  was  not  to  come 
to  an  end  except  with  the  end  of  the  war.^ 

The  new  consul  arrived  in  Africa  at  a  critical  moment. 
He  first  rescued  from  imminent  destruction  Mancinus,  one 
of  the  outgoing  generals,  who  had  allowed  himself  to  be  cut 
off  from  all  supphes  and  reinforcements  on  a  high  cliff  in  the 
suburbs,^  and  then  brought  back  the  other  army  of  the  consul 
Piso,  which  was  still  carrying  on  a  make-believe  warfare  amidst 
the  inland  towns,  to  its  proper  work,  the  siege  of  the  capital 
Having  restored  discipline  by  clearing  his  camp  of  the  ineffec- 
tives  and  of  the  birds  of  prey  of  various  species  which  had 
accumulated  in  it  with  amazing  rapidity  during  the  exploits  of 
the  last  two  years,  he  managed  to  take  the  vast  suburbs  of 
Megara  by  surprise,  and  thus  compelled  Hasdrubal  to  abandon 
his  open  camp  and  to  take  refuge  in  the  Byrsa.^ 

The  siege  of  the  city  proper  now  began  in  earnest,  and 
now  also  began,  if  we  may  believe  our  authorities,  a  reign 
of  terror  for  the  unhappy  Carthaginians  who  were  pent  up 
within  it.  Having  got  rid  of  his  namesake,  the  commander 
of  the  garrison,  by  false  charges,  Hasdrubal  installed  him- 
self as  commander-in-chief.     But  he  proved  to  be  as  vain 

1  Appian.  Pun.  109,  112. 

2  Appian,  Pun.  113-114 ;  Zonaras,  ix.  29.    See  below,  p.  382-383. 

3  Appian.  Pun.  113-118;  Zonaras,  ix.  29. 


SCIPIO'S  MOLE  AND  THE  NEW  OUTLET. 


365 


as  he  was  cruel,  and  as  weak  as  he  was  pretentious.^  His 
first  act  was  to  bring  all  the  Eoman  prisoners  to  the  battle- 
ments, and,  after  torturing  them  cruelly,  to  throw  them  over 
the  wall  in  sight  of  the  Roman  army.  When  expostula- 
tions were  addressed  to  him  by  some  of  the  citizens,  he 
vented  his  rage  on  them  in  a  similar  manner.^ 

Scipio  bridled  his  indignation,  caring  little  if  his  revenge 
were  slow,  provided  only  it  were  sure.  He  carried  a  double 
line  of  fortifications  right  across  the  isthmus  within  a  bow- 
shot of  the  city  walls,  thus  at  once  protecting  himself  from 
a  surprise  and  effectually  cutting  off  the  Carthaginians  from 
all  succour  on  the  land  side.  But  the  sea  was  still  open  to 
her  own  children,  and  fearless  blockade  runners  kept  enter- 
ing the  narrow  mouth  of  the  merchant  harbour  right  under 
the  eyes  of  the  Romans.  Scipio  therefore  began  to  construct 
a  mole  of  huge  stones,  which,  starting  from  the  Taenia,  should 
block  up  for  ever  the  mouth  of  the  harbour.  This  operation, 
if  it  was  feasible,  would  make  the  surrender  only  a  question 
of  time.  At  first  the  Carthaginians  thought  it  was  not  feas- 
ible. But  it  progressed  rapidly,  and  in  two  months  it  was 
all  but  completed  ;  when,  to  the  infinite  surprise  and  chagrin 
of  the  Romans,  a  fleet  of  fifty  triremes,  hastily  built  of  ma- 
terials which  had  been  accumulated  before  the  war  began 
sailed  out,  as  it  were  through  dry  land,  into  the  open  sea. 
and  that  at  a  point  where  the  waters  were  so  deep  and  the 
surf  so  angry  that  it  was  hopeless  to  think  of  closing  the  exit 
by  any  further  prolongation  of  the  mole.^ 

How  so  gigantic  a  work  can  have  been  accomplished — 
new  ships  built,  and  a  new  passage  opened — without  even 
a  suspicion  being  aroused  in  the  minds  of  the  Romans  as 
to  what  was  going  on,  it  is  difficult  to  say.  Deserters, 
indeed,    had    reported    that    the  workman's  pickaxe    and 

*  Polyb.  XXXix  .1-2.  xtvoBo^oi  Jiv  koX  «Aa^r  ««t  woKv  K^x^tp^Vfuvoi  riji  npaynaruc^ 
Kai  aTpartfyiK'^^  Swdntui*;. 

«  Polyb.  XXXix.  2,  6-13 ;  Appian,  Pun.  118. 
•Appian.  Pun.  120,121. 


366 


CARTHAGE  AND  THE  CARTHAGINIANS. 


THE  FINAL  ASSAULT. 


367 


1 


hammer  were  to  be  heard  day  and  night  within  the  harl)our 
quarter,  which  was  itself  surrounded  by  a  wall.^  But  the 
secret  had  been  kept ;  and  kept,  it  would  seem,  not  merely 
from  the  Komans,  but  from  the  mass  of  the  citizens  them- 
selves. It  is  another  illustration  of  that  suspicious  shrewd- 
ness which  marked  the  policy  of  the  ruling  Carthaginian 
oligarchy  throughout  its  history — a  shrewdness  which  often, 
indeed,  outwitted  itself,  but  sometimes,  as  in  this  supreme 
crisis  of  their  fate,  did  good  service,  and  which  explains  in 
part  what  is  otherwise  so  inexplicable — that  alternation  of 
caution  and  of  rashness,  of  ebullient  enthusiasm  and  of 
much-enduring  patience,  of  long-sighted  prevision  and  of 
short-sighted  laissez-faire,  of  sordid  selfishness  and  of  sub- 
lime self-abnegation,  which  bafifles  calculation  and  defies 
analysis,  refusing  to  be  accounted  for  by  any  ordinary 
combination  of  motives  or  to  be  tested  by  any  of  the  re- 
ceived maxims  of  morality.  The  Romans  found  that  all 
their  labour  had  been  thrown  away ;  and,  if  only  the  newly 
fledged  vessels  had  joined  battle  with  them  at  once,  instead 
of  airing  in  childish  but  natural  glee  their  untried  powers 
of  flight  in  the  open  gulf,  they  must  have  surprised  and 
overpowered  them.  But  this  was  not  to  be ;  and  after  an 
evolution  or  two,  they  returned  into  the  harbour  by  the 
narrow  passage  by  which  they  had  left  it.  Three  days 
after  they  sailed  out  again,  and  this  time  they  ofifered  battle. 
But  the  Romans  had  recovered  from  their  dismay.  The 
conflict  was  waged  on  equal  terms,  and  on  returning  at 
nightfall  to  their  harbour,  the  Carthaginian  ships,  jostling 
against  one  another  at  its  narrow  entrance,  were  exposed  to 
the  attacks  of  the  enemy  and  suffered  much  loss.' 

Bafiled  in  his  attempt  to  block  up  the  harbour  by  sea, 
Scipio  now  attacked  its  fortifications  by  land  from  the  side  of 
the  Taenia  and  from  the  newly  constructed  mole.  A  part  of 
its  walls  fell ;  but  the  Carthaginians,  wading  or  swimming 
through  the  water  by  night,  made  an  attack  on  the  besieging 


I 


1  Appian,  Pun.  127. 


«Appian,  Pwn.  123, 124. 


lines,  and  then,  suddenly  kindling  the  torches  which  they 
carried,  withstood,  with  the  fury  of  maniacs  or  of  wild  beasts 
at  bay,  the  darts  which  were  rained  on  their  naked  bodies  tiU 
they  had  efifected  their  object,  the  destruction  of  the  engines 
by  fire,  and  had  scattered  panic  throughout  the  Roman  army. 
In  the  morning  they  repaired  the  breach  in  the  fortifica- 
tions at  their  leisure,  and  raised  lofty  towers  along  the  harbour 
wall,  to  face  the  lines  of  circumvallation  and  the  mounds 
with  which  the  Romans  were  endeavouring  to  approach  it.^ 
80  the  summer  passed  away  and  still  Carthage  stood. 

During  the  winter  months  Scipio  attacked  Nepheris,  a  town 
on  the  other  side  of  the  lake,  the  head-quarters  of  a  relieving 
army,  and  the  place  from  which  provisions  and  supplies  had 
been  most  systematically  forwarded  to  the  beleaguered  Cartha- 
ginians ever  since  the  siege  began.  Laelius,  having  received  the 
chief  command  of  the  expedition,  took  the  large  fortified  camp 
outside  the  town,  and  put  to  the  sword  a  mixed  multitude 
of  seventy  thousand  soldiers  and  peasants.  Soon  afterwards 
Nepheris  itself  fell  into  Scipio's  hands  ;  and  all  the  isolated 
garrisons  which  had  hitherto  remained  true  to  Carthage, 
together  with  the  country  which  they  commanded,  submitted 
to  Rome. 2  And  so  one  more  winter  passed  away,  and  still, 
in  spite  of  the  more  than  "  Punic  perfidy "  which  three 
years  before  had  seemed  to  lay  Carthage  defenceless  at  the 
feet  of  Rome,  and  still  without  a  foot  of  ground  which  she 
could  now  call  her  own,  except  that  which  her  buildings 
covered,  and  without  a  soldier  or  a  citizen  save  those  who  were 
penned  within  her  walls — the  grand  old  city  held  bravely  out — 

0  pudor  ! 
0  magna  Karthago  probrosis 
Altior  Italiae  ruinis. 

But  now  her  hour  had  come.  At  the  beginning  of  the 
spring  Scipio  delivered  his  final  attack.  He  first  took  by 
storm   the  quarter  of  the  merchants'  harbour ;  then,  with 

'Appian,  Pmw.  124, 125. 

»  Appian.  Pun  126  ;  cf.  Strabo,  xvii  3, 16. 


368 


CARTHAGE  AND  THE  CARTHAGINIANS. 


the  help  of  a  surprise  planned  and  carried  out  by  Laelius, 
the  war  harbour ;  and  thence  he  passed,  without  opposition, 
into  the  adjacent  market-place. ^ 

The  city  might  now  have  been  thought  to  be  in  his 
hands.  Three  streets  led  up  from  the  market-place  to  the 
citadel,  and  the  citadel  alone,  it  might  have  been  anticipated, 
would  now  give  any  further  trouble.  But  those  three  streets 
meant  six  days  of  fighting  and  of  massacre.  They  were 
held  by  frenzied  and  despairing  Phoenicians,  and  were  well 
adapted  for  such  a  defence  as  frenzied  and  despairing 
Phoenicians  alone  could  make.  They  were  narrow,  and 
above  them  rose  houses  six  storeys  high  with  overhanging 
eaves ;  and  from  these  such  darts  and  missiles  as  came 
to  hand  would  be  hurled  down  in  one  continuous  shower 
on  the  advancing  foe.  From  such  a  downpour  even  the 
Komans  shrank.  They  hesitated  for  a  moment;  but  it 
was  for  a  moment  only.  Storming  the  first  house  to  which 
they  came,  they  put  its  inhabitants  to  the  sword,  and  then 
passing  step  by  step,  and  inch  by  inch,  from  building  to 
building,  or  from  roof-top  to  roof-top  by  planks  laid  across 
the  intervals,  they  massacred  every  Uving  thing  they  met. 
Each  house  was  a  castle,  and  a  castle  defended  by  its  gar- 
rison to  the  last  extremity.  The  battle  raged  on  the  house- 
tops, within  the  houses  themselves,  and  in  the  streets  below. 
Many  of  the  inmates  were  hurled  down  from  the  windows 
or  the  roofs  and  caught  on  the  pikes  of  the  assailants. 

At  last  the  citadel  was  reached  and  the  fighting  was  at  an 
end.  But  the  most  piteous  scene  of  all  was  still  to  come. 
Scipio  gave  the  order  to  fire  the  streets  which  it  had  cost  the 
Komans  so  much  to  gain,  to  level  the  ruins,  and  so  to  open 
the  approaches  to  the  Byrsa  which  still  frowned  in  front. 
It  was  a  natural  order,  and  one  which  did  not  appear  to 
imply  unnecessary  cruelty  or  loss  of  life.  But,  unknown  to 
Scipio,  a  number  of  old  men  and  women  and  children  had 
concealed  themselves  only  too  skilfully  in  the  cupboards  or 

>  Appian,  Pun.  127. 


CAPTURE  OF  THE  BYRSA. 


369 


the  cellars  of  the  houses  in  which  the  fighting  had  been 
going  on,  and  these  were  now  burned  alive,  or  fell  with 
the  falling  buildings ;  while  others,  half-roasted  or  half- 
suffocated,  flung  themselves  headlong  from  the  windows  into 
the  streets.  There  they  lay,  and  thence  they  were  shovelled, 
dead  and  dying  ahke,  amidst  charred  beams  and  crumbling 
masonry,  into  any  hollows  which  required  filling  up.  Heads 
or  legs  might  be  seen  protruding  from  the  reeking  and  the 
smouldering  mass  till  they  were  trampled  into  nothing  by 
the  oncoming  cavalry.  This  fearful  scene  Polybius  himself 
witnessed  and  recorded.^ 

The  six  days  of  the  struggle  and  the  massacre  were,  at 
length,  over.  The  Boman  troops  had  frequently  relieved 
each  other  during  its  progress,  but  Scipio  had  allowed  him- 
self to  take  no  rest.  He  snatched  his  food  only  in  the 
intervals  of  giving  orders,  and  he  now  at  last  sat  down  on 
an  "  elevated  place  "  to  see  what  had  been  done  and  what 
yet  remained  to  do.  The  Byrsa  was  not  so  much  a  citadel 
or  any  single  building  as  that  quarter  of  the  city  which  was 
on  the  highest  ground  and  was  most  strongly  fortified.  With- 
in that  quarter  all  who  had  escaped  the  starvation  of  the 
siege,  and  the  tyranny  of  Hasdrubal,  and  the  sword  and 
fire  of  the  Komans,  were  now  huddled  together;  and,  on 
the  following  day,  a  deputation  came  forth,  with  suppliant 
branches  and  fillets  taken  from  the  temple  of  ^sculapius 
in  their  hands,  begging  Scipio  to  spare  their  lives.  Their 
lives,  but  nothing  else,  the  conqueror  spared  them,  and  fifty 
thousand  men,  women,  and  children  came  forth  through  the 
gate  of  the  citadel.  The  nine  hundred  deserters  from  the 
Komans  remained  behind  with  Hasdrubal  and  his  wife  and 
children.  For  them  no  mercy  was  either  asked  or  granted. 
They  withdrew,  first,  from  the  sixty  steps  which  led  up  to- 
wards the  citadel  to  the  level  ground  at  the  top ;  thence, 
into  the  temple  of  ^sculapius  itself,  and  thence,  once  more, 
to  its  roof,  determined  to  sell  their  lives  as  dearly  as  pos- 

1  Appian,  Pun.  127-129  ;  Zouaras,  iz.  90. 

24 


i70 


CARTHAGE  AND  THE  CARTHAGINIANS. 


sible.  But  there  was  one  coward  soul  even  amongst  them. 
Alone  and  trembling,  Hasdrubal,  the  commander-in-chief,  the 
murderer  of  his  predecessor,  the  man  who  had  tortured  and 
massacred  the  Roman  prisoners,  who,  if  our  reports  speak 
true,  had  starved  the  citizens  while  he  himself  feasted  and 
drank — the  Marat  and  the  Robespierre  in  one  of  the  reign 
of  terror  which  he  had  established — crept  forth  in  suppliant 
guise,  and  threw  himself  at  Scipio's  feet  begging  for  his 
dear  hfe.^  It  was  contemptuously  granted  him  amidst  the 
curses,  loud  and  long,  of  the  deserters  who  were  crowded 
together  on  the  roof,  and  who  saw  the  dastardly  deed. 
Worn  out  with  fatigue  they  now  set  fire  to  the  temple,  and 
Hasdrubal's  wife,  arraying  herself,  like  her  majestic  com- 
patriot Jezebel,  in  her  best  attire,  came  forth,  it  is  said, 
upon  the  roof  with  her  two  sons,  and  after  complimenting 
Scipio  as  a  noble  foe,  and  heaping  reproaches  on  her  re- 
creant husband,  she  first  slew  her  sons  with  the  sword, 
and  then  flinging  herself  and  them  together  into  the  flames, 
died  as  became,  not  indeed  the  wife  of  Hasdrubal,  but  as 
became  the  wife  of  the  last  commander-in-chief  of  Carthaeje 
and  the  last  of  the  free  Phoenician  race.^ 

All  resistance  was  now  over,  and  Scipio  was  master  of  a 
heap  of  smouldering  ruins.  But  to  him,  at  all  events,  the 
victory  did  not  seem,  even  in  the  exuberance  of  the  moment, 
to  be  matter  for  unmixed  congratulation.  He  burst  into 
tears,  and  was  overheard  by  his  faithful  friend  Polybius 
repeating  to  himself  in  ominous  tones  the  words  of  Homer, 
*'  the  day  will  come  when  sacred  Troy  shall  fall,  and  Priam 

J  Polyb.  xxxix.  3  et  seq.  Ihne,  History  of  Rome,  iii.  p.  365,  questions  the 
truth  of  the  picture  which  Polybius  has  drawn  of  Hasdrubal.  But  it  is 
difficult  to  see  the  object  of  the  Romans  in  inventing,  if  indeed  they  did  in- 
vent, such  calumnies.  The  more  incapable  the  Carthaginian  commander,  the 
more  amazing  is  the  heroism  of  the  Carthaginian  resistance,  and  the  less 
the  cause  for  boasting  to  the  Romans  when  at  last  they  triumphed.  Hie  de- 
tails of  the  story  of  Hasdrubal's  wife  are  certainly  suspicious,  if  they  are  not 
altogether  impossible. 

«  Polyb.  xxxix.  3,  1,  2 ;  Appian,  Pun,  180,  181. 


CARTHAGE  RAZED  TO  THE  GROUND, 


371 


and  Priam's  people  too".^  The  work  of  butchery  over,  it 
was  time  for  that  of  plunder  to  begin.  The  gold  and  silver 
and  temple  ornaments  were  reserved  to  grace  Scipio's 
triumph ;  but  the  sculptures  and  the  paintings  and  other 
works  of  art  which  had  been  stolen  from  the  Sicilian  cities 
were  freely  restored  to  them ;  an  act  of  grace  and  modera- 
tion otherwise  unknown  in  the  Roman  annals,  and,  doubt- 
less, due  to  the  refined  soul  and  Hellenic  sympathies  of  the 
general  himself.  Many  of  these  works  of  art  were  un- 
fortunately, as  Cicero  remarks,  restored  to  the  Sicilians  by 
Scipio,  only  that  they  might  be  taken  from  them  by  Verres  ;  * 
but  for  this  the  Roman  people  at  large  are  happily  not  re- 
sponsible. The  joy  at  Rome  when  Scipio's  galley,  laden 
with  the  trophies  of  his  victory,  arrived  was  boundless  ;  and  it 
was  some  time  before  the  citizens  could  fully  realise  the  fact 
that  their  ancient  rival,  the  rival  which  had  once  and  again 
brought  them  to  the  brink  of  destruction,  was  no  more.^ 

Much  of  the  city  still  remained  standing,  and  it  was  the 
wish  of  Scipio  and  of  a  small  minority  of  the  noblest 
Romans  that  that  part  should  still  be  spared.  But  what 
had  been  granted  even  to  the  hated  Capua  was  denied  to 
Carthage.  The  spirit  of  old  Cato  seemed  even  from  his 
tomb  to  rule  the  day,  and  the  orders  of  the  Senate  were 
peremptory  that  all  vestiges  of  their  hereditary  foe  were  to 
be  effaced.  When  every  building  had  been  levelled  with 
the  ground,  the  plough  was  driven  over  its  remains,  and  a 
solemn  curse  was  pronounced  by  Scipio  on  any  one  who 
should  attempt  to  re- build  the  city,  or  even  to  dwell  upon 
its  site.  The  rest  of  the  inhabitants  were,  with  few  excep- 
tions, sold  as  slaves.  The  one  Carthaginian  who,  if  the  tales 
told  of  him  are  to  be  trusted,  was  least  worthy  of  his  liberty 
and  life,  the  miserable  Hasdrubal  himself,  was — perhaps 
by  an  act  of  cruel  kindness  on  the  part  of  the  Romans — 
aUowed  to  retain  them  both,  and  after  adorning  Scipio's 

>  Iliad,  vi  448-449  ;  Polyb.  xxxix.  3,  3-6  ;  Appian,  Pun.  132. 
"Cicero,  Verres,  iv.  83.  "Appian,  Pun.  133,  134. 


>  ^1 


hi 


372 


CARTHAGE  AND  THE  CARTHAGINIANS. 


triumph,  to  end  his  days  in  peace  in  Italy.  Utica  was  re- 
warded for  her  desertion  by  an  addition  to  her  territory ; 
while  all  the  towns  which  had  remained  faithful  to  Carthage 
were  condemned  to  share  her  fate.^ 

Thus  happened,  what,  happily,  has  rarely  happened  in 
history  before   or  since.      An  ancient  seat   of  civilisation, 
together  with  the  race  which  inhabited  it,  its  arts  and  its 
sciences,  its  laws,  its  literature,  and  its  religion,  was  swept 
away  at  a  single  stroke,  leaving  hardly  a  wrack  behind ; 
and  with  it  vanished  the  last  rival  whom  Rome  had  to  fear, 
the  one  state  which  ever  met  her  on  equal  terms,  and  there- 
fore alone  stood  between  her  and  universal  empire ;  the  one 
possible  check  upon  the  evils  which  the  decay  of  the  re- 
publican spirit,  the  increase  of  wealth,  the  abuse  of  con- 
quest, and  the  temptations  of  absolute  power  were  sure  to 
bring  in  their  train.     It  is  a  thrice  melancholy  picture.     It 
is  the  second  book  of  the  -^neid  in  stern  and  simple  fact. 
The  great  Roman  poet  needed  not  to  draw  upon  his  imagina- 
tion for  a  single  detail  of  his  splendid  picture  of  the  fall  of 
Troy.     The  burning  and  the  slaughter,  the  crash  of  falling 
houses,  the  obliteration  of  a  wealthy  and  an  ancient  city 
which  had  held  imperial  sway  for  many,  nay,  for  seven 
hundred  years — it  was  all  there,  written  in  letters  of  blood 
and  fire,  in  the  record  of  his  own  country's  most  signal 
achievement  I      It  was  a  loss  not  to  be  replaced.     The 
territory  of  Carthage,   indeed,  for  the   century  or  two  that 
the  republic  was  yet  to  last  supplied  Rome  with  com  for  her 
markets,  and  with  wild  beasts  and  gladiators  for  her  arena.   It 
gave,  in  fact,  to  the  populace  their  bread  and  their  Circensian 
games,   all  that  when  the  repubUc  had  fallen  they  would 
ever  want,  and  all  that  they  would  ever  have.      A  poor 
equivalent  this  for  the  mighty  city,  the  queen  of  the  Medi- 
terranean and  its  islands,  the  explorer  of  the  Ocean  beyond,  the 
nurse  of  commerce  and  colonisation,  the  mother  of  Hamilcar 
Itart'A  and  Mago,  of  Hasdrubal  and  Hannibal  I 

1  Appiiui.  Pun,  136. 


ATTEMPTS  TO  REBUILD  CARTHAGE. 


373 


The  curse  of  Scipio  rested  upon  its  site ;  yet,  not  many 
years  afterwards,  Caius  Gracchus,  unmindful  or,  perhaps, 
resentful  of  it,  and  moved  doubtless  by  the  noblest  motives, 
proposed  to  relieve  the  wants  of  the  poorer  Roman  citizens 
by  planting  six  thousand  of  them  on  the  spot.  But  African 
hyenas,  it  was  said,  tore  up  and  scattered  the  boundary  marks 
which  had  been  laid  down,  thus  demonstrating  to  the  hostile 
Senate  alike  the  efficacy  of  the  curse  and  the  guilt  of  the 
people's  friend  who  had  set  it  at  nought.  The  proposed 
colony  of  Junonia  cost  its  originator  his  noble  life  before  he 
had  done  more  for  it  than  give  it  its  name.  It  was  reserved 
for  the  greatest  of  the  Romans,  for  Julius  Caesar  himself, 
some  forty  years  after  Caius  Marius  had  so  theatrically 
taken  his  seat  amidst  its  ruins,  to  revive  the  project  of  Caius 
Gracchus.  His  death  anticipated  this,  as  it  anticipated 
other  cosmopolitan  projects  of  his  imperial  and  ultra-Roman 
mind.  But  Augustus  carried  out  with  filial  reverence  this 
and  other  provisions  of  his  uncle's  wiU,  only  attempting,  it  is 
said,  to  evade  the  letter  of  Scipio' s  curse  by  building  his 
city  not  on  but  near  the  site  of  the  Phoenician  city.^  He 
must  have  failed  in  this,  for,  as  we  have  seen,  the  whole  of 
the  peninsula  had  been  more  or  less  covered  by  the  original 
Carthage,  its  suburbs,  its  gardens,  and  its  burial  ground. 
Anyhow  the  natural  advantages  of  the  spot  overcame  the 
curse  and  soon  made  the  new  city  the  capital  of  Northern 
Africa  and  the  head-quarters  alike  of  Roman  civilisation  and 
of  African  Christianity.  After  connecting  itself  with  the  great 
names  of  Augustine  and  Tertullian  and  Cyprian — names  and 
characters  different  indeed  from  those  of  their  Phoenician 
predecessors — and  passing  through  the  hands  of  the  Vandals, 
it  fell  under  the  sway  of  the  new  Rome,  and  "  shed  or  re- 
ceived a  last  ray  of  lustre  "  from  the  great  name  of  Belisarius. 

Finally,  by  a  destiny  stranger  still,  it  was  destroyed  by 

>  Appian.  Pun.  136.  Pliny,  however  {Hist.  Nat.  v.  3),  says  that  the  Roman 
city  was  built  on  the  exact  site  of  the  Phoenician  :  "  Colonia  Carthago  magna 
in  vestigiis  Carthaginia  ". 


I 


374 


CARTHAGE  AND  THE  CARTHAGINIANS. 


the  Arabs,  a  race  nearly  akin  to  its  first  founders.  The 
hurricane  of  their  invasion  swept  away  all  that  remained  of 
the  city,  and  though  the  Arabs  founded  or  developed  at 
various  times  in  other  parts  of  Africa  rich  commercial  or 
literary  capitals,  such  as  Cairo  and  Cairwan,  Fez,  Tangiers, 
and  Morocco,  they  did  nothing  for  Carthage.  A  straggling 
village,  indeed,  sprang  up  later  on  its  site  and  dragged  on  a 
wretched  existence  for  some  centuries,  and  at  the  present 
moment,  by  another  caprice  of  fortune,  the  citadel  of  Car- 
thage is  occupied  by  a  chapel  dedicated  to  a  French  crusa- 
der, king  and  saint  in  one.  But  ever  since  the  Arab  chief 
Hassan  gave,  in  a.d.  689,  the  Byzantine  city  to  the  flames, 
the  memorable  words  in  which  the  author  of  the  "  Decline 
and  Fall "  has  described  Palestine  as  it  has  been  ever  since 
the  Crusades,  may,  with  at  least  equal  truth,  be  applied  to 
Carthage :  "  A  mournful  and  a  solitary  silence  has  prevailed 
along  the  coast  which  had  so  long  resounded  with  the  world's 
debate  ", 


A  VISIT  TO  CARTHAGE. 


375 


CHAPTER  XXI. 

CABTHAGB     AS     IT  IS. 

Interest  of  a  visit  to  Carthage — Nature  of  impressions  tlience  derived — Its  topo- 
graphy—First view  disappointing — The  Goletta  and  the  Taenia -Djebel 
Chawi  and  the  Necropolis— Vicissitudes  of  its  history— Its  treatment  by 
the  Romans— Sanctity  of  burying  place  among  Semitic  races — Ras  Sidi  Bu 
Said  and  its  sanctity — St  Louis  a  Muslim  saint — Scene  of  misadventure  of 
Mancinus — His  picture  of  Carthage— Hill  of  St.  Louis  the  ancient  Byrsa— 
Description  of  Byrsa— Gulf  of  Tunis  and  Peninsula  of  the  Dakhla— Lake  of 
Tunis  and  Plain  of  Carthage— The  aqueduct,  its  character,  history  and 
appearance — Utica— Obliteration  of  Punic  city — The  "smaller  cisterns" — 
Are  they  Punic  or  Roman  ?— The  larger  cisterns— Debris  of  four  cities — 
Excavations  of  Dr.  Davis— Excavations  of  M.  Beule— Remains  of  triple 
wall  and  traces  of  final  conflagration — Catapult  bolts— Remains  of  ancient 
harbours— Buildings  beneath  the  sea — Oriental  character  of  Tunis— Strange 
mixture  of  races— Streets  of  Tunis— Sights  of  Tunis— The  neighbourhood 
of  Tunis— Patriarchal  life — Characteristics  of  the  Arab— His  unchangeable- 
ness — Conclusion. 


It  was  early  on  the  morning  of  April  1,  1887,  that  we  cast 
anchor  ofif  the  Goletta,  a  tumble-down  fort  which  commands, 
or  does  not  command,  the  narrow  entrance  to  the  Lake  of 
Tunis,  and  found  ourselves  in  full  view  of  the  bold  promon- 
tory and  the  low  coast  line,  the  undulating  hills,  and  the 
fertile  plain,  which  mark  the  site  of  ancient  Carthage.  It 
was  a  moment  not  easily  to  be  forgotten,  a  moment  into 
which  the  interests  of  half  a  lifetime — of  half  my  lifetime 
at  all  events — seemed  to  be  compressed.  There  was  that 
tumult  of  feelings,  that  mixture  of  satisfaction  and  of  unrest, 
of  melancholy  and  of  delight,  of  enthusiasm  and  of  disap- 
pointment, which  it  is,  perhaps,  not  easy  adequately  to  ex- 
plain, but  which  needs,  I  imagine,  no  explanation  at  all  to 
any  one  who  has  seen  for  the  first  time  in  his  life  a  spot 


376 


CARTHAGE  AND  THE  CARTHAGINIANS. 


which  has  long  filled  a  large  place  in  his  imagination;  to 
the  poet  or  the  scholar  who  has  seen,  for  the  first  time,  the 
Acropolis  of  Athens ;  to  the  historian  who  has,  at  last,  set 
foot  in  Eome ;  to  the  pilgrim  who,  after  traversing  half  a 
continent,  perhaps  amidst  burning  deserts  or  eternal  snows, 
has  caught  sight — his  whole  nature  strung  to  the  highest 
pitch  of  tension — of  some  storied  mountain  or  some  holy 
city,  the  goal  of  all  his  aspirations  and  his  passionate  reli- 
gious yearnings.  Mount  Sinai  or  Mount  Elburz,  Eapalivastu 
or  Benares,  Mecca  or  Jerusalem.  It  is  more,  perhaps,  than 
he  has  hoped  for,  but  it  is  also  less. 

Qusesivit  coelo  lucem  ingemuitqne  reperti. 

In  a  work  of  this  kind,  anything  in  the  shape  of  a  journal, 
even  though  it  be  a  journal  of  a  visit  to  the  city  of  which  it 
treats,  would  be  obviously  out  of  place.  But  it  may  not  be 
out  of  place  to  gather  up  within  the  compass  of  a  single 
chapter  some  of  the  impressions  made  upon  my  mind  by 
what  I  saw  of  the  site  of  Carthage,  of  its  remains,  and  of  its 
present  inhabitants.  First  impressions  of  a  place,  it  has 
been  often  said,  may  make  up  by  their  freshness  for  what 
they  lack  in  point  of  accuracy  and  completeness ;  but  I  am 
not  sure  that  my  own  record  can  lay  claim  to  even  this  merit. 
If,  in  one  sense,  they  are  my  first  impressions,  in  another 
they  are  my  ultimate  conclusions;  and  it  may  well  be, 
therefore,  that  they  may  lack  the  freshness  of  the  one 
without  possessing  the  value  or  solidity  of  the  other.  Deep 
and  varied  though  the  interests  of  my  visit  were,  it  seemed 
to  me  throughout  as  though  I  was  taking  a  last  rather  than 
a  first  view  of  the  site  of  the  city ;  and  was  driving  home 
impressions  which  had  been  made  long  before  rather  than 
forming  new  ones.  Be  that  as  it  may,  I  will  endeavour 
to  record  some  of  them  here,  for  what  they  may  be  worth. 

Every  one  who  has  given  even  the  most  cursory  attention 
to  the  topography  of  Carthage  knows  what  diametrically 
opposite  views  have  been  held  respecting  it;   and  it  was 


DISPUTED  TOPOGRAPHY. 


377 


with  a  feeling  of  interest  not  unmixed  with  anxiety,  that  I 
took  that  first  glance  at  the  general  outline  of  the  place, 
which,  if  it  proves  nothing  at  all,  may  yet  seem  ominous  or 
suggestive  of  the  result.  It  might  well  be  that  on  a  personal 
inspection  of  the  spot  I  might  come  to  conclusions  very 
different  from  those  which  I  had  drawn  from  books  and 
maps,  and  which  had  hitherto  seemed  to  harmonise  best 
with  the  history  of  the  final  siege.  I  might  be  driven  by 
the  evidence  of  my  own  eyes  to  agree  with  those  who  put 
the  Byrsa  where  I  had  imagined  the  Megara,  and  the  Megara 
where  I  had  imagined  the  Byrsa,  and  to  transfer  the  har- 
bours, the  Taenia,  the  Forum,  and  all  the  thrilling  operations 
of  which  they  were  the  scene,  from  the  south  to  the  north  of 
the  city.  Ttim  labor  effusus:  much  at  least  of  my  labour 
would  have  been  thrown  away,  and  it  would  only  have  re- 
mained for  me  to  beat  a  retreat-  while  it  was  still  possible, 
and  to  make  my  views  bend  to  the  facts,  since  the  facts 
would  not  bend  to  them.  The  critical  moment  came  and 
it  passed.  Feeling  that  I  could  not  be  an  altogether  disin- 
terested witness  in  the  matter,  I  beUeve  I  put  considerable 
strain  upon  myself  to  see  if  I  could  fall  in  with  the  views 
expressed  by  Dr.  Davis,  the  energetic  excavator  and  ex- 
plorer, as  regards  the  position  of  the  Byrsa,  and  the  triple 
walls,  and  of  Bitter  or  Mannert  as  regards  the  position  of 
the  ports.  ^  But  I  came  to  the  conclusion  that  on  these 
particular  points  the  balance  of  the  evidence  lay  strongly  in 
other  directions,  and  that  the  inferences  on  which  I  had 
based  my  account  of  Carthage,  were,  on  the  whole,  correct. 


1  Dr.  Davis  places  the  Byrsa  on  Burj-Jedeed,  a  hill  near  the  sea,  consider- 
ably to  the  S.E.  of  the  hill  of  St.  Louis,  while  he  throws  back  the  triple  walls 
to  the  isthmus  behind  the  Megara.  Ritter  identifies  the  Byrsa  with  Djebel 
Khawi  or  the  Catacomb  Hill  on  the  N.  W.  of  the  city,  and  necessarily  therefore 
also  places  the  Taenia  and  the  artificial  harbours  in  the  same  locality  on  the 
ground  now  occupied  by  the  Salt  marsh.  Mannert  places  the  harbours  much 
in  the  position  which  I  have  indicated  in  the  accompanying  plan  of  Carthage, 
but  conceives  the  entrance  to  them,  and  therefore  also  Scipio's  Mole,  to  have 
been  inside  tlie  Ttenia ;  that  is,  not  in  the  open  gulf,  bi^t  in  the  Lake  of  Tunis. 


378 


CARTHAGE  AND  THE  CARTHAGINIANS, 


But  if  the  first  view  of  the  place,  as  seen  from  the  deck  of 
a  steamer,  is,  so  far,  satisfactory,  it  must  be  admitted  that, 
in  other  respects,  it  is  somewhat  disappointing.  There  is 
nothing,  at  first  sight,  to  delight  or  to  charm ;  there  are  no 
bold  outlines,  nothing,  in  fact,  in  the  physical  features  of  the 
spot  to  suggest  the  mighty  part  which  it  played  in  ancient 
history.  The  Byrsa  is  an  ordinary  looking  hill,  scarped,  it 
is  true,  in  some  portions,  but  anything  but  commanding  in 
itself.  There  is  no  frowning  rock — such  as  you  cannot  help 
picturing  to  yourself  beforehand— like  the  Acropolis  or  the 
Acro-Corinthus,  like  Edinburgh  or  Stirling  Castle ;  nothing, 
in  fact,  which  could  put  to  shame  even  the  supposed  Tar- 
peian  rock  at  Rome.  Rough  grass,  acres  of  beans  and 
barley,  and  ploughed  fields  do  not  dehght  the  eye ;  they  are 
not  naturally  suggestive  of  anything  beyond  themselves; 
moreover  the  whole  thing  lies,  or  appears  to  lie,  within  so 
small  a  compass.  There  does  not  seem  room  at  first  sight 
for  the  vast  operations  of  the  siege,  for  the  myriad  merchant- 
men and  ships  of  war,  for  the  teeming  population  who,  we 
are  told,  and  truly  told,  throve  and  trafiicked  here  for  cen- 
turies. A  partial  explanation  of  this,  no  doubt,  lies  in  the 
fact  that  the  distances  are  altogether  foreshortened,  and  it  is 
not  till  you  begin  to  walk  over  the  ground  from  the  Goletta 
to  the  Byrsa,  from  the  Byrsa  to  Cape  Carthage,  from  Cape 
Carthage  to  the  Necropolis,  and  so,  round  the  whole  circuit 
of  twenty-three  miles,  that  the  first  impression  of  want  of 
space  and  want  of  dignity  is  even  partially  removed. 

Let  me  now,  without  attempting  to  adhere  to  any  definite 
order  of  place  or  time,  say  a  word  or  two  on  some  of  the 
spots  which  interested  me  most.  I  had  felt  somewhat 
sceptical  beforehand  as  to  the  existence  of  that  extraordin- 
arily shaped  neck  of  land  which  I  had  seen  in  the  larger 
maps  of  Carthage,  with  its  tiny  opening  now  called  the 
Goletta  or  gullet.  My  doubts  on  that  score  were  set  at  rest 
at  once,  for,  as  I  have  said,  we  dropped  anchor  ofif  it,  and 
were  rowed  up  the  channel  along  which  only  a  few  boats 


THE  NECROPOLIS, 


379 


could  pass  abreast.  This  was  a  good  omen  for  what  was  to 
follow,  and  by  walking  some  half  mile  to  the  westward  along 
the  narrow  bar  of  sand  which  cuts  off  the  Lake  of  Tunis 
from  the  outer  sea,  we  found  ourselves  standing  on  the 
broadening  ground,  whence  Censorinus,  as  I  believe,  de- 
livered his  first,  and  Scipio  his  last  attack  on  the  doomed 
city.  On  one  side  of  us  was  the  land  which  owed  its  very 
existence  to  the  operations  of  the  siege;  for  it  must  have 
been  from  this  point  that  Censorinus  threw  those  vast 
masses  of  soil  and  ballast  into  the  lake  which  gave  him 
standing  room  for  his  forces,  and  so  enabled  him  to  bring 
his  gigantic  battering  rams  to  bear  on  the  weak  angle  of  the 
walL  On  the  other  side  of  the  bar  was  the  spot  from  near 
to  which  Scipio  must  have  begun  to  carry  that  cruel  mole 
which  was  to  cut  off  from  the  beleaguered  citizens  their  last 
hope  of  relief  from  without. 

To  the  extreme  north-west  of  the  ground  once  occupied 
by  the  Phoenician  city,  is  the  promontory  of  Ras  Ghamart, 
two  hundred  feet  high ;  and  the  line  of  rounded  hills,  called 
Djebel  Khawi,  which  runs  thence  in  a  southerly  direction 
for  the  distance  of  a  mile  or  so,  is  "  one  vast  Necropolis  ". 
Everywhere,  a  few  feet  beneath  the  surface  of  the  ground, 
are  labyrinths  of  low  vaulted  chambers,  often  communicating 
with  each  other,  or  separated  only  by  narrow  walls  of  rock ; 
perhaps  the  quarries  from  which  the  Punic  city  was  origin- 
ally hewn,  certainly  used  afterwards  as  sepulchres  for  its 
dead.  They  are  now,  for  the  most  part,  hidden  from  view 
or  filled  with  rubbish ;  and  the  wild  fig-tree  which,  as  the 
Roman  poet  remarked,  was  able  to  cleave  the  costly  marble 
sepulchres  of  Messala,  pushes  its  sturdy  roots  in  every  direc- 
tion through  these  humble  tenements  of  the  Phoenicians. 

All  traces  of  the  original  occupants  have  long  since  dis- 
appeared, and  the  vacant  space  is  often  tenanted  by  the 
jackal  and  the  hyena.*  When  the  Romans  had  exhausted 
their  fury  on  the  city  of  the  living,  they  turned  their  atten- 

1  Davis,  Carthage^  p.  472. 


38o 


CARTHAGE  AND  THE  CARTHAGINIANS. 


tion,  as  it  would  seem,  even  to  this  city  of  the  dead.     It  was 
their  practice  not  to  bury  but  to  bum  their  dead,  and  it  is 
not  likely  that  they  used  at  first  the  vast  Necropolis  which 
they  had  rifled  of  its  contents,  for  their  own  small  cinerary 
urns.     But  when  the  Roman  Carthage  became  the  metro- 
polis of  Africa,  and  the  head-quarters  of  African  Christianity, 
the  Pagan  practice  of  cremation  was  replaced  by  Christian 
burial,  and  the  ancient  mortuary  chambers  were  filled,  after 
the  lapse  of  centuries,  by  new  occupants.     These,  when  the 
impetuous  flood  of  Arab  invasion  had  spread  over  the  coun- 
try, were,  in  their  turn,  dispossessed  by  marauding  Bedouins. 
For  centuries  the  Bedouins  have  ransacked  them  for  any 
treasures  to  be  found  within  them,  and  they  visit  them  to 
this  day  for  the  chalk  which  they  contain.     Accordingly  we 
are  not  surprised  to  hear  that  out  of  some  hundred  sepulchres 
examined  by  Dr.  Davis  and  M.  Beul6,  only  one  contained 
a  skeleton.     In  another  was  found  a  relic  of  even  greater 
interest,  though  it  belongs  to  the  Vandal  or  the  Byzantine 
rather  than  the  Roman  era,  a  representation  on  the  rock  of 
the  seven-branched  candlestick.^    The  seven-branched  candle- 
stick, carried  off  by  Titus  from  Jerusalem  to  Rome,  was,  in 
the  strange  vicissitudes  of  human  fortune,  carried  ofif  again 
from  Rome  to  Carthage  by  the  terrible  Genseric,  the  lame 
Vandal  king,  and  so,  probably,  it  comes  about  that  the  sacred 
ornament  of  the  Jewish  temple — the  exact  shape  of  which  is 
known  to  all  the  world  from  the  sculptures  on  the  arch  of 
Titus — has  been  found  engraven  also  within  a  Phoenician 
sarcophagus  at  Carthage.     Some  of  the  sepulchral  chambers 
measure  twelve  by  fifteen  feet,  and  contain  as  many  as  ten 
niches,  or  columbaria,  hewn  out  of  the  solid  limestone  as 
receptacles  for  the  dead.^ 

With  what  deep  pathos  as  one  looks  at  Djebel  Ehawi 

its  hill-sides  riddled,  as  they  are,  with  myriads  of  Phoenician 

1  Davis,  Carthage,  p.  486. 

2  See  Beule,  FouUles  a  Carthage,  p.  129  wg.,  and  the  plans  of  the  sepnlchret 
in  the  Appendix. 


SANCTITY  OF  NECROPOLIS. 


381 


sepulchres — do  the  words  of  the  Carthaginian  legate  Banno 
come  back  to  the  mind.  "  Kill,*'  replied  he  to  the  Roman 
consul  who  cruelly  ordered  the  now  disarmed  and  helpless 
Carthaginians  to  destroy  their  beloved  city  and  build  another 
ten  miles  from  the  coast — "  kill,  if  it  be  your  good  pleasure, 
all  the  citizens,  but  spare  the  city,  spare  the  temples  of  the 
gods,  spare  the  tombs  of  the  dead.  The  dead,  at  least,  can 
do  you  no  harm ;  let  them  receive  the  honours  that  are  their 
due."  1  The  appeal  might  have  moved  a  heart  of  stone,  but 
it  touched  no  chord  in  the  breast  of  the  Romans. 

Deep  in  the  sanctuary  of  the  human  heart,  civilised  or 
uncivihsed  aUke,  Ues  the  feeling  of  reverence  for  the  last 
resting-place  of  the  individual,  the  family,  or  the  nation. 
For  the  tombs  of  their  fathers,  even  the  Nomad  Scythians 
told  Darius,  when  he  was  wearied  out  by  his  vain  pursuit 
of  an  enemy  who  always  fled  before  him  and  always  eluded 
his  grasp,  that  they  would  stand  and  fight  to  the  death.* 
But  nowhere,  probably,  does  the  feeling  lie  quite  so  deep  as 
in  the  hearts  of  the  various  branches  of  the  Semitic  race. 
The  voice  of  the  Phoenician  Banno  is  the  voice  of  human 
nature ;  but  in  a  more  special  sense  it  is  the  voice  which 
seems  to  speak  to  us  in  each  deed  of  heroism  which  marked 
the  last  agony  of  Carthage,  and  which  does  speak  to  us  from 
each  successive  page  of  the  sacred  Hterature  of  the  Hebrews 
who  are  next  of  kin  to  the  Carthaginians.  It  is  the  voice  of 
the  patriarch  himself  that  we  seem  to  hear :  "  Bury  me  with 
my  fathers  in  the  cave  that  is  in  the  field  of  Machpelah  which 
Abraham  bought  for  a  possession  of  a  burying  place  ;  there 
they  buried  Abraham  and  Sarah  his  wife  ;  there  they  buried 
Isaac  and  Rebekah  his  wife,  and  there  I  buried  Leah  **. 

The  other  promontory  which  is  included  within  the  circuit 
of  the  ancient  city,  Ras  Sidi  Bu  Said,  or  as  it  is  called  in 
our  maps  Cape  Carthage,  outtops  Ras  Ghamart  by  a  hundred 
feet.    It  is  of  red  sandstone,  and  is  the  most  commanding  emi- 

lAppian,  Pun.  c.  84. 

«  See  Stan  ley's  Jewish  Church,  vol  L  chap,  il  p.  24. 


3»2 


CARTHAGE  AND  THE  CARTHAGINIANS, 


nence  within  the  precincts.  It  is  crowned  at  present  by  an 
Arab  village  of  peculiar  sanctity,  so  sacred  that,  as  we  were 
told,  no  Christian  is  allowed  to  sleep  there.  The  venerable 
Sheikh  of  the  village,  however,  courteously  allowed  us  to 
enter  and  to  enjoy  the  superb  view  from  the  summit.  It  is 
inhabited  by  a  large  number  of  Marabouts  or  Muslim  saints, 
living  and  dead  ;  men  who,  by  their  austerities,  their  theo- 
logical learning,  or  their  charity,  have  earned  a  reputation 
for  sanctity,  and  have  come  to  live  where  other  saints  have 
hved  before  them,  and  to  lay  their  bones  in  death  by  the 
bones  of  those  whose  virtues  they  have  emulated. 

By  a  curious  caprice  of  fortune— or,  may  we  not  rather 
say  by  a  theological  Nemesis  ? — the  saint  who  is  supposed  to 
give  to  Sidi  Bu  Said  its  special  sanctity  is  no  less  a  per- 
sonage than  St.  Louis  of  France  himself.  The  crusading 
king  died  in  a.d.  1270  of  a  pestilence  which  broke  out  in 
his  army  near  Tunis,  as  he  was  on  his  way  to  Egypt.  His 
heart  hes  buried  near  Palermo,  and  his  body  rests  in  the 
sanctuary  of  the  French  kings  at  St.  Denis  ;  but  his  virtues 
and  his  sanctity  are  still  a  living  power  on  the  plains  of  Car- 
thage. So  widely  were  his  virtues  recognised  among  those 
whom  he  came  to  exterminate,  that  with  true  Muslim  charity 
ihey  believed,  or  wished  to  believe,  that  he  had  died  a  good 
Muslim,  and  "  the  Village  of  the  Saint  "  is  believed,  even  to 
this  day,  to  be  blessed  by  his  body,  and  by  a  special  portion  of 
his  spirit.  It  is  a  homage,  even  if  an  all-unwitting  homage, 
paid  by  his  followers  to  the  teaching  of  the  Prophet,  who  told 
them,  what  Muslim  and  Christian  have  proved  aUke  so  apt 
to  forget,  that  the  God  of  Muslims  and  Christians  is  one.i 

It  must  have  been  near  to  this  commanding  eminence, 
and  above  the  remains  of  the  ancient  sea  gate  which  is  still 
to   be   seen   on   the   beach  beneath,  that  the  incompetent 


1  Koran.  Sura  v.  73 :  -Say  unto  the  Christians  their  God  and  our  God 
is  one."  and  cf.  Sura  ii.  59  and  v.  52.  53.  For  a  full  discussion  on  this  sub- 
ject I  may  perhaps  be  allowed  to  refer  to  my  Mohammed  and  Mohammedan- 
ami,  p.  259-269. 


THE  LEGATE  MANCINUS. 


383 


legate,  Mancinus,  effected  a  landing  with  a  small  force 
during  the  final  siege,  hoping  to  take  the  town  by  assault, 
and  it  was  from  this  spot,  when  entirely  isolated,  without  a 
sufQciency  of  arms  or  of  provisions,  that  he  was  rescued 
from  total  destruction  by  the  prompt  succour  of  Scipio. 

Scipio  sent  him  off  in  disgrace  to  Eome,  and  we  can 
hardly  believe,  what  we  are  gravely  told  by  a  Eoman  writer, 
that  he  had  the  face  to  assert,  in  virtue  of  his  very  brief  and 
very  uncomfortable  occupation  of  this  one  spot  in  the  suburbs, 
that  he  had  been  the  first  Eoman  to  enter  Carthage ;  that  he 
caused  pictures  to  be  painted  representing  the  city  and  the 
various  assaults  made  on  it  by  the  Romans — in  which  his 
own,  doubtless,  bore  a  conspicuous  figure  ;  that  he  exhibited 
ihem  in  the  Forum  to  all  comers  with  copious  explanations  ; 
and  that  he  became  so  popular  thereby  that,  to  the  extreme 
disgust  of  Scipio,  he  was  elected  consul  for  the  year  which  fol- 
lowed the  fall  of  Carthage.^  We  can  share  Scipio's  disgust; 
but  we  feel  as  we  stand  upon  the  spot  and  look  upon  the  red 
sandstone  cHffs,  the  straggling  cactus  hedges,  and  the  bare 
hill  sides,  with  perhaps  a  sedate  Arab  or  two  picturesquely 
grouped  upon  them,  that  we  could  pardon  the  impudence  of 
Mancinus  if  only  one  of  those  pictures  had  been  preserved  to  us, 
or  had  been  so  described  by  any  one  of  the  eager  multitude 
who  thronged  to  look  at  them,  as  to  enable  us  better  to  reclothe, 
in  our  imagination,  the  landscape  with  the  walls  and  the 
towers,  the  palaces  and  the  gardens,  of  the  mighty  city 
which  must  have  lain  full  within  his  view. 

From  Sidi  Bu  Said  runs  in  a  south-west  direction,  parallel 
to  the  line  of  coast,  and  at  a  distance  of  three-quarters  of  a 
mile  from  it,  a  broken  line  of  hills  which  terminates  abruptly 
in  that  which,  since  its  purchase  by  the  French  and  the 
erection  of  a  small  chapel  on  its  summit,  bears  also  the 
name  of  St.  Louis.  This  hill,  although  it  is  in  no  way  striking 
or  precipitous,  and  although  there  are  some  difficulties  con- 
nected with  the  large  number  of  fifty  thousand  souls  said  by 

J  Pliny.  Not.  Bid,  xxxt.  4,  7.    Cf.  Cic.  LaUiut,  xxv.  98. 


384 


CARTHAGE  AND  THE  CARTHAGINIANS, 


Appian  to  have  taken  refuge  within  its  precincts  when  the 
last  hours  of  Carthage  came,  yet,  unquestionably,  dominates 
the  plain,  the  harbours,  and  the  isthmus  behind  it,  and  there 
can  be  no  reasonable  doubt  that  it  formed  the  Byrsa  or 
citadel  of  the  palmy  days  of  Carthage.  At  all  events,  it  was 
its  most  commanding  eminence. 

It  is  at  a  moderate  distance  from  the  coast,  as  the  ancient 
citadels  almost  invariably  were.  It  lies,  as  Appian  expresses 
it,  *'  towards  the  isthmus,"  ^  which  connected  Carthage  with 
the  mainland,  and,  alone  of  all  the  hills  within  the  circum- 
ference of  ancient  Carthage,  it  answers  to  the  description  of 
Strabo,  as  being  "  a  brow  sufficiently  steep  lying  in  the 
middle  of  the  city,  with  houses  on  all  sides  of  it  ".^  On 
this  spot  stood  the  famous  temple  of  Esmun  or  ^sculapius. 
Under  its  protection  the  infant  settlement  grew  up  to  matu- 
rity and  to  empire ;  against  its  fortifications  discontented 
mercenaries  and  hostile  Libyans,  Sicilian  Greeks  and  Boman 
generals  spent  their  strength,  for  centuries,  in  vain,  and  on  its 
summit  the  last  scene  of  the  sad  tragedy,  the  heroic  death  of 
Hasdrubal's  wife,  is  said  to  have  been  enacted.  The  view 
from  the  Byrsa  is,  therefore,  one  which,  for  its  historical  and 
tragic  interest,  if  not  for  its  intrinsic  beauty,  has  few  equals 
in  the  world.  It  may  be  well,  therefore,  taking  the  Byrsa  hill 
as  our  central  standpoint,  to  describe  something  of  what  we  saw 
from  thence  or  from  points  in  its  immediate  neighbourhood. 

To  the  south  and  east,  almost  beneath  one's  feet,  is  the 
broad  and  beautiful  Gulf  of  Tunis,  stretching  away  to  the 
open  Mediterranean  between  the  far-famed  Promontories  of 
Mercury  and  Apollo.  Beyond  the  gulf  is  the  Peninsula  of 
the  Dakhla,  whose  majestic  mountains — Hammam-el-Enf, 
the  most  commanding  among  them — by  their  shape^  their 
silence,  and  their  barrenness,  recall  what  one  had  read  of  the 
"  Alps  unclothed,"  as  they  have  been  well  described,  of  the 
Peninsula  of  Mount  Sinai.  Hidden  from  view  behind  the 
mountains  at  the  end  of  this  peninsula,  and  looking  straight 


1  Appian,  Pun.  96,  iwi  roO  avx'Vof. 


*  Strabo,  xz.  9. 


VIEW  FROM  THE  BYRSA. 


385 


across  towards  Sicily,  of  which,  in  prehistoric  times,  it  must 
have  formed  a  part,  is  the  Promontory  of  Mercury,  sometimes 
called  also  the  "  Fair  Promontory,"  the  point  which,  in 
times  of  peace,  was  named  by  the  proud  and  jealous  republic 
as  the  ne  plus  ultra  of  all  foreign — especially  of  all  Roman— 
merchantmen,  the  point  where  Regulus  halted  his  ships  of  war, 
where  the  greater  Scipio  first  landed,  and  from  which,  with 
characteristic  adroitness,  he  drew  his  first  omen  of  success. 

To  the  west  and  north  is  a  sandy  plain,  flanked  by  the 
Lake  of  Tunis,  with  its  flamingo-haunted  waters,  and  by  the 
ancient  city,  whose  glaring  houses  and  whitened  roof-tops, 
relieved  a  little  by  its  Moorish  mosques  and  minarets,  still 
recall  the  name  of  "  the  white,"  given  to  Tunis  by  Diodorus 
Siculus  eighteen  centuries  ago.^  The  plain  is  dotted  here 
and  there  with  houses  of  the  wealthy  Tunisians,  with  olive 
plantations,  with  one  or  two  solitary  palm  trees,  and  with 
huge  hedges  of  the  Barbary  fig,  whose  sharp  fleshy  leaves 
aflford  sure  protection  against  every  animal  except  the  camel. 
Part  of  it  is  under  cultivation,  and  yields  to  its  cultivators 
— if  those  who  just  scratch  the  surface  of  the  earth  may 
be  so  called — no  longer,  indeed,  the  hundred-and-fifty-fold 
of  Pliny's  time,^  but  still  in  ordinary  years  a  large  return. 
Large  tracts  of  country  which  we  know  were,  till  very  lately, 
covered  with  forests,  are  now  entirely  bare.  Trees  are  cut 
down,  but  new  ones  are  never  planted.  Even  the  olive 
plantations  seem  to  be  dying  away  for  want  of  tending  or 
renewal.  There  is  nothing,  therefore,  to  help  the  thirsty 
soil  to  retain  even  that  modicum  of  rain  from  heaven  which 
falls  upon  it,  while  scientific  irrigation  with  the  help  of  the 
rivers,  which  was  carried  to  such  a  wonderful  pitch  in 
ancient  times  alike  by  the  Phoenicians  and  by  the  Romans, 

*  Diod.  Sic.  XX.  9. 

•Pliny,  Hist.  Nat.  xvii.  3,  cf.  v.  3.  Sir  Richard  Wood,  K.C.M.G.,  Her 
Majesty's  Consul-General  at  Tunis,  to  whose  hospitality  and  kindness  as  well  as 
to  that  of  his  family  we  owe  much  of  the  success  and  comfort  of  our  stay  there, 
told  us  of  exceptional  instances  within  his  knowledge  in  which  even  Pliny's 
Itetimate  of  the  fertility  of  the  soil  had  been  largely  exceeded. 

25 


386 


CARTHAGE  AND  THE  CARTHAGINIANS. 


is  now  entirely  neglected.  What  wonder,  then,  if,  in  seasons 
of  exceptional  drought,  Nature  revenges  herself,  and  that  the 
crops,  having  no  deep  root,  wither  away,  while  the  inhabi- 
tants perish  by  hundreds  ?  The  cultivated  portions  of  the 
plain,  at  certain  times  of  the  year,  swarm  with  quails,  vast 
numbers  of  which  are  snared  in  nets  by  the  natives  or 
knocked  down  by  sticks  when  they  are  tired  out — as  was 
the  case  when  we  were  there — by  their  annual  migration. 
Wandering  over  the  pasture  lands  may  be  seen  the  flocks 
and  herds  of  the  Arabs  and  the  long  lines  of  their  camels. 
Here  and  there  are  their  black  tents,  which  may  be  shifted 
at  convenience.  But  some  of  the  natives,  passing  gradually 
from  the  nomadic  to  the  agricultural  stage,  have  found  a 
more  permanent,  if  not  a  more  congenial  abode,  in  the  nu- 
merous subterranean  cisterns  or  magazines  which  the  fore- 
thought of  their  more  civilised  predecessors  constructed  ; 
and  the  domestic  animals  of  the  Arabs  are  found  stabling  in 
the  very  buildings  which  may  once,  perhaps,  have  sheltered 
the  Carthaginian  elephants. 

Stretching  right  across  the  plain,  '*  like  the  bleached  ver- 
tebrae of  some  gigantic  serpent,"  as  they  have  been  well 
described  by  Sir  Grenville  Temple,  may  be  seen  great  blocks 
of  masonry,  the  remains  of  the  noble  Koman  aqueduct,^ 
which  brought  from  the  mountains  of  Zaghouan  (Mons 
Zeugitanus)  and  Djebel  Djougar  (Mons  Zuccharus)— from 
a  distance,  that  is,  of  over  sixty  miles — those  perennial 
streams  of  fresh  water  which  not  only  supplied  the  inhabi- 
tants of  the  city,  but  sufficed  to  irrigate  its  suburbs  and  its 
gardens,  and  made  much  even  of  the  intervening  arid 
country  to  smile  as  the  Garden  of  the  Lord.2  It  was  the 
handiwork  of  that  Koman  emperor  who  has  left  behind  him 

J  Procopius,  Bell.    Van.  ii.  1,  tok  bx*rhv  itioeiarov  orra  &«  <c  rhv  nokiv  tltniyt  rh 

v6wp.  Perhaps  even  more  "  worthy  of  admiration  "  it  still  is  in  its  decay  and 
ruin. 

2  It  has  been  calculated  that  the  aqueduct  conveyed  seven  millions  of  gallons 
of  water  a  day,  or  eighty -one  gallons  per  second  !  See  Playfair's  Travels  in  the 
J'wtsteps  of  Bruce,  p.  131. 


THE  AQUEDUCT. 


387 


traces  of  his  truly  imperial  passion  for  building  and  for 
travelling  in  every  province  of  his  vast  empire.  The  aque- 
duct of  Carthage  is  not  unworthy,  either  in  the  magnificence 
of  its  design  or  in  the  completeness  of  its  execution,  of  the 
man  who  could  rear  at  Kome  the  mighty  mass  of  buildings 
once  called  "  Hadrian's  Pile,"  and  at  Tivoli,  that  museum 
of  art  which  is  still  known  as  his  "  Villa  "  ;  who,  at  one  end 
of  his  dominions,  could  carry  a  wall  from  sea  to  sea,  from  the 
mouth  of  the  Tyne  to  the  Solway  Firth,  still  called  Hadrian's 
Rampart,  and  at  another,  could  complete  the  colossal  temple 
of  the  Olympian  Zeus,  which  had  been  begun  by  Pisistratus 
seven  centuries  before,  and  had  waited  seven  centuries  to  find 
any  one  who  had  the  means  and  the  will  to  finish  it. 

The  arches  of  the  aqueduct  which  were  once  visible  from 
the  Byrsa  have  been  destroyed,  not  by  the  hand  of  time,  but 
by  the  barbarism  of  the  inhabitants.     The  basements  alone 
remain,  and  we  saw  bands  of  Arabs  in  the  act  of  carrying 
away  such  blocks  even  of  these  as  their  pickaxes  could  break 
oflf,  to  build  a  new  palace  for  the  Bey  of  Tunis.     Farther 
away,  man  has  been  more  merciful,  or,  at  all  events,  less 
povverful  to  injure,  and  its  arches,  rising  to  the  height  often 
of  sixty,  and  sometimes,  it  is  said,  of  a  hundred  and  twenty- 
five  feet,i  march  across  the  valleys  from  hill  to  hill  in  stately 
procession.     Those  who  are  fond  of  birds  may  be  interested 
to  know  that  a  large  owl,  of  a  species  which  I  had  never 
seen  before,  was  building  its  nest  on  one  of  the  highest  of 
these  arches,  while,  on  the  other  side  of  the  same  arch,  a 
raven  was  sitting  on  its  young  in  undisturbed  repose,  and 
its  mate  flew  croaking  round— a  curious  mixture  of  associa- 
tions, ornithological  and  religious:  the  bird  of  Pallas  and 
the  bird  of  Odin  nestling  together  on  what  is  doubtless  the 
handiwork  of  those  master  builders  of  antiquity,  the  Roman 
worshippers  of  Jupiter  and  Juno,   but  which  supplied  the 
wants  of  those  who,  after  the  lapse  of  centuries  of  foreign 
conquest,  still  clung  desperately  to  their  ancestral  worship  of 

^  Davis,  i.  4tJ0. 


388 


CARTHAGE  AND  THE  CARTHAGINIANS. 


Baal-Moloch  and  Astarte !  ^  The  channel  which  conveyed  the 
water  from  Zaghouan,  sometimes  penetrates  deep  beneath 
the  ground,  sometimes  runs  along  the  top  of  single  arches, 
or  of  tiers  of  them,  one  above  the  other.  It  is  broad  enough 
and  deep  enough  for  a  man  to  walk  upright  within  it,  and  in 
many  parts  it  is  still  so  perfect  as  to  be  utilised  for  the  water- 
supply  which  modern  enterprise  has,  within  the  last  few  years, 
brought  to  Tunis  from  the  same  distant  and  perennial  fount. 

Far  away  to  the  north  of  the  plain  we  could  see  the  hill  on 
the  top  of  which  the  citadel  of  Utica  was  perched,  the  parent 
city  and  the  one  trusted  ally  of  Carthage,  the  point  where 
the  Komans  so  often  landed  in  their  invasions  of  Africa,  and 
whence  they  must  have  caught  the  first  glimpse  of  the  city 
which  they  had  so  perfidiously  doomed  to  destruction. 

But  if  the  view  from  the  Byrsa  is  impressive  from  what  it 
contains  within  it,  how  infinitely  more  impressive  is  it  from 
what  it  can  only  suggest !  It  was  long,  indeed,  before  we  could 
fully  realise,  what  we  knew  well  enough  before  we  went  there, 
that  on  the  ground  immediately  beneath  our  feet  so  many  cities 
— Phoenician,  Eoman,  Vandal,  Byzantine — had  been  founded, 
had  risen  to  opulence  and  power,  and  had  vanished  again,  leav- 
ing barely  a  trace  of  their  existence  behind.  A  lively  German, 
indeed,  a  resident  in  Tunis,  whom  we  met  on  board  the  steamer 
on  our  way  to  Africa,  could  hardly  suppress  his  surprise  or  his 
merriment,  perhaps  even  his  contempt,  when  we  told  him  that 
we  were  actually  coming  all  the  way  from  England  to  see  Car- 
thage. "  Carthage  /  c*est  rien  !  '*  he  exclaimed,  and  nothing, 
indeed,  in  one  sense  of  the  word,  there  was ;  but  in  another, 
and  perhaps  a  truer  sense,  how  very  much ! 


1  The  deep  channels  full  of  water  mentioned  by  Appian  as  intersecting  the 
Megara  in  every  direction  seem  to  necessitate  an  artificial  conduit  from  a  dis- 
tance even  in  the  time  of  the  Phoenician  city  :  Appian,  viii.  117,  ri  M«yopa  .  .  . 

o^yfTOic  paBtiTiv  vJarof  iroticiAotc  re  xat  (tkoAiois  Kara  n\iun>  rff.      In   like   manner  the 

description  of  the  country  round  Carthage  given  by  Diodorus  (xv.  8)  as  it  ap- 
peared to  the  soldiers  of  Agathocles,  implies  a  vast  system  of  tanks  or  cisterns, 
as  Wf  11  as  scientitic  irrigation  :  voAAwi'  v6arwv  iioxtrtvoiieyutv  xai  vavra.  rowov  ip' 
btoyrw. 


THE  CISTERNS. 


389 


One  trace,  however,  of  the  ancient  city  there  is  which  one 
would  have  thought  even  our  matter-of-fact  German  friend 
would  hardly  have  called  "  nothing  ".  About  a  quarter  of  a 
mile  from  the  Byrsa  and  nearer  to  the  sea,  is  a  huge  mass 
of  masonry  embedded  in  the  soil,  the  low  vaulted  roofs  of 
which,  rising  side  by  side  in  pairs  only  a  few  feet  above  the 
level  of  the  hill-side  which  has  been  excavated  around  them, 
and  are  actually  below  its  level  where  it  has  been  undis- 
turbed, look  hke  the  graves  of  some  gigantic  prehistoric  race. 
**  There  were  giants  in  the  earth  in  those  days,"  were  the 
words  which  rose  involuntarily  to  the  mind ;  but  these 
vaulted  roofs  turned  out  to  be  the  coverings  of  the  vast 
reservoirs  which  stored  up  water  for  the  teeming  population 
of  the  city.  They  were  eighteen  in  number ;  the  masonry 
and  cement  are  still  all  but  perfect.  Each  reservoir  is  nearly 
one  hundred  feet  long  by  twenty  wide,  and  the  water  still 
stands  in  many  of  them  to  the  depth  of  seventeen  feet.  A 
narrow  gallery,  hollowed  out  of  the  face  of  the  hill  beside 
them,  enables  the  visitor  to  pass  beneath  the  surface  along 
their  whole  length,  and  to  realise  the  silence  and  the  solitude 
which  reign  supreme  around  this,  the  one  remaining  monu- 
ment of  the  vanished  ancient  city.  I  say  advisedly  of  the 
ancient  city,  for  though  the  facings  of  the  cisterns  and  per- 
haps nearly  everything  which  meets  the  eye  may,  very 
possibly,  be  Koman,  yet,  as  M.  Beule,  one  of  the  highest 
authorities  on  ancient  architecture,  as  well  as  an  indefatigable 
excavator,  has  pointed  out,  the  plan  on  which  they  are 
constructed  is  undoubtedly  more  ancient,  and  the  Roman 
architects  have  only  copied  their  Punic  predecessors.  It 
seems  likely,  I  would  rather  say,  that  they  have  only  re- 
paired their  work.  If  the  aqueduct  is  admitted  to  be  Roman, 
it  will  follow  that  a  huge  collection  of  rain-water  cisterns 
would  have  been  an  absolute  necessity  in  the  Punic  city. 
Nor  is  it  easily  credible  that  the  Romans  would  have  taken 
the  trouble  to  destroy  what  lay  deep  hidden  beneath  the 
ground.     We  have  seen  that  they  did  not  destroy  the  Necro- 


390 


CARTHAGE  AND  THE  CARTHAGINIANS. 


polls,  they  only  pillaged  and  profaned  it.  Why  then  should 
they  have  destroyed,  at  an  infinite  expenditure  of  labour,  the 
huge  reservoirs  which,  in  that  arid  country,  would  be  of 
untold  value  to  the  scattered  cultivators  of  the  ground  or  to 
their  flocks  and  herds,  and  which  did  not  disturb  that  dead 
level  to  which  it  was  their  pleasure  and  their  practice  to 
condemn  alike  the  house  or  the  city  of  an  offender  ?  ^  The 
low  vaulted  roofs  of  the  cisterns  were  probably  then  covered 
with  soil,  to  lower  the  temperature  and  to  prevent  evapora- 
tion, and  the  Boman  plough  might  therefore  have  well  been 
driven  by  the  Boman  destroyers  almost  inadvertently  across 
them.  M.  Beule  well  points  out,  moreover,  that  the  defini- 
tion which  exactly  hits  off  the  series  of  undoubtedly  Punic 
fortifications  which  he  has  disinterred  beneath  the  Byrsa 
hits  off  with  equal  precision  the  range  of  cisterns  themselves. 
Each  consists  of  a  "  series  of  chambers  equal  and  parallel, 
and  opening  on  a  common  corridor  ".^ 

Behind  the  Byrsa  and  beyond  the  precincts  of  the  ancient 
city  proper,  there  is  another  group  of  cisterns  of  still  larger 
proportions.  These  probably  belong  to  the  Boman  city,  and 
they  were  fed  not  by  rain  water  but  by  the  aqueduct  of  which 
they  formed  the  termination.  They  are  called  the  *•  large 
cisterns  "  to  distinguish  them  from  the  other  group,  which 
certainly  could  never  be  called  *'  smaU,"  except  by  compari- 
son with  them.  They  are  said  by  the  traveller  Shaw  to  have 
been  in  his  time  twenty  in  number,  each  measuring  not  less 
than  a  hundred  feet  in  length  by  thirty  in  breadth.  Gigantic 
as  they  are,  they  are  not  so  imposing  either  in  associations 
or  in  appearance  as  the  smaller  group  which  I  have  just 
described,  partly  because  they  do  not  lie  so  well  together, 
and  partly  because  the  deposits  and  accumulations  of  suc- 
cessive ages  have  filled  them  to  within  a  few  feet  of  the 
roof.     Even  so,  they  are  of  considerable  value  to  the  inhabi- 


1  Cf.  Livy,  iv.  16,  for  the  iEquimselium  or  Mselian  level ;  the  place  on  which 
the  house  of  Sp.  Maelius,  the  presumed  traitor,  had  stood. 

2  Beul6,  FouUles,  p.  61. 


OBLITERATION  OF  CARTHAGE. 


391 


tants ;  for,  giving  shelter  as  they  do  to  a  whole  settlement 
of  Arabs  with  their  wives  and  children,  their  stores  of  grain, 
their  agricultural  implements,  and  their  domestic  animals 
— which  are  never  few  in  number— they  form  in  themselves 
the  whole  hamlet  of  Moalka,  home  and  homestead  in  one ! 

All  the  other  buildings  of  the  city,  whether  Punic  or 
Boman,  have  long  since  disappeared.  Whole  hamlets  and 
towns  have  been  built  out  of  their  materials.  We  saw  huge 
Blabs  of  Carthaginian  marble  embedded  in  the  palaces  of 
Tunisian  nobles ;  and  some  have  found  their  way  even  into 
Italian  and  Spanish  cathedrals.  Innumerable  small  frag- 
ments, however,  which  were  not  thought  worth  carrying 
away,  still  linger  on  the  site  of  the  city.  The  ground  beneath 
one's  feet  teems  with  them ;  nay,  rather,  it  is  composed  of 
them.  Bits  of  tessellated  pavement,  of  porphyry,  of  the  fa- 
mous Numidian  marble— green,  white,  and  red — everywhere 
meet  the  eye,  or  are  turned  up  by  the  spade  and  the  plough- 
share. These  belong,  I  believe,  almost  exclusively  to  periods 
later  than  that  of  the  Phoenician  city.  The  Romans  did  their 
work  of  destruction  on  their  hated  rival  too  thoroughly.  For 
seventeen  days  its  ruins  burned, ^  and  at  the  end  not  one  stone 
was  left  standing  on  another,  at  all  events  above  the  surface 
of  the  ground.  The  Manes  of  old  Cato  must  have  been  more 
than  satisfied  by  the  way  in  which  his  countrymen  carried  out 
his  grim  resolve. 

The  work  of  excavation  has  been  attempted  in  recent  times, 
with  such  means  as  were  at  their  disposal,  by  Dr.  Davis,  an 
English,  and  by  M.  Beul6,  a  French  archaeologist,  whose  names 
I  have  already  had  occasion  to  mention.  Dr.  Davis,  in  a  series 
of  explorations,  which  he  has  carried  on  for  many  years, 
partly  at  his  own  expense,  and  partly  at  that  of  the  English 
Government,  has  disinterred  a  large  number  of  marbles  and 
mosaics,  many  of  which,  of  course,  belong  to  the  Boman 
period.  But  he  has  also  opened  out  to  view  the  basement 
of  a  large  temple  to  Baal,  which,  if  it  is  not  Punic  itself,  is  in 

'  Klorus,  ii.  15.  18. 


392 


CARTHAGE  AND  THE  CARTHAGINIANS. 


all  probability,— as  we  know  the  Komans  in  their  new-born 
enthusiasm  for  the  city  of  Dido  and  Venus  made  a  point  of 
doing — built  upon  the  exact  site,  and,  as  nearly  as  possible, 
after  the  model  of  its  Punic  predecessor ;  and,  what  is  more  im- 
portant still,  he  has  discovered  a  very  large  number,  over  one 
hundred  and  twenty,  of  genuine  Punic  inscriptions.  That 
some  of  the  mosaic  pavements  also  found  by  him  belong  to 
the  Phoenician  city,  we  may  not  unreasonably  conclude,  when 
we  are  told  that  he  has  sometimes  found  three  successive 
layers  of  mosaics,  placed,  one  above  the  other,  at  considerable 
intervals ;  that  the  cement  in  which  the  lower  stratum  was 
laid  was  of  a  wholly  dififerent  character  to  that  of  the  upper ; 
that  it  was  easily  detached  from  the  mosaics  and  was  very 
friable  in  itself,  having  lost  all  its  adhesive  power  by  long 
lapse  of  time.i 

M.  Beul6,  on  the  other  hand,  who  is  well  known  for  his  ex- 
cavations  in  the  Acropolis  at  Athens,  expended  much  labour  in 
sinking  deep  shafts,  some  of  which  happily  still  remain  open, 
at  various  points  near  the  circumference  of  the  Byrsa,  and  he 
was  fortunate  enough  to  bring  to  light  considerable  remains 
of  the  great  triple  wall  so  accurately  described  by  the  ancients. 

There  he  came  upon  the  foundation  of  the  outer  wall,  which, 
as  we  have  ahready  stated,  was  six  feet  thick  and  forty-five 
feet  high,  strengthened  by  towers  at  intervals  which  rose 
twenty  feet  higher  stilL  There,  before  his  eyes,  were  the 
basements  of  the  semicircular  chamber — the  shape  so  much 
afifected  by  the  Phoenicians,  as  we  see  in  their  remains  at 
Malta  and  at  Gozo — which  contained  stabling  for  three  hun- 
dred elephants  below,  and  for  four  thousand  horses  above ; 
and  there,  too,  at  the  depth  of  fifty-six  feet  below  the  present 
surface  of  the  hill,  he  worked  his  way  through  a  layer  of 
ashes  five  or  six  feet  thick,  some  of  which  still  blackened  the 
hand  which  touched  them,  and  were  mixed  with  half-charred 
pieces  of  wood,  with  small  bits  of  iron  twisted  into  strange 
contortions  by  the  fury  of  the  Roman  flames  which  had  at- 

1  J>ayi8,  p.  202. 


REMAINS  OF  CARTHAGE. 


393 


tempted  to  consume  them,  with  fragments  of  pottery  and  glass 
— the  invention  of  the  Tyrians — and  with  projectiles  which 
must,  all  too  probably,  have  been  collected  together  in  the 
citadel  when  the  last  assault  was  imminent,  to  be  thrown 
thence  by  the  Balearic  slingers,  or  to  be  launched  from  the 
very  catapults  which  had  been  equipped  for  service  by  the 
free-will  ofiferings  of  the  long  hair  of  the  frenzied  Cartha- 
ginian matrons.^ 

Some  of  these  remains  are  preserved  in  a  small  museum 
near  the  chapel  of  St.  Louis,  and  one  of  the  projectiles  Pere 
Roger,  the  custodian  of  the  chapel,  was  kind  enough  to  give 
me,  when  he  found  that  I  was  specially  interested  in  the 
history  and  topography  of  Carthage.  It  is  heavy  for  its  size, 
and  is  made  of  terra-cotta,  that  is  to  say,  of  clay  which  had 
been  moulded  into  an  oval  form,  and  then  baked  to  a  red  heat, 
exactly  answering  to  the  description  given  by  Caesar  of  the 
acorn-shaped  bolts  used  by  the  Romans,  and  hence  called 
"  acorns".  Ferventes  fusili  ex  argilld  glandes,^  he  says  in  his 
Gallic  War,  and  this  is  one  of  precisely  the  same  shape  and 
material  used  by  the  Phoenicians. 

There  is  one  feature  of  the  ancient  city  which  in  spite  of 
all  I  had  heard  and  read  about  it  I  was  surprised  to  find  in 
such  perfect  preservation.  It  will  doubtless  be  remembered 
that  ancient  Carthage  had  two  docks  or  harbours,  both  the 
work  of  human  hands — one  oblong  for  the  use  of  merchant 
vessels,  the  other  circular  for  the  use  of  vessels  of  war — and 
our  pleasure  may  be  imagined  when  on  suddenly  reaching 
the  summit  of  the  Byrsa  from  behind  we  saw  them  both 
immediately  below  us,  each,  of  course,  much  diminished  in 
size  by  the  ever-shifting  soil,  and  by  the  debris  of  the  build- 
ings which  had  perished  around  them,  but  each  preserving 
its  characteristic  shape.  There,  before  our  eyes,  was  the 
circular  war  harbour,  once  surrounded  by  two  hundred  and 
twenty  different  docks,  each  fronted  by  two  Ionic  marble 
pillars.     There  was  still  the  island  in  the  middle,  on  which, 


1  BeaU,  p.  55. 


2  Caesar,  Bell.  Oall.  v.  41. 


394 


CARTHAGE  AND  THE  CARTHAGINIANS. 


in  the  days  when  Carthage  was  the  mistress  of  all  known 
seas  and  islands,  was  the  residence  of  her  lord  high  admiral, 
the  spot  from  which  he  could  superintend  all  the  operations 
of  that  busy  hive  of  industry,  and  could  issue  his  orders  by 
the  sound  of  the  trumpet ;  and  there  was  the  intervening  strip 
of  land,  narrower  now  than  then,  owing  to  the  encroachment 
of  the  waves,  looking  across  which— himself  unobserved  the 
while — he  could  see  all  that  went  on  in  the  open  sea,  and  con- 
cert his  measures  against  any  state  which  dared — and  few  ever 
dared — to  measure  her  strength  against  that  of  the  Queen  of 
the  Ocean.  And  there,  too,  was  something — though  I  believe 
it  is  really  much  more  modem — which  looked  hke  the  traces 
of  the  outlet  opened  by  the  beleaguered  Carthaginians  in  the 
days  of  their  distress,  when  they  were  thus  able,  for  the  time 
at  least,  to  laugh  to  scorn  the  labours  of  Scipio. 

We  bathed  close  to  the  supposed  outlet.  The  water  was 
dehciously  warm,  early  though  it  was  in  the  month  of  April, 
and  as  far  out  as  we  could  swim,  we  could  rest  once  and  again 
on  the  blocks  of  masonry  which  once  formed  the  quays,  or 
the  sea  wall,  or  it  may  be  even  the  buildings  of  the  Phoenician 
city,  but  which  are  now  encrusted  by  shell-fish  and  seaweeds, 
and  have  long  been  covered  by  the  waves. 

It  will  readily  be  believed  that  the  first  and  great  charm  of 
a  visit  to  Carthage  is  the  religio  loci,  the  place  itself,  and  the 
associations  which  cluster  round  it ;  but  a  second  and  hardly 
inferior  attraction  to  my  mind  is  the  character  of  the  people 
who  inhabit  the  plains  where  Carthage  once  was.  Compara- 
tively few  travellers  have  as  yet  visited  the  Cothon  or  the 
Byrsa.  Of  tourists,  in  the  ordinary  sense  of  the  word,  there 
are  none;  and  Tunis,  I  have  reason  to  believe,  is  at  the 
present  day  the  most  Oriental  of  all  Oriental  towns.  The 
wave  of  Western  civilisation  or  its  counterfeit,  which  has  done 
BO  much  to  transform  Constantinople  and  Cairo,  nay,  even 
Bagdad  and  Damascus,  has  not  yet  swept  over  Tunis.  A  few 
shopkeepers,  indeed,  and  most  of  the  voituriers  are  Italians, 
while  the  boatmen  and  the  porters  who  quarrel  for  the  honour 


THE  STREETS  OF  TUNIS. 


395 


of  carrying  your  portmanteau,  and  nearly  carry  you  off  in  the 
process,  are  Maltese,  who,  it  is  said,  do  most  of  the  crime, 
and  certainly  seem  to  carry  it  in  their  forbidding  counte- 
nances. But  beyond  these  outliers  of  civilisation,  and  the 
few  Europeans  attached  to  the  consulates,  there  are  no  sights 
visible,  and  there  is  no  influence  felt,  but  those  of  the  East. 

And  what  a  mixture  of  Eastern  races  there  is,  and  what 
gorgeous  costumes!  Grave  and  dignified  Osmanli  Turks, 
with  their  pride  of  race,  their  scarlet  fezes,  and  their  yellow 
shppers ;  Jews  with  their  bagging  pantaloons,  and  their  blue 
coats,  and  headdresses ;  Arabs  with  their  long  beards,  their 
white  turbans  and  burnouses,  and  their  many-coloured  tunics ; 
descendants  of  the  Prophet,  *'  Grand  Scherifs  "  as  they  are 
called,  rejoicing  in  their  green  robes  and  green  turbans — the 
size  of  which  is,  not  unusually,  exactly  proportioned  to  the  de- 
gree of  their  sanctity  and  their  dirtiness ;  swarthy  Moors  from 
the  desert,  and  Negroes  from  the  Soudan — not  such  sickly 
and  cringing  hybrids  as  you  see  in  Oxford  Street,  clad  in  Euro- 
pean dress  and  aping  European  manners — but  real  downright 
Negroes,  half  naked,  black  as  ebony ;  all  jostling  one  against 
the  other,  and  all  rejoicing  in  the  brotherhood  of  Islam. 

The  streets  of  Tunis  are  narrow  and  unpaved,  and  are  often 
very  dirty.  The  houses — as  in  their  counterparts,  the  three 
narrow  streets  leading  from  the  Forum  to  the  Byrsa  in  ancient 
Carthage — often  all  but  meet  across  them  overhead,  and  few 
of  them  have  any  pretensions  to  architectural  beauty;  yet, 
as  you  walk  up  and  down,  you  have  endless  and  ever- varying 
subjects  of  interest  and  amusement.  Every  man  and  woman 
you  meet,  and  still  more  every  shop  or  stall  you  pass,  with  its 
owner  sitting  in  the  middle  of  it  cross-legged  and  barefooted 
in  dignified  repose,  waiting  patiently  till  it  pleases  Allah  to 
send  him  a  customer,  is  a  study  in  itself. 

You  seem  to  have  the  "  Arabian  Nights  "  before  your  very 
eyes.  There,  for  instance,  is  the  barber's  shop  with  a  bench 
all  round  it,  on  which  sit  rows  of  customers  divested  of  their 
turbans  and  their  fezes,  listening  to  the  barber's  chatter  and 


396 


CARTHAGE  AND  THE  CARTHAGINIANS. 


each  waiting  till  his  turn  comes  to  have  his  head  operated 
upon.     There  is  the  Court  where  justice— Eastern  justice,  of 
course,  I  mean— is  administered  by  a  Turkish  Pasha,  who 
sometimes  despatches  the  cases  brought  before  him  at  the  rate 
of  two  a  minute,  but  to  the  equal  satisfaction,  as  it  would 
seem,  of  both  plaintifif  and  defendant.     There  is  the  prison, 
the  doors  of  which  are  never  closed  but  guarded  only  by  one 
shabby  policeman  armed  with  a  blunderbuss  which  looks  as 
if  it  would  never  go  off,  and  a  yataghan  which  is  so  rusty 
that  you  would  think  it  could  never  leave  its  scabbard ;  the 
prisoners  squatting  complacently  inside,  smoking,  or  knitting, 
or  wrapped  in  contemplation,  and  all  submitting  quietly  to 
their  incarceration,  because  it,  too,  is  the  will  of  Allah— or  of 
the  Bey.     There  is  the  Arab  coffee-house,  where  grave  and 
sedate  revellers  sit,  almost  in  the  dark,  playing  draughts  and 
sipping  strong  black  coffee,  of  course  without  sugar  and  with- 
out milk,  from  minute  saucerless  cups.     There  is  the  College, 
founded  by  the  Prime  Minister  Kheir-ed-din— a  Turk  and  a 
Pasha  and  yet  a  genuine  reformer,  who  is  loved  and  honoured 
the  whole  country  through,^— where  little  boys  learn  to  repeat 
by  rote  the  Koran  from  end  to  end  at  the  top  of  their  voices 
before  they  understand  a  word  of  its  meaning,  while  some 
reverend  Moullah  sits  in  the  midst  of  the  circle  and,  holding 
his  wand  of  office,  chastises  them  gently,  not  if  they  are  not 
quiet,  but— oh!  what  a  paradise  of  boys!— if  they  do  not 
make  noise  enough.     The  higher  classes,  meanwhile,  are 
answering  questions  in  Euclid,  or  arithmetic,  or  geography, 
describing  by  memory,  for  instance,  the  sea  passage  from  St. 

1  See  his  book  on  "  Necessary  Reforms  of  Mussulman  States"  :  Athetis,  1874 
It  may  be  worth  noting  that  Kheir-ed-din  had  (November,  1878),  when  the  second 
e.lition  of  this  work  was  going  to  press,  become  Grand  Vizier  of  the  Turkish  empire. 
It  may  also  be  observed  in  connection  with  the  remarks  made  on  p.  382  above, 
that  one  of  his  first  recorded  utterances  in  that  responsible  post,  "  We  aU  worship 
the  same  God,  you  Christians  in  the  church,  we  Muslims  in  the  mosque,"  is 
the  true  doctrine  of  the  Koran,  as  there  quoted,  and  is  of  happy  omen,  if  inly 
he  could  have  carried  out  its  spirit  and  retain  hia  post,  for  the  reconstruction 
and  reform  of  the  Turkish  empire. 


SIGHTS  OF  TUNIS. 


397 


Petersburg  to  Stamboul  through  the  Cattegat,  and  the  Ska- 
gerack,  and  all  the  rest  of  it,  with  a  precision  and  a  readiness 
in  which  I  am  not  quite  sure  that  all,  even  in  the  highest  forms 
in  English  schools,  would  be  able  to  keep  pace  with  them. 
There,  again,  are  the  mosques,  visited  five  times  a  day  by 
throngs  of  worshippers,  who  reverently  put  off  their  shoes 
before  they  enter  them,  and  into  which  Christians — since  the 
European  element  in  Tunis  is  happily  small  and  unaggressive 
—rightly  forbear  to  claim  an  entrance.  There  are  the  min- 
arets, from  which,  at  stated  intervals  throughout  the  day  and 
night,  and,  above  all,  at  daybreak,  comes  that  strange  and 
beautiful  call  to  prayer — the  very  same  which  is  heard  from 
Sierra  Leone  to  Sumatra,  and  from  Astrakan  to  Zanzibar — 
**Allahu  Akbar,  God  is  most  great ;  prayer  is  better  than  sleep, 
prayer  is  better  than  sleep;  there  is  no  God  but  God,  and 
Mohammed  is  his  prophet ".  And  there,  once  more,  are  the 
caravanserais  filled  at  evening  with  groups  of  camels  kneeling 
in  a  circle,  their  old-world  heads  pointing  inwards,  sullenly 
crunching  the  heap  of  green  barley  which  their  owners  with 
characteristic  improvidence  have  gathered  for  them,  and 
tended  all  night  long  by  some  swarthy  Arab  squatting  on  his 
haunches.  All  these  and  many  more  such  sights  were 
crowded  into  the  few  days  that  we  were  enabled  to  spend  in 
Tunis  and  its  neighbourhood. 

And  when  you  pass  the  city  wall — for  Tunis,  it  must  be 
made  known  to  all,  is  a  fortified  city,  and  possesses  something 
which  may  by  courtesy,  indeed,  be  called  a  wall,  but  which 
would,  I  verily  believe,  like  the  walls  of  Jericho,  tumble 
down  en  masse  at  the  bare  report  of  a  heavy  gun — when  you 
pass  the  gate  and  find  yourself  in  the  country,  what  a 
delight — irrespective  of  the  Roman  remains  which  are  so 
thickly  strewn  over  it,  at  Utica,  for  instance,  and  at  Uthina, 
at  Hippo  Zarytus  and  at  Tysdrus— to  see,  not  the  Turk,  or 
the  Moor,  or  the  Negro,  or  the  Jew,  interesting  though  each 
is  in  his  way,  but,  what  is  still  more  interesting,  the  genuine 
Bedouin  of  the  desert. 


398 


CARTHAGE  AND  THE  CARTHAGINIANS. 


There  you  have,  not  the  "Arabian  Nights,"  but,  what 
is  better  still,  the  book  of  Genesis  itself  before  your  eyes. 
There,  for  instance,  is  the  gaunt  figure  of  the  Arab  against 
the  clear  horizon  as  from  the  hill-top,  wrapped  in  his  white 
blanket,  he  stands  hke  Joseph  or  like  Moses  watching  his 
flocks,  or  as  he  walks  magnificently— for  who  has  a  walk 
that  can  be  named  with  that  of  the  Arab  ?— over  the  plain. 
There  is  the  encampment  of  black  tents,  the  very  same  in 
colour  and  materials,  in  shape  and  in  size,  as  that  which 
heard  the  laugh  of  Sarah,  or  witnessed  the  last  long  sleep  of 
Sisera.     There  is  the  venerable  Sheikh,  the  Abraham  of  his 
tribe,  with  his  long  white  beard,  his  grave  courtesy,  and  his 
boundless  hospitality;   there  his  dark-eyed  princess,  with 
tattered  garments  perhaps  and  bare  feet,  but  richly  decorated 
with  glass  beads  and  amulets,  with  ear-rings  which  hang 
not  through  but  round  the  ear,  and  with  ankle-rings  which 
are  often  of  silver  and  richly  chased ;  such  jewellery,  doubt- 
less, as  struck  the  fancy  of  the  grasping  Laban,  and  helped 
to  wm  the  heart  of  his  sister  to  a  stranger  in  a  far  distant 
country.     There,  again,  is  a  young  Rebekah,  a  damsel  of 
oUve  complexion  but  of  strange  beauty,  going  with  her  pitcher 
to  the  well.     Within  the  tent  are  stone  jars  of  water  of  patri- 
archal make  and  shape,  curtains  and  coveriets  of  camels'  hair, 
churns  for  butter,  kids'  skins  and  sheep  skins,  while  near  its 
entrance  is  the  rude  circular  stone  oven  about  the  size  of  a 
basin,  within  which  the  scanty  fuel  may  be  husbanded  to 
the  utmost,  and  yet  a  cake  may  be  baked  hastily  and  weU  for 
the  tired  wayfarer.     Round  about  the  encampment  roam  the 
Bedouin's  wealth,  the  only  wealth  he  possesses,  his  sheep 
and  his  oxen,  his  goats  and  his  dogs,  his  mules  and  his  asses 
while  here  and  there,  crossing  the  plain,  may  be  seen  those 
ships  of  the  desert,  the  long  line  of  his  camels,  each  one,  per- 
haps, carrying  a  whole  house  and  household  on  his  back, 
each  grunting  and  grumbling  as  he  shambles  along,  every  Une 
in  his  ungainly  figure,  and  every  feature  of  his  countenance 
even  his  gentle  eye,  looking  hke  what  it  really  is,  a  never^ 


CHARACTER  OF  THE  ARAB, 


399 


ceasing,  but,  alas !  a  bootless  protest  against  the  advance  of 
civilisation. 

And,  then,  what  lavish  hospitaUty  you  meet  with  every- 
where, what  courtesy,  what  simplicity  of  heart  and  life !  On 
one  occasion  we  stopped  for  a  few  moments  before  a  Bedouin 
encampment,  and  after  partaking  of  their  simple  fare,  their 
milk  and  their  butter,  from  a  dish  which  was  not  a  lordly 
one,  only  because  they  had  none  such  in  their  possession, 
we  were  about  to  depart,  when  one  of  their  number  was  sent 
otf  to  a  point  half  a  mile  away,  and  returned  bringing  on  his 
shoulders  a  present  which,  it  will  be  believed,  it  was  equally 
difficult  for  us  to  refuse  or  accept — a  live  lamb.  They  would 
not  take  a  refusal,  still  less  would  they  take  any  return  for  it. 

The  Arab  is,  in  a  sense  in  which  it  can  hardly  be  said  of 
any  European  nation,  an  inborn  gentleman.  If  he  is  not  the 
noblest,  he  is  yet,  in  my  opinion,  a  truly  noble  specimen  of 
humanity.  He  is — and  herein  lies  one  of  his  chief  charms 
— as  unchangeable  as  the  deserts  in  which  he  has  his  home. 
What  he  was  in  the  time  of  Abraham  and  Moses,  that  he 
was  in  the  time  of  Christ,  and  that,  in  spite  of  the  vast 
religious  impulse  given  him  by  Mohammed,  which  carried 
him  in  one  sweep  of  unbroken  conquest  over  half  the  world, 
he  is,  in  all  essentials,  down  to  the  present  day.  He  is,  indeed, 
such  a  living  bit  of  antiquity  himself  that  we  are  disposed 
to  make  rather  more  allowance  for  the  thoughtless  way  in 
which,  unconscious  of  his  past  and  careless  of  his  future,  he 
destroys,  and  has  for  centuries  past  destroyed,  the  remains  of 
a  less  venerable  antiquity  than  his  own  which  lie  scattered  so 
thickly  around  him.  But  I  must  forbear  to  enter  further  here 
upon  the  fascinating  subject  of  the  Arab ;  for  though  he  forms 
one  of  the  chief  attractions  of  a  visit  to  Carthage  and  its  neigh- 
bourhood, I  have  treated  of  him  fully  elsewhere,  and  his  his- 
tory and  characteristics  lie  beyond  the  proper  scope  and  object 
of  this  volume. 

It  was  a  revelation,  doul)tless,  to  the  Roman  senators  that 
the  splendid  tigs  which  Cato  showed  them  grew  in  a  country 


\ 


400 


CARTHAGE  AND  THE  CARTHAGINIANS, 


only  three  days*  sail  from  Borne ;  but  I  am  inclined  to  think 
it  was  a  greater  revelation  to  me  that  the  remains  of  the 
great  Imperial  City,  whose  history  had  so  long  occupied  my 
thoughts,  lay  within  six  days'  journey  of  England,  and  that 
they  could  be  enjoyed,  if  not  to  the  full,  at  least,  I  hope,  to 
some  good  effect,  within  the  narrow  limits  of  an  Easter 
Hohday. 


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